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THE    EXPANSION    OF   EUROPE 


BY    THE    SAME    AUTHOR 


NATIONALISM   AND    INTERNATIONALISM :    The 
Culmination  of  Modern  History. 

NATIONAL  SELF-GOVERNMENT:    The   Culmina- 
tion OF  Modern  History. 

PEERS    AND    BUREAUCRATS:    Two    Problems   of 
English  Government. 

BRITAIN'S  CASE  AGAINST  GERMANY. 

THE   MAKING   OF   BRITISH    INDIA. 

A   HISTORY  OF  LIVERPOOL. 

NEW  STUDENTS'  ATLAS  OF  MODERN  HISTORY. 


THE  EXPANSION 
OF  EUROPE 

THE  CULMINATION  OF  MODERN  HISTOEY 


BY 

HAMSAY    MUIH 

PROFESSOB  OF   MODERN  HISTORY  IN   THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  MANCHESTER 

SECOND  EDITION 


BOSTON  AND  NEW  YORK 

HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN  COMPANY 

1917 


cS  \S87 


Printed  in  Great  Britain 


49G7 


O 


ml 


^ 


TO 
MY    MOTHER 


PREFACE       , 

The  purpose  of  this  book  is  twofold. 

We  realise  to-day,  as  never  before,  that  the 
fortunes  of  the  world,  and  of  every  individual  in 
it,  are  deeply  affected  by  the  problems  of  world- 
politics  and  by  the  imperial  expansion  and  the 
imperial  rivalries  of  the  greater  states  of  Western 
civilisation.  But  when  men  who  have  given  no 
special  attention  to  the  history  of  these  questions 
try  to  form  a  sound  judgment  on  them,  they  fmd 
themselves  handicapped  by  the  lack  of  any  brief 
and  clear  resume  of  the  subject.  I  have  tried,  in 
this  book,  to  provide  such  a  summary,  in  the  form 
of  a  broad  survey,  unencumbered  with  detail,  but 
becoming  fuller  as  it  comes  nearer  to  our  own  time. 
That  is  my  first  purpose.  In  fulfilling  it  I  have 
had  to  cover  much  well-trodden  ground.  But  I 
hope  I  have  avoided  the  aridity  of  a  mere  com- 
pendium of  facts. 

My  second  purpose  is  rather  more  ambitious. 
In  the  course  of  my  narrative  I  have  tried  to  deal 
with  ideas  rather  than  with  mere  facts.  I  have 
tried  to  bring  out  the  political  ideas  which  are 
implicit  in,  or  which  result  from,  the  conquest  of 


X  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

the  world  by  Western  civilisation  ;  and  to  show 
how  the  ideas  of  the  West  have  affected  the  outer 
world,  how  far  they  have  been  modified  to  meet 
its  needs,  and  how  they  have  developed  in  the 
process.  In  particular  I  have  endeavoured  to 
direct  attention  to  the  significant  new  political 
form  which  we  have  seen  coming  into  existence, 
and  of  which  the  British  Empire  is  the  oldest 
and  the  most  highly  developed  example — the 
world-state,  embracing  peoples  of  many  different 
types,  with  a  Western  nation-state  as  its  nucleus. 
The  study  of  this  new  form  seems  to  me  to  be  a 
neglected  branch  of  political  science,  and  one  of 
vitah  importance.  Whether  or  not  it  is  to  be  a 
lasting  form,  time  alone  will  show.  Finally  I 
have  tried  to  display,  in  this  long  imperialist 
conflict,  the  strife  of  two  rival  conceptions  of 
empire :  the  old,  sterile,  and  ugly  conception  which 
thinks  of  empire  as  mere  domination,  ruthlessly 
pursued  for  the  sole  advantage  of  the  master,  and 
which  seems  to  me  to  be  most  fully  exemplified 
by  Germany  ;  and  the  nobler  conception  which 
regards  empire  as  a  trusteeship,  and  which  is  to 
be  seen  gradually  emerging  and  struggling  towards 
victory  over  the  more  brutal  view,  more  clearly 
and  in  more  varied  forms  in  the  story  of  the 
British  Empire  than  in  j)erhaps  any  other  part  of 
human  history.  That  is  why  I  have  given  a 
perhaps  disproportionate  attention  to  the  British 
Empire.     The  war  is  determining,  among  other 


PREFACE  xi 

great   issues,   which   of   these   conceptions   is   to 
dominate  the  future. 

In  its  first  form  this  book  was  completed  in  the 
autumn  of  1916  ;  and  it  contained,  as  I  am  bound 
to  confess,  some  rather  acidulated  sentences  in  the 
passages  which  deal  with  the  attitude  of  America 
towards    European    problems.     These    sentences 
were  due  to  the  deep  disappointment  which  most 
Englishmen  and  most  Frenchmen  felt  with  the 
attitude  of  aloofness  which  America  seemed  to 
have  adopted  towards  the  greatest  struggle  for 
freedom  and  justice  ever  waged  in  history.     It 
was  an  indescribable  satisfaction  to  be  forced  by 
events  to  recognise  that  I  was  wrong,  and  that 
these  passages  of   my  book  ought  not  to  have 
been  written  as  I  wrote  them.     There  is  a  sort  of 
solemn  joy  in  feeling  that  America,  France,  and 
Britain,  the  three  nations  which  have  contributed 
more  than  all  the  rest  of  the  world  put  together 
to  the  establishment  of   liberty  and  justice  on 
the  earth,  are  now  comrades  in  arms,  fightuig  a 
supreme  battle  for  these  great  causes.     May  this 
comradeship    never    be    broken.     May    it    bring 
about  such  a  decision  of  the  present  conflict  as 
will  open  a  new  era  in  the  history  of  the  world — 
a  v\Aorld  now  unified,  as  never  before,  by  the  final 
victory  of  Western  civilisation  which  it  is  the 
purpose  of  this  book  to  describe. 

Besides  rewriting  and  expanding  the  passages 
on  America,  I  have  seized  the  opportunity  of  this 


xii  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

new  issue  to  alter  and  enlarge  certain  other  sec- 
tions of  the  book,  notably  the  chapter  on  the  vital 
period  1878-1900,  which  was  too  slightly  dealt 
with  in  the  original  edition.  In  this  work,  which 
has  considerably  increased  the  size  of  the  book, 
I  have  been  much  assisted  by  the  criticisms  and 
suggestions  of  some  of  my  reviewers,  whom  I  wish 
to  thank. 

Perhaps  I  ought  to  add  that  though  this  book 
is  complete  in  itself,  it  is  also  a  sort  of  sequel  to  a 
little  book  entitled  Nationalism  and  International- 
ism, and  was  originally  designed  to  be  printed  along 
with  it :  that  is  the  explanation  of  sundry  footnote 
references.  The  two  volumes  are  to  be  followed 
by  a  third,  on  National  Self-government,  and  it  is 
my  hope  that  the  complete  series  may  form  a 
useful  general  survey  of  the  development  of  the 
main  political  factors  in  modern  history. 

In  its  first  form  the  book  had  the  advantage  of 
bemg  read  by  my  friend  Major  W.  L.  Grant, 
Professor  of  Colonial  History  at  Queen's  University 
Kingston,  Ontario.  The  pressure  of  the  military 
duties  in  which  he  is  engaged  has  made  it 
impossible  for  me  to  ask  his  aid  in  the  revision 
of  the  book. 

R.  M. 

July  1917 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Preface    .......  ix 

I.  The  Meaning  and  the  Motives  of  Imperialism  1 

II.  The  Era  of  Iberian  Monopoly    .  .  .13 

III.  The  Rivalry  of  the   Dutch,  the  French,  and 

THE  English,   1588-1763  ...         24 

(a)  The  Period  of  Settlement,   1588-1660  25 

(b)  The    Period    of    Systematic    Colonial 

Policy,  1660-1713       ...         38 

(c)  The  Conflict  op  French  and  English, 

1713-1763        ....         46 

IV.  The  Era  of  Revolution,   1763-1825        .  .         54 

V.  Europe  and  the  Non-European  World,  1815-1878         78 

VI.  The   Transformation    of    the    British    Empire, 

1815-1878  .  .  .  .  .105 

VII.  The  Era  of  the  World-States,   1878-1900         .       143 


VIII.  The   British   Empire   amid  the  World-Powers 
1878-1914         7""^   . 

IX.  The  Great  Challenge,   1900-1914 

^  X,  What  of  the  Night? 

Index       .  .  ... 


201 
234 
269 
291 


LIST    OF   MAPS 

1     Three  Eakly  Maps:   Fra  Mauro  (1459), 

Behaim  (1492),  ScHONER  (1523)  .     Facing  page  14 

2.  British  Settlements  in  North  America 

TO  1750  .  .  .  .  „         „     42 

3.  Growth  of  British  Power  in  India       .  „        „     72 

4.  Growth  of  the  Russian  Empire 

5.  Growth  of  the  United  States   . 

6.  The  Partition  of  Africa  .  .  „         ,,160 

7.  The    Atlas     Lands     (Algeria,     Tunis, 

Morocco)  .  .  .  .  ,,         „  256 

8.  The  World  Empires  in  1900-1914  .  „         „  268 


j>         jj 


THE  EXPANSION   OF   EUROPE 

I      S^tf/^\^\^0 

f    THE  MEANING  AND  THE  MOTIVES  OF 
IMPERIALISM 

One  of  the  most  remarkable  features  of  the  modern 
age  has  been  the  extension  of  the  influence  of 
European  civiHsation  over  the  whole  world..  This 
process  has  formed  a  very  important  el,emer>t.  \r\  thf^ 
history  of  the  last  four  centuries,  and  it  has  been 
strangely  undervalued  by  most  historiansu  jvjiose 
attention  has  been  too  exclusively  centred  upon 
the  domestic  politics,  diplomacies","  and  wars"oF 
Europe.  It  has  been  brought  about  by  the 
creation  of  a  succession  of  '  Empires '  by  the 
European  nations,  [some  of  which  have  broken  up, 
while  others  survive,  but  all  of  which  have  con- 
tributed their  share  to  the  general  result ;  and  for 
that  reason  the  term  '  Imperiarlism  '  is-oommonly 
employed  to  describe  the  spirit  which  has  led  to 
this  astonishing  and  world-embracing  movement^ 
of  the  modern  age. 

•The  terms  ^Empire  '  and  '  Imperialism  '  are  ill 
some  respects  unfortunate,  because  of  the  sugges- 
tion of  purely  military  dominion  which  they  con- 
vey ;  and  their  habitual  employment  has  led  to 
some  unhappy  results.  It  has  led  men  of  one 
school  of  thought  to  condemn  and  repudiate  the 


2  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

whole  movement,  as  an  immoral  product  of  brute 
force,  regardless  of  the  rights  of  conquered  peoples. 
They  have  refused  to  study  it,  and  have  made 
no  endeavour  to  understand  it ;  not  realising  that 
the  mpvATn  p.nt,  fh^y  were  r^^r*  j^^^^^^^g  was  as  in- 
evitable and 3:S_ Jrresistible  a^the^n^  of 
the  tides — and  as  capable^^L  being_Jnirned  to 
beneficent  ends.  On  the  other  hand,  the  impli- 
cations of  these  terms  have  perhaps  helped  to 
foster  in  men  of  another  type  of  mind  an  un- 
healthy spirit  of  pride  in  mere  domination,  as  if 
that  were  an  end  in  itself,  and  have  led  them  to 
exult  in  the  extension  of  national  power,  without 
closely  enough  considering  the  purposes  for  which 
it  was  to  be  used.  Both  attitudes  are  deplorable, 
and  in  so  far  as  the  words  '  Empire,'  '  Imperial,' 
\  and  '  Imperialism '  tend  to  encourage  them,  they 
are  unfortunate  words.  They  certainly  do  not 
adequately  express  the  full  significance  of  the 
process  whereby  the  civilisation  of  Europe  has 
been  made  into  the  civilisation  of  the  world. 

^Nevertheless  the  words  have  to  be  used,  because 
there  are  no  others  which  at  all  cover  the  facts,  | 
And,  after  all,  they  are  in  some  ways  entirely 
appropriate.  A  great  part  of  the  world's  area  is 
inhabited  by  peoples  who  are  still  in  a  condition 
of  barbarism,  and  seem  to  have  rested  in  that 
condition  for  untold  centuries.  For  such  peoples 
the  only  chance  of  improvement  was  that  they 
should  pass  under  the  dominion  of  more  highly 
developed  peoples ;  and  to  them  a  European 
'  Empire  '  brought,  for  the  first  time,  not  merely 


THE  MOTIVES  OF  IMPERIALISM  3 

law  and  justice,  but  even  the  rudiments  of  the 
only  kind  of  liberty  which  is  worth  having,  the 
liberty  which  rests  upon  law.  Another  vast 
section  of  the  world's  population  consists  of 
peoples  who  have  in  some  respects  reached  a  high 
stage  of  civilisation,  but  who  have  failed  to 
achieve  for  themselves  a  mode  of  organisation 
which  could  give  them  secure  order  and  equal 
laws.  For  such  peoples  also  the  '  Empire '  of 
Western  civilisation,  even  when  it  is  imposed  and 
maintained  by  force,  may  bring  advantages  which 
will  far  outweigh  its  defects.  In  these  cases  the 
word  'Empire'  can  be  used  without  violence  to 
its  original  significance,  and  yet  without  apology ; 
and  these  cases  cover  by  far  the  greater  part  of 
the  world. 

The  words  '  Empire  '  and  '  Imperialism  '  come 
to  us  from  ancient  Rome  ;  and  the  analogy  be- 
tween the  conquering  and  organising  work  of 
Rome  and  the  empire-building  work  of  the  modern 
nation-states  is  a  suggestive  and  stimulating 
analogy.  The  imperialism  of  Rome  extended  the 
modes  of  a  single  civilisation,  and  the  Reign  of 
Law 'which  was  its  essence,  over  all  the  Mediter- 
ranean lands. '  The  imperialism  of  the  nations 
to  which  the  torch  of  Rome  has  been  handed  on, 
has  made  the  Reign  of  Law,  and  the  modes  of  a 
single  civilisation,  the  common  possession  of  the 
whole  world.  Rome  made  the  common  life  of 
Europe  possible.  The  imperial  expansion  of  the 
European  nations  has  alone  made  possible  the 
vision — nay,   the   certainty — of   a   future   world- 


4  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

order.  For  these  reasons  we  may  rightly  and 
without  hesitation  continue  to  employ  these 
terms,  provided  that  we  remember  always  that 
the  justification  of  any  dominion  imposed  by  a 
more  advanced  upon  a  backward  or  disorganised 
people  is  to  be  found,  not  in  the  exteiisioil^of 
mere  brute  power,  but  in  the  enlargement  and 
diffusion,  under  the  shelter  of  power,  of  those 
vital  elements  in  the  Hfe  of  Western  civilisation 
which  have  been  the  secrets  of  its  strength,  and 
the  greatest  of  its  gifts  to  the  world:  the  sove- 
reignty of  a  just  and  rational  system  of  law, 
liberty  of  person,  of  thought,  and  of  speech,  and, 
finally,  where  the  conditions  are  favourable,  the 
practice  of  self-government  and  the  growth  of  that 
sentiment  of  common  interest  which  we  call  the 
national  spirit.  These  are  the  features  of  Western 
civilisation  which  have  justified  its  conquest  of 
the  world  ^;  and  it  must  be  for  its  success  or 
failure  in  attaining  these  ends  that  we  shall 
commend  or  condemn  the  imperial  work  of  each 
of  the  nations  which  have  shared  in  this  vast 
achievement. 

JEaiyuriam.- motives  can  be  perceived  at  work 
in  all  the  imperial  activities  of  the  European 
peoples  during  the  last  four  centuries.  ,  The  first, 
and  perhaps  the  most  potent,  has  been  the 
spirit  of  national  ^ride,  seeking  to  express  itself 
in  the  establishment  of  its  dominion  over  less 
highly    organised    peoples.      In    the    exultation 

^  See  the  first  essay  in  Nationalism  and  Internationalism,  in  which 
an  attempt  is  made  to  work  out  this  idea. 


^^  THE  MOTIVES  OF  IMPERIALISM  5 

which  follows  the  achievement  of  national  unity 
eacL  of  the  nation-states  in  turn,  if  the  circum- 
stances were  at  aU  favourable,  has  been  tempted 
to  impose  its  power  upon  its  neighbours,^  or  even 
to  seek  the  mastery  of  the  world.  From  "these 
attempts  have  sprung  the  greatest  of  the  Euro- 
pean wars.  From  them  also  have  arisen  aU  the 
colonial  empires  of  the  European  states.  It  is  no 
mere  coincidence  that  aU  the  great^cfilomsing. 
powers  hiLve  been-unified-natiAn-stateSjL  aiid  that 
their  imperial  ..activities^  have  Jbieen most  vigorous 
when  the  national  -seniimeiit  was  ^  its  strongest, 
among  them.  Spain,  Portugal,  England,  France, 
Holland,  Russia :  these  are  the  great  imperial 
powers,  and  they  are  also  the  great  nation-states. 
Denmark  and  Sweden  have  played  a  more  modest 
part,  in  extra-European  as  in  European  affairs. 
Germany  and  Italy  only  began  to  conceive  im- 
X^erial  ambitions  after  their  tardy  unification  in 
the  nineteenth  century.  Austria,  which  has  never 
been  a  nation-state,  never  became  a  colonismg 
power.  Nationahsm,  then,  with  its  eagerness  for 
domuiion,  may  be  regarded  as  the  chief  source 
of  impenalism^  and  if  its  effects  are  mihappy 
when  it  tries  to  express  itself  at  the  expense  of 
peoples  in  whom  the  potentiaHty  of  nationhood 
exists,  they  are  not  necessarily  unhappy  in  other 
cases.  When  it  takes  the  form  of  the  settle- 
ment of  unpeopled  lands,  or  the  organisation  and 
development  of  primitive  barbaric  peoples,  or 
the  reinvigoration  and  strengthening  of  old  and 

^  Nationalism  and  Internationalism,  pp.  60,  64,  104. 


6  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

decadent  societies,  it  may  prove  itself  a  beneficent 
force.  But  it  is  beneficent  only  in  so  far  as  it 
leads  to  an  enlargement  of  law  and  liberty. 

The  second  of  the  blended  motives  of  imperial 
^.^  expansion  has  been  the  desire  for  commercial 
V2^'  ^ofits ;  and  this  motive  has  played  so  prominent  a 
par^'^^specially  in  our  own  time,  that  we  are  apt  to 
exaggerate  its  force,  and  to  think  of  it  as  the  sole 
motive.  No  doubt  it  has  always  been  present  ifi 
some  degree  in  all  imperial  adventures.  But  mitil 
the  nineteenth  century  it  probably  formed  the 
predominant  motive  only  in  regard  to  the  acquisi- 
tion of  tropical  lands.  So  long  as  Europe  con- 
tinued to  be  able  to  produce  as  much  as  she  needed 
of  the  food  and  th^_r^"^  mflleaimlR  foj^^Jiidustry 
that  her  soil  and  climate  were  capable  of  yielding, 
the  commercial  motive  for  acquiring  territories  in 
the  temperate  zone,  which  could  produce  only 
commodities  of  the  same  tjrpe,  was  comparatively 
weak ;  and  the  European  settlements  in  these 
areas,  which  we  have  come  to  regard  as  the  most 
important  products  of  the  imperialist  movement, 
must  in  their  origin  and  early  settlement  be 
mainly  attributed  to  other  than  commercial 
motives.  But  Europe  has  always  depended  for 
most  of  her  luxuries  upon  the  tropics :  gold  and 
ivory  and  gems,  spices  and  sugar  and  fine  woven 
stuffs,  from  a  very  early  age  found  their  way 
into  Europe  from  India  and  the  East,  coming 
by  slow  and  devious  caravan  routes  to  the  shores 
of  the  Black  Sea  and  the  Mediterranean.  Until 
the  end  of  the  fifteenth  century  the  European 


THE  MOTIVES  OF  IMPERIALISM  7 

trader  had  no  direct  contact  with  the  sources  of 
these  precious  commodities  ;  the  supply  of  them 
was  scanty  and  the  price  high.  The  desire  to 
gain  a  more  direct  access  to  the  sources^ jtEis 
traffic,  and  to  obtain  control  of  the  supply,  formed 
the  principal  motive  for  the  great  explorations. 
But  these,  in  thefr  tiirnT  disclosed  fresh  tropical 
areas  worth  exploiting,  and  introduced  new 
luxuries,  such  as  tobacco  and  tea,  which  soon 
took  rank  as  necessities.  They  also  brought  a 
colossal  increment  of  wealth  to  the  countries 
which  had  undertaken  them.  Hence  the  acquisi- 
tion of  a  share  in,  or  a  monopoly  of,  these  lucrative 
lines  of  trade  became  a  primary  object  of  ambition 
to  aU  the  great  states.  LLq.  the  nineteenth  century 
Europe  began  to  be  unable  to  supply  her  own 
needs  in  regard  to  the  products  of  the  temperate 
zone,  and  therefore^  to  desire  control  over  other 
areas  of  this  ty^e  *]  but  until  then  it  was  mainly 
in  regard  to  ther^T0;|()ical  or  sub-tropical  areas  that 
the  commercial  motive  formed  the  predominant 
element  in  the  imperial  rivalries  of  the  nation- 
states.  And  even  to-day  it  is  over  these  areas 
that  their  conflicts  are  most  acute.  /  /n 

/A  third  motive  for  imperial  expansion,  which  A 
must  not  be  overlooked,  is  the  zeal  for  propa- 
ganda :  the  eagerness  of  virile  peoples  to  propa- 
gate the  religious-  and  political  ideas  which  they 
have  adopted.  But  this  is  only  another  way  of 
saying  that  nations  are  impelled  upon  the  im- 
perial career  by  the  desire  to  extend  the  influence 
of  their  conception  of  civilisation,  their  Kultur. 


8  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

In  one  form  or  another  this  motive  has  always 
been  present.  At  first  it  took  the  form  of  religi- 
ouszeaL  The  spirit  of  the  Crusaders  was  in- 
herited by  the  Portuguese  and  the  Spaniards, 
whose  whole  history  had  been  one  long  crusade 
against  the  Moors.  When  the  Portuguese  started 
upon  the  exploration  of  the  African  coast,  they 
could  scarcely  have  sustained  to  the  end  that  long 
and  arduous  task  if  they  had  been  allured  by  no 
other  prospect  than  the  distant  hope  of  finding  a 
new  route  to  the  East.  They  were  buoyed  up 
also  by  the  desire  to  strike  a  blow  for  Christianity. 
They  expected  to  find  the  mythical  Christian 
empire  of  Prester  John,  and  to  join  hands  with 
him  in  overthrowing  the  infidel.  When  Columbus 
persuaded  Queen  Isabella  of  Castile  to  supply  the 
means  for  his  madcap  adventure,  it  was  hy  a 
double  inducement  that  he  won  her  assent :  she 
was  to  gain  access  to  the  wealth  of  the  Indies, 
but  she  was  also  to  be  the  means  of  converting  the 
heathen  to  a  knowledge  of  Christianity ;  and  this 
double  motive  continually  recurs  in  the  early 
history  of  the  Spanish  Empire.  France  could 
scarcely,  perhaps,  have  persisted  in  maintaining 
her  far  from  profitable  settlements  on  the  barren 
shores  of  the  St.  Lawrence  if  the  missionary 
motive  had  not  existed  alongside  of  the  motives 
of  national  pride  and  the  desire  for  profits :  her 
great  work  of  exploration  in  the  region  of  the 
Great  Lakes  and  the  Mississippi  Valley  was  due 
quite  as  much  to  the  zeal  of  the  heroic  missionaries 
of  the  Jesuit  and  other  orders  as  to  the  enterprise 


THE  MOTIVES  OF  IMPERIALISM  9 

of  trappers  and  traders.  In  English  colonisation, 
indeed,  the  missionary  motive  was  never,  until  the 
nineteenth  century,  so  strongly  marked.  But  its 
place  was  taken  by  a  parallel  political  motive.  The 
belief  that  they  were  diffusmg  the  free  institutions 
in  which  they  took  so  much  pride  certainly  formed 
an  element  in  the  colonial  activities  of  the  Enghsh. 
It  is  both  foolish  and  unscientific  to  disregard  this 
element  of  propaganda  in  the  imperiahst  move- 
ment, still  more  to  treat  the  assertion  of  it  by  the 
colonising  powers  as  mere  hypocrisy.  The  motives 
of  imperial  expansion,  as  of  other  human  activities, 
are  mixed,  and  the  loftier  elements  in  them  are 
not  often  predominant.  [  But  the  loftier  elements 
are  always  present.  It  is  hypocrisy  to  pretend 
that  they  are  alone  or  even  chiefly  operative. 
But  it  is  cynicism  wholly  to  deny  their  influence. 
And  of  the  two  sins  cynicism  is  the  worse,  be- 
cause by  ovcr-emphasismg  it  strengthens  and 
cultivates  the   lower  among  the  mixed   motives 

by  which  men  are  ruled.  

The  fourth  of  the  governing  motives  of  im- 
perial expansion  is  tjie  n£ed-ofj£Ldiiig.ne3y-liomfis 
forjjie  surphis  population  of  the  colonising  people. ' 
This  was  not  ui  any  country  a  very  powerful 
motive  until  the  nineteenth-century,  for  ove.r- 
population  did  not  exist  in  any  serious  degree  in 
any  of  the  European  states  until  that  age.  Many 
of  the  political  writers  in  seventeenth-century 
England,  indeed,  regarded  the  whole  movement 
of  colonisation  with  alarm,  because  it  seemed  to 
be  drawing  off  men  who  could  not  be  spared.  '  But 


10  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

if  the  population  was  nowhere  excessive,  there 
were  in  all  countries  certain  classes  for  which 
emigration  to^nerLiands-offered-auiesired  oppor- 
^^mnit;^.  There  were  the  men  bitten  with  the  spirit 
of  adventure,  to  whom  the  work  of  the  pioneer 
presented  an  irresistible  attraction.  Such  men 
are  always  numerous  in  virile  communities,  and 
when  in  any  society  their  numbers  begin  to 
diminish,  its  decay  is  at  hand.  The  imperial 
activities  of  the  modern  age  have  more  than  any- 
thing else  kept  the  breed  alive  in  all  European 
countries,  and  above  all  in  Britain.  To  this  type 
belonged  the  conqiiistadores  of  Spain,  the  EUza- 
bethan  seamen,  the  French  explorers  of  North 
America,  the  daring  Dutch  navigators.  Again, 
there  were  the  younger  sons  of  good  family  for 
whom  the  homeland  presented  small  opportunities, 
but  who  found  in  colonial  settlements  the  chance 
of  creating/ estates  ~4^e  those  of  their  fathers  at 
home,  and  carriedr'Dut  with  them  bands  of  fol- 
lowers drawn  from  among  the  sons  of  their 
fathers'  tenantry.  To  this  class  belonged  most  of 
the  planter-settlers  of  Virginia,  the  seigneurs  of 
French  Canada,  the  lords  of  the  great  Portuguese 
feudal  holdings  in  Brazil,  and  the  dominant  class 
in  all  the  Spanish  colonies.  Again,  there  were 
the  '  undesirables '  of  whom  the  home  govern- 
ment wanted  to  be  rid — convicts,  paupers,  politi- 
cal prisoners ;  they  were  drafted  out  in  great 
numbers  to  the  new  lands,  often  as  indentured 
servants,  to  endure  servitude  for  a  period  of  years 
and  then  to  be  merged  in  the  colonial  population. 


THE  MOTIVES  OF  IMPERIALISM  11 

When  the  loss  of  the  Americtan  colonies  deprived  ' 
Britain  of  her  dumping-ground  for  convicts,  she 
had  to  find  a  new  region  in  which  to  dispose  / 
of  them  ;  and  this  led  to  the  first  settlement 
of  Austraha,  six  years  after  the  estabhshment  of 
American  independence.  Finally,  in  the  age  of 
bitter  religious  controversy  there  was  a  constant 
stream  of  reHgious  exiles  seeking  new  homes  in 
Avhich  they  could  freely  follow  their  own  forms  of 
worship.  The  Puritan  settlers  of  New  England 
are  the  outstanding  example  of  this  t3rpe.  But 
they  were  only  one  group  among  many.  Hugue- 
nots from  France,  Moravians  from  Austria,  perse- 
cuted '  Palatines  '  and  Salzburgers  from  Germany, 
poured  forth  in  an  almost  unbroken  stream.  It 
was  natural  that  they  should  take  refuge  in  the 
only  lands  where  full  reUgious  freedom  was  offered 
to  them ;  and  these  were  especially  some  of  the 
British  settlements  in  America,  and  the  Dutch 
colony  at  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope. 

jit  is  often  said  that  the  overflow  of  Europe 
over  the  world  has  been  a  sort  of  renewal  of  the 
folk-wandering  of  primitive  ages/  That  is  a  mis- 
leading view :  Ibhe  movement  has  been  far  more 
dehberate  and  organised,  and  far  less  due  to  the 
pressure  of  external  circumstances,  than  the  early 
movements  of  peoples  in  the  Old  World.;  Not 
until  the  nineteenth  century,  when  the  industrial 
transformation  of  Europe  brought  about  a  really 
acute  pressure  of  population,  can  it  be  said  that 
the  mere  pressure  of  need,  and  the  shortage  of 
sustenance  in  their  older  homes,  has  sent  large 


12  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

bodies  of  settlers  into  the  new  lands.  Until  tliat 
period  the  imperial  movement  has  been  due  to 
voluntary  and  purposive  action  in  a  far  higher 
degree  than  any  of  the  blind  early  wanderings  of 
peoples.  The  will-to-dominion  of  virile  nations 
exulting  in  their  nationhood  ;  the  desire  to  obtain 
a  more  abundant  supply  of  luxuries  than  had 
earlier  been  available,  and  to  make  profits  there- 
from ;  the  zeal  of  peoples  to  impose  their  mode 
of  civihsation  upon  as  large  a  part  of  the  world 
as  possible ;  the  existence  in  the  Western  world 
of  many  elements  of  restlessness  and  dissatisfac- 
tion, adventurers,  portionless  younger  sons,  or 
religious  enthusiasts  :  these  have  been  the  main 
operative  causes  of  this  huge  movement  during 
the  greater  part  of  the  four  centuries  over  which 
it  has  extended.  And  as  it  has  sprung  from  such 
diverse  and  conflicting  causes,  it  has  assumed  an 
infinite  variety  of  forms  ;  and  both  deserves  and 
demands  a  more  respectful  study  as  a  whole  than 
has  generally  been  given  to  it. 


II 

THE  ERA  OF  IBERIAN  MONOPOLY 

fDjiBiNa  the  Middle  Ages  the  contact  of  Europe 
with  the  rest  of  the  world  was  but  slight.  •  It  was 
shut  off  by  the  great  barrier  of  the  Islamic  Empire, 
upon  which  the  Crusades  made  no  permanent 
impression  ;  'and  although  the  goods  of  the  East 
came  by  caravan  to  the  Black  Sea  ports,  to 
Constantinople,  to  the  ports  of  Syria,  and  to 
Egypt,  where  they  were  picked  up  by  the  Itahan 
traders,  these  traders  had  no  direct  knowledge 
of  the  countries  which  were  the  sources  of  their 
wealth.  The  threat  of  the  Empire  of  Genghis 
Khan  in  the  thirteenth  century  aroused  the  in- 
terest of  Europe,  and  the  bold  friars,  Carpini  and 
Rubruquis,  made  their  way  to  the  centres  of  that 
barbaric  sovereign's  power  in  the  remote  East, 
and  brought  back  stories  of  what  they  had  seen ; 
later  the  Poli,  especially  the  great  Marco,  under- 
took stiU  more  daring  and  long-continued  jour- 
neys, which  made  India  and  Cathay  less  unreal 
to  Europeans,  and  stimulated  the  desire  for 
further  knowledge.  The  later  mediaeval  maps  of 
the  world,  like  that  of  Era  Mauro  (1459),^  which 

^  Simplified  reproductiona  of  this  and  the  other  early  maps 
alluded  to  are  printed  in  Phihp's  Students''  Atlas  of  Modern  History, 
which  also  contains  a  long  series  of  maps  illustrating  the  extra- 
European  activities  of  the  European  states.  , 


14  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

incorporate  this  knowledge,  are  less  wildly  imagina- 
tive than  their  predecessors,  and  show  a  vague 
notion  of  the  general  configuration  of  the  main  land- 
masses  in  the  Old  World.  But  beyond  the  frmges  of 
the  Mediterranean  the  world  was  still  in  the  main 
unknown  to,  and  unaffected  by,  European  civihsa- 
tion  down  to  the  middle  of  the  fifteenth  century. 

Then,  suddenly,  came  the  great  era  of  explora- 
tions, which  were  made  possible '  by  the  improve- 
ments in  navigation  worked  out  during  the  fifteenth 
century,  and  which  in  two  generations  incredibly 
transformed  the  aspect  of  the  world.  The  mar- 
vellous character  of  this  revelation  can  perhaps  be 
illustrated  by  the  comparison  of  two  maps,  that  of 
Behaim,  published  in  1492,  and  that  of  Schoner, 
published  in  1523.  Apart  from  its  adoption  of  the 
theory  that  the  earth  was  globular,  not  round  and 
flat,  Behaim' s  map  shows  little  advance  upon 
Fra  Mauro,  except  that  it  gives  a  clearer  idea  of 
the  shape  of  Africa,  due  to  the  earlier  explora- 
tions of  the  Portuguese.  But  Schoner's  map 
shows  that  the  broad  outlmes  of  the  distribution 
of  the  land-masses  of  both  hemispheres  were 
already  in  1523  pretty  clearly  understood.  This 
astonishing  advance  was  due  to  the  daring  and 
enterprise  of  the  Portuguese  explorers,  Diaz,  Da 
Gama,  Cabral,  and  of  the  adventurers  in  the 
service  of  Spain,  Columbus,  Balboa,  Vespucci,  and 
— greatest  of  them  all — Magellan. 

These  astonishing  discoveries  placed  for  a  time 
the  destinies  of  the  outer  world  in  the  hands  of 
Spain    and    Portugal,    and    the    first    period    of 


THREE    EARLY  MAPS 


GEORGE  nilUP  t  SON  L" 


THREE   EARLY  MAPS 


THE  ERA  OF  IBERIAN  MONOPOLY  15 

'feuropean  imperialism  is  the  period  of  Iberian 
monopoly,  extending  to  1588.  A  Papal  award  in 
1493  confirmed  the  division  of  the  non-European 
world  between  the  two  powers^'  by  a  judgment 
which  the  orthodox  were  bound  to  accept,  and 
did  accept  for  two  generations.  All  the  oceans, 
except  the  North  Atlantic,  were  closed  to  the 
navigators  of  other  nations ;  and  these  two 
peoples  were  given,  for  a  century,  the  oppor- 
tunity of  showing  in  what  guise  they  would 
introduce  the  civilisation  of  Europe  to  the  rest  of 
the  globe.  Pioneers  as  they  were  in  the  work  of 
imperial  development,  it  is  not  surprising  that 
they  should  have  made  great  blunders ;  and  in 
the  end  their  foreign  dommions  weakened  rather 
than  strengthened  the  home  countries,  and  con- 
tributed to  drag  them  down  from  the  high  place 
which  they  had  taken  among  the  nations. 

The  Portuguese  power  in  the  East  was  never 
more  than  a  commercial  dominion.  Except  in 
Goa,  on  the  west  coast  of  India,  no  considerable 
number  of  settlers  established  themselves  at  any 
point ;  and  the  Goanese  settlement  is  the  only 
instance  of  the  formation  of  a  mixed  race,  half 
Indian  and  half  European.  Wherever  the  Portu- 
guese power  was  established,  it  proved  itself  hard 
and  intolerant ;  for  the  spirit  of  the  Crusader 
was  ill-adapted  to  the  establishment  of  good 
relations  with  the  non-Christian  peoples.  The 
rivalry  of  Arab  traders  in  the  Indian  Ocean  was 
mercilessly  destroyed, '  and  there  was  as  little 
mercy  for  the  Italian  merchants,  who  found  the 


16  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

stream  of  goods  that  the  Arabs  had  sent  them 
by  way  of  the  Red  Sea  and  the  Persian  GuK 
almost  wholly  intercepted.  No  doubt  any  other 
people,  finding  itself  in  the  position  which  the 
Portuguese  occupied  in  the  early  sixteenth  cen- 
tury, would  have  been  tempted  to  use  their  power 
in  the  same  way  to  establish  a  complete  mono- 
poly ;  but  the  success  with  which  the  Portuguese 
attained  their  aim  was  in  the  end  disastrous  to 
them.  It  was  followed  by,  if  it  did  not  cause,  a 
rapid  deterioration  of  the  ability  with  which  their 
affairs  were  directed ;  and  when  other  European 
traders  began  to  appear  m  the  field,  they  were 
readily  welcomed  by  the  princes  of  India  and 
the  chieftains  of  the  Spice  Islands.  In  the 
West  the  Portuguese  settlement  in  Brazil  was  a 
genuine  colony,  or  branch  of  the  Portuguese 
nation,  because  here  there  existed  no  earHer 
civilised  people  to  be  dominated.  But  both  in 
East  and  West  the  activities  of  the  Portuguese 
were  from  the  first  subjected  to  an  over-rigid 
control  by  the  home  government.  Eager  to  make 
the  most  of  a  great  opportunity  for  the  national 
advantage,  the  rulers  of  Portugal  allowed  no  free- 
dom to  the  enterprise  of  individuals.  The  result 
was  that  in  Portugal  itself,  in  the  East,  and  in 
Brazil,  initiative  was  destroyed,  and  the  brilliant 
energy  which  this  gallant  little  nation  had  dis- 
played evaporated  within  a  century.  It  was 
finally  destroyed  when,  in  1580,  Portugal  and  her 
empire  fell  under  the  dominion  of  Spain,  and 
under  all  the  reactionary  influences  of  the  govern- 


THE  ERA  OF  IBERIAN  MONOPOLY  17 

merit  of  Philip  n.  By  the  time  this  heavy  yoke 
was  shaken  off,  in  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth 
centmy,  the  Portuguese  dominion  had  fallen 
into  decay.  To-day  nothing  of  it  remains  save 
'  spheres  of  influence '  on  the  western  and  eastern 
coasts  of  Africa,  two  or  three  ports  on  the  coast 
of  India,  the  Azores,  and  the  island  of  Magao  off 
the  coast  of  China. 

The  Spanish  dominion  in  Central  and  South 
America  was  of  a  different  character.  When  once 
they  had  reahsed  that  it  was  not  a  new  route  to 
Asia,  but  a  new  world,  that  Columbus  had  dis- 
covered for  them,  the  Spaniards  sought  no  longer 
mainly  for  the  riches  to  be  derived  from  traffic, 
but  for  the  precious  metals,  which  they  unhappily 
discovered  in  slight  quantities  in  Hispaniola,  but 
in  immense  abundance  in  Mexico  and  Peru.  It 
is  impossible  to  exaggerate  the  heroic  valour  and 
daring  of  Cortez,  Pizarro,  Hernando  de  Soto, 
Orellana,  and  the  rest  of  the  conquistadores  who 
carved  out  in  a  single  generation  the  vast  Spanish 
empire  in  Central  and  South  America  ;  but  it  is 
equally  impossible  to  exaggerate  their  cruelty, 
which  was  born  in  part  of  the  fact  that  they  were 
a  handful  among  myriads,  in  part  of  the  fierce 
traditions  of  crusading  warfare  against  the  infidel. 
Yet  without  undervaluing  their  daring,  it  must 
be  recognised  that  they  had  a  comparatively  easy 
task  in  conquering  the  peoples  of  these  tropical 
lands.  In  the  greater  islands  of  the  West  Indies 
they  found  a  gentle  and  yielding  people,  who 
rapidly  died  out  under  the  forced  labour  of  the 


18  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

mines  and  plantations,  and  had  to  be  replaced 
by  negro  slave-labour  imported  from  Africa.  In 
Mexico  and  Peru  they  found  civiUsations  which 
on  the  material  side  were  developed  to  a  com- 
paratively high  point,  and  which  collapsed  sud- 
denly when  their  governments  and  capitals  had 
been  overthrown  ;  while  their  peoples,  habituated 
to  slavery,  readily  submitted  to  a  new  servitude. 
It  must  be  recognised,  to  the  honour  of  the 
government  of  Charles  v.  and  his  successors,  that 
they  honestly  attempted  to  safeguard  the  usages 
and  possessions  of  the  conquered  peoples,  and  to 
protect  them  in  some  degree  against  the  exploita- 
tion of  their  conquerors.  But  it  was  the  pro- 
tection of  a  subject  race  doomed  to  the  condition 
of  Helotage ;  they  were  protected,  as  the  Jews 
were  protected  by  the  kings  of  mediaeval  England, 
because  they  were  a  valuable  asset  of  the  crown. 
The  policy  of  the  Spanish  government  did  not 
avail  to  prevent  an  intermixture  of  the  races, 
because  the  Spaniards  themselves  came  from  a 
sub-tropical  country,  and  the  Mexicans  and 
Peruvians  especially  were  separated  from  them 
by  no  impassable  gulf  such  as  separates  the  negro 
or  the  Austrahan  bushman  from  the  white  man. 
Central  and  Southern  America  thus  came  to  be 
peopled  by  a  hybrid  race,  speakmg  Spanish,  large 
elements  of  which  were  conscious  of  their  own 
inferiority.  This  in  itself  would  perhaps  have 
been  a  barrier  to  progress.  But  the  concentra- 
tion of  attention  upon  the  precious  metals,  and 
the  neglect  of  industry  due  to  this  cause  and  to 


THE  ERA  OF  IBERIAN  MONOPOLY  19 

the  employment  of  slave-labour,  formed  a  further 
obstacle.  And  in  addition  to  all,  the  Spanish 
government,  partly  with  a  view  to  the  execution 
of  its  native  policy,  partly  because  it  regarded  the 
precious  metals  as  the  chief  product  of  these 
lands  and  wished  to  maintam  close  control  over 
them,  and  partly  because  centralised  autocracy 
was  carried  to  its  highest  pitch  in  Spain,  aUowed 
little  freedom  of  action  to  the  local  governments, 
and  almost  none  to  the  settlers.  It  treated  the 
trade  of  these  lands  as  a  monopoly  of  the  home 
country,  to  be  carried  on  under  the  most  rigid 
control.  It  did  Httle  or  nothing  to  develop  the 
natural  resources  of  the  empire,  but  rather  dis- 
couraged them  lest  they  should  compete  with  the 
labours  of  the  mine  ;  and  in  what  concerned  the 
intellectual  welfare  of  its  subjects,  it  limited 
itself,  as  in  Spain,  to  ensuring  that  no  infection 
of  heresy  or  freethought  should  reach  any  part 
of  its  dominions.  All  this  had  a  deadening  effect ; 
and  the  surprising  thmg  is,  not  that  the  Spanish 
Empire  should  have  fallen  into  an  early  decrepi- 
tude, but  that  it  should  have  shown  such  com- 
parative vigour,  tenacity,  and  power  of  expansion 
as  it  actually  exhibited.  Not  until  the  nine- 
teenth century  did  the  vast  natural  resources  of 
these  regions  begin  to  undergo  any  rapid  develop- 
ment ;  that  is  to  say,  not  until  most  of  the 
settlements  had  discarded  the  connection  with 
Spain ;  and  even  then,  the  defects  bred  into  the 
people  by  three  centuries  of  reactionary  and 
unenlightened  government  produced  in  them   an 


20  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

incapacity  to  use  their  newly  won  freedom,  and 
condemned  these  lands  to  a  long  period  of  anarchy. 
It  would  be  too  strong  to  say  that  it  would  have 
been  better  had  the  Spaniards  never  come  to 
America  ;  for,  when  all  is  said,  they  have  done 
more  than  any  other  people,  save  the  British,  to 
plant  European  modes  of  life  in  the  non-European 
world..  But  it  is  undeniable  that  their  dominion 
afforded  a  far  from  happy  illustration  of  the 
working  of  Western  civilisation  in  a  new  field,  and 
exercised  a  very  unfortunate  reaction  upon  the 
life  of  the  mother-country. 

The  conquest  of  Portugal  and  her  empire  by 
PhiHp  n.,  in  1580,  turned  Spain  into  a  Colossus 
bestriding  the  world,  and  it  was  inevitable  that 
this  world-dominion  should  be  challenged  by 
the  other  European  states  which  faced  upon  the 
Atlantic.  The  challenge  was  taken  up  by  three 
nations,  the  English,  the  French,  and  the  Dutch, 
all  the  more  readily  because  the  very  existence 
of  all  three  and  the  religion  of  two  of  them 
were  threatened  by  the  apparently  overwhelming 
strength  of  Spain  in  Europe.  As  in  so  many 
later  instances,  the  European  conflict  was  inevit- 
ably extended  to  the  non-European  world.  From 
the  middle  of  the  sixteenth  century  onwards  these 
three  peoples  attempted,  with  increasing  daring, 
to  circumvent  or  to  undermine  the  Spanish  power, 
and  to  invade  the  sources  of  the  wealth  which 
made  it  dangerous  to  them ;  but  the  attempt, 
so  far  as  it  was  made  on  the  seas  and  beyond 
them,  was  in  the  main,  and  for  a  long  time,  due 


THE  ERA  OF  IBERIAN  MONOPOLY  21 

to  the  spontaneous  energies  of  volunteers,   not 
to    the    action    of    governments.      Francis   i.    of 
France  sent  out  the  Venetian  Verazzano  to  ex- 
plore the  American  shores  of  the  North  Atlantic, 
as  Henry  vn.   of  England  had  earher  sent  the 
Genoese    Cabots.  !  But    nothing    came    of    these 
ofi&cial  enterprises.     More  effective  were  the  pirate 
adventurers  who  preyed  upon  the  commerce  be- 
tween Spain  and  her  possessions  in  the  Nether- 
lands   as    it   passed   through   the    Narrow   Seas, 
running   the   gauntlet   of   English,    French,    and 
Dutch.     More  effective  still  were  the  attempts  to 
find  new  routes  to  the  East,(  not  barred  by  the 
Spanish  dominions,  by  a  north-east  or  a  north- 
west passage ;    for  some  of  the  earlier  of  these 
adventures    led    to    fruitful    unintended    conse- 
quences,   as   when    the    Englishman    Chancellor, 
seeking  for  a  north-east  passage,  found  the  route 
to  Archangel  and  opened  up  a  trade  with  Russia, 
or  as  when  the  Frenchman  Cartier,  seeking  for 
a  north-west  passage,  hit  upon  the  great  estuary 
of  the  St.   Lawrence,  and   marked  out  a  claim 
for  France  to  the  possession  of  the  area  which  it 
drained.     Most  effective  of  all  were  the  smuggling 
and  piratical  raids  into  the  reserved  waters  of 
West  Africa  and  the  West  Indies,  and  later  into 
the  innermost  penetralia   of  the  Pacific  Ocean, 
which  were  undertaken  with   rapidly  increasing 
boldness  by  the  navigators  of  all  three  nations, 
but    above    all  by   the   EngHsh.      Brake   is  the 
supreme  exponent   of   these   methods  -I    and   his 
career  illustrates  in  the  clearest  fashion  the  steady 


22  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

diminution  of  Spanish  prestige  under  these  at- 
tacks, and  the  growing  boldness  and  maritime 
skill  of  its  attackers. 

From  the  time  of  Drake's  voyage  round  the 
world  (1577)  and  its  insulting  defiance  of  the 
Spanish  power  on  the  west  coast  of  South  America, 
it  became  plain  that  the  maintenance  of  Spanish 
monopoly  could  not  last  much  longer.  It  came 
to  its  end,  fuially  and  unmistakably,  in  the  defeat 
of  the  Grand  Armada.  That  supreme  victory 
threw  the  ocean  roads  of  trade  open,  not  to  the 
English  only,  but  to  the  sailors  of  all  nations.  In 
its  first  great  triumph  the  English  navy  had 
established  the  Freedom  of  the  Seas,  of  which  it 
has  ever  since  been  the  chief  defender.  Since 
1588  no  power  has  dreamt  of  claiming  the  ex- 
clusive right  of  traversing  any  of  the  open  seas 
of  the  world,  as  until  that  date  Spain  and  Portugal 
had  claimed  the  exclusive  right  of  using  the  South 
Atlantic,  the  Pacific,  and  the  Indian  Oceans. 

So  ends  the  first  period  in  the  imperial  ex- 
pansion of  the  Western  peoples,  the  period  of 
Spanish  and  Portuguese  monopoly.  Meanwhile, 
unnoticed  in  the  West,  a  remarkable  eastward 
expansion  was  being  effected  by  the  Russian 
people.  By  insensible  stages  they  had  passed  the 
unreal  barrier  between  Europe  and  Asia,  and 
spread  themselves  thmly  over  the  vast  spaces  of 
Siberia,  subduing  and  assimilating  the  few  and 
scattered  tribes  whom  they  met ;  by  the  end  of 
the  seventeenth  century  they  had  already  reached 
the  Pacific   Ocean.     It  was  a  conquest  marked 


THE  ERA  OF  IBERIAN  MONOPOLY  23 

by  no  great  struggles  or  victories,  an  insensible 
permeation  of  half  a  continent.  This  process  was 
made  the  easier  for  the  Russians,  because  in  their 
own  stock  were  blended  elements  of  the  Mongol 
race  which  they  found  scattered  over  Siberia : 
they  were  only  reversing  the  process  which 
Genghis  Khan  had  so  easily  accomplished  in  the 
thirteenth  century.  And  as  the  Russians  had 
scarcely  yet  begun  to  be  affected  by  Western 
civilisation,  there  was  no  great  cleavage  or  con- 
trast between  them  and  their  new  subjects,  and 
the  process  of  assimilation  took  place  easily.  But 
the  settlement  of  Siberia  was  very  gradual.  At 
the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century  the  total 
population  of  this  vast  area  amounted  to  not 
more  than  300,000  souls,  and  it  was  not  until 
the  nineteenth  century  that  there  was  any  rapid 
increase. 


Ill 

THE  RIVALRY  OF  THE  DUTCH,  THE  FRENCH 
AND  THE  ENGLISH,  1588-1763 

The  second  period  of  European  imperialism  was 
filled  with  the  rivalries  of  the  three  nations  which 
had  in  different  degrees  contributed  to  the  break- 
down of  the  Spanish  monopoly,  the  Dutch,  the 
French,  and  the  English;  and  we  have  next  to 
inquire  how  far,  and  why,  these  peoples  were 
more  successful  than  the  Spaniards  in  planting 
in  the  non-European  world  the  essentials  of  Euro- 
pean civilisation.  The  long  era  of  their  rivalry 
extended  from  1588  to  1763,  and  it  can  be  most 
conveniently  divided  into  three  sections.  The 
first  of  these  extended  from  1588  to  about  1660, 
and  may  be  called  the  period  of  experiment  and 
settlement ;  during  its  course  the  leadership  fell 
to  the  Dutch.  The  second  extended  from  1660  to 
1713,  and  may  be  called  the  period  of  systematic 
colonial  policy,  and  of  growmg  rivalry  between 
France  and  England.  The  third,  from  1713  to 
1763,  was  dominated  by  the  intense  rivalry  of  these 
two  countries,  decadent  Spain  joining  in  the  con- 
flict on  the  side  of  France,  while  the  declming 
power  of  the  Dutch  was  on  the  whole  ranged  on 
the  side  of  Britain  ;  and  it  ended  with  the  com- 
plete ascendancy  of  Britain,  supreme  at  once  in 
the  West  and  in  the  East. 


RIVALRY  OF  DUTCH,  FRENCH,  ENGLISH    25 

(a)  The  Period  of  Settlement,  1588-1660 

The  special  interest  of  the  first  half  of  the 
seventeenth  century  is  that  in  the  trading  and 
colonial  experiments  of  this  period  the  character 
of  the  work  which  was  to  be  done  by  the  three 
new  candidates  for  extra-European  empire  was 
already  very  clearly  and  instructively  displayed. 
They  met  as  rivals  in  every  field  :  in  the  archi- 
pelago of  the  West  Indies,  and  the  closely  con- 
nected slaving  estabHshments  of  West  Africa,  in 
the  almost  empty  lands  of  North  America,  and 
in  the  trading  enterprises  of  the  far  East ;  and 
everywhere  a  difference  of  spirit  and  method 
appeared. 

The  Dutch,  who  made  a  far  more  systematic 
and  more  immediately  profitable  use  of  the  oppor- 
tunity than  either  of  their  rivals,  regarded  the 
whole  enterprise  as  a  great  national  commercial 
venture.  It  was  conducted  by  two  powerful 
trading  corporations,  the  Company  of  the  East 
Indies  and  the  Company  of  the  West  Indies  ;  but 
though  directed  by  the  merchants  of  Amsterdam, 
these  were  genumely  national  enterprises ;  their 
shareholders  were  drawn  from  every  province 
and  every  class  ;  and  they  were  backed  by  all 
the  influence  which  the  States-General  of  the 
United  Provinces — controlled  during  this  period 
mainly  by  the  commercial  interest — was  able  to 
wield. 

The  Company  of  the  East  Indies  was  the  richer 
and  the  more  powerful  of  the  two,  because  the 


26  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

trade  of  the  Far  East  was  beyond  comparison  the 
most  lucrative  in  the  world.  Aiming  straight  at 
the  source  of  the  greatest  profits — the  trade  in 
spices — the  Dutch  strove  to  establish  a  monopoly 
control  over  the  Spice  Islands  and,  in  general, 
over  the  Malay  Archipelago  ;  and  they  were  so 
successful  that  their  influence  remains  to-day  pre- 
dominant in  this  region.  Their  first  task  was  to 
overthrow  the  ascendancy  of  the  Portuguese,  and 
in  this  they  were  willing  to  co-operate  with  the 
English  traders.  But  the  bulk  of  the  work  was 
done  by  the  Dutch,  for  the  English  East  India 
Company  was  poor  in  comparison  with  the  Dutch, 
was  far  less  efficiently  organised,  and,  in  especial, 
could  not  count  upon  the  steady  support  of  the 
national  government.  It  was  mainly  the  Dutch 
who  built  forts  and  organised  factories,  because 
they  alone  had  sufficient  capital  to  maintain 
heavy  standing  charges.  Not  unnaturally  they 
did  not  see  why  the  English  should  reap  any  part 
of  the  advantage  of  their  work,  and  set  them- 
selves to  establish  a  monopoly.  In  the  end  the 
English  were  driven  out  with  violence.  After  the 
Massacre  of  Amboyna  (1623)  their  traders  dis- 
appeared from  these  seas,  and  the  Dutch  supre- 
macy remained  unchallenged  until  the  nineteenth 
century. 

It  was  a  quite  intolerant  commercial  monopoly 
which  they  had  instituted,  but  from  the  com- 
mercial point  of  view  it  was  administered  with 
great  intelligence.  Commercial  control  brought 
in  its  train  territorial  sovereignty,  over  Java  and 


RIVALRY  OF  DUTCH,  FRENCH,  ENGLISH    27 

many  of  the  neighbouring  islands ;  and  this 
sovereignty  was  exercised  by  the  directors  of 
the  company  primarily  with  a  view  to  trade 
interests.  It  was  a  trade  despotism,  but  a 
trade  despotism  wisely  administered,  which  gave 
justice  and  order  to  its  native  subjects.  On  the 
mainland  of  India  the  Dutch  never  attained  a 
comparable  degree  of  power,  because  the  native 
states  were  strong  enough  to  hold  them  in  check. 
But  in  this  period  their  factories  were  more 
numerous  and  more  prosperous  than  those  of  the 
English,  their  chief  rivals ;  and  over  the  island 
of  Ceylon  they  established  an  ascendancy  almost 
as  complete  as  that  which  they  had  created  in  the 
archipelago. 

They  were  intelligent  enough  also  to  see  the 
importance  of  good  calhng-stations  on  the  route 
to  the  East.     For  this  purpose  they  planted  a 
settlement  in  Mauritius,  and  another  at  the  Cape 
of  Good  Hope.     But  these  settlements  were  never 
regarded    as    colonies.     They   were    stations   be- 
longing to  a  trading  company ;    they  remained 
under  its  complete  control,  and  were  allowed  no 
freedom  of  development,  still  less  any  semblance 
of  self-government.     If  Cape  Colony  grew  into  a 
genuine  colony,  or  offshoot  of  the  mother-country, 
it  was  in  spite  of  the  company,  not  by  reason  of 
its   encouragement,    and   from   first   to   last   the 
company's  relations  with  the  settlers  were  of  the 
most  unhappy  kind.     For  the  company  would  do 
nothing  at  the  Cape  that  was  not  necessary  for 
the  Eastern  trade,  which  was  its  supreme  interest, 


28  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

and  the  colonists  naturally  did  not  take  the 
same  view.  It  was  this  concentration  upon 
purely  commercial  aims  which  also  prevented  the 
Dutch  from  making  any  use  of  the  superb  field 
for  European  settlement  opened  up  by  the  enter- 
prise of  their  explorers  in  Austraha  and  New 
Zealand.  These  fair  lands  were  left  unpeopled, 
largely  because  they  promised  no  immediate  trade 
profits. 

In  the  West  the  enterprises  of  the  Dutch  were 
only  less  vigorous  than  in  the  East,  and  they  were 
marked  by  the  same  feature  of  an  intense  con- 
centration upon  the  purely  commercial  aspect. 
While  the  English  and  (still  more)  the  French 
adventurers  made  use  of  the  lesser  West  Indian 
islands,  unoccupied  by  Spain,  as  bases  for  piratical 
attacks  upon  the  Spanish  trade,  the  Dutch,  with 
a  shrewd  instinct,  early  deserted  this  purely 
destructive  game  for  the  more  lucrative  business 
of  carrying  on  a  smuggling  trade  with  the  Spanish 
mainland  ;  and  the  islands  which  they  acquired 
(such  as  Curagoa)  were,  unlike  the  French  and 
English  islands,  especially  well  placed  for  this 
purpose.  They  established  a  sugar  colony  in 
Guiana.  But  their  main  venture  in  this  region 
was  the  conquest  of  a  large  part  of  Northern 
Brazil  from  the  Portuguese  (1624)  ;  and  here 
their  exploitation  was  so  merciless,  under  the 
direction  of  the  Company  of  the  West  Indies, 
that  the  inhabitants,  though  they  had  been  dis- 
satisfied with  the  Portuguese  government,  and 
had  at  first  welcomed  the  Dutch  conquerors,  soon 


RIVALRY  OF  DUTCH,  FRENCH,  ENGLISH    29 

revolted  against  them,   and  after  twenty  years 
drove  them  out. 

On  the  mainland  of  North  America  the  Dutch 
planted  a  single  colony — the  New  Netherlands, 
with  its  capital  at  New  Amsterdam,  later  New 
York.  Their  commercial  instinct  had  once  more 
guided  them  wisely.  They  had  found  the  natural 
centre  for  the  trade  of  North  America  ;  for  by 
way  of  the  river  Hudson  and  its  affluent,  the 
Mohawk,  New  York  commands  the  only  clear 
path  through  the  mountain  belt  which  everywhere 
shuts  off  the  Atlantic  coast  region  from  the  central 
plain  of  America.  Founded  and  controlled  by  the 
Company  of  the  West  Indies,  this  settlement  was 
intended  to  be,  not  primarily  the  home  of  a 
branch  of  the  Dutch  nation  beyond  the  seas,  but 
a  trading-station  for  collecting  the  furs  and  other 
products  of  the  inland  regions.  At  Orange 
(Albany),  which  stands  at  the  junction  of  the 
Mohawk  and  the  Hudson,  the  Dutch  traders 
collected  the  furs  brought  in  by  Indian  trappers 
from  west  and  north  ;  New  Amsterdam  was  the 
port  of  export ;  and  if  settlers  were  encouraged, 
it  was  only  that  they  might  supply  the  men  and 
the  means  and  the  food  for  carrying  on  this  traffic. 
The  Company  of  the  West  Indies  administered 
the  colony  purely  from  this  point  of  view.  No 
powers  of  self-government  were  allowed  to  the 
settlers ;  and,  as  in  Cape  Colony,  the  relations 
between  the  colonists  and  the  governing  company 
were  never  satisfactory,  because  the  colonists  felt 
that  their  interests  were  wholly  subordinated. 


30  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

The  distinguishing  feature  of  French  imperial 
activity  during  this  period  was  its  dependence 
upon   the    support   and   direction   of   the   home 
government,  which  was  the  natural  result  of  the 
highly  centralised   regime   estabhshed  m  France 
during  the  modern  era.     Only  in  one  direction 
was  French  activity  successfully  maintained  by 
private  enterprise,  and  this  was  in  the  not  very 
reputable  field  of  West  Indian  buccaneering,  in 
which  the  French  were  even  more  active  than 
their  principal  rivals  and  comrades,  the  English. 
The    word    '  buccaneer '    itself    comes    from    the 
French  :    houcan  means  the  wood-fire   at  which 
the  pirates  dried  and  smoked  their  meat,   and 
these    fires,    blazing    on    deserted   islands,    must 
often   have   warned   merchant   vessels   to    avoid 
an  ever-present  danger.     The  island  of  Tortuga, 
which  commands  the  passage  between  Cuba  and 
Hispaniola  through  which  the  bulk  of  the  Spanish 
traffic  passed  on  its  way  from  Mexico  to  Europe, 
was    the    most    important    of    the    buccaneering 
bases,  and  although  it  was  at  first  used  by  the 
buccaneers  of  all  nations,  it  soon  became  a  purely 
French   possession,    as   did,   later,  the   adjoining 
portion  of  the  island  of  Hispaniola  (San  Domingo). 
The  French  did,  indeed,  like  the  English,  plant 
sugar  colonies  in  some  of  the  lesser  Antilles  ;    but 
during  the  first  half  of  the  seventeenth  century 
they  attained  no  great  prosperity. 

For  the  greater  enterprises  of  trade  in  the  East 
and  colonisation  in  the  West,  the  French  relied 
almost  wholly  upon  government  assistance,  and 


RIVALRY  OF  DUTCH,  FRENCH,  ENGLISH     31 

although  both  Heiiry  I  v.  in  the  first  years  of  the 
century,  and  RicheUeu  in  its  second  quarter,  were 
anxious  to  give  what  help  they  could,  internal 
dissensions  were  of  such  frequent  occurrence  in 
France  during  this  period  that  no  systematic  or 
continuous  governmental  aid  was  available.  Hence 
the  French  enterprises  both  in  the  East  and  in 
the  West  were  on  a  small  scale,  and  achieved  little 
success.  The  French  East  India  Company  was 
all  but  extinct  when  Colbert  took  it  in  hand  in 
1664 ;  it  was  never  able  to  compete  with  its 
Dutch  or  even  its  English  rival. 

But  the  period  saw  the  establishment  of  two 
French  colonies  in  North  America  :  Acadia  (Nova 
Scotia)  on  the  coast,  and  Canada,  with  Quebec  as 
its  centre,  in  the  St.  Lawrence  valley,  separated 
from  one  another  on  land  by  an  almost  impass- 
able barrier  of  forest  and  m.ountain.  These  two 
colonies  were  founded,  the  first  in  1605  and 
the  second  in  1608,  almost  at  the  same  moment 
as  the  first  English  settlement  on  the  American 
continent.  They  had  a  hard  struggle  during  the 
first  fifty  years  of  their  existence ;  for  the  number 
of  settlers  was  very  small,  the  soil  was  barren, 
the  climate  severe,  and  the  Red  Indians,  especi- 
ally the  ferocious  Iroquois  towards  the  south, 
were  far  more  formidable  enemies  than  those  who 
bordered  on  the  Enghsh  colonies. 

There  is  no  part  of  the  history  of  European 
colonisation  more  full  of  romance  and  of  hero- 
ism than  the  early  history  of  French  Canada ; 
an   incomparable   atmosphere   of    gallantry   and 


32  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

devotion  seems  to  overhang  it.  From  the  first, 
despite  their  small  numbers  and  their  difficulties, 
these  settlers  showed  a  daring  in  exploration  which 
was  only  equalled  by  the  Spaniards,  and  to  which 
there  is  no  parallel  in  the  records  of  the  Enghsh 
colonies.  At  the  very  outset  the  great  explorer 
Champlain  mapped  out  the  greater  part  of  the 
Great  Lakes,  and  thus  reached  farther  into  the 
continent  than  any  Englishman  before  the  end  of 
the  eighteenth  century ;  and  although  this  is  partly 
explained  by  the  fact  that  the  St.  Lawrence  and  the 
lakes  afforded  an  easy  approach  to  the  interior, 
while  farther  south  the  forest-clad  ranges  of  the 
AUeghanies  constituted  a  very  serious  barrier, 
this  does  not  diminish  the  French  pre-eminence  in 
exploration.  Nor  can  anything  in  the  history  of 
European  colonisation  surpass  the  heroism  of  the 
French  missionaries  among  the  Indians,  who  faced 
and  endured  incredible  tortures  in  order  to  bring 
Christianity  to  the  barbarians.  No  serious  mis- 
sionary enterprise  was  ever  undertaken  by  the 
English  colonists  ;  this  difference  was  in  part  due 
to  the  fact  that  the  missionary  aim  was  definitely 
encouraged  by  the  home  government  in  France. 
From  the  outset,  then,  poverty,  paucity  of 
numbers,  gallantry,  and  missionary  zeal  formed 
marked  features  of  the  French  North  American 
colonies. 

In  other  respects  they  very  clearly  reproduced 
some  of  the  features  of  the  motherland.  Their 
organisation  was  strictly  feudal  in  character. 
The  real  unit  of  settlement  and  government  was 


RIVALRY  OF  DUTCH,  FRENCH,  ENGLISH    33 

the  seigneurie,  an  estate  owned  by  a  Frenchman 
of  birth,  and  cultivated  by  his  vassals,  who  found 
refuge  from  an  Indian  raid,  or  other  danger,  in 
the  stockaded  house  which  took  the  place  of  a 
chateau,  much  as  their  remote  ancestors  had  taken 
refuge  from  the  raids  of  the  Northmen  in  the 
castles  of  their  seigneur's  ancestors.  And  over 
this  feudal  society  was  set,  as  in  France,  a  highly 
centralised  government  wielding  despotic  power, 
and  in  its  turn  absolutely  subject  to  the  mandate 
of  the  Crown  at  home.  This  despotic  government 
had  the  right  to  require  the  services  of  all  its 
subjects  in  case  of  need  ;  and  it  was  only  the 
centralised  government  of  the  colony,  and  the 
warlike  and  adventurous  character  of  its  small 
feudalised  society,  which  enabled  it  to  hold  its 
own  for  so  long  against  the  superior  numbers 
but  laxer  organisation  of  its  English  neighbours. 
A  despotic  central  power,  a  feudal  organisation, 
and  an  entire  dependence  upon  the  will  of  the 
Eang  of  France  and  upon  his  support,  form, 
therefore,  the  second  group  of  characteristics 
which  marked  the  French  colonies.  They  were 
colonies  in  the  strictest  sense,  all  the  more  because 
they  reproduced  the  main  features  of  the  home 
system. 

Nothing  could  have  differed  more  profoundly 
from  this  system  than  the  methods  which  the 
English  were  contemporaneously  applying,  with- 
out plan  or  clearly  defined  aim,  and  guided  only 
by  immediate  practical  needs,  a,nd  by  the  rooted 
traditions  of  a  self-governing  people.     Their  enter- 

c 


34  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

prises  received  from  the  home  government  Kttle 
direct  assistance,  but  they  throve  better  without 
it;   and  if  there  was  httle  assistance,  there  was 
also  httle  interference.     In  the  East  the  English 
East  India  Company  had  to  yield  to  the  Dutch 
the  monopoly  of  the  Malayan  trade,  and  bitterly 
complained  of  the  lack  of  government  support ; 
but  it  succeeded  in  establishing  several  modest 
factories  on  the  coast  of  India,  and  was  on  the 
whole  prosperous.     But  it  was  in  the  West  that 
the  distinctive  work  of  the  English  was  achieved 
during   this   period,   by   the   establishment   of   a 
series    of    colonies    unlike    any    other    European 
settlements  which  had  yet  been  instituted.     Their 
distinctive  feature  was  self-government,  to  which 
they  owed   their   steadily  increasing   prosperity. 
No  other  European  colonies  were  thus  managed 
on    the    principle    of    autonomy.     Indeed,    these 
English  settlements  were  in  1650  the  only  self- 
governing  lands  in  the  world,  apart  from  England 
herself,  the  United  Provinces,  and  Switzerland. 

The  first  English  colony,  Virginia,  was  planted 
in  1608  by  a  trading  company  organised  for  the 
purpose,  whose  subscribers  included  nearly  aU 
the  London  City  Companies,  and  about  seven 
hundred  private  individuals  of  all  ranks.  Their 
motives  were  partly  political  ('  to  put  a  bit  in  the 
ancient  enemy's  (Spain's)  mouth '),  and  partly 
commercial,  for  they  hoped  to  fmd  gold,  and  to 
render  England  independent  of  the  marine  sup- 
plies which  came  from  the  Baltic.  But  profit 
was  not  their  sole  aim  ;   they  were  moved  also  by 


RIVALRY  OF  DUTCH,  FRENCH,  ENGLISH     35 

the  desire  to  plant  a  new  England  beyond  the 
seas.  They  made,  in  fact,  no  profits;  but  they 
did  create  a  branch  of  the  English  stock,  and 
the  young  squires'  and  yeomen's  sons  who  formed 
the  backbone  of  the  colony  showed  themselves 
to  be  Englishmen  by  their  unwillingness  to  sub- 
mit to  an  uncontrolled  direction  of  their  affairs. 
In  1619,  acting  on  instructions  received  from 
England,  the  company's  governor  summoned  an 
assembly  of  representatives,  one  from  each  town- 
ship, to  consult  on  the  needs  of  the  colony.  This 
was  the  first  representative  body  that  had  ever  ex- 
isted outside  Europe,  and  it  indicated  what  was  to 
be  the  character  of  English  colonisation.  Hence- 
forth the  normal  English  method  of  governing  a 
colony  was  through  a  governor  and  an  executive 
council  appointed  by  the  Crown  or  its  delegate, 
and  a  representative  assembly,  which  wielded 
full  control  over  local  legislation  and  taxation. 
'  Our  present  happiness,'  said  the  Virginian 
Assembly  in  1640,  '  is  exemplified  by  the  freedom 
of  annual  assemblies  and  by  legal  trials  by  juries 
in  all  civil  and  criminal  causes.' 

The  second  group  of  English  colonies,  those  of 
New  England,  far  to  the  north  of  Virginia,  repro- 
duced in  an  intensified  form  this  note  of  self- 
government.  Founded  in  the  years  following 
1620,  these  settlements  were  the  outcome  of 
Puritan  discontents  in  England.  The  commercial 
motive  was  altogether  subsidiary  in  their  estab- 
lishment ;  they  existed  in  order  that  the  doctrine 
and  discipline  of  Puritanism  might  find  a  home 


36  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

where  its  ascendancy  would  be  secure.  It  was 
indeed  under  the  guise  of  a  commercial  company 
that  the  chief  of  these  settlements  was  made,  but 
the  company  was  organised  as  a  means  of  safe- 
guarding the  colonists  from  Crown  interference, 
and  at  an  early  date  its  headquarters  were  trans- 
ferred to  New  England  itself.  Far  from  desiring 
to  restrict  this  freedom,  the  Crown  up  to  a  point 
encouraged  it.  Winthrop,  one  of  the  leadmg 
colonists,  tells  us  that  he  had  learnt  from  members 
of  the  Privy  Council  '  that  his  Majesty  did  not 
intend  to  impose  the  ceremonies  of  the  Church  of 
England  upon  us  ;  for  that  it  was  considered  that 
it  was  the  freedom  from  such  things  that  made 
people  come  over  to  us.'  The  contrast  between 
this  licence  and  the  rigid  orthodoxy  enforced 
upon  French  Canada  or  Spanish  America  is  very 
instructive.  It  meant  that  the  New  World,  so 
far  as  it  was  controlled  by  England,  was  to  be 
open  as  a  place  of  refuge  for  those  who  dishked 
the  restrictions  thought  necessary  at  home.  The 
same  note  is  to  be  found  in  the  colony  of  Mary- 
land, planted  by  the  Roman  Catholic  Lord  Balti- 
more in  1632,  largely  as  a  place  of  refuge  for  his 
co-religionists.  He  was  encouraged  by  the  govern- 
ment of  Charles  i.  in  this  idea,  and  the  second 
Lord  Baltimore  reports  that  his  father  '  had 
absolute  liberty  to  carry  over  any  from  his 
Majesty's  Dominions  wiUing  to  go.  But  he  found 
very  few  but  such  as  .  .  .  could  not  conform  to 
the  laws  of  England  relating  to  religion.  These 
declared    themselves    wiUuig    to    plant    in    this 


RIVALRY  OF  DUTCH,  FRENCH,  ENGLISH    37 

province,  if  they  might  have  a  general  toleration 
settled  by  law.'  Maryland,  therefore,  became  the 
first  place  in  the  world  of  Western  civilisation  in 
which  full  religious  toleration  was  allowed  ;  for 
the  aim  of  the  New  Englanders  was  not  religious 
freedom,  but  a  free  field  for  the  rigid  enforcement 
of  their  own  shade  of  orthodoxy. 

Thus,  in  these  first  English  settlements,  the 
deliberate  encouragement  of  varieties  of  type  was 
from  the  outset  a  distinguishing  note,  and  the 
home  authorities  neither  desired  nor  attempted 
to  impose  a  strict  uniformity  with  the  rules  and 
methods  existing  in  England.  There  was  as  great 
a  variety  in  social  and  economic  organisation  as 
in  religious  beliefs  between  the  aristocratic  planter 
colonies  of  the  south  and  the  democratic  agricul- 
tural settlements  of  New  England.  In  one  thing 
only  was  there  uniformity :  every  settlement 
possessed  self-governing  institutions,  and  prized 
them  beyond  all  other  privileges.  None,  indeed, 
carried  self-government  to  so  great  an  extent  as 
the  New  Englanders.  They  came  out  organised 
as  religious  congregations,  in  which  every  member 
possessed  equal  rights,  and  they  took  the  con- 
gregational system  as  the  basis  of  their  local 
government,  and  church  membership  as  the  test 
of  citizenship  ;  nor  did  any  other  colonies  attain 
the  right,  long  exercised  by  the  New  Englanders, 
of  electing  their  own  governors.  But  there  was 
no  English  settlement,  not  even  the  little  slave- 
worked  plantations  in  the  West  Indian  islands, 
like  Barbados,  which  did  not  set  up,  as  a  matter 


38  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

of  course,  a  representative  body  to  deal  with 
problems  of  legislation  and  taxation,  and  the 
home  government  never  dreamt  of  interfering 
with  this  practice.  Already  in  1650,  the  English 
empire  was  sharply  differentiated  from  the 
Spanish,  the  Dutch,  and  the  French  empires  by 
the  fact  that  it  consisted  of  a  scattered  group  of 
self-governing  communities,  varying  widely  in 
tjrpe,  but  united  especially  by  the  common 
possession  of  free  institutions,  and  thriving  very 
largely  because  these  institutions  enabled  local 
needs  to  be  duly  considered  and  attracted  settlers 
of  many  types. 

(b)  The  Period  of  Systematic  Colonial  Policy, 
1660-1713 

The  second  half  of  the  seventeenth  century  was 
a  period  of  systematic  imperial  policy  on  the  part 
of  both  England  and  France  ;  for  both  countries 
now  realised  that  in  the  profitable  field  of  com- 
merce, at  any  rate,  the  Dutch  had  won  a  great 
advantage  over  them. 

France,  after  many  internal  troubles  and  many 
foreign  wars,  had  at  last  achieved,  imder  the 
government  of  Louis  xiv.,.  the  boon  of  firmly 
established  order.  She  was  now  beyond  all 
rivalry  the  greatest  of  the  European  states,  and 
her  king  and  his  great  fuiance  minister,  Colbert, 
resolved  to  win  for  her  also  supremacy  in  trade 
and  colonisation.  But  this  was  to  be  done 
absolutely   under   the    control    and    direction   of 


RIVALRY  OF  BUTCH,  FRENCH,  ENGLISH    3d 

the  central  government.     Until  the  establishment 
of  the  German  Empire,  there  has  never  been  so 
marked  an  instance  of  the  centralised  organisa- 
tion  of   the   whole   national   activity   as   France 
presented    in    this    period.      The    French    East 
India   Company  was  revived   under  government 
direction,  and  began  for  the  first  time  to  be   a 
serious  competitor  for  Indian  trade.     An  attempt 
was   made   to   conquer   Madagascar   as   a  useful 
base  for  Eastern  enterprises.     The  sugar  industry 
in  the  French  West  Indian  islands  was  scientifi- 
cally encouraged  and '  developed,  though  the  full 
results  of  this  work  were  not  apparent  until  the 
next  century.     France  began  to  take  an  active 
share  in  the  West  African  trade  in  slaves  and 
other    commodities.     In    Canada    a    new    era    of 
prosperity   began ;     the   population   was   rapidly 
increased   by  the    dispatch   of    carefully  selected 
parties  of  emigrants,  and  the  French  activity  in 
missionary    work    and    in    exploration    became 
bolder  than  ever.     Pere  Marquette  and  the  Sieur 
de  la  Salle  traced  out  the  courses   of    the  Ohio 
and    the    Mississippi ;     French    trading  -  stations 
began  to  arise  among  the  scattered  Indian  tribes 
who  alone  occupied  the  vast  central  plain  ;    and 
a   strong   French   claim   was   established   to   the 
possession  of  this  vital  area,  which  was  not  only 
the  most  valuable  part  of  the  American  continent, 
but   would    have    shut    off    the    English    coastal 
settlements  from  any  possibility  of  westward  ex- 
pansion.    These  remarkable  explorations  led,  in 
1717,  to  the  foundation  of  New  Orleans  at  the 


40  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

mouth  of  the  great  river,  and  the  organisation 
of  the  colony  of  Louisiana.  But  the  whole  of 
the  intense  and  systematic  imperial  activity  of 
the  French  during  this  period  depended  upon  the 
support  and  direction  of  government ;  and  when 
Colbert  died  in  1683,  and  soon  afterwards  all  the 
resources  of  France  were  strained  by  the  pressure 
of  two  great  European  wars,  the  rapid  develop- 
ment which  Colbert's  zeal  had  brought  about  was 
checked  for  a  generation.  Centralised  administra- 
tion may  produce  remarkable  immediate  results,  but 
it  does  not  encourage  natural  and  steady  growth. 
Meanwhile  the  English  had  awakened  to  the 
fact  that  England  had,  almost  by  a  series  of 
accidents,  become  the  centre  of  an  empire,  and 
to  the  necessity  of  giving  to  this  empire  some  sort 
of  systematic  organisation.  It  was  the  statesmen 
of  the  Commonwealth  who  fiirst  began  to  grope 
after  an  imperial  system.  The  aspect  of  the 
situation  which  most  impressed  them  was  that 
the  enterprising  Dutch  were  reaping  most  of  the 
trading  profits  which  arose  from  the  creation  of 
the  English  colonies  :  it  was  said  that  ten  Dutch 
ships  called  at  Barbados  for  every  English  ship. 
To  deal  with  this  they  passed  the  Navigation  Act 
of  1651,  which  provided  that  the  trade  of  England 
and  the  colonies  should  be  carried  only  in  English 
or  colonial  ships.  They  thus  gave  a  logical  ex- 
pression to  the  polic}^  of  imperial  trade  monopoly 
which  had  been  in  the  minds  of  those  who  were 
interested  in  colonial  questions  from  the  outset ; 
and  they  also  opened  a  period  of  acute  trade 


RIVALRY  OF  DUTCH,  FRENCH,  ENGLISH    41 

rivalry  and  war  with  the  Dutch.  The  first  of  the 
Dutch  wars,  which  was  waged  by  the  Common- 
wealth, was  a  very  even  struggle,  but  it  secured 
the  success  of  the  Navigation  Act.  Cromwell, 
though  he  hastened  to  make  peace  with  the 
Dutch,  was  a  still  stronger  imperialist  than  his 
parliamentary  predecessors  ;  he  may  justly  be 
described  as  the  first  of  the  Jingoes.  He  de- 
manded compensation  from  the  Dutch  for  the 
half -forgotten  outrage  of  Ambojoia  in  1623.  He 
made  a  quite  unprovoked  attack  upon  the 
Spanish  island  of  Hispaniola,  and  though  he 
failed  to  conquer  it,  gained  a  compensation  in  the 
seizure  of  Jamaica  (1655).  And  he  insisted  upon 
the  obedience  of  the  colonies  to  the  home  govern- 
ment with  a  severity  never  earlier  shown.  With 
him  imperial  aims  may  be  said  to  have  become, 
for  the  first  time,  one  of  the  ruling  ends  of  the 
English  government. 

But  it  was  the  reign  of  Charles  ii.  which  saw 
the  definite  organisation  of  a  clearly  conceived 
imperial  policy  ;  in  the  history  of  English  im- 
perialism there  are  few  periods  more  important. 
The  chief  statesmen  and  courtiers  of  the  reign, 
Prince  Rupert,  Clarendon,  Shaftesbury,  Albe- 
marle, were  all  enthusiasts  for  the  imperial  idea. 
They  had  a  special  committee  of  the  Privy 
Council  for  Trade  and  Plantations,^  and  appointed 
John  Locke,  the  ablest  political  thinker  of  the 
age,  to  be  its  secretary.  They  pushed  home 
the    struggle   against    the    maritime    ascendancy 

1  It  was  not  till  1696,  however,  that  this  Board  became  permanent. 


42  THE  EXPANSION  OE  EUROPE 

of  the  Dutch,  and  fought  two  Dutch  wars  ;  and 
though  the  history-books,  influenced  by  the 
Whig  prejudice  against  Charles  n.,  always  treat 
these  wars  as  humiliating  and  disgraceful,  while 
they  treat  the  Dutch  war  of  the  Commonwealth 
as  just  and  glorious,  the  plain  fact  is  that  the 
first  Dutch  war  of  Charles  n.  led  to  the  conquest 
of  the  Dutch  North  American  colony  of  the  New 
Netherlands  (1667),  and  so  bridged  the  gap  be- 
tween the  New  England  and  the  southern 
colonies.  They  engaged  in  systematic  colonisa- 
tion, founding  the  new  colony  of  Carolina  to  the 
south  of  Virginia,  while  out  of  their  Dutch  con- 
quests they  organised  the  colonies  of  New  York, 
New  Jersey,  and  Delaware  ;  and  the  end  of  the 
reign  saw  the  establishment  of  the  interesting  and 
admirably  managed  Quaker  colony  of  Pennsyl- 
vania. They  started  the  Hudson  Bay  Company, 
which  engaged  in  the  trade  in  furs  to  the  north 
of  the  French  colonies.  They  systematically  en- 
couraged the  East  India  Company,  which  now 
began  to  be  more  prosperous  than  at  any  earlier 
period,  and  obtained  in  Bombay  its  first  terri- 
torial possession  in  India. 

More  important,  they  worked  out  a  new  colonial 
policy,  which  was  to  remain,  in  its  main  features, 
the  accepted  British  policy  down  to  the  loss  of 
the  American  colonies  in  1782.  The  theory  at 
the  base  of  this  policy  was  that  while  the  mother- 
country  must  be  responsible  for  the  defence  of  all 
the  scattered  settlements,  which  in  their  weak- 
ness were  exposed  to  attack  from  many  sides,  in 


1670 

riSH  SETTLEMENTS  IN 

iRTH  AIMERICA 

to   17  50. 

\itish  Settlements  about  1660 
\itish  Possessions  about  1750 
lundary  of  New  Netherland 


SrS 


BRITISH  SETTLEMENTS  IN 

NORTH  AMERICA 

to   17  50. 


RIVALRY  OF  DUTCH,  FRENCH,  ENGLISH    43 

return  she  might  reasonably  expect  to  be  put  in 
possession  of  definite  trade  advantages.     Hence 
the  Navigation  Act  of   1660  provided  not  only 
that  inter-imperial   trade   should  be    carried    in 
English  or  colonial  vessels,  but  that  certam  '  enu- 
merated articles,'  including  some  of  the  most  im- 
portant colonial  products,  should  be  sent  only  to 
England,  so  that  English  merchants  should  have 
the  profits  of  selling  them  to  other  countries,  and 
the  English  government  the  proceeds  of  duties 
upon    them ;     and    another    Act    provided    that 
imports  to  the  colonies  should  only  come  from, 
or  through,  England.     In  other  words,  England 
was  to  be  the  commercial  entrepot  of  the  whole 
empire  ;    and  the  regulation  of  imperial  trade  as 
a  whole  was  to  belong  to  the  Enghsh  govern- 
ment and  parUament.     To  the  Enghsh  govern- 
ment also  must  necessarily  fall  the  conduct  of 
the  relations  of  the  empire  as  a  whole  with  other 
powers.     This  commercial  system  was  not,  how- 
ever, purely  one-sided.     If  the  colonies  were  to 
send  their  chief  products  only  to  England,  they 
were  at  the  same  time  to  have  a  monopoly,  or  a 
marked  advantage,  in  Enghsh  markets.     Tobacco- 
growing  had  been  for  a  time  a  promising  industry 
in  England  ;    it  was  prohibited  in  order  that  it 
might   not   compete  with   the  colonial  product; 
and  differential  duties  were  levied  on  the  com- 
peting   products    of    other    countries    and    their 
colonies.     In  short,   the  new  policy  was  one  of 
Imperial   Preference ;     it   aimed   at   turning   the 
empire  into  an  economic  unit,  of  which  England 


44  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

should  be  the  administrative  and  distributing 
centre.  So  far  the  English  poUcy  did  not  differ 
in  kind  from  the  contemporary  colonial  policy  of 
other  countries,  though  it  left  to  the  colonies  a 
greater  freedom  of  trade  (for  example,  in  the 
'  non-enumerated  articles  ')  than  was  ever  allowed 
by  Spain  or  France,  or  by  the  two  great  trading 
companies  which  controlled  the  foreign  posses- 
sions of  Holland. 

But  there  is  one  respect  in  which  the  authors  of 
this  system  differed  very  widely  from  the  colonial 
statesmen  of  other  countries.  Though  they  were 
anxious  to  organise  and  consolidate  the  empire  on 
the  basis  of  a  trade  system,  they  had  no  desire  or 
intention  of  altering  its  self-governing  character, 
or  of  discouraging  the  growth  of  a  healthy 
diversity  of  type  and  method.  Every  one  of  the 
new  colonies  of  this  period  was  provided  with  the 
accustomed  machinery  of  representative  govern- 
ment :  in  the  case  of  CaroUna,  the  philosopher, 
John  Locke,  was  invited  to  draw  up  a  model 
constitution,  and  although  his  scheme  was 
quite  unworkable,  the  fact  that  he  was  asked 
to  make  it  affords  a  striking  proof  of  the  serious- 
ness with  which  the  problems  of  colonial  govern- 
ment were  regarded.  In  several  of  the  West 
Indian  settlements  self-governing  institutions  were 
organised  during  these  years.  In  the  Frame  of 
Government  which  Penn  set  forth  on  the  founda- 
tion of  Pennsylvania,  in  1682,  he  laid  it  down 
that  '  any  government  is  free  where  the  laws 
rule,  and  where  the  people  are  a  party  to  these 


RIVALRY  OF  DUTCH,  FRENCH,  ENGLISH    45 

rules,'  and  on  this  basis  proceeded  to  organise 
his  system.  According  to  this  definition  all  the 
English  colonies  were  free,  and  they  were  almost 
the  only  free  communities  in  the  world.  And 
though  it  is  true  that  there  was  an  almost  un- 
ceasing confhct  between  the  government  and  the 
New  England  colonies,  no  one  who  studies  the 
story  of  these  quarrels  can  fail  to  see  that  the 
demands  of  the  New  Englanders  were  often 
unreasonable  and  inconsistent  with  the  mainten- 
ance of  imperial  unity,  while  the  home  government 
was  extremely  patient  and  moderate.  Above  all, 
almost  the  most  marked  feature  of  the  colonial 
policy  of  Charles  n.  was  the  uniform  insistence 
upon  complete  religious  toleration  in  the  colonies. 
Every  new  charter  contained  a  clause  securing 
this  vital  condition. 

It  has  long  been  our  habit  to  condemn  the  old 
colonial  system  as  it  was  defined  in  this  period, 
and  to  attribute  to  it  the  disruption  of  the  empire 
in  the  eighteenth  century.  But  the  judgment  is 
not  a  fair  one  ;  it  is  due  to  those  Whig  prejudices 
by  which  so  much  of  the  modern  history  of 
England  has  been  distorted.  The  colonial  policy 
of  Shaftesbury  and  his  colleagues  was  incom- 
parably more  enlightened  than  that  of  any 
contemporary  government.  It  was  an  interesting 
experiment — the  fu-st,  perhaps,  in  modern  history 
— in  the  reconciliation  of  unity  and  freedom. 
And  it  was  undeniably  successful:  under  it  the 
English  colonies  grew  and  throve  in  a  very  striking 
way.     Everything,  indeed,  goes  to  show  that  this 


46  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

system  was  well  designed  for  the  needs  of  a  group 
of  colonies  which  were  still  in  a  state  of  weakness, 
still  gravely  under-peopled  and  undeveloped. 
Evil  results  only  began  to  show  themselves  in  the 
next  age,  when  the  colonies  were  growing  stronger 
and  more  independent,  and  when  the  self-com- 
placent Whigs,  instead  of  revising  the  system  to 
meet  new  conditions,  actually  enlarged  and 
emphasised  its  most  objectionable  features. 

(c)  The  Conflict  of  French  and  English,  1713-1763 

While  France  and  England  were  defuiing  and 
developing  their  sharply  contrasted  imperial 
systems,  the  Dutch  had  fallen  into  the  back- 
ground, content  with  the  rich  dominion  which 
they  had  already  acquired  ;  and  the  Spanish  and 
Portuguese  empires  had  both  fallen  into  stagna- 
tion. New  competitors,  indeed,  now  began  to 
press  into  the  field :  the  wildly  exaggerated  notions 
of  the  wealth  to  be  made  from  colonial  ventures 
which  led  to  the  frenzied  speculations  of  the  early 
eighteenth  century,  John  Law's  schemes,  and  the 
South  Sea  Bubble,  induced  other  poAvers  to  try  to 
obtain  a  share  of  this  wealth ;  and  Austria,  Bran- 
denburg, and  Denmark  made  fitful  endeavours  to 
become  colonising  powers.  But  the  enterprises 
of  these  states  were  never  of  serious  importance. 
The  future  of  the  non-European  world  seemed  to 
depend  mainly  upon  France  and  England ;  and  it 
was  yet  to  be  determined  which  of  the  two  systems, 
centralised  autocracy  enforcing  uniformity,  or  self- 


RIVALRY  OF  DUTCH,  FRENCH,  ENGLISH    47 

government  encouraging  variety  of  type,  would 
prove  the  more  successful  and  would  play  the 
greater  part.  Two  bodies  of  ideas  so  sharply 
contrasted  were  bound  to  come  into  conflict. 
In  the  two  great  wars  between  England  and 
Louis  XIV.  (1688-1713),  though  the  questions 
at  issue  were  primarily  European,  the  conflict 
inevitably  spread  to  the  colonial  field  ;  and  in 
the  result  France  was  forced  to  cede  in  1713  the 
province  of  Acadia  (which  had  twice  before  been 
in  Enghsh  hands),  the  vast  basin  of  Hudson's  Bay, 
and  the  island  of  Newfoundland,  to  which  the 
fishermen  of  both  nations  had  resorted,  though 
the  English  had  always  claimed  it.  But  these 
were  only  preliminaries,  and  the  main  conflict  was 
fought  out  during  the  half-century  following  the 
Peace  of  Utrecht,  1713-63. 

During  this  half-century  Britain  was  under  the 
rule  of  the  Whig  oligarchy,  which  had  no  clearly 
conceived  ideas  on  imperial  pohcy.  Under  the 
influence  of  the  mercantile  class  the  Whigs  in- 
creased the  severity  of  the  restrictions  on  colonial 
trade,  and  prohibited  the  rise  of  industries  likely 
to  compete  with  those  of  the  mother-country. 
But  under  the  influence  of  laziness  and  timidity, 
and  of  the  desire  quieta  non  movers,  they  made  no 
attempt  seriously  to  enforce  either  the  new  or 
the  old  restrictions,  and  in  these  circumstances 
smuggling  trade  between  the  New  England  colonies 
and  the  French  West  Indies,  in  defiance  of  the 
Navigation  Act  and  its  companions,  grew  to  such 
dimensions  that  any  serious  interference  with  it 


48  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

would  be  felt  as  a  real  grievance.  The  Whigs 
and  their  friends  later  took  credit  for  their  neglect. 
George  Grenville,  they  said,  lost  the  colonies 
because  he  read  the  American  dispatches ;  he 
would  have  done  much  better  to  leave  the 
dispatches  and  the  colonies  alone.  But  this  is 
a  damning  apology.  If  the  old  colonial  system, 
whose  severity,  on  paper,  the  Whigs  had  greatly 
increased,  was  no  longer  workable,  it  should  have 
been  revised  ;  but  no  Whig  showed  any  sign  of 
a  sense  that  change  was  necessary.  Yet  the 
prevalence  of  smuggling  was  not  the  only  proof 
of  the  need  for  change.  There  was  during  the 
period  a  long  succession  of  disputes  between 
colonial  governors  and  their  assemblies,  which 
showed  that  the  restrictions  upon  their  poUtical 
freedom,  as  well  as  those  upon  their  economic 
freedom,  were  beginning  to  irk  the  colonists  ;  and 
that  seK-government  was  following  its  universal 
and  inevitable  course,  and  demanding  its  own 
fulfilment.  But  the  Whigs  made  no  sort  of 
attempt  to  consider  the  question  whether  the 
self-government  of  the  colonies  could  be  increased 
without  impairing  the  unity  of  the  empire.  The 
single  device  of  their  statesmanship  was — not  to 
read  the  dispatches.  And,  in  the  meanwhile,  no 
evil  results  followed,  because  the  loyalty  of  the 
colonists  was  ensured  by  the  imminence  of  the 
French  danger.  The  mother-country  was  still 
responsible  for  the  provision  of  defence,  though 
she  was  largely  cheated  of  the  commercial  advan- 
tages which  were  to  have  been  its  recompense. 


RIVALRY  OF  DUTCH,  FRENCH,  ENGLISH    49 

After  1713  there  was  a  comparatively  long 
interval  of  peace  between  Britain  and  France, 
but  it  was  occupied  by  an  acute  commercial 
rivalry,  in  which,  on  the  whole,  the  French  seemed 
to  be  getting  the  upper  hand.  Their  sugar 
islands  in  the  West  Indies  were  more  productive 
than  the  British  ;  their  traders  were  rapidly  in- 
creasing their  hold  over  the  central  plain  of 
North  America,  to  the  alarm  of  the  British 
colonists  ;  their  intrigues  kept  ahve  a  perpetual 
umrest  in  the  recently  conquered  province  of 
Acadia ;  and  away  in  India,  under  the  spirited 
direction  of  Fran9ois  Dupleix,  their  East  India 
Company  became  a  more  formidable  competitor 
for  the  Indian  trade  than  it  had  hitherto  been. 
Hence  the  imperial  problem  presented  itself  to  the 
statesmen  of  that  generation  as  a  problem  of 
power  rather  than  as  a  problem  of  organisation ; 
and  the  intense  rivalry  with  France  dvv^arfed  and 
obscured  the  need  for  a  reconsideration  of  colonial 
relations.  At  length  this  rivalry  flamed  out  into 
two  wars.  The  first  of  these  was  fought,  on  both 
sides,  in  a  strangely  hah-hearted  and  lackadaisical 
way.  But  in  the  second  (the  Seven  Years'  War, 
1756-63)  the  British  cause,  after  two  years  of 
disaster,  fell  under  the  confident  and  daring  leader- 
ship of  Pitt,  which  brought  a  series  of  unexampled 
successes.  The  French  flag  was  almost  swept  from 
the  seas.  The  French  settlements  in  Canada  were 
overrun  and  conquered.  With  the  fall  of  Quebec  it 
was  determined  that  the  system  of  self-government, 
and   not   that  of   autocracy,   should   control  the 

D 


50  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

destinies  of  the  North  American  continent ;  and 
Britain  emerged  in  1763  the  supreme  colonial  power 
of  the  world.  The  problem  of  power  had  been 
settled  in  her  favour ;  but  the  problem  of  organisa- 
tion remained  unsolved.  It  emerged  in  an  acute 
and  menacing  form  as  soon  as  the  war  was  over. 

During  the  course  of  these  two  wars,  and  in 

the    interval    between    them,    an    extraordinary 

series   of   events    had   opened   a    new    scene    for 

the  rivalry  of    the  two   great  imperial    powers, 

and   a   new  world  began  to   be   exposed   to  the 

influence  of   the  political  ideas  of  Europe.     The 

vast    and    populous    land    of    India,   where    the 

Europeans  had  hitherto  been  content  to  play  the 

part  of  modest  traders,  under  the  protection  and 

control  of  great  native  rulers,  had  suddenly  been 

displayed  as  a  field  for  the  imperial  ambitions 

of  the  European  peoples.      Ever  since  the  first 

appearance  of  the  Dutch,  the  English,  and  the 

French    in   these   regions.    Northern    India    had 

formed  a  consolidated  empire  ruled  from  Delhi 

by  the  great  Mogul  dynasty  ;    the  shadow  of  its 

power  was  also  cast  over  the  lesser  prmces  of 

Southern  India.     But  after  1709,  and  still  more 

after  1739,  the  Mogul  Empire  collapsed,  and  the 

whole  of  India,  north  and  south,  rapidly  fell  into 

a  condition  of  complete  anarchy.     A  multitude  of 

petty   rulers,    nominal   satraps   of   the   powerless 

Mogul,  roving  adventurers,  or  bands  of  Mahratta 

raiders,  put  an  end  to  all  order  and  security ; 

and  to  protect  themselves  and  mamtain  their  trade 

the  European  traders  must  needs  enlist  consider- 


RIVALRY  OF  DUTCH,  FRENCH,  ENGLISH    51 

able  bodies  of  Indian  troops.  It  had  long  been 
proved  that  a  comparatively  small  number  of 
troops,  disciplined  in  the  European  fashion,  could 
hold  their  own  against  the  loose  and  disorderly 
mobs  who  followed  the  standards  of  Indian  rulers. 
And  it  now  occurred  to  the  ambitious  mind  of 
the  Frenchman  Dupleix  that  it  should  be  possible, 
by  the  use  of  this  military  superiority,  to  inter- 
vene with  effect  in  the  unceasing  strife  of  the 
Indian  princes,  to  turn  the  scale  on  one  side  or 
the  other,  and  to  obtain  over  the  princes  whose 
cause  he  embraced  a  commanding  influence,  which 
would  enable  him  to  secure  the  expulsion  of  his 
English  rivals,  and  the  establishment  of  a  French 
trade  monopoly  based  upon  political  influence. 

This  daring  project  was  at  first  triumphantly 
successful.  The  English  had  to  follow  suit  in 
self-defence,  but  could  not  equal  the  abihty  of 
Dupleix.  In  1750  a  French  protege  occupied  the 
most  important  throne  of  Southern  India  at 
Hyderabad,  and  was  protected  and  kept  loyal  by 
a  force  of  French  sepoys  under  the  Marquis  de 
Bussy,  whose  expenses  were  met  out  of  the 
revenues  of  large  provinces  (the  Northern  Sarkars) 
placed  under  French  administration ;  while  in 
the  Carnatic,  the  coastal  region  where  all  the 
European  traders  had  their  south-eastern  head- 
quarters, a  second  French  protege  had  almost 
succeeded  in  crushing  his  rival,  whom  the  English 
company  supported.  But  the  genius  of  Chve 
reversed  the  situation  with  dramatic  swiftness  ; 
the  French  authorities  at  home,  alarmed  at  these 


52  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

dangerous  adventures,  repudiated  and  recalled 
Dupleix  (1754),  and  the  British  power  was  left 
to  apply  the  methods  which  he  had  invented. 
When  the  Seven  Years'  War  broke  out  (1756),  the 
French,  repenting  of  their  earlier  decision,  sent 
a  substantial  force  to  restore  their  lost  influence 
in  the  Carnatic,  but  the  result  was  complete 
failure.  A  British  protege  henceforward  ruled  in 
the  Carnatic  ;  a  British  force  replaced  the  French 
at  Hyderabad ;  and  the  revenues  of  the  Northern 
Sarkars,  formerly  assigned  for  the  maintenance  of 
the  French  force,  were  handed  over  to  its  successor. 
Meanwhile  in  the  rich  province  of  Bengal  a 
stiU  more  dramatic  revolution  had  taken  place. 
Attacked  by  the  young  Nawab,  Siraj-uddaula,  the 
British  traders  at  Calcutta  had  been  forced  to 
evacuate  that  prosperous  centre  (1756).  But 
Chve,  coming  up  with  a  fleet  and  an  army  from 
Madras,  applied  the  lessons  he  had  learnt  in  the 
Carnatic,  set  up  a  rival  claimant  to  the  throne 
of  Bengal,  and  at  Plassey  (1757)  won  for  his 
puppet  a  complete  victory.  From  1757  onwards 
the  British  East  India  Company  was  the  real 
master  in  Bengal,  even  more  completely  than  in 
the  Carnatic.  It  had  not,  in  either  region,  con- 
quered any  territory ;  it  had  only  supported 
successfully  a  claimant  to  the  native  throne. 
The  native  government,  in  theory,  continued  as 
before  ;  the  company,  in  theory,  was  its  subject 
and  vassal.  But  m  practice  these  great  and  rich 
provmces  lay  at  its  mercy,  and  if  it  did  not  yet 
choose  to  undertake  their  government,  this  was 


RIVALRY  OF  DUTCH,  FRENCH,  ENGLISH    53 

only  because  it  preferred  to  devote  itself  to  its 
original  business  of  trade. 

Thus  by  1763  the  British  power  had  achieved 
a  dazzling  double  triumph.  It  had  destroyed  the 
power  of  its  chief  rival  both  in  the  East  and 
m  the  West.  It  had  established  the  supremacy 
of  the  British  peoples  and  of  British  methods 
of  government  throughout  the  whole  continent  of 
North  America  ;  and  it  had  entered,  blindly  and 
without  anj^  conception  of  what  the  future  was 
to  bring  forth,  upon  the  path  which  was  to  lead 
to  dominion  over  the  vast  continent  of  India, 
and  upon  the  tremendous  task  of  grafting  the 
ideas  of  the  West  upon  the  East. 

Such  v/as  the  outcome  of  the  first  two  periods 
in  the  history  of  European  imperialism.  It  left 
Central  and  South  America  under  the  stagnant 
and  reactionary  government  of  Spain  and 
Portugal ;  the  eastern  coast  of  North  America 
under  the  control  of  groups  of  self-governing 
Englishmen  ;  Ca.nada,  still  inhabited  by  French- 
men, under  British  dominance  ;  Java  and  the 
Spice- Islands,  together  with  the  small  settlement 
of  Cape  Colony,  in  the  hands  of  the  Dutch  ;  a 
medley  of  European  settlements  in  the  West 
Indian  islands,  and  a  string  of  European  factories 
along  the  coast  of  West  Africa  ;  and  the  beginning 
of  an  anomalous  British  dominion  established  at 
two  points  on  the  coast  of  India.  But  of  all  the 
European  nations  which  had  taken  part  in  this 
vast  process  of  expansion,  one  alone,  the  British, 
still  retained  its  vitality  and  its  expansive  power. 


IV 

THE  ERA  OF  REVOLUTION,  1763-1825 

'  Colonies  are  like  fruits,'  said  Turgot,  the 
eighteenth-century  French  economist  and  states- 
man :  '  they  cUng  to  the  mother-tree  only  until 
they  are  ripe.'  This  generalisation,  which  repre- 
sented a  view  very  widely  held  during  that  and 
the  next  age,  seemed  to  be  borne  out  in  the  most 
conclusive  way  by  the  events  of  the  sixty  years 
following  the  Seven  Years'  War.  In  1763  the 
French  had  lost  almost  the  whole  of  the  empire 
which  they  had  toilsomely  built  up  during  a 
century  and  a  haK.  Within  twenty  years  their 
triumphant  British  rivals  were  forced  to  recognise 
the  independence  of  the  American  colonies,  and 
thus  lost  the  bulk  of  what  may  be  called  the  first 
British  Empire.  They  still  retained  the  recently 
conquered  province  of  French  Canada,  but  it 
seemed  unlikely  that  the  French  Canadians  would 
long  be  content  to  live  under  an  aUen  dommion  : 
if  they  had  not  joined  in  the  American  Revolu- 
tion, it  was  not  because  they  loved  the  British, 
but  because  they  hated  the  Americans.  The 
French  Revolutionary  wars  brought  further 
changes.  One  result  of  these  wars  was  that  the 
Dutch    lost    Cape    Colony,    Ceylon,    and    Java, 


THE  ERA  OF  REVOLUTION  55 

though  Java  was  restored  to  them  in  1815.     A 
second    result   was   that   when    Napoleon    made 
himself   master   of   Spain   in    1808,    the   Spanish 
colonies   in   Central   and   South  America   ceased 
to   be  governed  from  the  mother-country;   and 
having  tasted  the  sweets  of  independence,   and 
still  more,  the  advantages  of  unrestricted  trade, 
could  never  again  be  brought  into  subordination. 
By   1825  nothing  was  left  of  the  vast  Spanish 
Empire  save  the  Canaries,  Cuba,  Porto  Rico,  and 
the  Philippine  Islands  ;   nothing  was  left  of  the 
Portuguese  Empire  save  a  few  decaying  posts  on 
the  coasts  of  Africa  and  India ;  nothing  was  left  of 
the  Dutch  Empire  save  Java  and  its  dependencies, 
restored  in  1815  ;    nothing  was  left  of  the  French 
Empire   save   a  few   West  Indian  islands ;     and 
what   had   been   the    British   American   colonies 
were  now  the  United  States,  a  great  power  de- 
claring to  Europe,  through  the  mouth  of  President 
Monroe,  that  she  would  resist  any  attempt  of  the 
European  powers  to  restore  the  old  regime   in 
South  America.     It  appeared  that  the  political 
control  of   European  states   over  non-European 
regions  must  be  short-hved  and  full  of  trouble ; 
and  that  the  influence  of  Europe  upon  the  non- 
European  world  would  henceforth  be  exercised 
mainly  through  new  independent  states   imbued 
with  European  ideas.     Imperial  aspirations  thus 
seemed  to  that  and  the  next  generation  at  once 
futile  and  costly. 

Of  aU  these  colonial  revolutions  the  most  strik- 
ing   was    that    which    tore    away    the    American 


56  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

colonies  from  Britain  (1764-82) ;  not  only  be- 
cause it  led  to  the  creation  of  one  of  the  great 
powers  of  the  world,  and  was  to  afford  the  single 
instance  which  has  yet  arisen  of  a  daughter-nation 
outnumbering  its  mother-country,  but  still  more 
because  it  seemed  to  prove  that  not  even  the 
grant  of  extensive  powers  of  self-government 
would  secure  the  permanent  loyalty  of  colonies. 
Indeed,  from  the  standpomt  of  Realpolitik,  it  might 
be  argued  that  in  the  case  of  America  self- 
government  was  shown  to  be  a  dangerous  gift ; 
for  the  American  colonies,  which  alone  among 
European  settlements  had  obtained  this  supreme 
endowment,  were  the  first,  and  indeed  the  only, 
European  settlements  to  throw  off  dehberately 
their  connection  with  the  mother-country.  France 
and  Holland  lost  their  colonies  by  war,  and  even 
the  Spanish  colonies  would  probably  never  have 
thought  of  severing  their  relations  with  Spain  but 
for  the  anomalous  conditions  created  by  the 
Napoleonic  conquest. 

The  American  Revolution  is,  then,  an  event 
unique  at  once  in  its  causes,  its  character,  and 
its  consequences  ;  and  it  throws  a  most  important 
illumination  upon  some  of  the  problems  of  im- 
perialism. It  cannot  be  pretended  that  the  revolt 
of  the  colonists  was  due  to  oppression  or  to  serious 
misgovernment.  The  paltry  taxes  which  were 
its  immediate  provoking  cause  would  have  formed 
a  quite  negligible  burden  upon  a  very  prosper- 
ous population  ;  they  were  to  have  been  spent 
exclusively  within  the  colonies  themselves,   and 


THE  ERA  OF  REVOLUTION  57 

would  have  been  mainly  used  to  meet  a  part  of 
the  cost  of  colonial  defence,  the  bulk  of  which 
was  stiU  to  be  borne  by  the  mother-country.  If 
the  colonists  had  been  willing  to  suggest  any 
other  means  of  raising  the  required  funds,  their 
suggestions  would  have  been  readily  accepted. 
This  was  made  plain  at  several  stages  in  the 
course  of  the  discussion,  but  the  invitation  to 
suggest  alternative  methods  of  raising  money 
met  with  no  response.  The  plain  fact  is 
that  Britain,  aheady  heavily  loaded  with  debt, 
was  bearing  practically  the  whole  burden  of 
colonial  defence,  and  was  much  less  able  than  the 
colonies  themselves  to  endure  the  strain.  As  for 
the  long-established  restrictions  on  colonial  trade, 
which  in  fact  though  not  in  form  contributed  as 
largely  as  the  proposals  of  direct  taxation  to  cause 
the  revolt,  they  were  far  less  severe,  even  if  they 
had  been  strictly  enforced,  than  the  restrictions 
imposed  upon  the  trade  of  other  European  settle- 
ments. 

It  is  equally  misleading  to  attribute  the  blame 
of  the  revolt  wholly  to  George  ni.  and  the 
ministers  by  whom  he  was  served  during  the 
critical  years.  No  doubt  it  is  possible  to  imagine 
a  more  tactful  man  than  George  Grenville,  a  more 
far-seeing  and  courageous  statesman  than  Lord 
North,  a  less  obstinate  prince  than  George  m. 
himself.  But  it  may  be  doubted  whether  any 
change  of  men  would  have  done  more  than  post- 
pone the  inevitable.  The  great  Whig  apologists 
who  have  dictated  the  accepted  view  of  British 


58  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

r 

history  in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  cen- 
turies have  laboured  to  create  the  impression  that 
if  only  Burke,  Chatham,  and  Charles  Fox  had  had 
the  handling  of  the  issue,  the  tragedy  of  disrup- 
tion would  have  been  avoided.  But  there  is  no 
evidence  that  any  of  these  men,  except  perhaps 
Burke,  appreciated  the  magnitude  and  difficulty  of 
the  questions  that  had  been  inevitably  raised  in 
1764,  and  must  have  been  raised  whoever  had  been 
in  power ;  or  that  they  would  have  been  able  to 
suggest  a  workable  new  scheme  of  colonial  govern- 
ment which  would  have  met  the  difficulty.  If 
they  had  put  forward  such  a  scheme,  it  would 
have  been  wrecked  on  the  resistance  of  British 
opinion,  which  was  still  dominated  by  the  theories 
and  traditions  of  the  old  colonial  system  ;  and 
even  if  it  had  overcome  this  obstacle,  it  would 
very  likely  have  been  ruined  by  the  captious  and 
litigious  spirit  to  which  events  had  given  birth 
among  the  colonists,  especially  in  New  England. 

The  root  of  the  matter  was  that  the  old  colonial 
system,  which  had  suited  well  enough  the  needs 
of  the  colonies  as  they  were  when  it  was  devised 
by  the  statesmen  of  Charles  n.'s  reign,  was  no 
longer  suitable  to  their  condition  now  that  they 
had  become  great  and  prosperous  communities 
of  freemen.  They  enjoyed  seK-government  on  a 
scale  more  generous  than  any  other  communities 
in  the  world  outside  of  Britain ;  indeed,  in  one 
sense  they  enjoyed  it  on  a  more  generous  scale 
than  Britain  herself,  since  political  rights  were 
much  more  widely  exercised  in  the  colonies,  owing 


THE  ERA  OF  REVOLUTION  59 

to  the  natural  conditions  of  a  new  and  prosperous 
land,  than  they  were  to  be,  or  could  be,  in  Britain 
until  nearly  a  century  later.  No  direct  taxation 
had  as  yet  been  imposed  upon  them  without 
their  own  consent.  They  made  the  laws  by 
which  their  own  lives  were  regulated.  They  were 
called  upon  to  pay  no  tribute  to  the  home  govern- 
ment, except  the  very  indirect  levy  on  goods 
passing  through  England  to  or  from  their  ports, 
and  this  was  nearly  balanced  by  the  advantages 
which  they  enjoyed  in  the  British  market,  and 
far  more  than  balanced  by  the  protection  afforded 
to  them  by  the  British  fleet.  They  were  not  even 
required  to  raise  troops  for  the  defence  of  their 
own  frontiers  except  of  their  own  free  wiU,  and 
the  main  burden  of  defending  even  their  land- 
ward frontier  was  borne  by  the  mother-country. 
But  being  British  they  had  the  instinct  of  self- 
government  in  their  blood  and  bones,  and  they 
found  that  the  control  of  their  own  affairs  was 
quahfied  or  limited  in  two  principal  ways. 

In  the  first  place,  the  executive  and  judicial 
officers  who  carried  out  the  laws  were  not  ap- 
pointed by  them  but  by  the  Crown  in  England  : 
the  colonies  were  not  responsible  for  the  adminis- 
tration of  their  own  laws.  In  the  second  place, 
the  regulations  by  which  their  foreign  trade  was 
governed  were  determined,  not  by  themselves, 
but  by  the  British  parUament:  they  were  not 
responsible  for  the  control  of  their  own  traffic  with 
the  outside  world.  It  is  true  that  the  salaries  of 
the  executive  officials  and  the  judges  depended 


60  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

upon  their  grant,  and  that  any  governor  who 
acted  in  the  teeth  of  colonial  opinion  would  find 
his  position  quite  untenable,  so  that  the  colonists 
exercised  a  real  if  indirect  control  over  adminis- 
tration. It  is  true  also  that  they  accepted  the 
general  principles  of  the  commercial  system,  and 
had  reaped  great  benefits  from  it. 

But  it  is  the  unfaihng  instinct  of  the  citizens 
in  a  self-governing  community  to  be  dissatisfied 
unless  they  feel  that  they  have  a  full  and  equal 
share  in  the  control  of  their  own  destinies.  Denied 
responsibility,  they  are  apt  to  become  irrespon- 
sible ;  and  when  all  allowance  has  been  made  for 
the  stupidities  of  governors  and  for  the  mistakes 
of  the  home  authorities,  it  must  be  recognised 
that  the  thirteen  American  colonial  legislatures 
often  behaved  in  a  very  irresponsible  way,  and 
were  extremely  difficult  to  handle.  They  re- 
fused to  vote  fixed  salaries  to  their  judges  in 
order  to  make  their  power  felt,  simply  because 
the  judges  were  appointed  by  the  Crown,  although 
in  doing  so  they  were  dangerously  undermining 
judicial  independence.  They  refused  in  many 
cases  to  supply  anything  like  adequate  contm- 
gents  for  the  war  against  the  French  and  their 
Indian  allies,  partly  because  each  legislature  was 
afraid  of  being  more  generous  than  the  others, 
partly  because  they  could  trust  to  the  home 
government  to  make  good  their  deficiencies.  Yet 
at  the  same  time  they  did  nothing  to  check,  but 
rather  encouraged,  the  wholesale  smuggling  by 
which  the  trade  regulations  were  reduced  to  a 


THE  ERA  OF  REVOLUTION  61 

nullity,  though  these  regulations  were  not  only 
accepted  in  principle  by  themselves,  but  afforded 
the  only  compensation  to  the  mother-country  for 
the  cost  of  colonial  defence.  It  is  as  unscientific 
to  blame  the  colonists  and  their  legislatures  for 
this  kind  of  action,  as  it  is  to  blame  the  British 
statesmen  for  their  proposals.  It  was  the  almost 
inevitable  result  of  the  conditions  among  a  free, 
prosperous,  and  extremely  self-confident  people; 
it  Avas,  indeed,  the  proof  that  in  this  young  people 
the  greatest  political  ideal  of  western  civilisation, 
the  ideal  of  self-government,  had  taken  firm  root. 
The  denial  of  responsibility  was  producing  irre- 
sponsibility ;  and  even  if  the  Stamp  Act  and 
the  Tea  Duties  had  never  been  proposed,  this 
state  of  things  was  bound  to  lead  to  increasing 
friction.  Nor  must  it  be  forgotten  that  this 
friction  was  accentuated  by  the  contrast  between 
the  democratic  conditions  of  colonial  life,  and  the 
aristocratic  organisation  of  English  society. 

It  ought  to  have  been  obvious,  long  before 
Grenville  initiated  his  new  pohcy  in  1764,  that 
the  colonial  system  was  not  working  well ;  and  the 
one  circumstance  which  had  prevented  serious 
conflict  was  the  danger  which  threatened  the 
colonists  in  the  aggressive  attitude  of  the  French 
to  the  north  and  west.  Since  the  individual 
colonies  refused  to  raise  adequate  forces  for  their 
own  defence,  or  to  co-operate  with  one  another 
in  a  common  scheme,  they  were  dependent  for 
their  security  upon  the  mother-country.  But  as 
soon  as  the  danger  was  removed,  as  it  was  in  1763, 


62  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

this  reason  for  restraint  vanished ;  and  although 
the  great  majority  of  the  colonists  were  quite 
sincerely  desirous  of  retaining  their  membership 
of  the  British  commonwealth,  the  conditions 
would  inevitably  have  produced  a  state  of  in- 
tensifying friction,  unless  the  whole  colonial 
system  had  been  drastically  reconstructed. 

Reconstruction  was  therefore  inevitable  in 
1764.  The  Whig  pohcy  of  simply  ignoring  the 
issue  and  *not  reading  the  dispatches'  could 
no  longer  be  pursued;  it  was  indeed  largely 
responsible  for  the  mischief.  George  iii.  and 
Grenville  deserve  the  credit  of  seeing  this.  But 
their  scheme  of  reconstruction  not  unnatural^ 
amounted  to  little  more  than  a  tightening-up  of 
the  old  system.  The  trade  laws  were  to  be  more 
strictly  enforced.  The  governors  and  the  judges 
were  to  be  made  more  independent  of  the  as- 
semblies by  being  given  fixed  salaries.  The 
colonists  were  to  bear  a  larger  share  of  the  cost  of 
defence,  which  fell  so  unfairly  on  the  mother- 
country.  If  the  necessary  funds  could  be  raised 
by  means  approved  by  the  colonists  themselves, 
well  and  good ;  but  if  not,  then  they  must  be 
raised  by  the  authority  of  the  imperial  parlia- 
ment. For  the  existing  system  manifestly  could 
not  continue  indefinitely,  and  it  was  better  to 
have  the  issue  clearly  raised,  even  at  the  risk  of 
conflict,  than  to  go  on  merely  drifting. 

When  the  colonists  (without  suggesting  any 
alternative  proposals)  contented  themselves  with 
repudiating  the  right  of  parliament  to  tax  them, 


THE  ERA  OF  REVOLUTION  63 

and  proceeded  to  outrageous  insults  to  the  king's 
authority,    and   the    most   open   defiance    of   the 
trade   regulations,    indignation   grew   in   Britain. 
It  seemed,  to  the  average  Englishman,  that  the 
colonists  proposed  to  leave  every  public  burden, 
even  the  cost  of  judges'  salaries,  on  the  shoulders 
of   the   mother -country,    already  loaded   with   a 
debt  which  had  been  largely  incurred  in  defence 
of  the  colonies  ;   but  to  disregard  every  obligation 
imposed  upon  themselves.     A  system  whereunder 
the  colony  has  all  rights  and  no  enforcible  duties, 
the  mother-country  all  duties  and  no  enforcible 
rights,  obviously  could  not  work.     That  was  the 
system  which,  in  the  view  of   the   gentlemen  of 
England,  the  colonists  were  bent  upon  establishing ; 
and,  taking  this  view,  they  cannot  be  blamed  for 
refusing  to  accept  such  a  conclusion.    There  was 
no  one,  either  m  Britain  or  in  America,  capable  of 
grasping  the  essentials  of  the  problem,  which  were 
that,  once  established,  self-government  inevitably 
strives  after  its  own  fulfilment ;   that  these  British 
settlers,   in  whom   the  British   tradition   of  self- 
government  had  been  strengthened  by  the  free- 
dom of  a  new  land,  would  never  be  content  until 
they  enjoyed  a  full  share  in  the  control  of  their 
own    affairs ;     and   that   although   they   seemed, 
even  to  themselves,   to  be  fighting  about  legal 
minutiae,   about  the   difference   between   internal 
and  external  duties,  about  the  legality  of  writs 
of  assistance,  and  so  forth,  the  real  issue  was  the 
deeper  one  of  the  fulfilment  of  self-government. 
Could     fully    responsible     self-government    be 


64  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

reconciled  with  imperial  unity  ?  Could  any  means 
be  devised  whereby  the  units  in  a  fellowship  of 
free  states  might  retain  full  control  over  their  own 
affairs,  and  at  the  same  time  effective^  combine 
for  common  purposes  ?  That  was  and  is  the 
ultimate  problem  of  British  imperial  organisation, 
as  it  was  and  is  the  ultimate  problem  of  inter- 
national relations.  But  the  problem,  though  it 
now  presented  itself  in  a  comparatively  simple 
form,  was  never  fairly  faced  on  either  side  of  the 
Atlantic.  For  the  mother  and  her  daughters  too 
quickly  reached  the  point  of  arguing  about  their 
legal  rights  against  one  another,  and  when  friends 
begin  to  argue  about  their  legal  rights,  the  breach 
of  their  friendship  is  at  hand.  So  the  dreary 
argument,  which  lasted  for  eleven  years  (1764-75), 
led  to  the  still  more  dreary  war,  which  lasted  for 
seven  years  (1775-82) ;  and  the  only  family  of 
free  self-governing  communities  existmg  in  the 
world  was  broken  up  in  bitterness.  This  was 
indeed  a  tragedy.  For  if  the  great  partnership 
of  freedom  could  have  been  reorganised  on 
conditions  that  would  have  enabled  it  to  hold 
together,  the  cause  of  liberty  in  the  world  would 
have  been  made  infinitely  more  secure. 

The  Revolution  gave  to  the  Americans  the  glory 
of  establishing  the  first  fully  democratic  system  of 
government  on  a  national  scale  that  had  yet  ex- 
isted in  the  world,  and  of  demonstrating  that  by 
the  machinery  of  self-government  a  number  of 
distinct  and  jealous  communities  could  be  united 
for  common  purposes.     The  new  American  Com- 


THE  ERA  OF  REVOLUTION  65 

monwealth  became  an  inspiration  for  eager  Liberals 
in  the  old  world  as  well  as  in  the  new,  and  its 
successful  establishment  formed  the  strongest  of 
arguments  for  the  democratic  idea  in  all  lands. 
Unhappily  the  .pride  of  this  great  achievement 
helped  to  persuade  the  Americans  that  they  were 
different  from  the  rest  of  the  Avorld,  and  unaffected 
by  its  fortunes.  They  were  apt  to  think  of  them- 
selves as  the  inventors  and  monopolists  of  political 
liberty.  Cut  oif  by  a  vast  stretch  of  ocean  from 
the  Old  World,  and  having  lost  that  contact  with 
its  affairs  which  the  relation  with  Britain  bad 
hitherto  maintained,  they  followed  but  dimly,  and 
without  much  comprehension,  the  obscure  and 
complex  struggles  wherein  the  spirit  of  liberty  was 
working  out  a  new  Europe,  in  the  face  of  diffi- 
culties vastly  greater  than  any  with  which  the 
Americans  had  ever  had  to  contend.  Thej^  had 
been  alienated  from  Britain,  the  one  great  free 
state  of  Europe,  and  had  been  persuaded  by  their 
reading  of  their  own  experience  that  she  was  a 
tyrant-power ;  and  they  thus  found  it  hard  to 
recognise  her  for  what,  with  all  her  faults,  she 
genuinely  was — the  mother  of  free  institutions  in 
the  modern  world,  the  founder  and  shaper  of  their 
own  prized  liberties.  All  these  things  combined 
to  persuade  the  great  new  republic  that  she  not 
only  might,  but  ought  to,  stand  aloof  from  the 
political  problems  of  the  rest  of  the  world, 
and  take  no  interest  in  its  concerns.  This  atti- 
tude, the  natural  product  of  the  conditions, 
was  to  last  for  more  than  a  century,  and  was 

E 


66  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

to  weaken  greatly  the  cause  of   liberty  in   the 
world. 

Although  the  most  obvious  features  of  the  half- 
century  following  the  great  British  triumph  of 
1763  were  the  revolt  of  the  American  colonies 
and  the  apparently  universal  collapse  of  the  im- 
periahst  ambitions  of  the  European  nations,  a 
more  deepty  impressive  feature  of  the  period  was 
that,  in  spite  of  the  tragedy  and  humiliation  of 
the  great  disruption,  the  imperial  impetus  con- 
tinued to  work  potently  in  Britain,  alone  among 
the  European  nations  ;  and  to  such  effect  that  at 
the  end  of  the  period  she  found  herself  in  control 
of  a  new  empire  more  extensive  than  that  which 
she  had  lost,  and  far  more  various  in  its  char- 
acter. Having  failed  to  solve  one  great  imperial 
problem,  she  promptly  addressed  herself  to  a 
whole  series  of  others  even  more  difficult,  and  for 
these  she  was  to  find  more  hopeful  solutions. 

When  the  American  revolt  began,  the  Canadian 
colonies  to  the  north  were  in  an  insecure  and 
unorganised  state.  On  the  coast,  in  Nova  Scotia 
and  Newfoundland,  there  was  a  small  British 
population  ;  but  the  riverine  colony  of  Canada 
proper,  with  its  centre  at  Quebec,  was  still  purely 
French,  and  was  ruled  by  martial  law.  Accus- 
tomed to  a  despotic  system,  and  not  yet  reconciled 
to  the  British  supremacy,  the  French  settlers 
were  obviously  unready  for  seK-government.  But 
the  Quebec  Act  of  1774,  by  securing  the  main- 
tenance of  the  Roman  Catholic  rehgion  and  of 
French    civil    law,    ensured    the    loyalty    of    the 


THE  ERA  OF  REVOLUTION  67 

French;  and  this  Act  is  also  noteworthy  as  the 
first  formal  expression  of  willingness  to  admit  or 
even  welcome  the  existence,  within  the  hospitable 
hmits  of  the  Empire,  of  a  variety  of  t3rpes  of 
civilisation.  In  the  new  British  Empire  there  was 
to  be  no  uniformity  of  Kultur. 

The  close  of  the  American  struggle,  however, 
brought  a  new  problem.  Many  thousands  of 
exiles  from  the  revolting  colonies,  willing  to 
sacrifice  everything  in  order  to  retain  their  British 
citizenship,  poured  over  the  borders  into  the 
Canadian  lands.  They  settled  for  the  first  time 
the  rich  province  of  Ontario,  greatly  increased 
the  population  of  Nova  Scotia,  and  started  the 
settlement  of  New  Brunswick.  To  these  exiles 
Britain  felt  that  she  owed  much,  and,  despite 
her  own  financial  distress,  expended  large  sums 
in  providing  them  with  the  means  to  make  a  good 
beginning  in  their  new  homes.  But  it  was  im- 
possible to  deny  these  British  settlers,  and  the 
emigrants  from  Britain  who  soon  began  to  join 
them,  the  rights  of  self-government,  to  which 
they  were  accustomed.  Their  advent,  however, 
in  a  hitherto  French  province,  raised  the  very 
difficult  problem  of  racial  relationship.  They 
might  have  been  used  as  a  means  for  Anglicising 
the  earlier  French  settlers  and  for  forcing  them 
into  a  British  mould ;  it  may  fairly  be  said  that 
most  European  governments  would  have  used 
them  in  this  way,  and  many  of  the  settlers  would 
willingly  have  faUen  in  with  such  a  programme. 
But  that  would  have  been  out  of  accord  with 


68  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

the  genius  of  the  British  system,  which  beheves 
in  freedom  and  variety.  Accordingly,  by  the  Act 
of  1791,  the  purely  French  region  of  Quebec  or 
Lower  Canada  was  separated  from  the  British 
region  of  Ontario  or  Upper  Canada,  and  both 
districts,  as  well  as  the  coastal  settlements,  were 
endowed  with  self-governing  institutions  of  the 
famihar  pattern — an  elected  assembly  controlhng 
legislation  and  taxation,  a  nominated  governor 
and  council  directing  the  executive.  Thus  within 
eighteen  years  of  their  conquest  the  French 
colonists  were  introduced  to  self-government. 
And  within  nine  years  of  the  loss  of  the  American 
colonies,  a  new  group  of  self-governing  American 
colonies  had  been  organised.  They  were  suffi- 
ciently content  with  the  system  to  resist  with 
vigour  and  success  an  American  invasion  in  1812. 
While  the  A.merican  controversy  was  proceed- 
ing, one  of  the  greatest  of  British  navigators. 
Captain  Cook,  was  busy  with  his  remarkable 
explorations.  He  was  the  first  to  survey  the 
archipelagoes  of  the  Pacific ;  more  important, 
he  was  the  real  discoverer  of  Australia  and  New 
Zealand ;  for  though  the  Dutch  explorers  had 
found  these  lands  more  than  a  century  earher, 
they  had  never  troubled  to  complete  their  ex- 
plorations. Thus  a  vast  new  field,  eminently 
suitable  for  European  settlement,  was  placed  at 
the  disposal  of  Britain.  It  was  utihsed  with 
extraordmary  promptitude.  The  loss  of  the 
American  colonies  had  deprived  Britain  of  her 
chief  dumping-ground  for  convicts.     In  1788,  six 


THE  ERA  OF  REVOLUTION  69 

years  after  the  recognition  of  their  independence, 
she  decided  to  use  the  new  continent  for  this 
purpose,  and  the  penal  settlement  of  Botany  Bay 
began  (under  unfavourable  auspices)  the  colonisa- 
tion of  Australia. 

But  the  most  important,  and  the  most  amazing, 
achievement  of  Britain  in  this  period  was  the 
establishment  and  extension  of  her  empire  in 
India,  and  the  planting  within  it  of  the  first  great 
gift  of  Western  civilisation,  the  sovereignty  of  a 
just  and  impartial  law.  This  was  a  novel  and  a 
very  difficult  task,  such  as  no  European  people 
had  yet  undertaken  ;  and  it  is  not  surprising  that 
there  should  have  been  a  period  of  bewildered  mis- 
government  before  it  was  achieved.  That  it 
should  have  been  achieved  at  all  is  one  of  the 
greatest  miracles  of  European  imperialism. 

By  1763  the  East  India  Company  had  estab- 
lished a  controlling  influence  over  the  Nawabs 
of  two  important  regions,  Bengal  and  the  Car- 
natic,  and  had  shown,  in  a  series  of  struggles, 
that  its  control  was  not  to  be  shaken  off.  But 
the  company  had  not  annexed  any  territory,  or 
assumed  any  responsibility  for  the  government 
of  these  rich  provinces.  Its  agents  in  the  East, 
who  were  too  far  from  London  to  be  effectively 
controlled,  enjoyed  power  without  responsibilitj'-. 
They  were  privileged  traders,  upon  whom  the 
native  governments  dared  not  impose  restric- 
tions, and  (as  any  body  of  average  men  would 
have  done  under  similar  circumstances)  they 
gravely  abused  their  position  to  build  up  huge 


70  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

fortunes  for  themselves.  During  the  fifteen  years 
following  the  battle  of  Plassey  (1757)  there  is  no 
denying  that  the  political  power  of  the  British 
in  India  was  a  mere  curse  to  the  native  popula- 
tion, and  led  to  the  complete  disorganisation  of 
the  already  decrepit  native  system  of  government 
in  the  provinces  affected.  It  was  vain  for  the 
directors  at  home  to  scold  their  servants.  There 
were  only  two  ways  out  of  the  difficulty.  One 
was  that  the  company  should  abandon  India, 
which  was  not  to  be  expected.  The  other  was 
that,  x^ossessing  power,  of  which  it  was  now  im- 
possible to  strip  themselves,  they  should  assume 
the  responsibility  for  its  exercise,  and  create  for 
their  subjects  a  just  and  efficient  system  of 
government.  But  the  company  would  not  see 
this.  They  had  never  desired  political  power,  but 
had  drifted  into  the  possession  of  it  in  spite  of 
themselves.  They  honestly  disliked  the  idea  of 
establishing  by  force  an  alien  domination  over 
subject  peoples,  and  this  feeling  was  yet  more 
strongly  held  by  the  most  influential  political 
circles  in  England.  The  company  desired  nothing 
but  trade.  Their  business  was  that  of  traders, 
and  they  wanted  only  to  be  left  free  to  mind  their 
business.  So  the  evils  arising  from  power  without 
responsibility  continued,  and  half-hearted  attempts 
to  amend  them  in  1765  and  in  1769  only  made  the 
conditions  worse.  The  events  of  the  years  from 
1757  to  1772  showed  that  when  the  superior  organ- 
isation of  the  West  came  in  contact  with  the  East, 
mere  trading  exploitation  led  to  even  worse  results 


THE  ERA  OF  REVOLUTION  71 

than  a  forcibly  imposed  dominion  ;  and  the  only 
solution  lay  in  the  wise  adaptation  of  western 
methods  of  government  to  eastern  conditions. 

Thus  Britain  foimd  herself  faced  with  an  im- 
perial  problem    of    apparently   insuperable    diffi- 
culty, which  reached  its  most  acute  stage  just  at 
the  time  when  the  American  trouble  was  at  its 
height.     The  British  parliament  and  government 
intervened,  and  in  1773  for  the  first  time  assumed 
some  responsibility  for  the   affairs  of  the   East 
India  Company.     But  they  did  not  understand 
the  Indian  problem — how,  indeed,  should  they  ? — 
and  their  first  solution  was  a  failure.     By  a  happy 
fortune,  however,  the  East  India  Company  had 
conferred  the  governorship  of  Bengal  (1772)  upon 
the  greatest  Enghshman  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury, Warren  Hastings.     Hastings  pensioned  off 
the  Nawab,  took  over  direct  responsibihty  for  the 
government  of  Bengal,  and  organised  a  system  of 
justice   which,   though   far  from   perfect,   estab- 
lished for  the  first  time  the  Reign^  of  Law  in  an 
Indian  realm.     His  firm  and  straightforward  deal- 
ings with  the  other  Indian  powers  still  further 
strengthened  the  position  of  the  company ;    and 
when  in  the  midst  of  the  American  war,  at  a 
moment  when  no  aid  could  be  expected  from 
Britain,   a  combination  of   the   most  formidable 
Indian  powers,  backed  by  a  French  fleet,  threatened 
the  downfall  of  the  company's  authority,  Hastings' 
resourceful  and  inspiring  leadership  was  equal  to 
every    emergency.     He    not    only    brought    the 
company   with   heightened    prestige    out   of    the 


72  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

war,  but  throughout  its  course  no  hostile  army 
was  ever  allowed  to  cross  the  frontiers  of  Bengal. 
In  the  midst  of  the  unceasing  and  desolating  wars 
of  India,  the  territories  under  direct  British  rule 
formed  an  island  of  secure  peace  and  of  justice. 
That  was  Hastings'  supreme  contribution  :  it  was 
the  foundation  upon  which  arose  the  fabric  of 
the  Indian  Empire.  Hastings  was  not  a  great 
conqueror  or  annexer  of  territory  ;  the  only  im- 
portant acquisition  made  during  his  regime  was 
effected,  in  defiance  of  his  protests,  by  the  hostile 
majority  which  for  a  time  overrode  him  in  his 
own  council,  and  which  condemned  him  for 
ambition.  His  work  was  to  make  the  British 
rule  mean  security  and  justice  in  place  of  tyranny  ; 
and  it  was  because  it  had  come  to  mean  this 
that  it  grew,  after  his  time,  with  extraordinary 
rapidity. 

It  was  not  by  the  desire  of  the  directors  or  the 
home  government  that  it  grew.  They  did  every- 
thing in  their  power  to  check  its  growth,  for 
they  shrank  from  any  increase  to  their  responsi- 
bilities. They  even  prohibited  by  law  all  annexa- 
tions, or  the  making  of  alliances  with  Indian 
powers.^  But  fate  was  too  strong  for  them. 
Even  a  governor  like  Lord  Cornwalhs,  a  con- 
vinced supporter  of  the  policy  of  non-expansion 
and  non-intervention,  found  himself  forced  into 
war,  and  compelled  to  annex  territories ;  because 
non-intervention  was  interpreted  by  the  Indian 
powers  as  a  confession  of  weakness  and  an  in- 

1  India  Act  of  1784. 


THE  ERA  OF  REVOLUTION  73 

vitation  to  attack.  Non-intervention  also  gave 
openings  to  the  French,  who,  since  the  outbreak 
of  the  Revolution,  had  revived  their  old  Indian 
ambitions  ;  and  while  Bonaparte  was  engaged  in 
the  conquest  of  Egypt  as  a  half-way  house  to 
India  (1797),  French  agents  were  busy  building 
up  a  new  combination  of  Indian  powers  against 
the  company. 

This  formidable  coalition  was  about  to  come 
to  a  head  when,  in  1798,  there  landed  in  India  a 
second  man  of  genius,  sent  by  fate  at  the  critical 
moment.  In  five  years,  by  an  amazing  series  of 
swiftly  successful  wars  and  brilliantly  conceived 
treaties,  the  Marquess  Wellesley  broke  the  power 
of  every  member  of  the  hostile  coalitions,  except 
two  of  the  Mahratta  princes.  The  area  of  British 
territory  was  quadrupled ;  the  most  important 
of  the  Indian  princes  became  vassals  of  the  com- 
pany ;  and  the  Great  Mogul  of  Delhi  himself, 
powerless  now,  but  always  a  symbol  of  the  over- 
lordship  of  India,  passed  under  British  protec- 
tion. When  Wellesley  left  India  in  1805,  the 
East  India  Company  was  already  the  paramount 
power  in  India  south-east  of  the  Sutlej  and  the 
Indus.  The  Mahratta  princes,  indeed,  stiU  re- 
tained a  restricted  independence,  and  for  an 
interval  the  home  authorities  dechned  to  permit 
a,ny  interference  with  them,  even  though  they 
were  manifestly  giving  protection  to  bands  of 
armed  raiders  who  terrorised  and  devastated 
territories  which  were  under  British  protection. 
But  the  time   came  when  the   Mahrattas  them- 


74  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

selves  broke  the  peace.  Then  their  power  also 
was  broken ;  and  in  1818  Britain  stood  forth  as 
the  sovereign  ruler  of  India. 

This  was  only  sixty  years  after  the  battle  of 
Plassey  had  estabhshed  British  influence,  though 
not  British  rule,  in  a  single  province  of  India  ; 
only  a  little  over  thirty  years  after  Warren 
Hastings  returned  to  England,  leaving  behind  him 
an  empire  still  almost  Umited  to  that  single 
province.  There  is  nothing  in  history  that  can 
be  compared  with  the  swiftness  of  this  achieve- 
ment, which  is  all  the  more  remarkable  when  we 
remember  that  almost  every  step  in  the  advance 
was  taken  with  extreme  unwilUngness.  But  the 
most  impressive  thing  about  this  astounding  fabric 
of  power,  which  extended  over  an  area  equal  to 
half  of  Europe  and  inhabited  by  perhaps  one- 
sixth  of  the  human  race,  was  not  the  swiftness  with 
which  it  was  created,  but  the  results  which  flowed 
from  it.  It  had  begun  in  corruption  and  oppres- 
sion, but  it  had  grown  because  it  had  come  to 
stand  for  justice,  order,  and  peace.  In  1818  it 
could  already  be  claimed  for  the  British  rule  in 
India  that  it  had  brought  to  the  numerous  and 
conflicting  races,  religions,  and  castes  of  that  vast 
and  ancient  land,  three  boons  of  the  highest 
value  :  political  unity  such  as  they  had  never 
known  before  ;  security  from  the  hitherto  unceas- 
ing ravages  of  internal  turbulence  and  war ;  and, 
above  aU,  the  supreme  gift  which  the  West  had 
to  offer  to  the  East,  the  substitution  of  an  unvary- 
ing  Reign   of   Law   for   the   capricious   wills   of 


THE  ERA  OF  REVOLUTION  75 

innumerable  and  shifting  despots.  This  is  an 
achievement  unexampled  in  history,  and  it  alone 
justified  the  imposition  of  the  rule  of  the  West  over 
the  East,  which  had  at  first  seemed  to  produce 
nothing  but  evil.  It  took  place  during  the  age  of 
Revolution,  when  the  external  empires  of  Europe 
were  on  all  sides  falling  into  ruin  ;  and  it  passed 
at  the  time  almost  unregarded,  because  it  was 
overshadowed  by  the  drama  of  the  Revolutionary 
and  Napoleonic  Wars. 

The  construction  of  the  Indian  Empire  would 
of  itself  suffice  to  make  an  age  memorable,  but  it 
does  not  end  the  catalogue  of  the  achievements 
of  British  imperiahsm  in  this  tremendous  period. 
As  a  result  of  the  participation  of  Holland  in 
the  war  on  the  side  of  France,  the  Dutch  colony 
at   the   Cape   of   Good   Hope   was   occupied   by 
Britain.     It  was  first  occupied  in  1798,  restored 
for  a  brief  period  in  1801,  reoccupied  in  1806,  and 
finally  retained  under  the  treaty  settlement  of 
1815.     The  Cape  was,  in  fact,  the  most  important 
acquisition  secured  to   Britain  by  that  treaty ; 
and  it  is  worth  noting  that  while  the  other  great 
powers  who  had  joined  in  the  final  overthrow  of 
Napoleon  helped  themselves  without  hesitation 
to    immense    and    valuable    territories,    Britain, 
which  had  alone  maintained  the  struggle  from 
beginning  to  end  without  flagging,  actually  paid 
the  sum  of  £2,000,000  to  Holland  as  a  compensa- 
tion for  this  thinly  peopled  settlement.     She  re- 
tained it  mainly  because  of  its  value  as  a  calling- 
station  on  the  way  to  India.     But  it  imposed  upon 


76  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

her  an  imperial  problem  of  a  very  difficult  kind. 
As  in  Canada,  she  had  to  deal  here  with  an  ahen 
race  of  European  origin  and  proud  traditions  ; 
but  this  racial  problem  was  accentuated  by  the 
further  problem  of  dealing  with  a  preponderant 
and  growing  negro  population.  How  were  justice, 
peace,  liberty,  and  equality  of  rights  to  be  estab- 
lished in  such  a  field  ? 

It  was,  then,  an  astonishing  new  empire  which 
had  grown  up  round  Britain  during  the  period 
when  the  world  was  becoming  convinced  that 
colonial  empires  were  not  worth  acquiring,  because 
they  could  not  last.  It  was  an  empire  of  conti- 
nents or  sub-continents — Canada,  Australia,  India, 
South  Africa — not  to  speak  of  innumerable  scat- 
tered islands  and  tradmg-posts  dotted  over  all 
the  seas  of  the  world,  which  had  either  survived 
from  an  earher  period,  or  been  acquired  in  order 
that  they  might  serve  as  naval  bases.  It  was 
spread  round  the  whole  globe  ;  it  included  almost 
every  variety  of  soil,  products,  and  climate  ;  it 
was  inhabited  by  peoples  of  the  most  varying 
types  ;  it  presented  an  infinite  variety  of  political 
and  racial  problems.  In  1825  this  empire  was 
the  only  extra-European  empire  of  importance 
still  controlled  by  any  of  the  historic  imperial 
powers  of  Western  Europe.  And  at  the  opening 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  when  extra-European 
empires  seemed  to  have  gone  out  of  fashion,  the 
greatest  of  all  imperial  questions  was  the  question 
whether  the  poHtical  capacity  of  the  British 
peoples,  having  failed  to  solve  the  comparatively 


THE  ERA  OF  REVOLUTION  77 

simple  problem  of  finding  a  mode  of  organisation 
which  could  hold  together  communities  so  closely 
akin  as  those  of  America  and  the  parent  islands, 
would  be  capable  of  achieving  any  kind  of  effec- 
tive organisation  for  this  new  astounding  fabric, 
while  at  the  same  time  securing  to  all  its  members 
that  liberty  and  variety  of  development  which  in 
the  case  of  America  had  only  been  fully  secured 
at  the  cost  of  disruption. 


EUROPE  AND  THE  NON-EUROPEAN  WORLD 
1815-1878 

When  the  European  peoples  settled  down,  in 
1815,  after  the  long  wars  of  the  French  Revolu- 
tion, they  found  themselves  faced  by  many 
problems,  but  there  were  few  Europeans  who 
would  have  included  among  these  problems  the 
extension  of  Western  civihsation  over  the  as  yet 
unsubjugated  portions  of  the  world.  Men's  hearts 
were  set  upon  the  organisation  of  permanent 
peace :  that  seemed  the  greatest  of  all  questions, 
and,  for  a  time,  it  appeared  to  have  obtained  a 
satisfactory  solution  with  the  organisation  of  the 
great  League  of  Peace  of  1815.  But  the  peace 
was  to  be  short-Uved,  because  it  was  threatened 
by  the  emergence  of  a  number  of  other  problems 
of  great  complexity.  First  among  these  stood  the 
problem  of  nationahty :  the  increasingly  clamor- 
ous demand  of  divided  or  subject  peoples  for 
unity  and  freedom.  Alongside  of  this  arose  the 
sister-problem  of  Uberahsm  :  the  demand  raised 
from  all  sides,  among  peoples  who  had  never 
known  poUtical  Uberty,  for  the  institutions  of 
self-government  which  had  been  proved  practic- 
able by  the  British  peoples,  and  turned  into  the 

78 


EUROPE  AND  THE  NON-EUROPEAN  WORLD  79 

object  of  a  fervent  belief  by  the  preachings  of  the 
French.  These  two  causes  were  to  plunge  Europe 
into  many  wars,  and  to  vex  and  divide  the 
peoples  of  every  European  country,  throughout 
the  period  1815-78.  And  to  add  to  the  com- 
plexity, there  was  growing  in  intensity  during  aU 
these  years  the  problem  of  IndustriaUsm — the 
transformation  of  the  very  bases  of  life  in  all 
civilised  communities,  and  the  consequent  de- 
velopment of  wholly  new,  and  terribly  difficult, 
social  issues.  Preoccupied  with  all  these  ques- 
tions, the  statesmen  and  the  peoples  of  most 
European  states  had  no  attention  to  spare  for  the 
non-European  world.  They  neglected  it  aU  the 
more  readily  because  the  events  of  the  preced- 
ing period  seemed  to  demonstrate  that  colonial 
empires  were  not  worth  the  cost  and  labour 
necessary  for  their  attainment,  since  they  seemed 
doomed  to  fall  asunder  as  soon  as  they  began  to 
be  valuable. 

Yet  the  period  1815-78  was  to  see  an  ex- 
tension of  European  civihsation  in  the  non- 
European  world  more  remarkable  than  that  of 
any  previous  age.  The  main  part  in  this  exten- 
sion was  played  by  Britain,  who  found  herself 
left  free,  without  serious  rivalry  in  any  part  of 
the  globe,  to  expand  and  develop  the  extraordi- 
nary empire  which  she  possessed  in  1815,  and  to 
deal  with  the  bewildering  problems  which  it 
presented.  So  marked  was  the  British  predomi- 
nance in  colonial  activity  during  this  age  that 
it  has  been  called  the  age  of  British  monopoly, 


80  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

and  so  far  as  trans-oceanic  activities  were  con- 
cerned, this  phrase  very  nearly  represents  the 
truth.  But  there  were  other  developments  of  the 
period  almost  as  remarkable  as  the  growth  and 
reorganisation  of  the  British  Empire  ;  and  it  will 
bo  convenient  to  survey  these  in  the  first  instance 
before  turning  to  the  British  achievement. 

The  place  of  honour,  as  always  in  any  great 
story  of  European  civilisation,  belongs  to  France. 
Undeterred  by  the  loss  of  her  earher  empire, 
and  unexhausted  by  the  strain  of  the  great  ordeal 
through  which  she  had  just  passed,  France  began 
in  these  years  the  creation  of  her  second  colonial 
empire,  which  was  to  be  in  many  ways  more 
splendid  than  the  first.  Within  fifteen  years  of 
the  fall  of  Napoleon,  the  French  flag  was  flying 
in  Algiers. 

The  northern  coast  of  Africa,  from  the  Gulf  of 
S3rrtis  to  the  Atlantic,  which  has  been  in  modern 
times  divided  into  the  three  districts  of  Tunis, 
Algeria,  and  Morocco,  forms  essentially  a  single 
region,  whose  character  is  determined  by  the 
numerous  chains  of  the  Atlas  Mountains.  This 
region,  shut  off  from  the  rest  of  Africa  not  only 
hy  the  Atlas  but  by  the  most  impassable  of  all 
geographical  barriers,  the  great  Sahara  desert, 
really  belongs  to  Europe  rather  than  to  the 
continent  of  which  it  forms  a  part.  Its  fertile 
valleys  were  once  the  homes  of  brilliant  civilisa- 
tions ;  they  were  the  seat  of  the  Carthaginian 
Empire,  and  at  a  later  date  they  constituted  one 
of  the  richest  and  most  civilised  provinces  of  the 


EUROPE  AND  THE  NON-EUROPEAN  WORLD     81 

Roman  Empire.     Their  civilisation  was  wrecked 
by  that  barbarous  German  tribe,  the  Vandals,  in 
the  fifth  century.     It  received  only  a  partial  and 
temporary  revival  after  the  Mahomedan  conquest  at 
the  end  of  the  seventh  century,  and  since  that  date 
this  once  happy  region  has  gradually  lapsed  into 
barbarism.     During  the  modern  age  it  was  chiefly 
known    as    the    home   of    ruthless    and   destruc- 
tive pirates,   whose   chief  headquarters  were   at 
Algiers,  and  who  owned  a  merely  nominal  allegi- 
ance to  the  Sultan  of  Turkey.     Ever  since  the 
time   of   Khair-ed-din   Barbarossa,   in   the   early 
sixteenth   century,   the  powers   of  Europe  have 
striven  in  vain  to  keep  the  Barbary  corsairs  in 
check.     Charles  v.,  Philip  n.,  Louis  xiv.  attacked 
them  with  only  temporary  success  :    they  con- 
tinued to  terrorise  the  trade  of  the  Mediterranean, 
to   seize   trading-ships,    to   pillage   the   shores   of 
Spain  and  Italy,  and  to  carry  off  thousands  of 
Christians  into  a  cruel  slavery  ;   Robinson  Crusoe, 
it  may  be  recalled,   was  one   of    their   victims. 
The  powers   at  Vienna  endeavoured  to  concert 
action  against  them  in  1815.     They  were  attacked 
by  a  British  fleet  in   1816,  and  by  a  combined 
British  and  French  fleet  in  1819.      But  all  such 
temporary  measures  were  insufficient.     The  only 
cure  for  the  ill  was  that  the  headquarters  of  the 
pirate  chiefs  should  be  conquered,  and  brought 
under  civilised  government. 

This  task  France  was  rather  reluctantly  drawn 
into  undertaking,  as  the  result  of  a  series  of 
insults  offered  by  the  pirates  to  the  French  flag 


82  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

between  1827  and  1830.  At  first  the  aim  of  the 
conquerors  was  merely  to  occupy  and  administer 
the  few  ports  which  formed  the  chief  centres  of 
piracy.  But  experience  showed  that  this  was 
futile,  since  it  involved  endless  wars  with  the 
unruly  clansmen  of  the  interior.  Gradually, 
therefore,  the  whole  of  Algeria  was  systematically 
conquered  and  organised.  The  process  took  nearly 
twenty  years,  and  was  not  completed  until  1848. 
In  all  the  records  of  European  imperialism  there 
has  been  no  conquest  more  completely  justified 
both  by  the  events  which  led  up  to  it  and  by  the 
results  which  have  followed  from  it.  Peace  and 
Law  reign  throughout  a  country  which  had  for 
centuries  been  given  over  to  anarchy.  The  wild 
tribesmen  are  unlearning  the  habits  of  disorder, 
and  being  taught  to  accept  the  conditions  of  a 
civilised  life.  The  great  natural  resources  of  the 
country  are  being  developed  as  never  since  the 
days  of  Roman  rule.  No  praise  can  be  too  high 
for  the  work  of  the  French  administrators  who 
have  achieved  these  results.  And  it  is  worth 
noting  that,  alone  among  the  provinces  conquered 
by  the  European  peoples,  Algeria  has  been 
actually  incorporated  in  the  mother-country  ;  it 
is  part  of  the  French  R-epubhc,  and  its  elected 
representatives  sit  in  the  French  Parhament. 

In  the  nature  of  things  the  conquest  of  Algeria 
could  not  stand  alone.  Algeria  is  separated  by 
merely  artificial  lines  from  Tunis  on  the  east  and 
Morocco  on  the  west,  where  the  old  conditions 
of  anarchy  still  survived  ;    and  the  establishment 


EUROPE  AND  THE  NON-EUROPEAN  WORLD  83 

of  order  and  peace  in  the  middle  area  of  ttiis 
single  natural  region  was  difficult,  so  long  as  the 
areas  on  either  side  remained  in  disorder  and 
war.  In  1844  France  found  it  necessary  to  make 
war  upon  Morocco  because  of  the  support  which 
it  had  afforded  to  a  rebeUious  Algerian  chief, 
and  this  episode  illustrated  the  close  connection 
of  the  two  regions.  But  the  troops  were  with- 
drawn as  soon  as  the  immediate  purpose  was 
served.  France  had  not  yet  begun  to  think  of 
extending  her  dominion  over  the  areas  to  the 
east  and  west  of  Algeria.  That  was  to  be  the 
work  of  the  next  period. 

Further  south  in  Africa,  France  retained,  as  a 
relic  of  her  older  empire,  a  few  posts  on  the 
coast  of  West  Africa,  notably  Senegal.  From 
these  her  intrepid  explorers  and  traders  began  to 
extend  their  influence,  and  the  dream  of  a  great 
French  empire  in  Northern  Africa  began  to 
attract  French  minds.  But  the  realisation  of  this 
dream  also  belongs  to  the  next  period.  In  the 
Far  East,  too,  this  was  a  period  of  beginnings. 
Ever  since  1787 — ^before  the  Revolution — the 
French  had  possessed  a  foothold  on  the  coast  of 
Annam,  from  which  French  missionaries  carried 
on  their  labours  among  the  peoples  of  Indo-China. 
Maltreatment  of  these  missionaries  led  to  a  war 
with  Annam  in  1858,  and  in  1862  the  extreme 
south  of  the  Amiamese  Empire — the  province  of 
Cochin-China — was  ceded  to  France.  Lastly,  the 
French  obtained  a  foothold  in  the  Pacific,  by  the 
annexation  of  Tahiti  and  the  IMarquesas  Islands 


84  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

in  1842,  and  of  New  Caledonia  in  1855.  But  in 
1878  the  French  dominions  in  the  non-European 
world  were,  apart  from  Algeria,  of  shght  import- 
ance. They  were  quite  insignificant  in  com- 
parison with  the  far-spreading  realms  of  her 
ancient  rival,  Britain. 

On  a  much  greater  scale  than  the  expansion  of 
France  was  the  expansion  of  the  already  vast 
Russian  Empire  during  this  period.  The  history 
of  Russia  in  the  nineteenth  century  is  made  up 
of  a  series  of  alternations  between  a  regime  of 
comparative  hberahsm,  when  the  interest  of 
government  and  people  was  chiefly  turned  to- 
wards the  west,  and  a  regime  of  reaction,  when 
the  government  endeavoured  to  pursue  what  was 
called  a  '  national '  or  purely  Russian  policy,  and 
to  exclude  all  Western  influences.  During  these 
long  intervals  of  reaction,  attention  was  turned 
eastward  ;  and  it  was  in  the  reactionary  periods, 
mainly,  that  the  Russian  power  was  rapidly 
extended  in  three  directions — over  the  Caucasus, 
over  Central  Asia,  and  m  the  Far  East. 

Before  this  advance,  the  huge  Russian  Empire 
had  been  (everywhere  except  on  the  west,  in  the 
region  of  Poland)  marked  off  by  very  clearly 
defined  barriers.  The  Caucasus  presented  a  formid- 
able obstacle  between  Russia  and  the  Turkish 
and  Persian  Empires  ;  the  deserts  of  Central  Asia 
separated  her  from  the  Moslem  peoples  of  KJiiva, 
Bokhara  and  Turkestan  ;  the  huge  range  of  the 
Altai  Mountains  and  the  desert  of  Gobi  cut  ofl 
her  thinly  peopled  province  of  Eastern  Siberia 


EUROPE  AND  THE  NON-EUROPEAN  WORLD    85 

from  the  Chinese  Empu'e ;  while  in  the  remote 
East  her  shores  verged  upon  ice-bomid  and  in- 
hospitable seas.  Hers  was  thus  an  extraordi- 
narily isolated  and  self-contained  empire,  except 
on  the  side  of  Europe  ;  and  even  on  the  side  of 
Europe  she  was  more  inaccessible  than  any  other 
state,  being  all  but  land-locked,  and  divided 
from  Central  Europe  by  a  belt  of  forests  and 
marshes. 

The  part  she  had  played  in  the  Napoleonic 
Wars,  and  in  the  events  which  followed  them,  had 
brought  her  more  fully  into  contact  with  Europe 
than  she  had  ever  been  before.  The  acquisition 
of  Poland  and  Finland,  which  she  obtained  by 
the  treaties  of  1815,  had  increased  this  contact, 
for  both  of  these  states  were  much  influenced 
by  Western  ideas.  Russia  had  promised  that  their 
distinct  national  existence,  and  their  national  in- 
stitutions, should  be  preserved ;  and  this  seemed 
to  suggest  that  the  Russian  Empire  might  de- 
velop into  a  partnership  of  nations  of  varying 
types,  not  altogether  unlike  the  form  into  which 
the  British  Empire  was  developing.  But  this 
conception  had  no  attraction  for  the  Russian 
mind,  or  at  any  rate  for  the  Russian  government ; 
and  the  reactionary  or  pure-Russian  school, 
which  strove  to  exclude  all  ahen  influences,  was 
inevitably  hostile  to  it.  Hence  the  period  of 
reaction,  and  of  eastward  conquest,  saw  also  the 
denial  of  the  promises  made  in  1815.  Poland  pre- 
served her  distinct  national  organisation,  in  any 
full  degree,  only  for  fifteen  years ;    even  in  the 


86  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

faintest  degree,  it  was  preserved  for  less  than 
fifty  years.  Finland  was  allowed  a  longer  grace, 
but  only,  perhaps,  because  she  was  isolated  and 
had  but  a  small  population  :  her  turn  for  ',  Russi- 
fication  '  was  to  come  in  due  course.  The  ex- 
clusion of  Western  influence,  the  segregation  of 
Russia  from  the  rest  of  the  world,  and  the  re- 
pudiation of  liberty  and  of  varieties  of  type  thus 
form  the  main  features  of  the  reactionary  periods 
which  filled  the  greater  part  of  this  age ;  and  the 
activity  of  Russia  in  eastward  expansion  was  in 
part  intended  to  forward  this  pohcy,  by  diverting 
the  attention  of  the  Russian  people  from  the  west 
towards  the  east,  and  by  substituting  the  pride 
of  dominion  for  the  desire  for  liberty.  Hence  im- 
perialism came  to  be  identified,  for  the  Russian 
people,  with  the  denial  of  liberty. 

But  it  is  a  very  striking  fact  that  each  of  the 
three  main  lines  of  territorial  advance  followed 
by  Russia  in  Asia  during  this  period  led  her  to 
overstep  the  natural  barriers  which  had  made 
her  an  isolated  and  self-dependent  empire,  brought 
her  into  relation  with  other  civilisations,  and 
compelled  her  to  play  her  part  as  one  of  the 
factors  in  world-politics. 

Russia  had  begun  the  conquest  of  the  wild 
Caucasus  region  as  early  as  1802  ;  after  a  long 
series  of  wars,  she  completed  it  by  the  acquisition 
of  the  region  of  Kars  in  1878.  The  mastery  of 
the  Caucasus  brought  her  into  immediate  rela- 
tion with  the  Armenian  province  of  the  Turkish 
Empire,  which  she  henceforward  threatened  from 


EUROPE  AND  THE  NON-EUROPEAN  WORLD  87 

the  east  as  well  as  from  the  west.  It  brought 
her  into  contact  also  with  the  Persian  Empire, 
over  whose  policy,  from  1835  onwards,  she  wielded 
a  growing  influence,  to  the  perturbation  of 
Britain.  And  besides  bringing  her  into  far  closer 
relations  with  the  two  greatest  Mahomedan 
powers,  it  gave  her  a  considerable  number  of 
Mahomedan  subjects,  since  some  of  the  Caucasus 
tribes  belonged  to  that  faith. 

Again,  the  conquest  of  Central  Asia  led  her  to 
overstep  the  barrier  of  the  Kirghiz  deserts.  The 
wandering  Kirghiz  and  Turkoman  tribes  of  this 
barren  region  lived  largely  upon  the  pillage  of 
caravans,  and  upon  raids  into  neighbouring 
countries  ;  they  disposed  of  their  spoil  (which 
often  included  Russian  captives)  mainly  in  the 
bazars  of  Bokhara,  Khiva,  Samarkand  and 
IChokand — Mahomedan  Khanates  which  occupied 
the  more  fertile  areas  in  the  southern  and  south- 
eastern part  of  the  desert  region.  The  attempt 
to  control  the  Turkoman  raiders  brought  Russia 
into  conflict  with  these  outposts  of  Islam.  Almost 
the  whole  of  this  region  was  conquered  in  a  long 
series  of  campaigns  between  1848  and  1876. 
These  conquests  (which  covered  an  area  1200 
miles  from  east  to  west  and  600  miles  from  north 
to  south)  made  Russia  a  great  Mahomedan  power. 
They  also  brought  her  into  direct  contact  with 
Afghanistan.  Russian  agents  were  at  work  in 
Afghanistan  from  1838  onwards.  The  shadow  of 
her  vast  power,  looming  over  Persia  and  the 
Persian    Gulf   on   the   one   hand,    and   over  the 


88  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

mountain  frontiers  of  India  on  the  other,  naturally 
appeared  highly  menacing  to  Britam.  It  was  the 
direct  cause  of  the  advance  of  the  British  power 
from  the  Indus  over  North- Western  India,  until  it 
could  rest  upon  the  natural  frontier  of  the  moun- 
tains— an  advance  which  took  place  mainly 
during  the  years  1839-49.  And  it  formed  the 
chief  source  of  the  undying  suspicion  of  Russia 
which  was  the  dominant  note  of  British  foreign 
policy  throughout  the  period. 

Another  feature  of  these  conquests  was  that, 
taken  in  conjunction  with  the  French  conquest 
of  Algeria  and  the  British  conquest  of  India,  thej^ 
constituted  the  first  serious  impact  of  European 
civilisation  upon  the  vast  realm  of  Islam.  Until 
now  the  regions  of  the  Mddle  East  which  had 
been  subjugated  by  the  followers  of  Mahomed 
had  repelled  every  attack  of  the  West.  More 
definite  in  its  creed,  and  more  exacting  in  its 
demands  upon  the  allegiance  of  its  adherents, 
than  any  other  religion,  Mahomedanism  had  for 
more  than  a  thousand  years  been  able  to  resist 
with  extraordinary  success  the  influence  of  other 
civiUsations ;  and  it  had  been,  from  the  time 
of  the  Crusades  onwards,  the  most  formidable 
opponent  of  the  civilisation  of  the  West.  Under 
the  rule  of  the  Turk  the  Mahomedan  world  had 
become  stagnant  and  sterile,  and  it  had  shut  out 
not  merely  the  direct  control  of  the  West  (which 
would  have  been  legitimate  enough),  but  the  influ- 
ence of  Western  ideas.  All  the  innumerable 
schemes  of  reform  which  were  based  upon  the 


EUROPE  AND  THE  NON-EUROPEAN  WORLD  89 

retention  of  the  old  regime  in  the  Turkish  Empire 
have  hopelessly  broken  down :  and  the  only  chance 
for  an  awakening  in  these  lands  of  ancient  civilisa- 
tion seemed  to  depend  upon  the  breakdown  of  the 
old  system  under  the  impact  of  Western  imperial- 
ism or  insurgent  nationalism.  It  has  only  been 
during  the  nineteenth  century,  as  a  result  of 
Russian,  French,  and  British  imperiaUsm,  that 
the  resisting  power  of  Islam  has  begun  to  give 
way  to  the  influence  of  Europe.  >/ 

The  third  line  of  Russian  advance  was  on  the 
Pacific  coast,  where  in  the  years  1858  and  1860 
Russia  obtained  from  China  the  Amur  province, 
with  the  valuable  harbour  of  Vladivostok.  It  was 
an  almost  empty  land,  but  its  acquisition  made 
Russia  a  Pacific  power,  and  brought  her  mto 
very  close  neighbourhood  with  China,  into  whose 
reserved  markets,  at  the  same  period,  the  mari- 
time powers  of  the  West  were  forcing  an  entrance. 
At  the  same  time  Russian  relations  with  Japan, 
which  were  to  have  such  pregnant  consequences, 
were  beginning  :  in  1875  the  Japanese  were  forced 
to  cede  the  southern  half  of  the  island  of  Sakhahn, 
and  perhaps  we  may  date  from  this  year  the 
suspicion  of  Russia  which  dominated  Japanese 
policy  for  a  long  time  to  come. 

Thus,  while  in  Europe  Russia  was  trying  to 
shut  herself  off  from  contact  with  the  world,  her 
advances  in  Asia  had  brought  her  at  three  points 
into  the  full  stream  of  world-politics.  Her  vast 
empire,  though  for  the  most  part  very  thinly 
peopled,    formed    beyond    all    comparison     the 


90  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

greatest  continuous  area  ever  brought  under  a 
single  rule,  since  it  amounted  to  between  eight 
and  nine  million  square  miles  ;  and  when  the 
next  age,  the  age  of  rivalry  for  world-power, 
began,  this  colossal  fabric  of  power  haunted  and 
dominated  the  imaginations  of  men. 

A  demonstration  of  the  growing  power  of 
Western  civilisation,  even  more  impressive  than 
the  expansion  of  the  Russian  Empire,  was  afforded 
during  these  years  by  the  opening  to  Western 
influence  of  the  ancient,  pot-bound  empires  of  the 
Far  East,  China  and  Japan.  The  opening  of 
China  began  with  the  Anglo-Chinese  War  of  1840, 
which  led  to  the  acquisition  of  Hong-Kong  and 
the  openmg  of  a  group  of  treaty  ports  to  European 
trade.  It  was  carried  further  by  the  combined 
Franco-British  war  of  1857-58,  which  v/as  ended 
by  a  treaty  permitting  the  free  access  of  European 
travellers,  traders,  and  missionaries  to  the  in- 
terior, and  providing  for  the  permanent  residence 
of  ambassadors  of  the  signatory  powers  at  the 
court  of  Pekin.  All  the  European  states  rushed 
to  share  these  privileges,  and  the  Westernising  of 
China  had  begun.  It  did  not  take  place  rapidly 
or  completely,  and  it  was  accompanied  by  grave 
disturbances,  notably  the  Taiping  rebellion,  which 
was  only  suppressed  by  the  aid  of  the  British 
General  Gordon,  in  command  of  a  Chinese  army. 
But  though  the  process  was  slow,  it  was  fully  at 
work  by  1878.  The  external  trade  of  China, 
nearly  all  in  European  hands,  had  assumed  great 
proportions.     The  missionaries  and  schoolmasters 


EUROPE  AND  THE  NON-EUROPEAN  WORLD     91 

of  Europe  and  America  were  busily  at  work  in 
the  most  populous  provinces.  Shanghai  had 
become  a  European  city,  and  one  of  the  great 
trade-centres  of  the  world.  In  a  lame  and  in- 
competent way  the  Chinese  government  was 
attempting  to  organise  its  army  on  the  European 
model,  and  to  create  a  navy  after  the  European 
style.  Steamboats  were  plying  on  the  Yang-tse- 
kiang,  and  the  first  few  miles  of  railway  were 
open.  Chinese  students  were  beginning  to  resort 
to  the  universities  and  schools  of  the  West ;  and 
although  the  conservatism  of  the  Chinese  mind 
was  very  slow  to  make  the  plunge,  it  was  already 
plain  that  this  vast  hive  of  patient,  clever,  and 
industrious  men  was  bound  to  enter  the  orbit  of 
Western  civilisation. 

Meanwhile,  after  a  longer  and  stiffer  resist- 
ance, Japan  had  made  up  her  mind  to  a  great 
change  with  amazing  suddenness  and  complete- 
ness. There  had  been  some  preUminary  relations 
with  the  Western  peoples,  beginning  with  the 
visits  of  the  American  Commodore  Perry  in 
1853  and  1854,  and  a  few  ports  had  been  opened 
to  European  trade.  But  then  came  a  sudden, 
violent  reaction  (1862).  The  British  embassy  was 
attacked ;  a  number  of  British  subjects  were 
murdered ;  a  mixed  jfleet  of  British,  French, 
Dutch,  and  American  ships  proved  the  power  of 
Western  arms,  and  Japan  began  to  awaken  to 
the  necessity  of  adopting,  in  self-defence,  the 
methods  of  these  intrusive  foreigners.  The  story 
of  the  internal  revolution  in  Japan,  which  began 


92  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

in  1866,  cannot  be  told  here  ;  enough  that  it  led 
to  the  most  astounding  change  in  history.  Emerg- 
ing from  her  age-long  isolation  and  from  her 
contentment  with  her  ancient,  unchanging  modes 
of  life,  Japan  reahsed  that  the  future  lay  with 
the  restless  and  progressive  civilisation  of  the 
West ;  and  with  a  national  resolve  to  which  there 
is  no  sort  of  parallel  or  analogy  in  history,  de- 
cided that  she  must  not  wait  to  be  brought  under 
subjection,  but  must  adopt  the  new  methods  and 
ideas  for  herself,  if  possible  without  shedding  too 
much  of  her  ancient  traditions.  By  a  dehberate 
exercise  of  the  will  and  an  extraordinary  effort 
of  organisation,  she  became  industrial  without 
ceasing  to  be  artistic  ;  she  adopted  parliamentary 
institutions  without  abandoning  her  rehgious 
veneration  for  the  person  of  the  Mikado  ;  she 
borrowed  the  military  methods  of  the  West  with- 
out losing  the  chivalrous  and  fatahst  devotion  of 
her  warrior-caste ;  and  devised  a  Western  educa- 
tional system  without  disturbing  the  deep  oriental- 
ism of  her  mind.  It  was  a  transformation  almost 
terrifying,  and  to  any  Western  quite  bewildering, 
in  its  deliberation,  rapidity,  and  completeness. 
Europe  long  remained  unconvinced  of  its  reality. 
But  in  1878  the  work  was,  in  its  essentials,  already 
achieved,  and  the  one  state  of  non-European  origin 
which  has  been  able  calmly  to  choose  what  she 
would  accept  and  what  she  would  reject  among  the 
systems  and  methods  of  the  West,  stood  ready  to 
play  an  equal  part  with  the  European  nations  in 
the  later  stages  of  the  long  imperial  struggle. 


EUROPE  AND  THE  NON-EUROPEAN  WORLD  93 

One  last  sphere  of  activity  remains  to  be  sur- 
veyed before  we  turn  to  consider  the  develop- 
ment of  the  new  British  Empire:    the  expansion 
of  the  independent  states  which  had  arisen  on 
the  ruins  of  the  first  colonial  empires  in  the  New 
World.     Of  the  Spanish  and  Portuguese  states  of 
Central  and  South  America  it  is  not  necessary  to 
say  much.     They  had  established  their  independ- 
ence between  1815  and  1825.     But  the  unhappy 
traditions  of  the  long   Spanish  ascendancy  had 
rendered  them  incapable  of  using  freedom  well, 
and  Central  and  South  America  became  the  scene 
of  ceaseless  and  futile  revolutions.     The  influence 
of  the  American  Monroe  Doctrine  forbade,  per- 
haps fortunately,  the  intervention  of  any  of  the 
European  states  to  put  an  end  to  this  confusion, 
and  America  herself  made  no  serious  attempt  to 
restrain  it.     It  was  not  until  the  later  years  of  our 
period  that  any  large  stream  of  immigration  began 
to    flow  into    these    lands   from   other  European 
countries  than  Spain  and  Portugal,  and  that  their 
vast  natural  resources  began  to  be  developed  by 
the  energy  and  capital  of  Europe.     But  by  1878 
the  more  fertile  of  these  states,  Argentina,  Brazil, 
and  Chili,  were  being  enriched  by  these  means, 
were   becoming    highly    important    elements    in 
the  trade-system  of  the  world,  and  were  conse- 
quently   beginning    to    achieve    a    more    stable 
and   settled   civilisation.     In   some   regards   this 
work  (though  it  belongs  mainly  to  the  period  after 
1878)  constitutes  one  of  the  happiest  results  of  the 
extra-European  activities  of  the  European  peoples 


94  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

during  the  nineteenth  century.  It  was  carried  on, 
in  the  main,  not  by  governments  or  under  govern- 
ment encouragement,  but  by  the  private  enter- 
prises of  merchants  and  capitalists  ;  and  while  a 
very  large  part  in  these  enterprises  was  played 
by  British  and  American  traders  and  settlers,  one 
of  the  most  notable  features  of  the  growth  of  South 
America  was  that  it  gave  play  to  some  of  the 
European  peoples,  notably  the  Germans  and  the 
Italians,  whose  part  in  the  political  division  of 
the  world  was  relatively  small. 

Far  more  impressive  was  the  almost  miraculous 
expansion  which  came  to  the  United  States  during 
this  period.  When  the  United  States  started 
upon  their  career  as  an  independent  nation  in 
1782,  their  territory  was  limited  to  the  lands 
east  of  the  Mississippi,  excluding  Florida,  which 
was  still  retained  by  Spain.  Only  the  eastern 
margin  of  this  area  was  at  all  fully  settled  ;  and 
the  population  numbered  at  most  2,000,000, 
predominantly  of  British  blood.  In  1803,  by  a 
treaty  with  Napoleon,  the  French  colony  of 
Louisiana,  with  vast  and  ill-defined  claims  to  the 
territory  west  of  the  Mississippi,  was  purchased 
from  France.  MeanAvhile  the  stream  of  immi- 
grants from  the  eastern  states,  and  in  a  less 
degree  from  Europe,  was  pouring  over  the 
Alleghany  Mountains  and  occupying  the  great 
central  plain ;  and  by  1815  the  population  had 
risen  to  almost  9,000,000,  still  mauily  of  British 
stock,  though  it  also  included  substantial  French 
and  German  elements,  as  well  as  large  numbers  of 


EUROPE  AND  THE  NON-EUROPEAN  WORLD    96 

negro  slaves.  In  1819  Florida  was  acquired  by- 
purchase  from  Spain.  In  1845-48  a  revolution  in 
Texas  (then  part  of  Mexico),  followed  by  two 
Mexican  wars,  led  to  the  annexation  of  a  vast 
area  extending  from  the  GuK  of  Mexico  to  the 
Pacific  coast,  including  the  paradise  of  California ; 
while  treaties  with  Britain  in  1818  and  1846 
determined  the  northern  boundary  of  the  States, 
and  secured  their  control  over  the  regions  of 
Washington  and  Oregon. 

Thus  the  imperialist  spirit  was  working  as  irresis- 
tibly in  the  democratic  communities  of  the  New 
World  as  in  the  monarchies  of  Europe.  Not  content 
with  the  possession  of  vast  and  almost  unpeopled 
areas,  they  had  spread  their  dominion  from  ocean 
to  ocean,  and  built  up  an  empire  less  extensive 
mdeed  than  that  of  Russia,  but  even  more  com- 
pact, far  richer  in  resources,  and  far  better  suited 
to  be  the  home  of  a  highly  civilised  people.  Into 
this  enormous  area  there  began  to  pour  a  mighty- 
flood  of  immigration  from  Europe,  as  soon  as 
the  Napoleonic  wars  were  over.  By  1878  the 
population  of  the  States  had  risen  to  about 
50,000,000,  and  was  greater  than  that  of  any 
European  state  save  Russia.  A  new  world-state 
of  the  first  rank  had  arisen.  It  was  made  up  of 
contributions  from  all  the  European  peoples. 
Those  of  British  stock,  especially  the  Irish,  still 
predominated  throughout  this  period,  but  the 
Germans  and  the  Scandinavians  were  becoming 
increasingly  numerous,  and  the  ItaUans,  Greeks, 
Poles,  Czechs,  Russian   Jews,    and   other   stocl^s 


96  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

were  beginning  to  form  very  substantial  elements. 
It  was  a  melting-pot  of  races,  which  had  to  be 
somehow  welded  into  a  nation  by  the  moulding - 
power  of  the  traditions  implanted  by  the  earlier 
British  settlers.  It  may  fairly  be  said  that  no 
community  has  ever  had  imposed  upon  it  a  more 
difficult  task  than  the  task  imposed  hj  Fate  upon 
the  American  people  of  creating  a  national  unity 
out  of  this  heterogeneous  material.  The  great  ex- 
periment was,  during  this  period,  singularly  success- 
ful. The  strength  of  the  national  sentiment  and 
of  the  tradition  of  freedom  was  very  powerfully 
exhibited  in  the  strain  of  the  great  Civil  War 
(1861-65)  which  maintained  at  a  great  cost  the 
threatened  unity  of  the  republic,  and  brought 
about  the  emancipation  of  the  negro  slaves.  And 
the  Civil  War  produced  in  Abraham  Lincoln  a 
national  hero,  and  an  exponent  of  the  national 
character  and  ideals,  worthy  to  be  set  beside 
Washington.  The  America  of  Lincoln  manifestly 
stood  for  Liberty  and  Justice,  the  fundamental 
ideals  of  Western  civihsation. 

But  in  this  great  moulding  tradition  of  freedom 
there  was  one  dubious  and  narrowing  element. 
Accustomed  to  regard  herself  as  having  achieved 
liberty  by  shaking  off  her  connection  with  the  Old 
World,  America  was  tempted  to  think  of  this 
liberty  as  something  peculiar  to  herself,  something 
which  the  '  effete  monarchies '  of  the  Old  World 
did  not,  and  could  not,  fully  understand  or  share, 
something  which  exempted  her  from  responsi- 
bility for  the  non- American  world,  and  from  the 


EUROPE  AND  THE  NON-EUROPEAN  WORLD     97 

duty  of  aiding  and  defending  liberty  beyond  her 
own  limits.  In  the  abounding  prosperity  of  this 
fortunate  land,  Hberty  was  apt  to  be  too  readily 
identified  merely  with  the  opportunity  of  securing 
material  prosperity,  and  the  love  of  liberty  was 
apt  to  become,  what  indeed  it  too  often  is  every- 
where, a  purely  self-regarding  emotion.  The 
distance  of  the  repubhc  from  Europe  and  its  con- 
troversies, its  economic  self-sufficiency,  its  ap- 
parent security  against  all  attack,  fostered  and 
strengthened  this  feeling.  While  the  peoples  of 
the  Old  World  strove  with  agony  and  travail  to- 
wards freedom  and  justice,  or  wrestled  with  the 
task  of  sharing  their  own  civilisation  with  the 
backward  races  of  the  globe,  the  echo  of  their 
strivings  penetrated  but  faintly  into  the  mind  of 
America,  like  the  noises  of  the  street  dimly  heard 
through  the  shuttered  windows  of  a  warmed  and 
lighted  room.  To  the  citizens  of  the  Middle  West 
and  the  Far  West,  especially,  busy  as  they  were 
with  the  development  of  vast  untapped  resources, 
the  affairs  of  the  outer  world  necessarily  appeared 
remote  and  insignificant.  Even  their  newspapers 
told  them  little  about  these  far-off  events.  Natur- 
ally it  appeared  that  the  function  of  the  republic 
in  the  progress  of  the  world  was  to  till  its  own 
garden,  and  to  afford  a  haven  of  refuge  to  the 
oppressed  and  impoverished  who  poured  in  from 
all  lands  ;  and  this  idea  was  strengthened  by  the 
great  number  of  immigrants  who  were  driven  to 
the  New  World  by  the  failure  of  the  successive 
European  revolutions  of  the  nineteenth  century, 


98  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

and  by  the  oppressive  tyranny  of  the  Habsburg 
monarchy  and  the  Russian  despots. 

This  attitude  of  aloofness  from,  and  contempt, 
or,  at  the  best,  indifference,  to  the  Old  World  was 
further  encouraged  by  the  traditional  treatment 
of  American  history.  The  outstanding  event  of 
that  story  was,  of  course,  the  breach  with  Britain, 
with  which  the  independent  existence  of  the  Re- 
public began,  and  which  constituted  also  almost 
its  only  direct  contact  with  the  politics  of  the  Old 
World.  The  view  of  this  conflict  which  was  driven 
into  the  national  mind  by  the  school-books,  by  the 
annual  celebrations  of  the  Fourth  of  July,  and 
by  incessant  newspaper  writing,  represented  the 
great  quarrel  not  as  a  dispute  in  a  family  of  free 
communities,  in  which  a  new  and  very  difficult 
problem  was  raised,  and  in  which  there  were  faults 
on  both  sides,  but  as  one  in  which  all  the  right 
was  on  one  side,  as  a  heroic  resistance  of  free  men 
against  malevolent  tyranny.  This  view  has  been 
profoundly  modified  by  the  work  of  American 
historians,  whose  researches  during  the  last  genera- 
tion have  transformed  the  treatment  of  the  Ameri- 
can Revolution.  To-day  the  old  one-sided  view 
finds  expression,  in  books  of  serious  pretensions, 
only  in  England ;  and  it  is  to  American  scholars 
that  we  must  have  recourse  for  a  more  scientific 
and  impartial  treatment.  But  the  new  and  saner 
view  has  scarcely  yet  made  its  way  into  the  school- 
books  and  the  newspapers.  If  Britain,  the  mother 
of  political  liberty  in  the  modern  world,  the  land 
from  which  these  freemen  had  inherited  their  own 


EUROPE  AND  THE  NON-EUROPEAN  WORLD    99 

liberties  and  the  spirit  which  made  them  insist 
upon  their  enlargement,  was  made  to  appear  a 
tyrant  power,  how  could  it  be  expected  that  the 
mass  of  Americans,  unversed  in  world-politics, 
should  follow  with  sympathy  the  progress  of  liberty 
beyond  the  limits  of  their  own  republic  ?  It  was 
in  the  light  of  this  traditional  attitude  that  the 
bulk  of  Americans  regarded  not  only  the  wars  and 
controversies  of  Europe,  but  the  vast  process  of 
European  expansion.  All  these  things  did  not 
appear  to  concern  them  ;  they  seemed  to  be  caused 
by  motives  and  ideas  which  the  great  republic  had 
outgrown,  though,  as  we  have  already  seen,  and 
shall  see  again,  the  republic  had  by  no  means  out- 
grown them.  The  strength  of  this  traditional 
attitude,  fostered  as  it  was  by  every  circumstance, 
naturally  made  the  bulk  of  the  American  people 
slow  to  realise,  when  the  great  challenge  of  Ger- 
many was  forced  upon  the  world,  that  the  problems 
of  world-politics  were  as  vitally  important  for 
them  as  for  all  other  peoples,  and  that  no  free 
nation  could  afiord  to  be  indifferent  to  the  fate  of 
liberty  upon  the  earth. 

At  one  moment,  indeed,  almost  at  the  beginning 
of  the  period,  it  appeared  as  if  this  narrow  out- 
look was  about  to  be  abandoned.  The  League  of 
Peace  of  the  great  European  powers  of  1815^  had, 
by  1822,  developed  into  a  league  of  despots  for 
the  suppression  of  revolutionary  tendencies.  They 
had  intervened  to  crush  revolutionary  outbreaks 

^  See  Nationalism  and  Internationalism,  p.  155  ff. 


100  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

in  Naples  and  Piedmont ;  they  had  authorised 
France  to  enter  Spain  in  order  to  destroy  the 
democratic  system  which  had  been  set  up  in  that 
country  in  1820.  Britain  alone  protested  against 
these  interventions,  claiming  that  every  state 
ought  to  be  left  free  to  fix  its  own  form  of  govern- 
ment ;  and  in  1822  Canning  had  practically 
withdrawn  from  the  League  of  Peace,  because  it 
was  being  turned  into  an  engine  of  oppression. 
It  was  notorious  that,  Spain  once  subjugated, 
the  monarchs  desired  to  go  on  to  the  reconquest 
of  the  revolting  Spanish  colonies  in  South  America. 
Britain  could  not  undertake  a  war  on  the  Conti- 
nent against  all  the  Continental  powers  combined, 
but  she  could  prevent  their  intervention  in 
America,  and  Canning  made  it  plain  that  the 
British  fleet  would  forbid  any  such  action.  To 
strengthen  his  hands,  he  suggested  to  the  Ameri- 
can ambassador  that  the  United  States  might 
take  common  action  in  this  sense.  The  result 
was  the  famous  message  of  President  Monroe  to 
Congress  in  December  1823,  which  declared  that 
the  United  States  accepted  the  doctrine  of  non- 
intervention, and  that  they  would  resist  any 
attempt  on  the  part  of  the  European  monarchs 
to  establish  their  reactionary  system  in  the 
New  World. 

In  effect  this  was  a  declaration  of  support  for 
Britain.  It  was  so  regarded  by  Monroe's  most 
influential  adviser,  Thomas  Jefferson.  *  Great 
Britain,'  he  wrote,  '  is  the  nation  which  can  do 
us  the  most  harm  of  any  one,  or  aU,  on  earth, 


EUROPE  AND  THE  NON-EUROPEAN  WORLD  101 

and  with  her  on  our  side  we  need  not  fear 
the  whole  world.  With  her,  then,  we  should 
the  most  sedulously  cherish  a  cordial  friendship  ; 
and  nothing  would  tend  more  to  knit  our  affec- 
tion than  to  be  fighting  once  more  side  by  side 
in  the  same  cause.'  To  be  fighting  side  by  side 
with  Britain  in  the  same  cause — the  cause  of  the 
secure  estabhshment  of  freedom  in  the  world — 
this  seemed  to  the  Democrat  Jefferson  an  object 
worth  aiming  at ;  and  the  promise  of  this  seemed 
to  be  the  mam  recommendation  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  It  was  intended  as  an  aUiance  for  the 
defence  of  freedom,  not  as  a  proclamation  of 
aloofness ;  and  thus  America  seemed  to  be 
taking  her  natural  place  as  one  of  the  powers 
concerned  to  strengthen  law  and  liberty,  not  only 
within  her  own  borders,  but  throughout  the 
world. 

The  Monroe  Doctrme  was  rapidly  accepted  as 
expressing  the  fundamental  principle  of  American 
foreign  policy.  But  under  the  influence  of  the 
powerful  tradition  which  we  have  attempted  to 
anatyse,  its  significance  was  gradually  changed ; 
and  instead  of  being  interpreted  as  a  procla- 
mation that  the  great  republic  could  not  be 
indifferent  to  the  fate  of  liberty,  and  would 
co-operate  to  defend  it  from  attack  in  all  cases 
where  such  co-operation  was  reasonably  prac- 
ticable, it  came  to  be  interpreted  by  average 
public  opinion  as  meaning  that  America  had  no 
concern  with  the  politics  of  the  Old  World,  and 
that  the  states  of  the  Old  World  must  not  be 


102  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

allowed  to  meddle  in  any  of  the  affairs  of  either 
American  continent.  The  world  of  civilisation 
was  to  be  divided  into  water-tight  compart- 
ments ;  as  if  it  were  not  indissolubly  one.  Yet 
even  in  this  rather  narrow  form,  the  Monroe  doc- 
trine has  on  the  whole  been  productive  of  good  ;  it 
has  helped  to  save  South  America  from  becoming 
one  of  the  fields  of  rivalry  of  the  European 
powers. 

^  But  it  may  be  doubted  whether  the  mere  enunci- 
ation of  the  doctrine,  even  in  this  precise  and  defi- 
nite form,  has  of  itself  been  sufficient  to  secure 
this  end.  There  is  good  reason  to  believe  that  the 
doctrine  would  not  have  been  safe  from  challenge 
if  it  had  not  been  safeguarded  by  the  supremacy 
of  the  British  Fleet.  For  throughout  the  last 
half-century  all  the  world  has  known  that  any 
defiance  of  this  doctrine,  and  any  attack  upon 
America,  would  bring  Britain  into  the  field. 
During  all  this  period  one  of  the  factors  of  world- 
politics  has  been  the  existence  of  an  informal  and 
one-sided  alliance  between  Britain  and  America. 
The  alliance  has  been  informal,  because  it  has  not 
rested  upon  any  treaty  or  even  upon  any  definite 
understanding.  It  has  been  one-sided,  because 
while  average  opinion  in  America  has  been  dis- 
trustful of  Britain,  has  been  apt  to  put  unfavour- 
able constructions  upon  British  policy,  and  has 
generally  failed  to  appreciate  the  value  and  signi- 
ficance of  the  work  which  Britain  has  done  in  the 
outer  world,  Britain,  on  the  other  hand,  has  always 
known  that  America  stood  for  justice  and  freedom  ; 


EUROPE  AND  THE  NON-EUROPEAN  WORLD  103 

and  therefore,  however  difficult  the  relations 
between  the  two  powers  might  occasionally  be- 
come, Britain  has  steadfastly  refused  to  consider 
the  possibility  of  a  breach  with  America,  and  with 
rare  exceptions  has  steadily  given  her  support  to 
American  policy.  The  action  of  the  British 
squadron  off  the  Philippines  in  1898,  in  quietly 
interposing  itself  between  the  threatening  German 
guns  and  the  American  Fleet,  has,  in  fact,  been 
broadly  t5rpical  of  the  British  attitude.  This 
factor  has  not  only  helped  to  preserve  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  from  challenge,  it  has  indirectly  contri- 
buted to  deepen  the  American  conviction  that 
it  was  possible,  even  in  the  changed  conditions 
of  the  modern  world,  to  maintain  a  complete 
isolation  from  the  political  controversies  of  the 
powers. 

During  the  period  1815-1878,  then,  while  the 
greater  part  of  Europe  was  still  indifferent  to 
extra-European  affairs,  America  had  developed 
into  a  vast  state  wherein  freedom  and  law  were 
enthroned,  a  huge  melting-pot  wherein  diverse 
peoples  were  being  gradually  unified  and  turned 
into  a  new  nation  under  the  moulding  power  of  a 
great  tradition  of  liberty.  But  her  geographical 
position,  and  certain  elements  in  her  tradition, 
had  hitherto  led  her  to  abstain  from,  and  even  to 
repudiate,  that  great  part  in  the  shaping  of  the 
common  destinies  of  civilisation  to  which  she  was 
manifestly  called  by  her  wealth,  her  numbers,  her 
freedom,  and  her  share  in  the  traditions  of  all  the 
European  peoples.     In  the  nature  of  things,  what- 


104  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

ever  some  Americans  might  think,  this  voluntary 
isolation  could  not  continue  for  ever.  It  was  to 
be  brought  to  an  end  by  the  fevered  developments 
of  the  next  era,  and  by  the  great  challenge  to  the 
liberties  of  the  world  in  which  it  culminated. 


VI 

THE  TRANSFORMATION  OF  THE  BRITISH 
EMPIRE,  1815-1878 

Mighty  as  had  been  the  achievements  of  other 
lands  which  have  been  surveyed  in  the  last 
section,  the  mam  part  in  the  expansion  of  Euro- 
pean civiUsation  over  the  world  during  the  first 
three-quarters  of  the  nineteenth  century  was 
played  by  Britain.  For  she  was  engaged  in  open- 
ing out  new  continents  and  sub-continents  ;  and 
she  was  giving  an  altogether  new  significance  to 
the  word  '  Empire.'  Above  all,  she  was  half- 
blindly  laying  the  foundations  of  a  system  whereby 
freedom  and  the  enriching  sense  of  national  unity 
might  be  realised  at  once  in  the  new  and  vacant 
lands  of  the  earth,  and  among  its  oldest  civilised 
peoples  ;  she  was  feeling  her  way  towards  a  mode 
of  linking  diverse  and  free  states  in  a  common 
brotherhood  of  peace  and  mutual  respect.  There 
is  no  section  of  the  history  of  European  imperialism 
more  interesting  than  the  story  of  the  growth  and 
organisation  of  the  heterogeneous  and  disparate 
empire  with  which  Britain  entered  upon  the  new 
age. 

This  development  appeared,  on  the  surface,  to 
be  quite  haphazard,  and  to  be  governed  by  no 


106  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

clearly  grasped  theories  or  policy.  It  is  indeed 
true  that  at  all  times  British  policy  has  not  been 
governed  by  theory,  but  by  the  moulding  force 
of  a  tradition  of  ordered  freedom.  The  period 
produced  in  Britain  no  imperialist  statesman  of 
the  first  rank,  nor  did  imperial  questions  play  a 
leading  part  in  the  dehberations  of  parhament. 
In  fact,  the  growth  of  the  British  Empire  and 
its  organisation  were  alike  spontaneous  and  un- 
systematic ;  their  only  guide  (but  it  proved  to 
be  a  good  guide)  was  the  spirit  of  seK-government, 
existmg  in  every  scattered  section  of  the  people ; 
and  the  part  played  by  the  colonists  themselves, 
and  by  the  administrative  officers  in  India  and 
elsewhere,  was  throughout  more  important  than 
the  part  played  by  colonial  secretaries.  East 
Indian  directors,  parhament arians  and  pubHcists 
at  home.  For  that  reason  the  story  is  not  easily 
handled  in  a  broad  and  simple  way. 

Enjoying  almost  a  monopoly  of  oversea 
activity,  Britain  was  free,  in  most  parts  of  the 
world,  to  expand  her  dominions  as  she  thought 
fit.  Her  statesmen,  however,  were  far  from  de- 
siring further  expansion :  they  rightly  felt  that 
the  responsibilities  already  assumed  were  great 
enough  to  tax  the  resources  of  any  state,  how- 
ever rich  and  populous.  But,  try  as  they  would, 
they  could  not  prevent  the  inevitable  process  of 
expansion.  Several  causes  contributed  to  produce 
this  result.  Perhaps  the  most  important  was  the 
unexampled  growth  of  British  trade,  which  during 
these  years  dominated  the  whole  world  ;    and  the 


TRANSFORMATION  OF  BRITISH  EMPIRE    107 

flag  is  apt  to  follow  trade.  A  second  cause  was 
the  pressure  of  economic  distress  and  the  extra- 
ordinarily rapid  increase  of  population  at  home, 
leading  to  wholesale  emigration ;  in  the  early 
years  of  the  century  an  extravagantly  severe 
penal  code,  which  inflicted  the  penalty  of  death, 
commonly  commuted  into  transportation,  for  an 
incredible  number  of  offences,  gave  an  artificial 
impetus  to  this  movement.  The  restless  and 
adventurous  spirit  of  the  settlers  in  huge  and 
unexplored  new  countries  contributed  another 
motive  for  expansion.  And  in  some  cases,  notably 
in  India,  political  necessity  seemed  to  demand 
annexations.  Over  a  movement  thus  stimulated, 
the  home  authorities  found  themselves,  with  the 
best  will  in  the  world,  unable  to  exercise  any 
effective  restraint ;  and  the  already  colossal 
British  Empire  continued  to  grow.  It  is  no  doubt 
to  be  regretted  that  other  European  nations  were 
not  able  during  this  period  to  take  part  in  the 
development  of  the  non-European  world  in  a 
more  direct  way  than  by  sending  emigrants  to 
America  or  the  British  lands.  But  it  is  quite 
certain  that  the  growth  of  British  territory  is  not 
to  be  attributed  in  any  degree  to  the  deliberate 
policy,  or  to  the  greed,  of  the  home  government, 
which  did  everything  in  its  power  to  check  it. 

In  India  the  Russian  menace  seemed  to  necessi- 
tate the  adoption  of  a  policy  towards  the  inde- 
pendent states  of  the  North- West  which  brought 
an  extension  of  the  frontier,  between  1839  and 
1849,  to  the  great  mountain  ranges  which  form 


108  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

the  natural  boundary  of  India  in  this  direction  ; 
while  a  succession  of  intolerable  and  quite  un- 
provoked aggressions  by  the  Burmese  led  to  a 
series  of  wars  which  resulted  in  the  annexation 
of  very  great  territories  in  the  east  and  north- 
east: Assam,  Aracan,  and  Tenasserim  in  1825; 
Pegu  and  Rangoon  in  1853 ;  finally,  in  1885-86, 
the  whole  remainder  of  the  Burmese  Empire.  In 
North  America  settlers  found  their  way  across 
the  Rocky  Mountains  or  over  the  Isthmus  of 
Panama  into  the  region  of  British  Columbia, 
which  was  given  a  distinct  colonial  organisation 
in  1858  ;  and  the  colonisation  of  the  Red  River 
Settlement,  1811-18,  which  became  in  1870  the 
province  of  Manitoba,  began  the  development  of 
the  great  central  plain.  In  South  Africa  frontier 
wars  with  the  Kaffirs,  and  the  restless  movements 
of  Boer  trekkers,  brought  about  an  expansion  of 
the  limits  of  Cape  Colony,  the  annexation  of  Natal, 
and  the  temporary  annexation  of  the  Orange 
River  Settlement  and  the  Transvaal ;  but  all 
these  additions  were  most  reluctantly  accepted ; 
the  Orange  River  Settlement  and  the  Transvaal 
soon  had  their  independence  restored,  though  the 
former,  at  any  rate,  accepted  it  unwilhngly.  In 
Australia,  drafts  of  new  settlers  planting  them- 
selves at  new  points  led  to  the  organisation  of  six 
distinct  colonies  between  1825  and  1859 ;  and 
this  implied  the  definite  amiexation  of  the  whole 
continent.  New  Zealand  was  annexed  in  1839, 
but  only  because  British  traders  had  already 
estabhshed   themselves    in   the    islands,   were   in 


TRANSFORIVIATION  OF  BRITISH  EMPIRE    109 

unhappy  relations  with  the  natives,  and  had  to 
be  brought  under  control. 

But  it  was  not  the  territorial  expansion  of  the 
British  Empire  which  gave  significance  to  this 
period  in  its  history,  but,  in  a  far  higher  degree, 
the  new  principles  of  government  which  were 
developed  during  its  course.  The  new  colonial 
policy  which  gradually  shaped  itself  during  this 
age  was  so  complete  a  departure  from  every  pre- 
cedent of  the  past,  and  represented  so  remarkable 
an  experiment  in  imperial  government,  that  its 
sources  deserve  a  careful  analysis.  It  was  brought 
into  being  by  a  number  of  distinct  factors  and 
currents  of  opinion  which  were  at  work  both  in 
Britain  and  in  the  colonies. 

In  the  first  place,  there  existed  in  Britain,  as 
in  other  European  countries,  a  large  body  of 
opinion  which  held  that  all  colonies  were  sure  to 
demand  and  obtain  their  independence  as  soon  as 
they  became  strong  enough  to  desire  it ;  that  as 
independent  states  they  could  be  quite  as  profit- 
able to  the  mother  -  country  as  they  could  ever 
be  while  they  remained  attached  to  her,  more 
especially  if  the  parting  took  place  without  bitter- 
ness ;  and  that  the  wisest  policy  for  Britain  to 
pursue  was  therefore  to  facilitate  their  develop- 
ment, to  place  no  barrier  in  the  way  of  the  in- 
crease of  their  self-government,  and  to  enable 
them  at  the  earliest  moment  to  start  as  free 
nations  on  their  own  account.  This  was  not, 
indeed,  the  universal,  nor  perhaps  even  the  pre- 
ponderant, attitude  in  regard  to  the  colonies  in 


110  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century.  But  it 
was  pretty  common.  It  appeared  in  the  most 
unexpected  quarters,  as  when  DisraeU  said  that 
the  colonies  were  '  millstones  about  our  necks,' 
or  as  when  The  Times  advocated  in  a  leading 
article  the  cession  of  Canada  to  the  United  States, 
on  the  ground  that  annexation  to  the  great 
Republic  was  the  inevitable  destiny  of  that  colony, 
and  that  it  was  much  better  that  it  should  be 
carried  out  in  a  peaceable  and  friendly  way  than 
after  a  conflict.  It  is  difficult  to-day  to  realise 
that  men  could  ever  have  entertained  such 
opinions.  But  they  were  widely  held  ;  and  it 
must  at  least  be  obvious  that  the  prevalence  of 
these  views  is  quite  inconsistent  with  the  idea 
that  Britain  was  deliberately  following  a  policy 
of  expansion  and  annexation  in  this  age.  Men 
who  held  these  opinions  (and  they  were  to  be 
found  in  every  party)  regarded  with  resentment 
and  alarm  every  addition  to  what  seemed  to 
them  the  useless  burdens  assumed  by  the  nation, 
and  required  to  be  satisfied  that  every  new 
annexation  of  territory  was  not  merely  justifiable, 
but  inevitable. 

A  second  factor  which  contributed  to  the  change 
of  attitude  towards  the  colonies  was  the  growing 
influence  of  a  new  school  of  economic  thought, 
the  school  of  Adam  Smith,  Ricardo,  and  Malthus. 
Their  ideas  had  begun  to  affect  national  policy  as 
early  as  the  twenties,  when  Huskisson  took  the 
first  steps  on  the  way  to  free  trade.  In  the 
thirties   the  bulk   of  the  trading   and  industrial 


TRANSFORMATION  OF  BRITISH  EMPIRE     111 

classes  had  become  converts  to  these  ideas,  which 
won  their  definite  victories  in  the  budgets  of  Sir 
Robert  Peel,  1843-46,  and  in  those  of  his  disciple 
Gladstone.  The  essence  of  this  doctrine,  as  it 
affected  colonial  policy,  was  that  the  regulation 
of  trade  by  government,  which  had  been  the 
main  object  of  the  old  colonial  policy,  brought 
no  advantages,  but  only  checked  its  free  develop- 
ment. And  for  a  country  in  the  position  which 
Britain  then  occupied,  this  was  undeniably  true  ; 
so  overwhelming  was  her  preponderance  in  world- 
trade  that  every  current  seemed  to  set  in  her 
direction,  and  the  removal  of  artificial  barriers, 
originally  designed  to  train  the  current  towards 
her  shores,  aUowed  it  to  follow  its  natural  course. 
The  only  considerable  opposition  to  this  body  of 
economic  doctrine  came  from  those  who  desired 
to  protect  British  agriculture;  but  this  motive 
had  (at  this  period)  no  bearing  upon  colonial 
trade.  The  triumph  of  the  doctrine  of  free  trade 
meant  that  the  principal  motive  which  had  earher 
led  to  restrictions  upon  the  self-government  of 
the  colonies — the  desire  to  secure  commercial  ad- 
vantages for  the  mother-country — was  no  longer 
operative.  The  central  idea  of  the  old  colonial 
system  was  destroyed  by  the  disciples  of  Adam 
Smith  ;  and  there  no  longer  remained  any  ap- 
parent reason  why  the  mother  -  country  should 
desire  to  control  the  fiscal  policy  of  the  colonies. 
An  even  more  important  result  of  the  adoption  of 
this  new  economic  doctrine  was  that  it  destroyed 
every  motive  which  would  lead  the  British  govern- 


112  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

ment  to  endeavour  to  secure  for  British  traders  a 
monopoly  of  the  traffic  with  British  possessions. 
Henceforth  all  territories  administered  under  the 
direct  control  of  the  home  government  were  thrown 
open  as  freely  to  the  merchants  of  other  countries 
as  to  those  of  Britain  herself.  The  part  which 
Britain  now  undertook  in  the  undeveloped  regions 
of  her  empire  (except  in  so  far  as  they  were  con- 
trolled by  fully  self-governing  colonies)  was  simply 
that  of  mamtaining  peace  and  law  ;  and  in  these 
regions  she  adopted  an  attitude  which  may  fairly 
be  described  as  the  attitude,  not  of  a  monopolist, 
'  but  of  a  trustee  for  civilisation.  It  was  this  poHcy 
which  explains  the  small  degree  of  jealousy  with 
which  the  rapid  expansion  of  her  territory  was 
regarded  by  the  rest  of  the  civihsed  world.  If  the 
same  policy  had  been  followed,  not  necessarily  at 
home,  but  in  their  colonial  possessions,  by  all  the 
colonising  powers,  the  motives  for  colonial  rivalry 
would  have  been  materially  diminished,  and  the 
claims  of  various  states  to  colonial  territories, 
when  the  period  of  rivalry  began,  w  ould  have  been 
far  more  easily  adjusted. 

These  were  negative  forces,  leading  merely  to 
the  abandonment  of  the  older  colonial  theories. 
But  there  were  also  positive  and  constructive 
forces  at  work.  First  among  them  may  be  noted 
a  new  body  of  definite  theory  as  to  the  function 
which  colonies  ought  to  play  in  the  general 
economy  of  the  civilised  world.  It  was  held  to 
be  their  function  not  (as  in  the  older  theory)  to 
afford   lucrative   opportunities   for  trade   to   the 


TRANSFORMATION  OF  BRITISH  EMPIRE     113 

mother-countrj^ :  so  far  as  trade  was  concerned 
it  seemed  to  matter  little  whether  a  coimtry  was 
a  colony  or  an  independent  state.  But  the  main 
object  of  colonisation  was,  on  this  view,  the 
systematic  draining-off  of  the  surplus  population 
of  the  older  lands.  This,  it  was  felt,  could  not 
safely  be  left  to  the  operation  of  mere  chance  ; 
and  one  of  the  great  advantages  of  colonial  pos- 
sessions was  that  they  enabled  the  country 
which  controlled  them  to  deal  in  a  scientific  way 
with  its  surplus  population,  and  to  prevent  the 
reproduction  of  unhealthy  conditions  in  the  new 
communities,  which  was  apt  to  result  if  emigrants 
were  allowed  to  drift  aimlessly  wheresoever  chance 
took  them,  and  received  no  guidance  as  to  the 
proper  modes  of  establishing  themselves  in  their 
new  homes.  The  great  apostle  of  this  body  of 
colonial  theory  was  Edward  Gibbon  Wakefield ; 
and  his  book,  A  View  of  the  Art  of  Colonisation 
(1847),  deserves  to  be  noted  as  one  of  the  classics 
of  the  history  of  imperialism.  He  did  not  confine 
himself  to  theory,  but  was  tireless  in  organising 
practical  experiments.  They  were  carried  out,  in 
a  curious  revival  of  the  methods  of  the  seven- 
teenth century,  by  means  of  a  series  of  colonising 
companies  which  Wakefield  promoted.  The  settle- 
ment of  South  Australia,  the  first  considerable 
settlement  in  the  North  Island  of  New  Zealand, 
and  the  two  admirably  designed  and  executed 
settlements  of  Canterbury  and  Otago  in  the  South 
Island  of  New  Zealand,  were  all  examples  of  his 
methods  :   with  the  exception  of  the  North  Island 

H 


114  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

settlement,  they  were  all  very  successful.  Nor 
were  these  the  only  instances  of  organised  and 
assisted  emigration.  In  1820  a  substantial  settle- 
ment, financed  by  government,  was  made  in  the 
eastern  part  of  Cape  Colony,  in  the  region  of 
Grahamstown  and  Port  Elizabeth,  and  this 
brought  the  first  considerable  body  of  British 
inhabitants  into  South  Africa,  hitherto  almost 
exclusively  Dutch.  An  unsuccessful  plantation 
at  Swan  River  in  West  Australia  may  also  be 
noted.  Systematic  and  scientific  colonisation  was 
thus  bemg  studied  in  Britain  during  this  period 
as  never  before.  In  the  view  of  its  advocates 
Britain  was  the  trustee  of  civilisation  for  the 
administration  of  the  most  valuable  luipeopled 
regions  of  the  earth,  and  it  was  her  duty  to  see 
that  they  were  skilfully  utilised.  So  high  a 
degree  of  success  attended  some  of  their  efforts 
that  it  is  impossible  not  to  regret  that  they  were 
not  carried  further.  But  they  depended  upon 
Crown  control  of  undeveloped  lands.  With  the 
growth  of  full  self-government  in  the  colonies 
the  exercise  of  these  Crown  functions  was  trans- 
ferred from  the  ministry  and  parliament  of 
Britain  to  the  ministries  and  parliaments  of  the 
colonies  ;  and  this  transference  put  an  end  to  the 
possibility  of  a  centralised  organisation  and  direc- 
tion of  emigration. 

A  second  constructive  factor  very  potently  at 
work  during  this  age  was  the  humanitarian  spirit, 
which  had  become  a  powerful  factor  in  British 
life  during  the  late  eighteenth  and  early  nine- 


TRANSFORMATION  OF  BRITISH  EMPIRE    115 

teenth  centuries.  It  had  received  perhaps  its 
most  practical  expression  in  the  abohtion  of  the 
slave-trade  in  1806,  and  the  campaign  against  the 
slave-trade  in  the  rest  of  the  world  became  an 
important  object  of  British  poUcy  from  that 
time  onwards.  Havmg  abolished  the  slave-trade, 
the  humanitarians  proceeded  to  advocate  the 
complete  abolition  of  negro  slavery  throughout 
the  British  Empire.  They  won  their  victory 
in  1833,  when  the  British  parhament  declared 
slavery  illegal  throughout  the  Empire,  and  voted 
£20,000,000 — at  a  time  when  British  finance  was 
still  suffering  from  the  burdens  of  the  Napoleonic 
War — to  purchase  from  their  masters  the  freedom 
of  all  the  slaves  then  existing  in  the  Empire.  It 
was  a  noble  deed,  but  it  was  perhaps  carried  out 
a  little  too  suddenly,  and  it  led  to  grave  diffi- 
culties, especially  in  the  West  Indies,  whose  pro- 
sperity was  seriously  impaired,  and  in  South 
Africa,  where  it  brought  about  acute  friction 
with  the  slave-owning  Boer  farmers.  But  it  gave 
evidence  of  the  adoption  of  a  new  attitude  to- 
wards the  backward  races,  hitherto  mercilessly 
exploited  by  all  the  imperialist  powers.  One  ex- 
pression of  this  attitude  had  akeady  been  afforded 
by  the  organisation  (1787)  of  the  colony  of  Sierra 
Leone,  on  the  West  African  coast,  as  a  place  of 
refuge  for  freed  slaves  desiring  to  return  to  the 
land  of  their  fathers. 

It  was  principally  through  the  activity  of  mis- 
sionaries that  this  new  point  of  view  was  expressed 
and  cultivated.     Organised  missionary  activity  in 


116  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

Britain  dates  from  the  end  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  but  its  range  grew  with  extraordinary 
rapidity  throughout  the  period.  And  wherever 
the  missionaries  went,  they  constituted  them- 
selves the  protectors  and  advocates  of  the  native 
races  among  whom  they  worked.  Often  enough 
they  got  themselves  into  bad  odour  with  the 
European  traders  and  settlers  with  whom  they 
came  m  contact.  But  through  their  powerful 
home  organisations  they  exercised  very  great 
influence  over  pubhc  opinion  and  over  govern- 
ment pohcy.  The  power  of  '  Exeter  Hall,'  where 
the  rehgious  bodies  and  the  missionary  societies 
held  their  meetings  in  London,  was  at  its  height 
in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century,  and 
politicians  could  not  afford  to  disregard  it,  even 
if  they  had  desired  to  do  so.  This  influence, 
supporting  the  trend  of  humanitarian  opinion, 
succeeded  in  establishing  it  as  one  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  British  imperial  policy  that  it  was  the 
duty  of  the  British  government  to  protect  the 
native  races  against  the  exploitation  of  the 
European  settlers,  and  to  guide  them  gently  into 
a  civihsed  way  of  Ufe.  It  is  a  sound  and  noble 
principle,  and  it  may  fairly  be  said  that  it  has 
been  honestly  carried  out,  so  far  as  the  powers 
of  the  home  government  rendered  possible.  No 
government  in  the  world  controls  a  greater  number 
or  variety  of  subjects  belonging  to  the  backward 
races  than  the  British ;  no  trading  nation  has 
had  greater  opportunities  for  the  oppressive  ex- 
ploitation of  defenceless  subjects.     Yet  the  grave 


TRANSFORMATION  OF  BRITISH  EMPIRE    117 

abuse  of  these  opportunities  has  been  infrequent. 
There  have  been  in  the  history  of  modern  British 
imperiahsm  sporadic  instances  of  injustice,  like 
the  forced  labour  of  Kanakas  in  the  Pacific. 
But  there  have  been  no  Congo  outrages,  no 
Putumayo  atrocities,  no  Pequena  slave  scandals, 
no  merciless  slaughter  like  that  of  the  Hereros 
in  German  South- West  Africa. 

The  principle  of  the  protection  of  backward 
peoples  has,  however,  sometimes  had  an  unfortu- 
nate influence  upon  colonial  pohcy ;  and  there 
was  no  colony  in  which  it  exercised  a  more  un- 
happy effect  than  South  Africa.  Here  the  Boer 
farmers  still  retained  towards  their  native  neigh- 
bours the  attitude  which  had  been  characteristic 
of  all  the  European  peoples  in  the  seventeenth 
and  eighteenth  centuries :  they  regarded  the 
negro  as  a  natural  inferior,  born  to  servitude. 
It  is  not  surprising  that  no  love  was  lost  between 
the  Boers  and  the  missionaries,  who  appeared  as 
the  protectors  of  the  negroes,  and  whose  repre- 
sentations turned  British  opinion  violently  against 
the  whole  Boer  community.  This  was  in  itself 
a  sufficiently  unfortunate  result :  it  lies  largely 
at  the  base  of  the  prolonged  disharmony  which 
divided  the  two  peoples  in  South  Africa.  The 
belief  that  the  Boers  could  not  be  trusted  to  deal 
fairly  with  the  natives  formed,  for  a  long  period, 
the  chief  reason  which  urged  the  British  Govern- 
ment to  retain  their  control  over  the  Boers,  even 
when  they  had  trekked  away  from  the  Cape 
(1836)    and   established   themselves   beyond    the 


118  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

Orange  and  the  Vaal  rivers  ;  and  the  conflict 
of  this  motive  with  the  desire  to  avoid  any 
increase  of  colonial  responsibilities,  and  with  the 
feeling  that  if  the  Boers  disliked  the  British 
system,  they  had  better  be  left  in  freedom  to 
organise  themselves  in  their  own  way,  accounts 
for  the  curious  vacillation  in  the  policy  of  the 
period  on  this  question.  At  first  the  trekkers 
were  left  to  themselves  ;  then  the  lands  which 
they  had  occupied  were  annexed ;  then  their 
independence  was  recognised  ;  and  finally,  when, 
at  the  end  of  the  period,  they  seemed  to  be  causing 
a  dangerous  excitement  among  the  Zulus  and 
other  native  tribes,  the  Transvaal  was  once  more 
annexed  ;  with  the  result  that  revolt  broke  out, 
and  the  Majuba  campaign  had  to  be  fought. 

Again,  tenderness  for  the  natives  led  to  several 
curious  and  not  very  successful  experiments  in 
organisation.  The  amiexation  of  Natal  was  long 
delayed  because  it  was  held  that  this  area  ought 
to  form  a  native  reserve,  and  fruitless  attempts 
were  made  to  restrict  the  settlement  of  Europeans 
in  this  empty  and  fertile  land.  An  attempt  was 
also  made  to  set  up  a  series  of  native  areas  under 
British  protection,  from  which  the  white  settler 
was  excluded.  British  Kaffraria,  Griqualand 
East  and  Griqualand  West  were  examples  of  this 
policy,  which  is  still  represented,  not  unsuccess- 
fully, by  the  great  protected  area  of  Basutoland. 
But,  on  the  whole,  these  experiments  in  the  hand- 
ling of  the  native  problem  in  South  Africa  did 
more  harm  than  good.     They  were  unsuccessful 


TRANSFORMATION  OF  BRITISH  EMPIRE     119 

mainly  because  South  Africa  was  a  white  man's 
country,  into  which  the  most  vigorous  of  the 
native  races,  those  of  the  Bantu  stock  (Kaffirs, 
Zulus,  Matabili,  etc.),  were  more  recent  immi- 
grants than  the  white  men  themselves.  Owing 
to  their  warhke  character  and  rapidly  growing 
numbers  they  constituted  for  a  long  time  a  very 
formidable  danger ;  and  neither  the  missionaries 
nor  the  home  authorities  sufficiently  recognised 
these  facts. 

Perhaps  the  most  unhappy  result  of  this 
friction  over  the  native  question,  apart  from  the 
alienation  of  Boer  and  Briton  which  it  produced, 
was  the  fact  that  it  was  the  principal  cause  of 
the  long  delay  in  establishing  seK-governing  insti- 
tutions in  South  Africa.  The  home  government 
hesitated  to  give  to  the  colonists  full  control  over 
their  own  affairs,  because  it  distrusted  the  use 
which  they  were  likely  to  make  of  their  powers 
over  the  natives  ;  even  the  normal  institutions 
of  all  British  colonies  were  not  estabhshed  in 
Cape  Colony  till  1854,  and  in  Natal  tiU  1883. 
But  although  in  this  case  the  new  attitude  to- 
wards the  backward  races  led  to  some  unhappy 
results,  the  spirit  which  inspired  it  was  altogether 
admirable,  and  its  growing  strength  accounts  in 
part  for  the  real  degree  of  success  which  has  been 
achieved  by  British  administrators  in  the  govern- 
ment of  regions  not  suited  for  the  settlement  of 
Europeans  in  large  numbers.  Indeed,  this  spirit 
has  come  to  be  one  of  the  outstanding  features  of 
modern  British  imperiahsm. 


120  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

It  was  not  only  in  the  treatment  of  backward 
races  that  the  humanitarian  spirit  made  itself 
felt.  It  was  at  work  also  in  the  government  of 
the  highly  developed  civihsations  of  India,  where, 
during  this  period,  British  power  began  to  be 
boldly  used  to  put  an  end  to  barbarous  or  in- 
humane practices  which  were  supported  or  toler- 
ated by  the  religious  behefs  or  immemorial  social 
usages  of  India.  Such  practices  as  ihagi,  or 
meria  sacrifices,  or  female  infanticide,  or,  above 
all,  sati,  had  been  left  undisturbed  by  the  earlier 
rulers  of  British  India,  because  they  feared  that 
interference  with  them  would  be  resented  as  an 
infraction  of  Indian  custom  or  religion.  They  were 
now  boldly  attacked,  and  practically  abolished, 
without  evil  result. 

Alongside  of  this  new  courage  in  measures  that 
seemed  to  be  dictated  by  the  moral  ideas  of  the 
West,  there  was  to  be  seen  growing  throughout  this 
period  a  new  temper  of  respect  for  Indian  civilisa- 
tion and  a  desire  to  study  and  understand  it,  and 
to  safeguard  its  best  features.  The  study  of  early 
Indian  literature,  law,  and  religious  philosophy 
had  indeed  been  begun  in  the  eighteenth  century 
by  Sir  William  Jones  and  Nathaniel  Halhed,  with 
the  ardent  encouragement  of  Warren  Hastings. 
But  in  this  as  in  other  respects  Hastings  was 
ahead  of  the  political  opinion  of  his  time  ;  the 
prevalent  idea  was  that  the  best  thing  for  India 
would  be  the  introduction,  so  far  as  possible,  of 
British  methods.  This  led  to  the  absurdities 
of   the  Supreme  Court,  established    in    1773    to 


TRANSFORMATION  OF  BRITISH  EMPIRE     121 

administer  English  law  to  Indians.  It  led  also 
to  the  great  blunder  of  Cornwallis's  settlement  of 
the  land  question  in  Bengal,  which  was  an  attempt 
to  assimilate  the  Indian  land-system  to  that  of 
England,  and  resulted  in  an  unhappy  weakening 
of  the  village  commimities,  the  most  healthy 
features  of  Indian  rural  life.  In  the  nineteenth 
century  this  attitude  was  replaced  by  a  spirit  of 
respect  for  Indian  traditions  and  methods  of 
organisation,  and  by  a  desire  to  retain  and 
strengthen  their  best  features.  The  new  attitude 
was  perhaps  to  be  seen  at  its  best  in  the  work  of 
Mountstuart  Elphinstone,  a  great  administrator 
who  was  also  a  profoimd  student  of  Indian 
history,  and  a  very  sympathetic  observer  and 
friend  of  Indian  customs  and  modes  of  life.  But 
the  same  spirit  was  exemplified  by  the  whole  of 
the  remarkable  generation  of  statesmen  of  whom 
Elphinstone  was  one.  They  estabUshed  the 
view  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  British  power  to 
reorganise  India,  indeed,  but  to  reorganise  it  on 
lines  in  accordance  with  its  own  traditions.  Above 
all,  the  principle  was  in  this  generation  very 
definitely  estabhshed  that  India,  like  other  great 
dependencies,  must  be  administered  in  the  in- 
terests of  its  own  people,  and  not  in  the  interests 
of  the  ruling  race.  That  seems  to  us  to-day  a  plati- 
tude. It  would  not  have  seemed  a  platitude  in  the 
eighteenth  century.  It  would  not  seem  a  plati- 
tude in  modern  Germany.  And  it  may  safely  be 
said  that  the  enunciation  of  such  a  doctrine  would 
have  seemed  merely  absurd  in  any  of  the  earUer 


122  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

historical  empires.  In  1833  an  official  report  laid 
before  the  British  parliament  contained  these 
remarkable  words  :  '  It  is  recognised  as  an  indis- 
putable principle,  that  the  interests  of  the  Native 
Subjects  are  to  be  consulted  in  preference  to 
those  of  Europeans,  wherever  the  two  come  in 
competition.'  In  all  the  records  of  imperialism 
it  would  be  hard  to  find  a  parallel  to  this  formal 
statement  of  pohcy  by  the  supreme  government 
of  a  ruling  race.  When  such  a  statement  could 
be  made,  it  is  manifest  that  the  meaning  of  the 
word  Empire  had  undergone  a  remarkable  trans- 
formation. No  one  can  read  the  history  of 
British  rule  in  India  during  this  period  without 
feehng  that,  in  spite  of  occasional  lapses,  this 
was  its  real  spirit. 

But  the  most  powerful  constructive  element  in 
the  shaping  of  the  new  imperial  policy  of  Britain 
was  the  strength  of  the  belief  in  the  idea  of  seK- 
government,  as  not  only  morally  desirable  but 
practically  efficacious,  which  was  to  be  perceived 
at  work  in  the  pohtical  circles  of  Britain  durmg 
this  age.  Self-government  had  throughout  the 
modern  age  been  a  matter  of  habit  and  practice 
with  the  British  peoples ;  now  it  became  a 
matter  of  theory  and  belief.  And  from  this  re- 
sulted a  great  change  of  attitude  towards  the 
problems  of  colonial  administration.  The  Ameri- 
can problem  in  the  eighteenth  century  had  arisen 
ultimately  out  of  the  demand  of  the  Americans 
for  unquahfied  and  responsible  control  over  their 
own  affairs  :    the  attitude  of  the  Enghshman  in 


TRANSFORMATION  OF  BRITISH  EMPIRE    123 

reply  to  this  demand  (though  he  never  clearly 
analysed  it)  was,  in  effect,  that  self-government 
was  a  good  and  desirable  thing,  but  that  on  the 
scale  on  which  the  Americans  claimed  it,  it  would 
be  fatal  to  the  unity  of  the  Empire,   and  the 
unity  of  the  Empire  must  come  first.     Faced  by 
similar  problems  in  the  nineteenth  century,  the 
Enghshman's  response   generally  was   that   self- 
government  on  the  fullest  scale  was  the  right  of  all 
who  were  fit  to  exercise  it,  and  the  most  satis- 
factory  working    solution   of   political   problems. 
Therefore  the  right  must  be  granted  ;    and  the 
unity  of  the  Empire  must  take  care  of  itself.     No 
doubt   this   attitude   was   more   readily   adopted 
because  of  the  widespread  belief  that  in  fact  the 
colonies  would  all  sooner  or  later  cut  their  con- 
nection with   the   mother-country.     But   it   was 
fully  shared  by  men  who  did  not  hold  this  view, 
and  who  believed  strongly  in  the  possibihty  and 
desirability    of    maintaining    imperial    unity.     It 
was  shared,  for  example,  by  Wakefield,  a  con- 
vinced imperiahst  if  ever  there  was  one,  and  by 
that    great    colonial    administrator.    Sir    George 
Grey.      It  was  shared  by  Lord  Durham  and  by 
Lord  John  Russell,  who  were  largely  responsible 
for  the  adoption  of  the  new  policy.     Their  behef 
and  hope  was  that  the  common  possession  of  free 
institutions  of  kindred  types  would  in  fact  form 
the  most  effective  tie  between  the  lands  which 
enjoyed  them.     This  hope  obtained  an  eloquent 
expression  in  the  speech  in  which,  in  1852,  Russell 
introduced  the  bill  for  granting  to  the  Australian 


124  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

colonies  self-government  on  such  a  scale  as 
amounted  almost  to  independence.  It  is  not 
true,  as  is  sometimes  said,  that  the  self-governing 
institutions  of  the  colonies  were  established  during 
this  period  owing  to  the  indifference  of  the  home 
authorities,  and  their  readiness  to  put  an  end  to 
the  connection.  The  new  pohcy  of  these  years 
was  deliberately  adopted ;  and  although  its 
acceptance  by  parliament  was  rendered  easier 
by  the  prevalence  of  disbelief  in  the  permanence 
of  the  imperial  tie,  yet,  on  the  part  of  the  re- 
sponsible men,  it  was  due  to  far-sighted  states- 
manship. 

The  critical  test  of  the  new  colonial  pohcy,  and 
the  most  dramatic  demonstration  of  its  efficacy, 
were  afforded  by  Canada,  where,  during  the 
thirties,  the  conditions  which  preceded  the  revolt 
of  the  American  colonies  were  being  reproduced 
with  curious  exactness.  The  self-governing  insti- 
tutions established  in  the  Canadian  colonies  in 
1791  very  closely  resembled  those  of  the  American 
colonies  before  the  revolution  :  they  gave  to  the 
representative  houses  control  over  taxation  and 
legislation,  but  neither  control  over,  nor  responsi- 
bility for,  the  executive.  And  the  same  results 
were  following.  Incomplete  self-government  was 
striving  after  its  own  fulfilment :  the  denial 
of  responsibility  was  producing  irresponsibihty. 
There  was  the  same  unceasing  friction  between 
governors  and  their  councils  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  representative  bodies  on  the  other  hand  ; 
and  the  assembUes  were  showing  the  same  un- 


TRANSFORMATION  OF  BRITISH  EMPIRE    125 

reasonableness  in  refusing  to  meet  manifest  public 
obligations.  This  state  of  things  was  becoming 
steadily  more  acute  in  all  the  colonies,  but  it 
was  at  its  worst  m  the  province  of  Quebec,  where 
the  constitutional  friction  was  embittered  by  a 
racial  conflict,  the  executive  body  being  British, 
while  the  great  majority  of  the  assembly  was 
French  ;  and  the  conflict  was  producing  a  very 
dangerous  ahenation  between  the  two  peoples. 
The  French  colonists  had  quite  forgotten  the 
gratitude  they  had  once  felt  for  the  maintenance 
of  their  religion  and  of  their  social  organisation, 
and  there  was  a  strong  party  among  them  who 
were  bent  upon  open  revolt,  and  hoped  to  be 
able  to  establish  a  little  isolated  French  com- 
munity upon  the  St.  Lawrence.  This  party  of 
hotheads  got  the  upper  hand,  and  their  agitation 
culminated  in  the  rebeUion  of  Papineau  in  1837. 
In  the  other  colonies,  and  especially  in  Upper 
Canada,  the  conditions  were  almost  equally 
ominous ;  when  Papineau  revolted  in  Quebec, 
WiUiam  Mackenzie  led  a  sympathetic  rising  in 
Ontario.  The  situation  was  quite  as  alarming  as 
the  situation  in  the  American  colonies  had  been 
in  1775.  It  is  true  that  the  risings  were  easily 
put  down.  But  mere  repression  formed  no  solu- 
tion, any  more  than  a  British  victory  in  1775 
would  have  formed  a  solution  of  the  American 
question. 

Realising  this,  the  Whig  government  sent  out 
Lord  Durham,  one  of  their  own  number,  to  report 
on  the  whole  situation.     Durham  was  one  of  the 


126  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

most  advanced  Liberals  in  Britain,  a  convinced 
believer  in  the  virtues  of  self-government,  and 
he  took  out  with  him  two  of  the  ablest  advocates 
of  scientific  colonisation,  Edward  Gibbon  Wake- 
field and  Charles  BuUer.  Durham's  administra- 
tive work  was  not  a  success  :  his  high-handed  de- 
portation of  some  of  the  rebel  leaders  was  strongly 
condemned,  and  he  was  very  quickly  recalled. 
But  he  had  had  time  to  study  and  understand  the 
situation,  and  he  presented  a  masterly  Report  on 
Canada,  which  is  one  of  the  classics  in  the  history 
of  British  imperiahsm.  His  explanation  of  the 
unhappy  condition  of  Canadian  politics  was  not 
(as  some  were  tempted  to  say)  that  the  colonists 
had  been  given  too  much  liberty,  but  that  they 
had  not  been  given  enough.  They  must  be  made 
to  feel  their  responsibility  for  the  working  of  the 
laws  which  they  adopted,  and  for  the  welfare  of 
the  whole  community.  As  for  the  conflict  of 
races,  its  only  cure  was  that  both  should  be  made 
to  feel  their  common  responsibility  for  the  des- 
tmies  of  the  community  in  which  both  must 
remain  partners. 

Lord  Durham's  recommendations  were  fully 
carried  into  effect,  partly  in  the  Canada  Act  of 
1840,  but  more  especially  by  a  simple  instruction 
issued  to  governors,  that  their  ministries  must 
henceforward  be  chosen,  in  the  British  fashion, 
on  the  ground' that  they  commanded  the  support 
of  a  majority  in  the  elected  house ;  and  that  the 
governors  themselves  must  be  guided  by  their 
advice.     A  crucial  test  of  this  new  policy  came  in 


TRANSFORMATION  OF  BRITISH  EMPIRE    127 

1849,  when  the  ministers  and  the  parhamentary 
majority  proposed  to  vote  compensation  for  pro- 
perty destroyed  in  1837.  This  to  many  seemed 
compensation  for  rebels,  and  the  indignant  loyaHsts 
were  urgent  that  the  governor,  Lord  Elgin,  should 
veto  it.  He  firmly  declined  to  do  so ;  and  thus  gave 
an  invaluable  lesson  to  both  parties.  The  Canadian 
people,  acting  through  their  representatives,  were 
now  responsible  for  their  actions.  If  they  chose 
to  vote  for  irresponsible  and  dangerous  devices, 
they  must  henceforward  reahse  that  they  must 
themselves  answer  for  the  consequences. 

Thus,  within  a  few  years  of  the  outbreak  of 
rebellion  in  two  provinces,  full  power  had  been 
entrusted  to  the  rebels  themselves.  It  was  a 
daring  poUcy,  only  to  be  justified  by  a  very 
confident  belief  in  the  virtues  of  self-government. 
But  it  was  completely  and  triumphantly  suc- 
cessful. Henceforward  friction  between  the  Cana- 
dian colonies  and  the  mother-country  ceased :  if 
there  were  grounds  for  complaint  in  the  state 
of  Canadian  affairs,  the  Canadians  must  now 
blame  their  own  ministers,  and  the  remedy  lay 
in  their  own  hands.  And  what  was  the  out- 
come ?  Twenty  years  later  the  various  colonies, 
once  as  full  of  mutual  jealousies  as  the  American 
colonies  had  been  before  1775,  began  to  discuss 
the  possibility  of  federation.  With  the  cordial 
approval  and  co-operation  of  the  home  govern- 
ment, they  drew  up  a  scheme  for  the  formation 
of  a  united  Dominion  of  Canada,  includmg  distant 
British  Columbia  and  the  coastal  colonies  of  Nova 


128  THE  EXPi\JS[SION  OF  EUROPE 

Scotia,  New  Brunswick,  and  Prince  Edward 
Island  ;  and  the  adoption  of  this  scheme,  in  1867, 
turned  Canada  from  a  bundle  of  separate  settle- 
ments into  a  great  state.  To  this  state  the  home 
government  later  made  over  the  control  of  all  the 
vast  and  rich  lands  of  the  North- West,  and  so 
the  destinies  of  half  a  continent  passed  under  its 
direction.  It  was  a  charge,  the  magnitude  and 
challenge  of  which  could  not  but  bring  forth  all 
that  there  was  of  statesmanship  among  the 
Canadian  people  ;   and  it  has  not  failed  to  do  so. 

One  feature  of  Canadian  constitutional  develop- 
ment remains  to  be  noted.  It  might  have  been 
expected  that  the  Canadians  would  have  been 
tempted  to  follow  the  political  model  of  their 
great  neighbour  the  United  States  ;  and  if  their 
development  had  been  the  outcome  of  friction 
with  the  mother-country,  no  doubt  they  would 
have  done  so.  But  they  preferred  to  follow  the 
British  model.  The  keynote  of  the  American 
system  is  division  of  power  :  division  between  the 
federal  government  and  the  state  governments, 
which  form  mutual  checks  upon  one  another ; 
division  between  the  executive  and  the  legislature, 
which  are  independent  of  one  another  at  once  in 
the  states  and  in  the  federal  government,  both 
being  directly  elected  by  popular  vote.  The 
keynote  of  the  British  system  is  concentration  of 
responsibility  by  the  subordination  of  the  execu- 
tive to  the  legislature.  The  Canadians  adopted 
the  British  principle:  what  had  formerly  been 
distmct  colonies  became,  not  '  states  '  but  '  pro- 


TRANSFORMATION  OF  BRITISH  EMPIRE    129 

vinces,'  definitely  subordinated  to  the  supreme 
central  government ;  and  whether  in  the  federal 
or  in  the  provincial  system,  the  control  of  govern- 
ment by  the  representative  body  was  finally 
established.  This  concord  with  the  British  sys- 
tem is  a  fact  of  real  import.  It  means  that 
the  political  usages  of  the  home-country  and  the 
great  Dominion  are  so  closely  assimilated  that 
political  co-operation  between  them  is  far  easier 
than  it  otherwise  might  be ;  it  increases  the 
possibility  of  a  future  Unk  more  intimate  than 
that  of  mere  co-operation. 

Not  less  whole-hearted  or  generous  than  the 
treatment  of  the  problems  of  Canadian  govern- 
ment was  the  treatment  of  the  same  problem  in 
Austraha.  Here,  as  a  matter  of  course,  all  the 
colonies  had  been  endowed,  at  the  earliest  possible 
date,  with  the  famihar  sj^stem  of  representative 
but  not  responsible  government.  No  such  acute 
friction  as  had  occurred  in  Canada  had  yet  shown 
itself,  though  signs  of  its  development  were  not 
lacking.  But  in  1852  an  astonishing  step  was 
taken  by  the  British  parliament :  the  various 
Australian  colonies  were  empowered  to  elect 
single-chamber  constituent  assemblies  to  decide 
the  forms  of  government  under  which  they  wished 
to  live.  They  decided  in  every  case  to  reproduce 
as  nearly  as  possible  the  British  system  :  legis- 
latures of  two  chambers,  with  ministries  respon- 
sible to  them.  Thus,  in  Australia  as  in  Canada, 
the  daughter-peoples  were  made  to  feel  the  com- 
munity  of   their   institutions  with   those   of   the 

J 


130  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

mother-country,  and  the  possibihty  of  intimate 
and  easy  co-operation  was  increased.  Two  years 
later,  in  1854,  New  Zealand  was  endowed  with 
the  same  system.  Among  all  the  British  realms 
in  which  the  white  man  was  predommant,  only 
South  Africa  was  as  yet  excluded  from  this  re- 
markable development.  The  reasons  for  this  ex- 
clusion we  have  already  noted :  its  consequences 
will  occupy  our  attention  in  later  pages. 

Very  manifestly  the  empire  which  was  de- 
veloping on  such  lines  was  not  an  empire  in  the 
old  sense — a  dominion  imposed  by  force  upon 
unwilling  subjects.  That  old  word,  which  has 
been  used  in  so  many  senses,  was  being  given  a 
wholly  new  connotation.  It  was  being  made  to 
mean  a  free  partnership  of  self-governing  peoples, 
held  together  not  by  force,  but  in  part  by  common 
interests,  and  in  a  still  higher  degree  by  common 
sentiment  and  the  possession  of  the  same  institu- 
tions of  liberty. 

In  the  fullest  sense,  however,  this  new  con- 
ception of  empire  applied  only  to  the  group  of 
the  great  self-governing  colonies.  There  were 
many  other  regions,  even  before  1878,  included 
within  the  British  Empire,  though  as  yet  it  had 
not  incorporated  those  vast  protectorates  over 
regions  peopled  by  backward  races  which  have 
been  added  during  the  last  generation.  There 
were  tropical  settlements  like  British  Honduras, 
British  Guiana,  Sierra  Leone,  and  Cape  Coast 
Castle  ;  there  were  many  West  Indian  Islands, 
and    scattered    possessions    Uke    Mauritius    and 


TRANSFORMATION  OF  BRITISH  EMPIRE     131 

Hong-Kong  and  Singapore  and  the  Straits  Settle- 
ments; there  were  garrison  towns  or  coahng- 
stations  Hke  Gibraltar,  Malta,  Aden,  St.  Helena. 
To  none  of  these  were  the  institutions  of  full 
responsible  seK-government  granted.  Some  of 
them  possessed  representative  institutions  with- 
out responsible  ministries  ;  in  others  the  governor 
was  assisted  by  a  nominated  council,  intended  to 
express  local  opinion,  but  not  elected  by  the 
inhabitants ;  in  yet  others  the  governor  ruled 
autocratically.  But  in  aU  these  cases  the  ulti- 
mate control  of  policy  was  retained  by  the  home 
government.  And  in  this  general  category,  as 
yet,  the  South  African  colonies  were  included. 
Why  were  these  distinctions  drawn  ?  Why  did 
the  generation  of  British  statesmen,  who  had 
dealt  so  generously  with  the  demand  for  self- 
government  in  Canada  and  Austraha,  stop  short 
and  refuse  to  carry  out  their  principles  in  these 
other  cases  ? 

It  is  characteristic  of  British  politics  that  they 
are  never  merely  or  fully  logical,  and  that  even 
when  political  doctrines  seem  to  enjoy  the  most 
complete  ascendancy,  they  are  never  put  into 
effect  without  quahfications  or  exceptions.  The 
exceptions  already  named  to  the  establishment  of 
full  self-government  were  due  to  many  and  vary- 
ing causes.  In  the  first  place,  there  was  in  most 
of  these  cases  no  effective  demand  for  fuU  self- 
government  ;  and  it  may  safely  be  asserted  that 
any  community  in  which  there  is  no  demand  for 
self-governing   institutions  is  probably  not  in  a 


132  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

condition  to  work  them  with  effect.  Some  of 
these  possessions  were  purely  military  posts,  like 
Gibraltar  and  Aden,  and  were  necessarily  ad- 
ministered as  such.  Others  were  too  small  and 
weak  to  dream  of  assuming  the  full  privileges. 
But  in  the  majority  of  cases  one  outstanding 
common  feature  will  appear  on  closer  analysis. 
Nearly  all  these  territories  were  tropical  or  semi- 
tropical  lands,  whose  British  inhabitants  were  not 
permanent  settlers,  but  were  present  solely  for 
the  purposes  of  trade  or  other  exploitation,  while 
the  bulk  of  the  population  consisted  of  backward 
peoples,  whose  traditions  and  civihsation  rendered 
their  effective  participation  in  public  affairs  quite 
impracticable.  In  such  cases,  to  have  given  full 
poHtical  power  to  the  small  and  generally  shift- 
ing mmority  of  white  men  would  have  been  to 
give  scope  to  many  evils ;  and  to  have  en- 
franchised, on  a  mere  theory,  the  mass  of  the 
population  would  have  been  to  produce  still 
worse  results.  It  would  have  sentenced  these 
communities  to  the  sort  of  fate  which  has  be- 
fallen the  beautiful  island  of  Ha3i}i,  where  the 
self-government  of  a  population  of  emancipated 
negro  slaves  has  brought  nothing  but  anarchy 
and  degradation.  In  such  conditions  the  steady 
Reign  of  Law  is  the  greatest  boon  that  can  be 
given  to  white  settlers  and  coloured  subjects 
alike  ;  and  the  final  authority  is  rightly  retained 
by  the  home  government,  inspired,  as  British 
opinion  has  long  required  that  it  should  be,  by 
the  principle   that   the  rights   of  the  backward 


TRANSFORMATION  OF  BRITISH  EMPIRE    133 

peoples  must  be  safeguarded.  Under  this  system, 
both  law  and  a  real  degree  of  liberty  are  made 
possible ;  whereas  under  a  doctrinaire  application 
of  the  theory  of  self-government,  both  would 
vanish. 

But  there  remains  the  vast  dominion  of  India, 
which  faUs  neither  into  the  one  category  nor 
into  the  other.  Though  there  are  many  primitive 
and  backward  elements  among  its  vast  popula- 
tion, there  are  also  peoples  and  castes  whose 
members  are  intellectually  capable  of  meeting  on 
equal  terms  the  members  of  any  of  the  ruling 
races  of  the  West.  Yet  during  this  age,  when 
seK-government  on  the  amplest  scale  was  being 
extended  to  the  chief  regions  of  the  British 
Empire,  India,  the  greatest  dominion  of  them  all, 
did  not  obtain  the  gift  of  representative  institu- 
tions even  on  the  most  modest  scale.  Why  was 
this? 

It  was  not  because  the  ruHng  race  was  hostile 
to  the  idea,  or  desired  merely  to  retain  its  own 
ascendancy.  On  the  contrary,  both  in  Britain 
and  among  the  best  of  the  British  administrators 
in  India,  it  was  increasingly  held  that  the  only 
ultimate  justification  for  the  British  power  in 
India  would  be  that  under  its  guidance  the  Indian 
peoples  should  be  gradually  enabled  to  govern 
themselves.  As  early  as  1824,  when  in  Europe 
sheer  reaction  was  at  its  height,  this  view  was 
being  strongly  urged  by  one  of  the  greatest  of 
Anglo-Indian  administrators.  Sir  Thomas  Munro, 
a  soldier  of  distinction,  then  serving  as  governor 


134  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

of  Madras.  '  We  should  look  upon  India,'  he 
wrote,  '  not  as  a  temporary  possession,  but  as  one 
which  is  to  be  mamtained  permanent^,  until  the 
natives  shall  have  abandoned  most  of  their  super- 
stitions and  prejudices,  and  become  sufficiently 
enlightened  to  frame  a  regular  government  for 
themselves,  and  to  conduct  and  preserve  it. 
Whenever  such  a  time  shaU  arrive,  it  will  probably 
be  best  for  both  countries  that  the  British  control 
over  India  should  be  gradually  withdrawn.  That 
the  desirable  change  contemplated  may  in  some 
after  age  be  effected  in  India,  there  is  no  cause  to 
despair.  Such  a  change  was  at  one  time  in 
Britam  itself  at  least  as  hopeless  as  it  is  here. 
When  we  reflect  how  much  the  character  of  nations 
has  always  been  influenced  by  that  of  govern- 
ments, and  that  some,  once  the  most  cultivated, 
have  sunk  into  barbarism,  while  others,  formerly 
the  rudest,  have  attained  the  highest  point  of 
civilisation,  we  shall  see  no  reason  to  doubt  that 
if  we  pursue  steadily  the  proper  measures,  we 
shall  in  time  so  far  improve  the  character  of  our 
Indian  subjects  as  to  make  them  able  to  govern 
and  protect  themselves.' 

In  other  words,  self-government  was  the  de- 
sirable end  to  be  pursued  in  India  as  elsev/here  ; 
but  in  India  there  were  many  and  grave  obstacles 
to  its  efficient  workmg,  which  could  only  slowly 
be  overcome.  In  the  first  place,  India  is  more 
deeply  divided  in  race,  language,  and  rehgion 
than  any  other  region  of  the  world.  Nowhere 
else  is  there  such  a  medley  of  peoples  of  every 


TRANSFORMATION  OF  BRITISH  EMPIRE     135 

grade  of  development,  from  the  almost  savage 
Bhil  to  the  cultivated  and  high-bred  Brahmin  or 
Rajput  or  Mahomedan  chief.  There  are  sharp 
regional  differences,  as  great  as  those  between 
the  European  countries ;  but  cutting  across  these 
there  are  everywhere  the  rigid  and  impermeable 
distinctions  of  caste,  which  have  no  parallel  any- 
where else  in  the  world.  The  experience  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Empire,  whose  confusion  of 
races  is  simphcity  itself  in  comparison  with  the 
chaos  of  India,  affords  a  significant  demonstra- 
tion of  the  fact  that  parliamentary  mstitutions, 
if  they  are  estabhshed  among  deeply  divided 
peoples,  must  almost  inevitably  be  exploited  for 
the  purpose  of  racial  ascendancy  by  the  most 
vigorous  or  the  best-organised  elements  among 
the  people ;  and  a  very  ugly  tyranny  is  apt  to 
result,  as  it  has  resulted  in  Austro-Hungary. 
This  consequence  would  almost  certainly  follow 
the  estabhshment  of  a  full  representative  system 
in  India.  In  the  cities  of  mediaeval  Italy,  when 
the  conflict  of  parties  became  so  acute  that 
neither  side  could  expect  justice  from  the  other, 
the  practice  grew  up  of  electing  a  podesta  from 
some  foreign  city  to  act  as  an  impartial  arbiter. 
The  British  power  in  India  has  played  the  part 
of  a  podesta  in  restraining  and  mediating  between 
the  conflicting  peoples  and  religions  of  India. 

But  again  (and  this  is  even  more  fundamental), 
for  thousands  of  years  the  history  of  India  has 
been  one  long  story  of  conquests  and  tyrannies 
by   successive   rulmg   races.     Always   Might  has 


136  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

been  Right,  so  that  the  lover  of  righteousness 
could  only  pursue  it,  like  the  mediaeval  ascetic, 
by  cutting  himself  off  from  the  world,  abjiu-ing 
all  social  ties,  and  immolating  the  flesh  in  order 
to  hve  by  the  spirit.  Always  Law  had  been,  in 
the  last  resort,  the  Will  of  the  Stronger,  not  the 
decree  of  impartial  justice.  Always  the  master- 
races,  the  predatory  bands,  the  ruhng  castes, 
had  expected  to  receive,  and  the  mass  of  the 
people  had  been  accustomed  to  give,  the  most 
abject  submission ;  and  these  habits  were  diffi- 
cult to  overcome.  '  In  England,'  says  Sir  Thomas 
Munro,  '  the  people  resist  oppression,  and  it  is 
their  spirit  which  gives  efficacy  to  the  law :  in 
India  the  people  rarely  resist  oppression,  and  the 
law  intended  to  secure  them  from  it  can  there- 
fore derive  no  aid  from  themselves.  ...  It  is  in 
vain  to  caution  them  against  paymg  by  telling 
them  that  the  law  is  on  their  side,  and  will 
support  them  m  refusing  to  comply  with  un- 
authorised demands.  AU  exhortations  on  this 
head  are  thrown  away,  and  after  listening  to  them 
they  will  the  very  next  day  submit  to  extortion 
as  quietly  as  before.'  How  could  representative 
institutions  be  expected  to  work  under  such 
conditions  ?  They  would  have  lacked  the  very 
foundation  upon  which  alone  they  can  firmly 
rest :  respect  for  law,  and  public  co-operation  in 
the  enforcement  of  it.  Thus  the  supreme  service 
which  the  government  of  India  could  render  to  its 
people  was  the  establishment  and  maintenance  of 
the  Reign  of  Law,  and  of  the  liberty  which  it 


TRANSFORMATION  OF  BRITISH  EMPIRE    137 

shelters.  In  such  conditions  representative  govern- 
ment would  be  Uable  to  bring,  not  liberty,  but 
anarchy  and  the  renewal  of  lawless  oppression. 

But  although  the  extension  of  the  representa- 
tive system  to  India  neither  v/as  nor  could  be 
attempted  in  this  age,  very  remarkable  advances 
were  made  towards  turning  India  in  a  real  sense 
into  a  self-governing  comitry.  It  ceased  to  be 
regarded  or  treated  as  a  subject  dominion  exist- 
ing solely  for  the  advantage  of  its  conquerors. 
That  had  always  been  its  fate  in  all  the  long 
centuries  of  its  history ;  and  in  the  first  period 
of  British  rule  the  tradmg  company  which  had 
acquired  this  amazing  empire  had  naturally  re- 
garded it  as  primarily  a  source  of  profit.  In 
1833  the  company  was  forbidden  to  engage  in 
trade,  and  the  profit-makmg  motive  disappeared. 
The  shareholders  still  continued  to  receive  a  fixed 
dividend  out  of  the  Indian  revenues,  but  this 
may  be  compared  to  a  fixed  debt-charge,  an 
amiual  payment  for  capital  expended  in  the  past ; 
and  it  came  to  an  end  when  the  company  was 
abolished  in  1858.  Apart  from  this  dividend,  no 
sort  of  tribute  was  exacted  from  India  by  the 
ruling  power.  India  was  not  even  required  to 
contribute  to  the  upkeep  of  the  navy,  which 
protected  her  equally  with  the  rest  of  the  Empire, 
or  of  the  diplomatic  service,  which  was  often  con- 
cerned with  her  interests.  She  paid  for  the  small 
army  which  guarded  her  frontiers ;  but  if  any 
part  of  it  was  borrowed  for  service  abroad,  its 
whole   pay   and   charges   were   met   by   Britain. 


138  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

She  paid  the  salaries  and  pensions  of  the  handful 
of  British  administrators  who  conducted  her 
government,  but  this  was  a  very  small  charge  in 
comparison  with  the  lavish  outlay  of  the  native 
princes  whom  they  had  replaced.  India  had 
become  a  self-contained  state,  whose  whole  re- 
sources were  expended  exclusively  upon  her  own 
needs,  and  expended  with  the  most  scrupulous 
honesty,  and  under  the  most  elaborate  safe- 
guards. 

They  were  expended,  moreover,  especially 
during  the  later  part  of  this  period,  largely  in 
equipping  her  with  the  material  apparatus  of 
modern  civilisation.  Efficient  poHce,  great  roads, 
a  postal  service  cheaper  than  that  of  any  other 
country,  a  well-planned  railway  system,  and, 
above  all,  a  gigantic  system  of  irrigation  which 
brought  under  cultivation  vast  regions  hitherto 
desert — these  were  some  of  the  boons  acquired  by 
India  during  the  period.  They  were  rendered 
possible  partly  by  the  economical  management  of 
her  finances,  partly  by  the  hberal  expenditure  of 
British  capital.  Above  all,  the  period  saw  the 
beginning  of  a  system  of  popular  education,  of 
which  the  English  language  became  the  main 
vehicle,  because  none  of  the  thirty-eight  recog- 
nised vernacular  tongues  of  India  either  possessed 
the  necessary  literature,  or  could  be  used  as  a 
medium  for  instruction  in  modern  science.  In 
1858  three  universities  were  established ;  and 
although  their  system  was  ill-devised,  under  the 
malign  influence  of  the  analogy  of  London  Uni- 


TRANSFORMATION  OF  BRITISH  EMPIRE     139 

versity,  a  very  large  and  increasing  number  of 
young    graduates,    trained    for    modern    occupa- 
tions, began  to  filter  into  Indian  society,  and  to 
modify    its   point    of    view.      All    speaking    and 
writing  English,  and  all  trained  in  much  the  same 
body  of  ideas,  they  possessed  a  similarity  of  out- 
look and  a  vehicle  of  communication  such  as  had 
never  before  linked  together  the  various  races 
and   castes   of   India.     This   large    and   growing 
class,  educated  in  some  measure  in  the  learning  of 
the   West,   formed   already,   at   the   end   of   the 
period,  a  very  important  new  element  in  the  life 
of  India.     They  were  capable  of  criticising  the 
work  of  their  government :  they  were  not  without 
standards  of  comparison  by  which  to  measure  its 
achievements ;    and,  aided  by  the  large  freedom 
granted  to  the  press  under  the  British  system, 
they  were  able  to  begin  the  creation  of  an  in- 
teUigent  public   opinion,   which  was  apt,   in  its 
first  movements,  to  be  ill-guided  and  rash,  but 
which  was  nevertheless  a  healthy  development. 
That  this  newly  created  class  of  educated  men 
should  produce  a  continual  stream  of  criticism, 
and  that  it  should  even  stimulate  into  existence 
public  discontents,  is  by  no  means  a  condemnation 
of  the  system  of  government  which  has  made  these 
developments  possible.     On  the  contrary,  it  is  a 
proof  that  the  system  has  had  an  invigorating 
effect.     For  the  existence  and  the  expression  of 
discontent  is  a  sign  of  life  ;  it  means  that  there 
is  an  end  of  that  utter  docility  which  marks  a 
people  enslaved  body  and  soul.     India  has  never 


140  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

been  more  prosperous  than  slie  is  to-day  ;  she  has 
never  before  known  so  impartial  a  system  of  justice 
as  she  now  possesses ;  and  these  are  legitimate 
grounds  of  pride  to  her  rulers.  But  they  may  even 
more  justly  pride  themselves  upon  the  fact  that 
in  all  her  history  India  has  never  been  so  frankly 
and  incessantly  critical  of  her  government  as  she 
is  to-day  ;  never  so  bold  in  the  aspirations  for 
the  future  which  her  sons  entertam. 

The  creation  of  the  new  class  of  Western-edu- 
cated Indians  also  facilitated  another  develop- 
ment which  the  British  government  definitely 
aimed  at  encouraging :  the  participation  of 
Indians  in  the  conduct  of  administration  in  their 
own  land.  The  Act  of  1833  had  laid  it  down  as 
a  fundamental  prmciple  that  '  no  native  of  the 
said  territories  .  .  .  shall  by  reason  only  of  his 
religion,  place  of  birth,  descent,  or  any  of  them, 
be  disabled  from  holding  any  place,  office,  or 
employment.'  The  great  majority  of  the  mmor 
administrative  posts  had  always  been  held  by 
Indians  ;  but  until  1833  it  had  been  held  that  the 
maintenance  of  British  supremacy  required  that 
the  liigher  offices  should  be  reserved  to  members 
of  the  ruhng  race.  This  restriction  was  now 
abolished ;  but  it  was  not  until  the  development 
of  the  educational  system  had  produced  a  body 
of  sufficiently  trained  men  that  the  new  principle 
could  produce  appreciable  results ;  and  even 
then,  the  deficiencies  of  an  undeveloped  system 
of  training,  combined  with  the  racial  and  religious 
jealousies  which  the  government  of   India   must 


TRANSFORMATION  OF  BRITISH  EMPIRE    141 

always  keep  in  mind,  imposed  limitations  upon  the 
rapid  increase  of  the  number  of  Indians  holding 
the  higher  posts.     Still,  the  principle  had  been  laid 
down,  and  was  being  acted  upon.     And  that  also 
constituted  a  great  step  towards  self-government. 
India  in  1878  was  governed,  under  the  terms 
of  a  code  of  law  based  upon  Indian  custom,  by 
a  small  body  of   British   officials,  among  whom 
leading  Indians  were  gradually  taking  their  place, 
and  who  worked  in  detail  through  an  army  of 
minor  officials,   nearly  aU   of   Indian  birth,  and 
selected  without  regard  to  race  or  creed.     She 
was   a   self-contained   country   whose   whole   re- 
sources  were   devoted   to   her   own   needs.     She 
was  prospering  to  a  degree  unexampled  in  her 
history  ;   she  had  achieved  a  pohtical  unity  never 
before  known  to  her ;    she  had  been  given  the 
supreme  boon  of  a  just  and  impartial  law,  ad- 
ministered without  fear  or  favour ;    and  she  had 
enjoyed  a  long  period  of  peace,  unbroken  by  any 
attack  from  external  foes.     Here  also,  as  fully  as 
in  the  self-governing  colonies,  membership  of  the 
British  Empire  did  not  mean  subjection  to  the 
selfish  dominion  of  a  master,  or  the  subordination 
to  that  master's  interests  of  the  vital  interests 
of  the  community.     It  meant  the  estabhshment 
among  a  vast  population  of  the  essential  gifts  of 
Western  civilisation,  rational  law,  and  the  liberty 
which  exists  under  its  shelter.     Empire  had  come 
to  mean,  not  merely  domination  pursued  for  its 
own  sake,  but  trusteeship  for  the  extension  of 
civilisation. 


142  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

The  period  of  practical  British  monopoly,  1815- 
1878,  had  thus  brought  about  a  very  remarkable 
transformation  in  the  character  of  the  British 
Empire.  It  had  greatly  increased  in  extent,  and 
by  every  test  of  area,  population,  and  natural 
resources,  it  was  beyond  comparison  the  greatest 
power  that  had  ever  existed  in  the  world.  But 
its  organisation  was  of  an  extreme  laxity ;  it 
possessed  no  real  common  government ;  and  its 
principal  members  were  united  rather  by  a  com- 
munity of  institutions  and  ideas  than  by  any 
formal  ties.  Moreover,  it  presented  a  more 
amazing  diversity  of  racial  tjrpes,  of  religions,  and 
of  grades  of  civihsation,  than  any  other  political 
fabric  which  had  existed  in  history.  Its  de- 
velopment had  assuredly  brought  about  a  very 
great  expansion  of  the  ideas  of  Western  civihsa- 
tion over  the  face  of  the  globe,  and,  above  all,  a 
remarkable  diffusion  of  the  institutions  of  political 
Uberty.  But  it  remained  to  be  proved  whether 
this  loosely  compacted  bundle  of  states  possessed 
any  real  unity,  or  would  be  capable  of  standing 
any  severe  strain.  The  majority  of  observers, 
both  in  Britam  itself  and  throughout  the  world, 
would  have  been  inclined,  in  1878,  to  give  a 
negative  answer  to  these  questions. 


VII 

THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES,  1878-1900 

The  Congress  of  Berlin  in  1878  marks  the  close 
of   the  era  of  nationalist  revolutions   and  wars 
in  Europe.     By  the  same  date  all  the  European 
states  had  attained  to  a  certain  stability  m  their 
constitutional  systems.     With  equal  definiteness 
this  year  may  be  said  to  mark  the  opening  of  a 
new  era  in  the  history  of  European  imperialism  ; 
an  era  of  eager  competition  for  the  control  of  the 
still  unoccupied  regions  of  the  world,  in  which  the 
concerns  of  remote  lands  suddenty  became  matters 
of  supreme  moment  to  the  great  European  powers, 
and  the  peace  of  the  world  was  endangered  by 
questions  arising  in  China  or  Siam,  in  Morocco  or 
the  Soudan,  or  the  islands  of  the  Pacific.     The 
control  of  Europe  over  the  non-European  world 
was  in  a  single  generation  completed  and  confirmed. 
And  the  most  important  of  the  many  questions 
raised    by   this   development   was    the    question 
whether  the  spirit  in  which  this  world-supremacy 
of  Europe  was  to  be  wielded  should  be  the  spirit 
which  long  experience  had  inspired  in  the  oldest 
of  the  colonising  nations,  the  spirit  of  trusteeship 
on  behalf  of  civilisation  ;   or  whether  it  was  to  be 
the  old,  brutal,  and  sterile  spirit  of  mere  domina- 
tion for  its  own  sake. 

}43 


144  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

On  a  superficial  view  the  most  obvious  feature 
of  this  strenuous  period  was  that  all  the  remaining 
unexploited  regions  of  the  world  were  either 
annexed  by  one  or  other  of  the  great  Western 
states,  or  were  driven  to  adopt,  with  greater  or  less 
success,  the  modes  of  organisation  of  the  West. 
But  what  was  far  more  important  than  any  new 
demarcation  of  the  map  was  that  not  only  the 
newly  annexed  lands,  but  also  the  half-developed 
territories  of  earlier  European  dominions,  were 
with  an  extraordinary  devouring  energy  penetrated 
during  this  generation  by  European  traders  and 
administrators,  equipped  with  railways,  steam- 
boats, and  all  the  material  apparatus  of  modern 
life,  and  in  general  organised  and  exploited  for  the 
purposes  of  industry  and  trade.  This  astonishing 
achievement  was  almost  as  thorough  as  it  was 
swift.  And  its  result  was,  not  merely  that  the 
political  control  of  Europe  over  the  backward 
regions  of  the  world  was  strengthened  and  secured 
by  these  means,  but  that  the  whole  world  was 
turned  into  a  single  economic  and  political  unit, 
no  part  of  which  could  henceforth  dwell  in  isola- 
tion. This  might  have  meant  that  we  should 
have  been  brought  nearer  to  some  sort  of  world- 
order  ;  but  unhappily  the  spirit  in  which  the  great 
work  was  undertaken  by  some,  at  least,  of  the 
nations  which  participated  in  it  has  turned  this 
wonderful  achievement  into  a  source  of  bitterness 
and  enmity,  and  led  the  world  in  the  end  to  the 
tragedy  and  agony  of  the  Great  War. 

The  causes  of  this  gigantic  outpouring  of  energy 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES        145 

were  manifold.  The  main  impelling  forces  were 
perhaps  economic  rather  than  political.  But  the 
economic  needs  of  this  strenuous  age  might  have 
been  satisfied  without  resort  to  the  brutal  arbitra- 
ment of  war  :  their  satisfaction  might  even  have 
been  made  the  means  of  diminishing  the  danger 
of  war.  It  was  the  interpretation  of  these  econo- 
mic needs  in  terms  of  an  unhappy  political  theory 
which  has  led  to  the  final  catastrophe. 

On  a  broad  view,  the  final  conquest  of  the  world 
by  European  civiUsation  was  made  possible,  and 
indeed  inevitable,  by  the  amazing  development 
of  the  material  aspects  of  that  civilisation  during 
the  nineteenth  century ;  by  the  progressive  com- 
mand over  the  forces  of  nature  which  the  advance 
of  science  had  placed  in  the  hands  of  man,  by  the 
application  of  science  to  industry  in  the  develop- 
ment of  manufacturing  methods  and  of  new 
modes  of  communication,  and  by  the  intricate  and 
flexible  organisation  of  modern  finance.  These 
changes  were  already  in  progress  before  1878,  and 
were  already  transforming  the  face  of  the  world. 
Since  1878  they  have  gone  forward  with  such 
accelerating  speed  that  we  have  been  unable  to 
appreciate  the  significance  of  the  revolution  they 
were  effecting.  We  have  been  carried  off  our  feet ; 
and  have  found  it  impossible  to  adjust  our  moral 
and  political  ideas  to  the  new  conditions. 

The  great  material  achievements  of  the  last  two 
generations  have  been  mainly  due  to  an  intense 
concentration  and  specialisation  of  functions 
among  both  men  of  thought  and  men  of  action. 

K 


146  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

But  the  result  of  this  has  been  that  there  have 
been  few  to  attempt  the  vitally  important  task 
of  appreciating  the  movement  of  our  civilisation 
as  a  whole,  and  of  endeavouring  to  determine  how 
far  the  political  conceptions  inherited  from  an 
earUer  age  were  valid  in  the  new  conditions.     For 
under  the  pressure  of  the  great  transformation 
political  forces  also  have  been  transformed,  and 
in  all  countries  poUtical  thought  is  bafHed  and 
bewildered  by  the  complexity  of  the  problems  by 
which  it  is  faced.     To  this  in  part  we  owe  the 
dimness  of  vision  which  overtook  us  as  we  went 
whirling  together  towards  the  great  catastrophe. 
It  is  only  in  the  glare  of  a  world-conflagration  that 
we  begin  to  perceive,  in  something  like  their  true 
proportions,  the  great  forces  and  events  which 
have  been  shaping  our  destinies.     In  the  future, 
if  the  huge  soulless  mechanism  which  man  has 
created  is  not  to  get  out  of  hand  and  destroy  him, 
we  must  abandon  that  contempt  for  the  philo- 
sopher and  the  political  thinker  which  we  have 
latterly  been  too  ready  to  express,  and  we  must 
recognise  that  the  task  of  analysmg  and  relating 
to  one  another  the  achievements  of  the  past  and 
the  problems  of  the  present  is  at  least  as  important 
as   the   increase   of   our   knowledge   and   of   our 
dangerous  powers  by  intense  and  narrow  con- 
centration within  ver}'-  limited  fields  of  thought 
and  work. 

In  the  meantime  we  must  observe  (however 
briefly  and  inadequately),  how  the  dazzling  ad- 
vances of  science  and  industry  have  affected  the 


THE  ERA  OE  THE  WORLD-STATES         147 

conquest  of  the  world  by  European  civilisation, 
and  why  it  has  come  about  that  instead  of  leading 
to  amity  and  happmess,  they  have  brought  us 
to  the  most  hideous  catastrophe  in  human  history. 

Science  and  industry,  in  the  first  place,  made  the 
conquest  and  organisation  of  the  world  easy.  In 
the  first  stages  of  the  expansion  of  Europe  the 
material  superiority  of  the  West  had  unquestion- 
ably aSorded  the  means  whereby  its  pohtical  ideas 
and  institutions  could  be  made  operative  in  new 
fields.  The  mvention  of  ocean-gomg  ships,  the 
use  of  the  mariner's  compass,  the  discovery  of  the 
rotundity  of  the  earth,  the  development  of  fire- 
arms— these  were  the  things  which  made  possible 
the  creation  of  the  first  European  empires ;  though 
these  purely  material  advantages  could  have  led 
to  no  stable  results  unless  they  had  been  wielded 
by  peoples  possessing  a  real  poHtical  capacity. 
In  the  same  way  the  briUiant  triumphs  of  modern 
engineering  have  alone  rendered  possible  the  rapid 
conquest  and  organisation  of  huge  undeveloped 
areas  ;  the  deadly  precision  of  Western  weapons 
has  made  the  Western  peoples  irresistible  ;  the 
wonderful  progress  of  medical  science  has  largely 
overcome  the  barriers  of  disease  which  long  ex- 
cluded the  white  man  from  great  regions  of  the 
earth ;  and  the  methods  of  modern  fmance, 
organising  and  making  available  the  combined 
credit  of  whole  communities,  have  provided  the 
means  for  vast  enterprises  which  without  them 
could  never  have  been  undertaken. 

Then,  in  the  next  place,  science  has  found  uses 


148  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

for  many  commodities  which  were  previously  of 
little  value,  and  many  of  which  are  mainly  pro- 
duced in  the  undeveloped  regions  of  the  earth. 
Some  of  these,  like  rubber,  or  nitrates,  or  mineral 
and  vegetable  oils,   have  rapidly  become   quite 
indispensable    materials,    consumed    by    the    in- 
dustrial countries  on  an  immense  scale.     Accord- 
ingly, the  more  highly  industrialised  a  country  is, 
the  more  dependent  it  must  be  upon  supplies 
drawn  from  all  parts  of  the  world  ;   not  only  sup- 
plies of  food  for  the  maintenance  of  its  teeming 
population,  but,  even  more,  supplies  of  material 
for  its  industries.     The   days  when  Europe,   or 
even  America,  was  self-sufficient  are  gone  for  ever. 
And  in  order  that  these  essential  supplies  may  be 
available,  it  has  become  necessary  that  all  the 
regions  which  produce  them  should  be  brought 
under  efficient  administration.     The  anarchy  of 
primitive  barbarism  cannot  be  allowed  to  stand  in 
the  way  of  access  to  these  vital  necessities  of  the 
new  world-economy.     It  is  merely  futile  for  well- 
meaning  sentimentalists  to  talk  of  the  wickedness 
of  invading  the  inalienable  rights  of  the  primitive 
occupants  of  these  lands  :    for  good  or  for  ill,  the 
world  has  become  a  single  economic  unit,  and  its 
progress  camiot  be  stopped  out  of  consideration 
for  the  time-honoured  usages  of  uncivilised  and 
backward  tribes.    Of  course  it  is  our  duty  to  ensure 
that  these  simple  folks  are  justly  treated,  led  gently 
into  civilisation,  and  protected  from  the  iniquities 
of  a  mere  ruthless  exploitation,  such  as,  in  some 
regions,  we  have  been  compelled  to  witness.     But 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES        149 

Western  civilisation  has  seized  the  reins  of  the 
world,  and  it  will  not  be  denied.  Its  economic 
needs  drive  it  to  undertake  the  organisation  of  the 
whole  world.  What  we  have  to  secure  is  that  its 
political  principles  shall  be  such  as  will  ensure 
that  its  control  will  be  a  benefit  to  its  subjects  as 
well  as  to  itself.  But  the  development  of  scientific 
industry  has  made  European  control  and  civilised 
administration  inevitable  throughout  the  world. 

It  did  not,  however,  necessarily  follow  from  these 
premises  that  the  great  European  states  which 
did  not  already  possess  extra-European  territories 
were  bound  to  acquire  such  lands.  So  far  as  their 
purely  economic  needs  were  concerned,  it  would 
have  been  enough  that  they  should  have  freedom 
of  access,  on  equal  terms  with  their  neighbours, 
to  the  sources  of  the  supplies  they  required.  It  is 
quite  possible,  as  events  have  shown,  for  a  European 
state  to  attain  very  great  success  in  the  industrial 
sphere  without  possessing  any  political  control 
over  the  lands  from  which  its  raw  materials  are 
drawn,  or  to  which  its  finished  products  are  sold. 
Norway  has  created  an  immense  shipping  industry 
without  owning  a  single  port  outside  her  own 
borders.  The  manufactures  of  Switzerland  are  as 
thriving  as  these  of  any  European  country,  though 
Switzerland  does  not  possess  any  colonies.  Ger- 
many herself,  the  loudest  advocate  of  the  necessity 
of  political  control  as  the  basis  of  economic  pro- 
sperity, has  found  it  possible  to  create  a  vast  and 
very  prosperous  industry,  though  her  colonial 
possessions  have  been  small,  and  have  contributed 


150  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

scarcely  at  all  to  her  wealth.  Her  merchants  and 
capitalists  have  indeed  found  the  most  profitable 
fields  for  their  enterprises,  not  in  their  own  colonies, 
which  they  have  on  the  whole  tended  to  neglect, 
bnt  in  a  far  greater  degree  in  South  and  Central 
America,  and  in  India  and  the  other  vast  terri- 
tories of  the  British  Empire,  which  have  been  open 
to  them  as  freely  as  to  British  merchants.  All  that 
the  prosperity  of  European  industry  required  was 
that  the  sources  of  supply  should  be  under  efficient 
administration,  and  that  access  to  them  should  be 
open.  And  these  conditions  were  fulfilled,  before  the 
great  rush  began,  over  the  greater  part  of  the  earth. 
If  in  1878,  when  the  European  nations  suddenly 
awoke  to  the  importance  of  the  non-European 
world,  they  had  been  able  to  agree  upon  some 
simple  principle  which  would  have  secured  equal 
treatment  to  all,  how  different  would  have  been 
the  fate  of  Europe  and  the  world  !  If  it  could 
have  been  laid  down,  as  a  principle  of  international 
law,  that  in  every  area  whose  administration  was 
undertaken  by  a  European  state,  the  '  open  door  ' 
should  be  secured  for  the  trade  of  all  nations 
equally,  and  that  this  rule  should  continue  in 
force  until  the  area  concerned  acquired  the  status 
of  a  distinctly  organised  state  controlling  its  own 
fiscal  system,  the  industrial  communities  would 
have  felt  secure,  the  little  states  quite  as  fully  as 
the  big  states.  Moreover,  since,  under  these  con- 
ditions, the  annexation  of  territory  by  a  European 
state  would  not  have  threatened  the  creation  of  a 
monopoly,  but  would  have  meant  the  assumption 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES         151 

of  a  duty  on  behalf  of  civilisation,  the  acrimonies 
and  jealousies  which  have  attended  the  process  of 
partition  would  have  been  largely  conjured  away. 
In  1878  such  a  solution  would  have  presented  few 
difficulties.  For  at  that  date  the  only  European 
state  which  controlled  large  undeveloped  areas 
was  Britain  ;  and  Britain,  as  we  have  seen,  had 
on  her  own  account  arrived  at  this  solution,  and 
had  administered,  as  she  still  administers,  all  those 
regions  of  her  Empire  which  do  not  possess  self- 
governing  rights  in  the  spirit  of  the  principle  we 
have  suggested. 

Wh}^  was  it  that  this  solution,  or  some  solution 
on  these  lines,  was  not  then  adopted,  and  had 
no  chance  of  being  adopted  ?  It  was  because  the 
European  states,  and  first  and  foremost  among 
them  Germany,  were  still  dominated  by  a  political 
theory  which  forbade  their  taking  such  a  view. 
We  may  call  this  theory  the  Doctrine  of  Power.  It 
is  the  doctrine  that  the  highest  duty  of  every  state 
is  to  aim  at  the  extension  of  its  own  power,  and 
that  before  this  duty  every  other  consideration 
must  give  way.  The  Doctrine  of  Power  has  never 
received  a  more  unflinching  expression  than  it 
received  from  the  German  Treitschke,  whose 
influence  was  at  its  height  during  the  years  of  the 
great  rush  for  extra-European  possessions.  The 
advocate  of  the  Doctrine  of  Power  is  not,  and 
cannot  be,  satisfied  with  equality  of  opportunity  ; 
he  demands  supremacy,  he  demands  monopoly,  he 
demands  the  means  to  injure  and  destroy  his 
rivals.     It  would  not  be  just  to  say  that  this 


152  THE  EXPANSION  OP  EUROPE 

doctrine  was  influential  only  in  Germany  ;  it  was 
in  some  degree  potent  everywhere,  especially  in 
this  period,  which  was  the  period  par  excellence 
of  '  imperialism  '  in  the  bad  sense  of  the  term.  But 
it  is  certainly  true  that  no  state  has  ever  been  so 
completely  dominated  by  it  as  Germany  ;  and 
no  state  less  than  Britain.  It  was  in  the  light  of 
this  doctrine  that  the  demands  of  the  new  scien- 
tific industry  were  interpreted.  Hag-ridden  b}^  this 
conception,  when  the  statesmen  of  Europe  awoke 
to  the  importance  of  the  non-European  world,  it 
was  not  primarily  the  economic  needs  of  their 
countries  that  they  thought  of,  for  these  were, 
on  the  whole,  not  inadequately  met :  what  struck 
their  imagination  was  that,  in  paying  no  attention 
to  the  outer  world,  they  had  missed  great  oppor- 
tunities of  increasing  their  power.  This  oversight, 
they  resolved,  must  be  rectified  before  it  was  too 
late. 

For  when  the  peoples  of  Western  and  Central 
Europe,  no  longer  engrossed  by  the  problems  of 
Nationalism  and  Liberalism,  cast  their  eyes  over 
the  world,  lo  !  the  scale  of  thmgs  seemed  to  have 
changed.  Just  as,  in  the  fifteenth  century,  civilisa- 
tion had  suddenly  passed  from  the  stage  of  the 
city-state  or  the  feudal  principality  to  the  stage 
of  the  great  nation-state,  so  now,  while  the 
European  peoples  were  still  struggling  to  realise 
their  nationhood,  civilisation  seemed  to  have 
stolen  a  march  upon  them,  and  to  have  advanced 
once  more,  this  time  into  the  stage  of  the  world- 
state.     For  to  the  east  of  the  European  nations 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES         153 

lay  the  vast  Russian  Empire,  stretching  from 
Central  Europe  across  Asia  to  the  Pacific  ;  and  in 
the  west  the  American  Repubhc  extended  from 
ocean  to  ocean,  across  three  thousand  miles  of 
territory  ;  and  between  these  and  around  them 
spread  the  British  Empire,  sprawling  over  the 
whole  face  of  the  globe,  on  every  sea  and  in  every 
continent.  In  contrast  with  these  giant  empires, 
the  nation-states  of  Europe  felt  themselves  out  of 
scale,  just  as  the  Italian  cities  in  the  sixteenth 
century  must  have  felt  themselves  out  of  scale  in 
comparison  with  the  new  nation-states  of  Spain 
and  France.  To  achieve  the  standard  of  the  world- 
state,  to  make  their  own  nations  the  controlling 
factors  in  wide  dominions  which  should  include 
territories  and  populations  of  varied  tjrpes,  be- 
came the  ambition  of  the  most  powerful  European 
states.  A  new  political  ideal  had  captivated  the 
mind  of  Europe. 

These  powerful  motives  were  reinforced  by  others 
which  arose  from  the  development  of  affairs  within 
Europe  itself.  In  the  first  place,  the  leading 
European  states  had  by  1878  definitely  abandoned 
that  tendency  towards  free  trade  which  had 
seemed  to  be  increasing  in  strength  during  the 
previous  generation  ;  and,  largely  in  the  hope  of 
combating  the  overwhelming  mercantile  and  in- 
dustrial supremacy  of  Britain,  had  adopted  the 
fiscal  policy  of  protection.  The  ideal  of  the 
protectionist  creed  is  national  self-sufficiency  in 
the  economic  sphere.  But,  as  we  have  seen, 
economic  self-sufficiency  was  no  longer  attainable 


154  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

in  the  conditions  of  modern  industry  by  any 
European  state.  Only  by  large  foreign  annexa- 
tions, especially  in  the  tropical  regions,  did  it  seem 
possible  of  achievement.  But  when  a  protectionist 
state  begins  to  acquire  territory,  the  anticipation 
that  it  will  use  its  power  to  exclude  or  destroy  the 
trade  of  its  rivals  must  drive  other  states  to  safe- 
guard themselves  by  still  further  annexations.  It 
was,  indeed,  this  fear  which  mainly  drove  Britain, 
in  spite  of,  or  perhaps  because  of,  her  free  trade 
theories,  into  a  series  of  large  annexations  in 
regions  where  her  trade  had  been  hitherto  pre- 
dominant. 

Again,  the  most  perturbing  feature  of  the  rela- 
tions between  the  European  powers  also  contri- 
buted to  produce  an  eagerness  for  colonial  posses- 
sions. Europe  had  entered  upon  the  era  of  huge 
national  armies  ;  the  example  of  Prussia,  and  the 
rancours  which  had  been  created  by  her  policy, 
had  set  all  the  nations  arming  themselves.  They 
had  learned  to  measure  their  strength  by  their 
available  man-power,  and  in  two  ways  the  desire 
to  increase  the  reserve  of  military  manhood  formed 
a  motive  for  colonisation.  In  the  first  place,  the 
surplus  manhood  of  a  nation  was  lost  to  it  if  it 
was  8.11owed  to  pass  under  an  alien  flag  by  emigra- 
tion. Those  continental  states  from  which  emi- 
gration took  place  on  a  large  scale  began  to  aspire 
after  the  possession  of  colonies  of  their  own,  where 
their  emigrants  could  still  be  kept  under  control, 
and  remain  subject  to  the  obligations  of  service. 
Germany,    the    state    which    beyond    all    others 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES         155 

measures  its  strength  by  its  figiiting  man-power, 
was  most  affected  by  this  motive,  which  formed 
the  chief  theme  of  the  colonial  school  among  her 
politicians  and  journalists,  and  continued  to  be  so 
even  when  the  stream  of  her  emigrants  had  dwindled 
to  very  small  proportions.  In  a  less  degree,  Italy 
was  influenced  by  the  same  motive.  In  the  second 
place,  conquered  subjects  even  of  backward  races 
might  be  made  useful  for  the  purposes  of  war. 
This  motive  appealed  most  strongly  to  France. 
Her  home  population  was  stationary.  She  lived 
in  constant  dread  of  a  new  onslaught  from  her 
formidable  neighbour ;  and  she  watched  with 
alarm  the  rapid  increase  of  that  neighbour's 
population,  and  the  incessant  increases  in  the 
numbers  of  his  armies.  At  a  later  date  Germany 
also  began  to  be  attracted  by  the  possibility  of 
drilling  and  arming,  among  the  negroes  of  Central 
Africa,  or  the  Turks  of  Asia  Minor,  forces  which 
might  aid  her  to  dominate  the  world. 

Thus  the  political  situation  in  Europe  had  a 
very  direct  influence  upon  the  colonising  activity 
of  this  period.  The  dominant  fact  of  European 
politics  during  this  generation  was  the  supreme 
prestige  and  influence  of  Germany,  who,  not  con- 
tent v/ith  an  unquestioned  military  superiority  to 
any  other  power,  had  buttressed  herself  by  the 
formation  (1879  and  1882)  of  the  most  formidable 
standing  alliance  that  has  ever  existed  in  European 
history,  and  completely  dominated  European 
politics.  France,  having  been  hurled  from  the 
leadership  of  Europe  in  1870,  dreaded  nothing  so 


156  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

much  as  the  outbreak  of  a  new  European  war, 
in  which  she  must  be  inevitably  involved,  and  in 
which  she  might  be  utterly  ruined.  She  strove  to 
find  a  compensation  for  her  wounded  pride  in 
colonial  adventures,  and  therefore  became,  during 
the  first  part  of  the  period,  the  most  active  of 
the  powers  in  this  field.  She  was  encouraged 
to  adopt  this  policy  by  Bismarck,  partly  in  the 
hope  that  she  might  thus  forget  Alsace,  partly 
in  order  that  she  might  be  kept  on  bad  terms  with 
Britain,  whose  interests  seemed  to  be  continually 
threatened  by  her  colonising  activity.  But  she 
hesitated  to  take  a  very  definite  line  in  regard  to 
territories  that  lay  close  to  Europe  and  might 
involve  European  complications. 

Bismarck  himself  took  little  interest  in  colonial 
questions,  except  in  so  far  as  they  could  be  used 
as  a  means  of  alienating  the  other  powers  from 
one  another,  and  so  securing  the  European 
supremacy  of  Germany.  He  therefore  at  first 
made  no  attempt  to  use  the  dominant  position  of 
Germany  as  a  means  of  acquiring  extra-European 
dominions.  But  the  yomiger  generation  in  Ger- 
many was  far  from  sharing  this  view.  It  was 
determined  to  win  for  Germany  a  world-empire, 
and  in  1884  and  the  following  years — rather  late 
in  the  day,  when  most  of  the  more  desirable  terri- 
tories were  already  occupied — it  forced  Bismarck 
to  annex  large  areas.  After  Bismarck's  fall,  in 
1890,  this  party  got  the  upper  hand  in  German 
politics,  and  the  creation  of  a  great  world-empire 
became,    as   we   shall   see,   the   supreme   aim   of 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES         157 

William  ii.  and  his  advisers.  The  formidable  and 
threatening  power  of  Germany  began  to  be  syste- 
matically employed  not  merely  for  the  maintenance 
of  supremacy  in  Europe,  which  could  be  secured 
by  peaceful  means,  but  for  the  acquisition  of  a 
commanding  position  in  the  outer  world ;  and 
since  this  could  only  be  attained  by  violence,  the 
world  being  now  almost  completely  partitioned, 
the  new  policy  made  Germany  the  source  of  unrest 
and  apprehension,  as  she  had  earlier  been,  and 
still  continued  to  be,  the  main  cause  of  the  burden 
of  military  preparation  in  Europe. 

Among  the  other  powers  which  participated  in 
the  great  partition,  Russia  continued  her  pressure 
in  two  of  the  three  directions  which  she  had  earlier 
followed — south-eastwards  in  Central  Asia,  east- 
wards towards  China.  In  both  directions  her 
activity  aroused  the  nervous  fears  of  Britain, 
while  her  pressure  upon  China  helped  to  bring 
Japan  into  the  ranks  of  the  militant  and  aggressive 
powers.  But  Russia  took  no  interest  in  the  more 
distant  quarters  of  the  world.  Nor  did  Austria, 
thougli  during  these  years  her  old  ambition  to 
expand  south-eastwards  at  the  expense  of  Turkey 
and  the  Balkan  peoples  revived  under  German 
encouragement.  Italy,  having  but  recently 
achieved  national  unity  and  taken  her  place  among 
the  Great  Powers,  felt  that  she  could  not  be  left 
out  of  the  running,  now  that  extra-European 
possessions  had  come  to  appear  an  almost  essential 
mark  of  greatness  among  states ;  and,  disappointed 
of  Tunis,  she  endeavoured  to  find  compensation 


158  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

on  the  shores  of  the  Red  Sea.  Spam  and  Portugal, 
in  the  midst  of  all  these  eager  rivalries,  were 
tempted  to  furbish  up  their  old  and  half-dormant 
claims.  Even  the  United  States  of  America  joined 
in  the  rush  during  the  fevered  period  of  the 
'nineties. 

Lastly,  Britain,  the  oldest  and  the  most  fully 
endowed  of  all  the  colonising  powers,  was  drawn, 
half  unwilling,  into  the  competition  ;  and  having 
an  immense  start  over  her  rivals,  actually  acquired 
more  new  territory  than  any  of  them.  She  was, 
indeed,  like  the  other  states,  passing  through  an 
'  imperialist '  phase  in  these  years.  The  value 
attached  by  other  countries  to  oversea  posses- 
sions awakened  among  the  British  people  a  new 
pride  in  their  far-spread  dominions.  Disraeli,  who 
was  in  the  ascendant  when  the  period  opened, 
had  forgotten  his  old  opinion  of  the  uselessness  of 
colonies,  and  had  become  a  prophet  of  Empire. 
An  Imperial  Federation  Society  was  founded  in 
1878.  The  old  unwillmgness  to  assume  new 
responsibilities  died  out,  or  diminished  ;  and  the 
rapid  annexations  of  other  states,  especially  France, 
in  regions  where  British  influence  had  hitherto 
been  supreme,  and  whose  chieftains  had  often 
begged  in  vain  for  British  protection,  aroused 
some  irritation.  The  ebullient  energ}^  of  the 
colonists  themselves,  especially  in  South  Africa 
and  Australia,  demanded  a  forward  policy.  x\bove 
all,  the  fact  that  the  European  powers,  now  so 
eager  for  colonial  possessions,  had  all  adopted  the 
protectionist  policy  aroused  a  fear   lest  British 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES         159 

traders  should  find  themselves  shut  out  from  lands 
whose  trade  had  hitherto  been  almost  wholly  in 
their  hands ;  and  the  militant  and  aggressive 
temper  sometimes  shown  by  the  agents  of  these 
powers  awakened  some  nervousness  regarding  the 
safety  of  the  existing  British  possessions.  Hence 
Britain,  after  a  period  of  hesitancy,  became  as 
active  as  any  of  the  other  states  in  annexation. 
Throughout  this  period  her  main  rival  was  France, 
whose  new  claims  seemed  to  come  in  conflict  with 
her  own  in  almost  every  quarter  of  the  globe.  This 
rivalry  produced  acute  friction,  which  grew  in 
intensity  until  it  reached  its  culminating  point 
in  the  crisis  of  Fashoda  in  1898,  and  was  not 
removed  until  the  settlement  of  1904  solved  all 
the  outstanding  difficulties.  It  would  be  quite 
untrue  to  say  that  Britain  deliberately  endeavoured 
to  prevent  or  to  check  the  rapid  colonial  expan- 
sion of  France.  The  truth  is  that  British  trading 
interests  had  been  predominant  in  many  of  the 
regions  where  the  French  were  most  active,  and 
that  the  protectionist  policy  which  France  had 
adopted  stimulated  into  a  new  life  the  ancient 
rivalry  of  these  neighbour  and  sister  nations.  To- 
wards the  colonial  ambitions  of  Germany,  and  still 
more  of  Italy,  Britain  was  far  more  complaisant. 

It  is  difficult  to  give  in  a  brief  space  a  clear  sum- 
mary of  the  extremely  complicated  events  and 
intrigues  of  this  vitally  important  period.  But 
perhaps  it  will  be  easiest  if  we  consider  in  turn  the 
regions  in  which  the  strenuous  rivalries  of  the 
powers  displayed  themselves.     The  most  import- 


160  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

ant  was  Africa,  which  lay  invitmgly  near  to 
Europe,  and  was  the  only  large  region  of  the 
world  which  was  still  for  the  most  part  unoccupied. 
Here  all  the  competitors,  save  Russia,  Japan,  and 
America,  played  a  part.  Western  Asia  formed  a 
second  field,  in  which  three  powers  only,  Russia, 
Germany,  and  Britain,  were  immediately  con- 
cerned. The  Far  East,  where  the  vast  Empire 
of  China  seemed  to  be  falling  into  decrepitude, 
afforded  the  most  vexed  problems  of  the  period. 
Finally,  the  Pacific  Islands  were  the  scene  of  an 
active  though  less  intense  rivalry. 

It  is  a  curious  fact  that  Africa,  the  continent 
whose  outline  was  the  first  outside  of  Europe  itself 
to  be  fuUy  mapped  out  by  the  European  peoples, 
was  actually  the  last  to  be  effectively  brought 
under  the  influence  of  European  civilisation.  This 
was  because  the  coasts  of  Africa  are  for  the  most 
part  inhospitable  ;  its  vast  interior  plateau  is 
almost  everywhere  shut  off  either  by  belts  of 
desert  land,  or  by  swampy  and  malarious  regions 
along  the  coast ;  even  its  great  rivers  do  not 
readily  tempt  the  explorer  inland,  because  their 
course  is  often  interrupted  by  falls  or  rapids  not 
far  from  their  mouths,  where  they  descend  from 
the  interior  plateau  to  the  coastal  plain  ;  and  its 
inhabitants,  warlike  and  difficult  to  deal  with, 
are  also  peoples  of  few  and  simple  wants,  who  have 
little  to  offer  to  the  trader.  Hence  eight  genera- 
tions of  European  mariners  had  circumnavigated 
the  continent  without  seriousl}^  attempting  to 
penetrate  its  central  mass  ;    and  apart  from  the 


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s 


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UCA 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES         161 

Aiiglo-Dutch  settlements  at  the  Southern  ex- 
tremity, the  French  empire  in  Algeria  in  the  north, 
a  few  trading  centres  on  the  West  Coast,  and  some 
half-derelict  Portuguese  stations  in  Angola  and 
Mozambique,  the  whole  continent  remained  avail- 
able for  European  exploitation  in  1878. 

What  trade  was  carried  on,  except  in  Egypt, 
in  Algeria,  and  in  the  immediate  vichiity  of 
the  old  French  settlements  on  the  West  Coast,  was 
mainly  in  the  hands  of  British  merchants.  Over 
the  greater  part  of  the  coastal  belts  only  the 
British  power  was  known  to  the  native  tribes  and 
chieftains.  Many  of  them  (like  the  Sultan  of 
Zanzibar  and  the  chiefs  of  the  Cameroons)  had 
repeatedly  begged  to  be  taken  under  British  pro- 
tection, and  had  been  refused.  During  the  two 
generations  before  1878  the  interior  of  the  continent 
had  begun  to  be  known.  But  except  in  the  north 
and  north-west,  where  French  explorers  and  a  few 
Germans  had  been  active,  the  work  had  been 
mainly  done  by  British  travellers.  Most  of  the 
great  names  of  African  exploration — Livingstone, 
Burton,  Speke,  Baker,  Cameron  and  the  Anglo- 
American  Stanley — were  British  names.  These 
facts,  of  course,  gave  to  Britain,  already  so  richly 
endowed,  no  sort  of  claim  to  a  monopoly  of  the 
continent.  But  they  naturally  gave  her  a  right 
to  a  voice  in  its  disposal.  Only  the  French  had 
shown  anything  like  the  same  activity,  or  had 
established  anything  like  the  same  interests  ;  and 
they  were  far  behind  their  secular  rivals. 

But  these  facts  bring  out  one  feature  which 


162  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

differentiated  the  settlement  of  Africa  from  that  of 
any  other  region  of  the  non-European  world.  It 
was  not  a  gradual,  but  an  extraordinarily  rapid 
achievement.  It  was  based  not  upon  claims 
established  by  work  already  done,  but,  for  the 
most  part,  upon  the  implicit  assumption  that  extra- 
European  empire  was  the  due  of  the  European 
peoples,  simply  because  they  were  civilised  and 
powerful.  This  was  the  justification,  in  a  large 
degree,  of  all  the  European  empires  in  Africa. 
But  it  was  especially  so  in  the  case  of  the  empire 
which  Germany  created  in  the  space  of  three  years. 
This  empire  was  not  the  product  of  German  enter- 
prise in  the  regions  included  withm  it ;  it  was  the 
product  of  Germany's  dominating  position  in 
Europe,  and  the  expression  of  her  resolve  to  create 
an  external  empire  worthy  of  that  position. 

Africa  falls  naturally  into  two  great  regions. 
The  northern  coast,  separated  from  the  main  mass 
of  the  continent  by  the  broad  belt  of  deserts  which 
runs  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Red  Sea,  has  always 
been  far  more  intimately  connected  with  the  other 
Mediterranean  lands  than  with  the  rest  of  Africa. 
Throughout  the  course  of  history,  indeed,  the 
northern  coast-lands  have  belonged  rather  to  the 
realms  of  Western  or  of  Asiatic  civilisation  than 
to  the  primitive  barbarism  of  the  sons  of  Ham. 
In  the  days  of  the  Carthaginians  and  of  the  Roman 
Empire,  all  these  lands,  from  Eg^^t  to  Morocco, 
had  known  a  high  civilisation.  They  were  raci- 
ally as  well  as  historically  distinct  from  the  rest 
of  the  continent.     They  had  been  in  name  part 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES         163 

of  the  Turkish  Empire,  and  any  European  inter- 
ference in  their  affairs  was  as  much  a  question  of 
European  poHtics  as  the  problems  of  the  Balkans. 
Two  countries  in  this  area  fell  under  European 
direction  during  the  period  with  which  we  are 
concerned,  and  in  each  case  the  effects  upon 
European  politics  were  very  great.  In  1881 
France,  with  the  deliberate  encouragement  of 
Bismarck,  sent  armies  into  Tunis,  and  assumed 
the  protectorate  of  that  misgoverned  region.  She 
had  good  grounds  for  her  action.  Not  only  had 
she  large  trade-interests  in  Tunis,  but  the  country 
was  separated  from  her  earlier  dominion  in 
Algeria  only  by  an  artificial  line,  and  its  disorders 
increased  the  difficulty  of  developing  the  efficient 
administration  which  she  had  established  there. 
Unhappily  Italy  also  had  interests  in  Tunis.  There 
were  more  Italian  than  French  residents  in  the 
country,  which  is  separated  from  Sicily  only  by 
a  narrow  belt  of  sea.  And  Italy,  who  was  begin- 
ning to  conceive  colonial  ambitions,  had  not  un- 
naturally marked  down  Tunis  as  her  most  obvious 
sphere  of  influence.  The  result  was  to  create  a 
long-lived  ill-feeling  between  the  two  Latin  coun- 
tries. As  a  consequence  of  the  annexation  of 
Tunis,  Italy  was  persuaded  in  the  next  year  (1882) 
to  join  the  Triple  Alliance  ;  and  France,  having 
burnt  her  fingers,  became  chary  of  colonial  adven- 
tures in  regions  that  were  directly  under  the  eye 
of  Europe.  Isolated,  insecure,  and  eternally  sus- 
picious of  Germany,  she  could  not  afford  to  be 
drawn  into  European  quarrels.     This  is  in  a  large 


164  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

degree  the  explanation  of  her  vacillating  action 
in  regard  to  Egypt. 

In  Egypt  the  political  influence  of  France  had 
been  preponderant  ever  since  the  time  of  Mehemet 
Ali ;  perhaps  we  should  say,  ever  since  the  time 
of  Napoleon.  And  political  influence  had  been 
accompanied  by  trading  and  financial  interests. 
France  had  a  larger  share  of  the  trade  of  Eg^^t, 
and  had  lent  more  money  to  the  ruling  princes  of 
the  country,  than  any  other  country  save  England. 
She  had  designed  and  executed  the  Suez  Canal. 
But  this  waterway,  once  opened,  was  used  mainly 
by  British  ships  on  the  way  to  India,  Australia, 
and  the  Far  East.  It  became  a  point  of  vital 
strategic  importance  to  Britain,  who,  though  she 
had  opposed  its  construction,  eagerly  seized  the 
chance  of  buying  a  great  block  of  shares  in  the 
enterprise  from  the  bankrupt  Khedive.  Thus 
French  and  British  interests  in  Egypt  were  equally 
great ;  greater  than  those  of  all  the  rest  of  Europe 
put  together.  When  the  native  government  of 
Egypt  fell  into  bankruptcy  (1876),  the  two  powers 
set  up  a  sort  of  condominium,  or  joint  control  of 
the  finances,  in  order  to  ensure  the  payment  of 
interest  on  the  Egyptian  debt  held  by  their  citizens. 
To  bankruptcy  succeeded  political  chaos  ;  and  it 
became  apparent  that  if  the  rich  land  of  Egypt 
was  not  to  fall  into  utter  anarchy,  there  must  be 
direct  European  intervention.  The  two  powers 
proposed  to  take  joint  action ;  the  rest  of  Europe 
assented.  But  the  Sultan  of  Turkey,  as  suzerain 
of  Egypt,  threatened  to  make  difficulties.     At  the 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES        165 

last  moment  France,  fearful  of  the  complications 
that  might  result,  and  resolute  to  avoid  the  danger 
of  European  war,  withdrew  from  the  project  of 
joint  intervention.  Britain  went  on  alone  ;  and 
although  she  hoped  and  believed  that  she  would 
quickly  be  able  to  restore  order,  and  thereupon  to 
evacuate  the  country,  found  herself  drawn  into  a 
labour  of  reconstruction  that  could  not  be  dropped. 
We  shall  in  the  next  chapter  have  more  to  say 
on  the  British  occupation  of  Egypt,  as  part  of  the 
British  achievement  during  this  period.  In  the 
meanwhile,  its  immediate  result  was  continuous 
friction  between  France  and  Britain.  France 
could  not  forgive  herself  or  Britain  for  the  oppor- 
tunity which  she  had  lost.  The  embitterment 
caused  by  the  Egyptian  question  lasted  through- 
out the  period,  and  was  not  healed  till  the  Entente 
of  1904.  It  intensified  and  exacerbated  the  rivalry 
of  the  two  countries  in  other  fields.  It  made  each 
country  incapable  of  judging  fairly  the  actions  of 
the  other.  To  wounded  and  embittered  France, 
the  perfectly  honest  British  explanations  of  the 
reasons  for  delay  in  evacuating  Egypt  seemed  only 
so  many  evidences  of  hypocrisy  masking  greed. 
To  Britain  the  French  attitude  seemed  fractious 
and  unreasonable,  and  she  suspected  in  every 
French  forward  movement  in  other  fields — notably 
in  the  Eastern  Soudan  and  the  upper  valley  of  the 
Nile — an  attempt  to  attack  or  undermine  her. 
Thus  Egypt,  like  Tunis,  illustrated  the  influence 
of  European  politics  in  the  extra-European  field. 
The  power  that  profited  most  was  Germany,  who 


166  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

had  strengthened  herself  by  drawmg  Italy  into 
the  Triple  Alliance,  and  had  kept  France  at  her 
mercy  by  using  colonial  questions  as  a  mea,ns  of 
alienating  her  from  her  natural  friends.  It  was, 
in  truth,  only  from  this  point  of  view  that  colonial 
questions  had  any  interest  for  Bismarck.  He  was, 
as  he  repeatedly  asserted  almost  to  the  day  of  his 
death,  '  no  colony  man.'  But  the  time  was  at 
hand  when  he  was  to  be  forced  out  of  this  attitude. 
For  alread}^  the  riches  of  tropical  Africa  were 
beginning  to  attract  the  attention  of  Europe. 

The  most  active  and  energetic  of  the  powers  in 
tropical  Africa  was  France.  From  her  ancient 
foothold  at  Senegal  she  was  already,  in  the  late 
'seventies,  pushing  inland  towards  the  upper  waters 
of  the  Niger ;  while  further  south  her  vigorous 
explorer  de  Brazza  was  penetrating  the  hinterland 
behind  the  French  coastal  settlements  north  of  the 
Congo  mouth.  Meanwhile  the  explorations  of 
Livingstone  and  Stanley  had  given  the  world  some 
conception  of  the  wealth  of  the  vast  exterior.  In 
1876  Leopold,  King  of  the  Belgians,  summoned  a 
conference  at  Brussels  to  consider  the  possibility 
of  setting  the  exploration  and  settlement  of  Africa 
upon  an  international  basis.  Its  result  was  the 
formation  of  an  International  African  Association, 
with  branches  in  all  the  principal  countries.  But 
from  the  first  the  branches  dropped  all  serious 
pretence  of  international  action.  They  became 
(so  far  as  they  exercised  any  influence)  purely 
national  organisations  for  the  purpose  of  acquiring 
the  maximum  amomit  of  territory  for  their  own 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES         167 

states.     And  the  central  body,  after  attempting 
a  few  unsuccessful  exploring  expeditions,  practi- 
cally resolved  itself  into  the  organ  of  King  Leopold 
himself,  and  aimed  at  creating  a  neutral  state  in 
Central   Africa    under   his   protection.     In    1878 
H.  M.  Stanley  returned  from  the  exploration  of 
the  Congo.     He  was  at  once   invited  by   King 
Leopold  to  midertake  the  organisation  of  the  Congo 
basin  for  his  Association,  and  set  out  again  for 
that  purpose  in  1879.     But  he  soon  found  himseK 
in  conflict  with  the  active  French  agents  mider  de 
Brazza,  who  had  made  their  way  into  the  Congo 
valley  from  the  north-west.     And  at  the  same  time 
Portugal,  reviving  ancient  and  dormant  claims, 
asserted  that  the  Congo  belonged  to  her.     It  was 
primarily  to  find  a  solution  for  these  disputes  that  the 
Berlin  Conference  was  summoned  in  December  1884. 
Meanwhile  the  rush  for  territory  was  gouig  on 
furiously  in  other  regions  of  Africa.     Not  only  on 
the  Congo,  but  on  the  Guinea  Coast  and  its  hinter- 
land, France  was  showing  an  immense  activity,  and 
was    threatening    to     reduce    to    small    coastal 
enclaves  the  old  British  settlements  on  this  coast. 
Only  the  energy  shown  by  a  group  of  British 
merchants,  who  formed  themselves  into  a  National 
African  Company  in  1881,  and  the  vigorous  action 
of  their  leader,  Mr.  (afterwards  Sir)  George  Taub- 
man  Goldie,  prevented  the  extrusion  of   British 
interests  from  the  greater  part  of  the  Niger  valley, 
where  they  had  hitherto  been  supreme.     In  Mada- 
gascar, too,  the  ancient  ambitions  of  France  had 
revived.     Though  British  trading  raid  missionary 


168  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

activities  in  the  island  were  at  this  date  probably 
greater  than  French,  France  claimed  large  rights, 
especially  in  the  north-east  of  the  island.  These 
claims  drew  her  into  a  war  with  the  native  power 
of  the  Hovas,  which  began  in  1883,  and  ended  in 
1885  with  a  vague  recognition  of  French  suzerainty. 
Again,  Italy  had,  in  1883,  obtained  her  first  foot- 
hold in  Eritrea,  on  the  shore  of  the  Red  Sea.  And 
Germany,  also,  had  suddenly  made  up  her  mind  to 
embark  upon  the  career  of  empire.  In  1883  the 
Bremen  merchant,  Liideritz,  appeared  in  South- 
west Africa,  where  there  were  a  few  German 
mission  stations  and  trading-centres,  and  annexed 
a  large  area  which  Bismarck  was  persuaded  to  take 
under  the  formal  protection  of  Germany.  This 
region  had  hitherto  been  vaguely  regarded  as 
within  the  British  sphere,  but  though  native 
princes,  missionaries,  and  in  1868  even  the  Prussian 
government,  had  requested  Britain  to  establish 
a  formal  protectorate,  she  had  always  declined  to 
do  so.  In  the  next  year  another  German  agent. 
Dr.  Nachtigal,  was  commissioned  by  the  German 
government  to  report  on  German  trade  interests 
on  the  West  Coast,  and  the  British  government  was 
formally  acquainted  with  his  mission  and  requested 
to  instruct  its  agents  to  assist  him.  The  real  pur- 
pose of  the  mission  was  shown  when  Nachtigal 
made  a  treaty  with  the  King  of  Togoland,  on  the 
Guinea  Coast,  whereby  lie  accepted  German 
suzeramty.  A  week  later  a  similar  treaty  was 
made  with  some  of  the  native  chiefs  in  the 
Cameroons.     In  this  region  British  interests  had 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES         1G9 

hitherto  been  predominant,  and  the  chiefs  had 
repeatedly  asked  for  British  protection,  which  had 
always  been  refused.  A  little  later  the  notorious 
Karl  Peters,  with  a  few  companions  disguised  as 
working  engineers,  arrived  at  Zanzibar  on  the 
East  Coast,  with  a  commission  from  the  German 
Colonial  Society  to  peg  out  German  claims.  In 
the  island  of  Zanzibar  British  interests  had  long 
been  overwhelmingly  predominant ;  and  the 
Sultan,  who  had  large  and  vague  claims  to  supre- 
macy over  a  vast  extent  of  the  mainland,  had  re- 
peatedly asked  the  British  government  to  take 
these  regions  under  its  protectorate.  He  had 
always  been  refused.  Peters'  luggage  consisted 
largely  of  draft  treaty-forms  ;  and  he  succeeded 
in  making  treaties  with  native  princes  (usually 
unaware  of  the  meaning  of  the  documents  they 
were  signing)  whereby  some  60,000  square  miles 
were  brought  under  German  control.  The  pro- 
tectorate over  these  lands  had  not  been  accepted 
by  the  German  government  when  the  Conference 
of  Berlin  met.  It  was  formally  accepted  in  the 
next  year  (1885).  Far  from  being  opposed  by 
Britain,  the  establishment  of  German  power  in 
East  Africa  was  actually  welcomed  by  the  British 
government,  whose  foreign  secretary.  Earl  Gran- 
ville, wrote  that  his  government  'views  with  favour 
these  schemes,  the  realisation  of  which  will  entail 
the  civilisation  of  large  tracts  over  which  hitherto 
no  European  influence  has  been  exercised.'  And 
when  a  group  of  British  traders  began  to  take 
action  further  north,  in  the  territory  which  later 


170  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

became  British  East  Africa,  and  in  which  Peters  had 
done  nothing,  the  British  government  actually  con- 
sulted the  German  government  before  licensing  their 
action.  Thus  before  the  meeting  of  the  Conference 
of  Berlin  the  foundations  of  the  German  empire  in 
Africa  were  already  laid ;  the  outlines  of  the  vast 
French  empire  in  the  north  had  begun  to  appear  ; 
and  the  curious  dominion  of  Leopold  of  Belgium 
in  the  Congo  valley  had  begun  to  take  shape. 

The  Conference  of  Berlm  (Dec.  1884-reb.  1885), 
which  marks  the  close  of  the  first  stage  in  the  par- 
tition of  Africa,  might  have  achieved  great  things 
if  it  had  endeavoured  to  lay  down  the  principles 
upon  which  European  control  over  backward 
peoples  should  be  exercised.  But  it  made  no  such 
ambitious  attempt.  It  prescribed  the  rules  of  the 
game  of  empire-building,  ordaining  that  all  pro- 
tectorates should  be  formally  notified  by  the 
power  which  assumed  them  to  the  other  powers, 
and  that  no  annexation  should  be  made  of  territory 
which  was  not  '  effectively  '  occupied  ;  but  evi- 
dently the  phrase  '  effective  occupation '  can  be 
very  laxly  interpreted.  It  provided  that  there 
should  be  free  navigation  of  the  Congo  and  Niger 
rivers,  and  freedom  of  trade  for  all  nations  within 
the  Congo  valley  and  certain  other  vaguely  defined 
areas.  But  it  made  no  similar  provision  for  other 
parts  of  Africa  ;  and  it  whittled  away  the  value  of 
what  it  did  secure  by  the  definite  proviso  that 
should  parts  of  these  areas  be  annexed  by  inde- 
pendent states,  the  restriction  upon  their  control 
of  trade  should  lapse.     It  recognised  the  illegality 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES         171 

of  the  slave-trade,  and  imposed  upon  annexing 
powers  the  duty  of  helping  to  suppress  it ;  this 
provision  was  made  much  fuller  and  more  definite 
by  a  second  conference  at  Brussels  in  1890,  on  the 
demand  of  Britain,  who  had  hitherto  contended 
almost  alone  against  the  traffic  in  human  flesh. 
But  no  attempt  was  made  to  define  native  rights, 
to  safeguard  native  customs,  to  prohibit  the  main- 
tenance of  forces  larger  than  would  be  necessary 
for  the  maintenance  of  order  :  in  short,  no  attempt 
was  made  to  lay  down  the  doctrine  that  the  function 
of  a  rulmg  power  among  backward  peoples  is  that 
of  a  trustee  on  behalf  of  its  simple  subjects  and 
on  behalf  of  civilisation.  That  the  partition  of 
Africa  should  have  been  effected  without  open 
war,  and  that  the  questions  decided  at  Berlin 
should  have  been  so  easily  and  peacefully  agreed 
upon,  seemed  at  the  moment  to  be  a  good  sign. 
But  the  spirit  which  the  conference  expressed  was 
not  a  healthy  spirit. 

After  1884  the  activity  of  the  powers  in  explora- 
tion, annexation  and  development  became  more 
furious  than  ever.  Britain  now  began  seriously 
to  arouse  herself  to  the  danger  of  exclusion  from 
vast  areas  where  her  interests  had  hitherto  been 
predominant ;  and  it  was  during  these  years 
that  all  her  main  acquisitions  of  territor}^  in 
Africa  were  made  :  Rhodesia  and  Central  Africa 
in  the  south,  East  Africa  and  Somaliland  in  the 
East,  Nigeria  and  the  expansion  of  her  lesser 
protectorates  in  the  West.  To  these  years  also 
belonged    the    definite,    and    most    unfortunate, 


172  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

emergence  of  Italy  as  a  colonising  power.  She 
had  got  a  foothold  in  Eritrea  in  1883  ;  in  1885  it 
was,  with  British  aid,  enlarged  by  the  annexation 
of  territory  which  had  once  been  held  by  Egypt, 
but  had  been  abandoned  when  she  lost  the  Soudan. 
But  the  Italian  claims  in  Eritrea  brought  on  con- 
flict with  the  neighbouring  native  power  of  Ab3^s- 
sinia.  In  spite  of  a  sharp  defeat  at  Dogali  in  1887, 
she  succeeded  in  holding  her  own  in  this  conflict ; 
and  in  1889  Abyssinia  accepted  a  treaty  which 
Italy  claimed  to  be  a  recognition  of  her  suzerainty. 
But  the  Abyssinians  repudiated  this  interpretation ; 
and  in  a  new  war,  which  began  in  1896,  inflicted 
upon  the  Italians  so  disastrous  a  defeat  at  Adowa 
that  they  were  constrained  to  admit  the  complete 
independence  of  Abyssinia — the  sole  native  state 
which  has  so  far  been  able  to  hold  its  own  against 
the  pressure  of  Europe.  Meanwhile  in  1889  and 
the  following  years  Italy  had,  once  more  with  the 
direct  concurrence  of  Britain,  marked  out  a  new 
territory  in  Somaliland. 

The  main  features  of  the  years  from  1884  to 
1900  were  the  rapidity  with  which  the  territories 
earlier  annexed  were  expanded  and  organised, 
more  especially  by  France.  In  the  'nineties  her 
dominions  extended  from  the  Mediterranean  to 
the  Guinea  Coast,  and  she  had  conceived  the  ambi- 
tion of  extending  them  also  across  Africa  from 
West  to  East.  This  ambition  led  her  into  a  new 
and  more  acute  conflict  with  Britain,  who,  having 
undertaken  the  reconquest  of  the  Egyptian  Soudan 
and  the  upper  valley  of  the  Nile,  held  that  she 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES         173 

could  not  permit  a  rival  to  occupy  the  upper 
waters  of  the  great  river,  or  any  part  of  the  terri- 
tory that  belonged  to  it.  Hence  when  the  intrepid 
explorer,  Marchand,  after  a  toilsome  expedition 
which  lasted  for  two  years,  planted  the  French 
flag  at  Fashoda  in  1898,  he  was  promptly  disturbed 
by  Kitchener,  fresh  from  the  overthrow  of  the 
Khalifa  and  the  reconquest  of  Khartoum,  and  was 
compelled  to  withdraw.  The  tension  was  severe  ; 
no  episode  in  the  partition  of  Africa  had  brought 
the  world  so  near  to  the  outbreak  of  a  European 
war.  But  in  the  end  the  dispute  Avas  settled  by 
the  Anglo-French  agreement  of  1898,  which  ma}^ 
be  said  to  mark  the  conclusion  of  the  process  of 
partition.  It  was  the  last  important  treaty  in  a  long 
series  which  filled  the  twenty  years  following  1878, 
and  which  had  the  result  of  leaving  Africa,  with  the 
exception  of  Morocco,  Tripoli,  and  Abyssinia,  com- 
pletely divided  among  the  chief  European  states. 
Africa  was  the  main  field  of  the  ambitions  and 
rivalries  of  the  European  powers  during  this 
period  ;  the  other  fields  may  be  more  rapidly 
surveyed.  In  Central  Asia  and  the  Near  East 
the  main  features  of  the  period  were  two.  The 
first  was  the  steady  advance  of  Russia  towards 
the  south-east,  which  awakened  acute  alarms  in 
Britain  regarding  India,  and  led  to  the  adoption  of 
a  '  forward  policy '  among  the  frontier  tribes  in  the 
north-west  of  India.  The  second  was  the  gradual 
and  silent  penetration  of  Turkey  by  German 
influence.  Here  there  was  no  partition  or  annexa- 
tion.     But  Germany  became   the   political   pro- 


174  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

tector  of   the  Turk  ;    undertook  the  reorganisa- 
tion of  his  armies  ;    obtained  great  commercial 
concessions ;    bought    up   his    railways,   ousting 
the  earlier  British  and  French  concerns  which  had 
controlled  them,  and  built  new  lines.     The  greatest 
of  these  was  the  vitally  important  project  of  the 
Bagdad  railway,  which  was  taken  in  hand  just 
before  the  close  of  the  period.     It  was  a  project 
whose  political  aims  outweighed  its  commercial 
aims.     And  it  provided  a  warning  of  the  gigantic 
designs  which  Germany  was  beginning  to  work 
out.     But  as  yet,  in  1900,  the  magnitude  of  these 
designs  was  unperceived.     And  the  problems  of 
the  Middle  East  were  not  yet  very  disturbing.    The 
Turkish   Empire   remained   intact ;     so   did    the 
Persian  Empire,  though  both  were  becoming  more 
helpless,  partly  owing  to  the  decrepitude  of  their 
governments,   partly   owing    to    the   pressure   of 
European  financial  and  trading  interests.     As  yet 
the  empires  of  the  Middle  East  seemed  to  form 
a  region  comparatively  free  from  European  influ- 
ence.   But  this  was  only  seeming.    The  influence  of 
Europe  was  at  work  in  them ;  and  it  was  probably 
inevitable  that  some  degree  of  European  political 
tutelage  should  follow  as  the  only  means  of  pre- 
venting the  disintegration  which  must  result  from 
the  pouring  of  new  wine  into  the  old  bottles. 

In  the  Far  East — in  the  vast  empire  of  China — 
this  result  seemed  to  be  coming  about  inevitably 
and  rapidly.  The  ancient  pot- bound  civilisation 
of  China  had  withstood  the  impact  of  the  West  in 
the    mid-nineteenth    century    without    breaking 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES         175 

down  ;  but  China  had  made  no  attempt,  such  as 
Japan  had  triumphantly  carried  out,  to  adapt 
herself  to  the  new  conditions,  and  her  system  was 
slowly  crumbling  under  the  influence  of  the 
European  traders,  teachers,  and  missionaries  whom 
she  had  been  compelled  to  admit.  The  first  of  the 
powers  to  take  advantage  of  this  situation  was 
France,  who  already  possessed  a  footing  in  Cochin- 
China,  and  was  tempted  during  the  colonial 
enthusiasm  of  the  'eighties  to  transform  it  into 
a  general  supremacy  over  Annam  and  Tonking. 
As  early  as  1874  she  had  obtained  from  the  King 
of  Annam  a  treaty  which  she  interpreted  as  giving 
her  suzerain  powers.  The  King  of  Annam  him- 
self repudiated  this  interpretation,  and  maintained 
that  he  was  a  vassal  of  China.  China  took  the 
same  view  ;  and  after  long  negotiations  a  war 
between  France  and  China  broke  out.  It  lasted 
for  four  years,  and  demanded  a  large  expenditure 
of  strength.  But  it  ended  (1885)  with  the  formal 
recognition  of  French  suzerainty  over  Annam, 
and  a  further  decline  of  Chinese  prestige. 

Ten  years  later  a  still  more  striking  proof  of 
Chinese  weakness  was  afforded  b}^  the  rapid  and 
complete  defeat  of  the  vast,  ill-organised  empire  by 
Japan,  the  youngest  of  the  great  powers.  The 
war  gave  to  Japan  Formosa  and  the  Pescadores 
Islands,  and  added  her  to  the  list  of  imperialist 
powers.  She  would  have  won  more  still — the 
Liao-tang  Peninsula  and  a  sort  of  suzerainty  over 
Korea — ^but  that  the  European  powers,  startled 
by  the  signs  of  China's  decay,  and  perhaps  desiring 


176  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

a  share  of  the  plunder,  intervened  to  forbid  these 
annexations,  on  the  pretext  of  defending  the 
integrity  of  China.  Russia,  France  and  German}^ 
combined  in  this  step  ;  Britain  stood  aloof.  Japan, 
unwillingly  giving  way,  and  regarding  Russia  as 
the  chief  cause  of  her  humiliation,  began  to  prepare 
herself  for  a  coming  conflict.  As  for  unhappy 
China,  she  was  soon  to  learn  how  much  sincerity 
there  was  in  the  zeal  of  Europe  for  the  maintenance 
of  her  integrity.  In  1896  she  was  compelled  to 
permit  Russia  to  build  a  railway  across  Man- 
churia ;  and  to  grant  to  France  a  '  rectification  of 
frontiers '  on  the  south,  and  the  right  of  building 
a  railway  through  the  j)rovince  of  Yunnan,  which 
lies  next  to  Tonking.  The  partition  of  China 
seemed  to  be  at  hand.  Britain  and  America  vainly 
urged  upon  the  other  powers  that  China  should 
be  left  free  to  direct  her  own  affairs  subject  to  the 
maintenance  of  '  the  ojDen  door '  for  European 
trade.  The  other  powers  refused  to  listen,  and  in 
1897  the  beginning  of  the  end  seemed  to  have 
come.  Germany,  seizing  on  the  pretext  afforded 
by  the  murder  of  two  German  missionaries, 
stretched  forth  her  '  mailed  fist,'  and  seized  the 
strong  place  and  admirable  harbour  of  Kiao-chau, 
the  most  valuable  strategic  position  on  the  Chinese 
coast.  That  she  meant  to  use  it  as  a  base  for 
future  expansion  was  shown  by  her  lavish  expendi- 
ture upon  its  equipment  and  fortification.  Russia 
responded  by  seizing  the  strong  place  of  Port 
Arthur  and  the  Liao-Tang  Peninsula,  while  every 
day  her  hold  upon  the  great  province  of  Manchuria 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES         177 

was  strengthened.  Foreseeing  a  coming  conflict 
in  which  her  immense  trading  interests  would  be 
imperilled,  Britain  acquired  a  naval  base  on  the 
Chinese  coast  by  leasing  Wei-hai-Wei.  Thus  all 
the  European  riv^als  were  clustered  round  the 
decaying  body  of  China  ;  and  in  the  last  years  of 
the  century  were  already  beginning  to  claim 
'  spheres  of  influence,'  despite  the  protests  of 
Britain  and  America.  But  the  outburst  of  the 
Boxer  Rising  in  1900 — caused  mainly  by  resent- 
ment of  foreign  intervention — had  the  effect  of 
postponing  the  rush  for  Chinese  territorj^  And 
when  Britain  and  Japan  made  an  alliance  in  1902 
on  the  basis  of  guaranteeing  the  status  quo  in  the 
East,  the  overwhelming  naval  strength  of  the  two 
allies  made  a  European  partition  of  China  im- 
practicable ;  and  China  was  once  more  given  a 
breathing-space.  Only  Russia  could  attack  the 
Chinese  Empire  by  land ;  and  the  severe  defeat 
which  she  suffered  at  the  hands  of  Japan  in  1904-5 
removed  that  danger  also.  The  Far  East  was  left 
with  a  chance  of  maintaining  its  independence, 
and  of  voluntarily  adapting  itself  to  the  needs  of  a 
new  age. 

The  last  region  in  which  territories  remained 
available  for  European  annexation  consisted  of 
the  innumerable  archipelagoes  of  the  Pacific  Ocean. 
Here  the  preponderant  influence  had  been  in  the 
hands  of  Britain  ever  since  the  days  of  Captain 
Cook.  She  had  made  some  annexations  during 
the  first  three  quarters  of  the  century,  but  had 
on  the  whole  steadfastly  refused  the  requests  of 

M 


178  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

many  of  the  island  peoples  to  be  taken  under  her 
protection.  France  had,  as  we  have  seen,  ac- 
quired New  Caledonia  and  the  Marquesas  Islands 
during  the  previous  period,  but  her  activity  in 
this  region  was  never  very  great.  The  only  other 
European  power  in  possession  of  Pacific  terri- 
tories was  Spain,  who  held  the  great  archipelago 
of  the  Philippines,  and  claimed  also  the  numerous 
minute  islands  (nearly  six  hundred  in  number) 
which  are  known  as  Micronesia.  When  the  colonial 
enthusiasm  of  the  'eighties  began,  Germany  saw 
a  fruitful  field  in  the  Pacific,  and  annexed  the 
Bismarck  Archipelago  and  the  north-eastern 
quarter  of  New  Guinea.  Under  pressure  from 
Australia,  who  feared  to  see  so  formidable  a  neigh- 
bour established  so  near  her  coastline,  Britain 
annexed  the  south-eastern  quarter  of  that  huge 
island.  Durmg  the  'nineties  the  partition  of  the 
Pacific  Islands  was  completed ;  the  chief  partici- 
pators being  Germany,  Britain,  and  the  United 
States  of  America. 

The  entry  of  America  into  the  race  for  imperial 
possessions  in  its  last  phase  was  too  striking  an 
event  to  pass  without  comment.  America  annexed 
Hawaii  in  1898,  and  divided  the  Samoan  group 
with  Germany  in  1899.  But  her  most  notable 
departure  from  her  traditional  policy  of  self- 
imposed  isolation  from  world-politics  came  when 
in  1898  she  was  drawn  by  the  Cuban  question  into 
a  war  with  Spain.  Its  result  was  the  disappear- 
ance of  the  last  relics  of  the  Spanish  Empire  in  the 
New  World  and  in  the  Pacific.     Cuba  became  an 


THE  ERA  or  THE  WORLD-STATES         179 

independent  republic.  Porto  Rico  was  annexed  by 
America.  In  the  Pacific  the  Micronesian  posses- 
sions of  Spain  were  acquired  by  Germany.  Ger- 
many would  fain  have  annexed  also  the  Philipi^ine 
Islands.  But  America  resolved  herself  to  assume 
the  task  of  organising  and  governing  these  rich 
lands  ;  and  in  doing  so  made  a  grave  breach  with 
her  traditions.  Her  new  possession  necessarily 
drew  her  into  closer  relations  with  the  problems  of 
the  Far  East ;  it  gave  her  also  some  acquaintance 
with  the  difficulty  of  introducing  Western  methods 
among  a  backward  people.  Durmg  these  years 
of  universal  imperialist  excitement  the  spirit  of 
imperialism  seemed  to  have  captured  America 
as  it  had  captured  the  European  states  ;  and  this 
was  expressed  in  a  new  interpretation  of  the 
Monroe  doctrine,  put  forth  by  the  Secretary  of 
State  during  the  Venezuela  controversy  of  1895. 
'  The  United  States,'  said  Mr.  Olney, '  is  practically 
sovereign  on  this  continent  (meanmg  both  North 
and  South  America),  '  and  its  fiat  is  law  upon  the 
subjects  to  which  it  confines  its  interposition.' 
No  such  gigantic  imperial  claim  had  ever  been  put 
forward  by  any  European  state  ;  and  it  constituted 
an  almost  defiant  challenge  to  the  imperialist 
powers  of  Europe.  It  may  safely  be  said  that  this 
dictum  did  not  represent  the  settled  judgment  of 
the  American  people.  But  it  did  appear,  in  the 
last  years  of  the  century,  as  if  the  great  republic 
were  about  to  emerge  from  her  self-imposed  isola- 
tion, and  to  take  her  natural  part  in  the  task  of 
planthig  the  civilisation  of  the  West  throughout 


180  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

the  world.  Had  she  iraukly  done  so,  had  she 
made  it  plam  that  she  recognised  the  indissoluble 
unity  and  the  common  interests  of  the  whole  world, 
it  is  possible  that  her  influence  might  have  eased 
the  troubles  of  the  next  period,  and  exercised  a 
deterrent  influence  upon  the  forces  of  disturbance 
which  were  working  towards  the  great  catastrophe. 
But  her  traditions  were  too  strong  ;  and  after  the 
brief  imperialist  excitement  of  the  'nineties,  she 
gradually  relapsed  once  more  into  something  like 
her  old  attitude  of  aloofness. 

It  is  but  a  cursory  and  superficial  view  which  we 
have  been  able  to  take  of  this  extraordinary 
quarter  of  a  century,  during  which  almost  the 
whole  world  was  partitioned  among  a  group  of 
mighty  empires,  and  the  political  and  economic 
unity  of  the  globe  was  finally  and  irrefragably 
established.  Few  regions  had  escaped  the  direct 
political  control  of  European  powers ;  and  most 
of  these  few  were  insensibly  falling  under  the  influ- 
ence of  one  or  other  of  the  powers :  Turkey  under 
that  of  Germany,  Persia  under  that  of  Russia  and 
Britain.  No  region  of  the  earth  remained  exempt 
from  the  indirect  influence  of  the  European  system. 
The  civilisation  of  the  West  had  completed  the 
domination  of  the  globe  ;  and  the  interests  of  the 
great  world-states  were  so  intertwined  and  inter- 
mingled in  every  corner  of  the  earth  that  the  balance 
of  power  among  them  had  become  as  precarious 
as  was  the  European  balance  in  the  eighteenth 
century.  The  era  of  the  world-states  had  very 
definitely   opened.     It   remained   to   be   seen   in 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES        181 

what  spirit  it  was  to  be  used,  and  whether  it  was 
to  be  of  long  duration.  These  two  questions  are 
one  ;  for  no  system  can  last  which  is  based  upon 
injustice  and  the  denial  of  right. 

At  this  point  we  may  well  stop  to  survey  the 
new  world-states  which  had  been  created  by  this 
quarter  of  a  century  of  eager  competition. 

First  among  them,  in  extent  and  importance, 
stood  the  new  empire  of  France.     It  covered  a 
total  area  of  five  million  square  miles,  and  in  size 
ranked   third   in   order,   coming   after   the   older 
empires  of  Russia  and  Britain.     It  had  been  the 
result  of  the  strenuous  labours  of  three-quarters 
of  a  century,  datmg  from  the  first  invasion  of 
Algiers ;     it   included   also   some   surviving   frag- 
ments of  the  earlier  French  Empire.     But  over- 
whelmingly the  greater  part  of  this  vast  dominion 
had  been  acquired  during  the  short  period  which 
we  have  surveyed  in  this  chapter  ;   and  its  system 
of  organisation  and  government  had  not  yet  had 
time  to  establish  itself.     It  had  been  built  only  at 
the  cost  of  strenuous  labour,  and  many  wars.     Yet 
the  French  had  shown  in  its  administration  that 
they  still  retained  to  the  full  that  imaginative 
tact  in  the  handling  of  alien  peoples  which  had 
stood  them  in  good  stead  in  India  and  America 
during  the  eighteenth  century.     Once  their  rule 
was  established  the  French  had  on  the  whole  very 
little  trouble  with  their  subjects  ;   and  it  is  impos- 
sible to  praise  too  highly  the  labours  of  civilisation 
which  French  administrators  were  achieving.     So 
far  as  their  subjects  were  concerned,  they  may 


182  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

justly  be  said  to  have  regarded  themselves  as 
trustees.  So  far  as  the  rest  of  the  civilised  world 
was  concerned,  the  same  praise  cannot  be  given  ; 
for  the  French  policy  in  the  economic  administra- 
tion of  colonies  was  definitely  one  of  monopoly  and 
exclusion.  The  French  Empire  fell  into  three 
main  blocks.  First,  and  most  important,  was  the 
empire  of  Northern  Africa,  extending  from  Algiers 
to  the  mouth  of  the  Congo,  and  from  the  Atlantic 
to  the  valley  of  the  Nile.  Next  came  the  rich 
island  of  Madagascar ;  lastly  the  eastern  empire 
of  Annam  and  Tonking,  the  beginnings  of  which 
dated  back  to  the  eighteenth  century.  A  few  in- 
considerable islands  in  the  Pacific  and  the  West 
Indies,  acquired  long  since,  a  couple  of  towns  in 
India,  memories  of  the  dreams  of  Dupleix,  and 
the  province  of  French  Guiana  in  South  America, 
which  dated  back  to  the  seventeenth  century, 
completed  the  list.  For  the  most  part  a  recent 
and  rapid  creation,  it  nevertheless  had  roots  in  the 
past,  and  was  the  work  of  a  people  experienced  in 
the  handling  of  backward  races. 

Next  may  be  named  the  curious  dominion  of 
the  Congo  Free  State,  occupying  the  rich  heart  of 
the  African  continent.  Nominally  it  belonged  to 
no  European  power,  but  was  a  recognised  neutral 
territory.  In  practice  it  was  treated  as  the  personal 
estate  of  the  Belgian  king,  Leopold  ii.  Subject 
to  closer  international  restrictions  than  any  other 
European  domain  in  the  non-European  world, 
the  Congo  was  nevertheless  the  field  of  some  of  the 
worst  iniquities  in  the  exploitation  of  defenceless 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES         183 

natives  that  have  ever  disgraced  the  record  of 
European  imperiaUsm.  International  regulations 
are  no  safeguard  against  misgovernment ;  the 
only  real  sanction  is  the  character  and  spirit  of 
the  government.  For  the  Congo  iniquities 
Leopold  II.  must  be  held  guilty  at  the  bar  of 
posterity.  When  he  went  to  his  judgment  in  1908 
this  rich  realm  passed  under  the  direct  control  of 
the  Belgian  government  and  parliament,  and  an 
immediate  improvement  resulted. 

The  least  successful  of  the  new  world-states 
was  that  of  Italy.  Its  story  was  a  story  of 
disaster  and  disappointment.  It  included  some 
two  hundred  thousand  square  miles  of  territory ; 
but  they  were  hot  and  arid  lands  on  the  inhos- 
pitable shores  of  the  Red  Sea  and  in  Somaliland. 
Italy  had  as  yet  no  real  opportunit}^  of  showing  how 
she  would  deal  with  the  responsibilities  of  empire. 

The  most  remarkable,  in  many  respects,  of 
all  these  suddenly  acquired  empires  was  that  of 
Germany.  For  it  was  practically  all  obtained 
within  a  period  of  three  years,  without  fighting 
or  even  serious  friction.  It  fell  almost  wholly 
within  regions  where  Germany's  interests  had  been 
previously  negligible,  and  British  trade  predomin- 
ant. Yet  its  growth  had  not  been  impeded,  it 
had  even  been  welcomed,  by  its  rivals.  This 
easily-won  empire  was  indeed  relatively  small, 
being  not  much  over  one  million  square  miles, 
little  more  than  one-fifth  of  the  French  dominions. 
But  it  was  five  times  as  large  as  Germany  itself, 
and   it  included   territories  which  were,   on  the 


184  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

whole,  richer  than  those  of  France.  The  com- 
parative smallness  of  its  area  was  dne  to  the  fact 
that  Germany  was  actually  the  last  to  enter  the 
race.  She  took  no  steps  to  acquire  territory,  she 
showed  no  desire  to  acquire  it,  before  1883  ;  if 
she  had  chosen  to  begin  ten  years  earlier,  as  she 
might  easily  have  done,  or  if  she  had  shown  any 
marked  activity  in  exploring  or  missionary  work, 
without  doubt  she  could  have  obtained  a  much 
larger  share  of  African  soil. 

These  rich  lands  afforded  to  their  new  masters 
useful  supplies  of  raw  materials,  which  were  capable 
of  almost  indefinite  expansion.  They  included,  in 
East  and  South- West  Africa,  areas  well  suited  for 
white  settlement ;  bat  German  emigrants,  despite 
every  encouragement,  refused  to  settle  in  them. 
An  elaborately  scientific  system  of  administration, 
such  as  might  be  expected  from  the  German 
bureaucracy,  was  devised  for  the  colonies ;  officials 
and  soldiers  have  from  the  beginning  formed  a 
larger  proportion  of  their  white  population  than 
in  any  other  European  possessions.  Undoubtedly 
the  government  of  the  German  colonies  was  in 
many  respects  extremely  efficient.  But  over- 
administration,  which  has  its  defects  even  in  an 
old  and  well-ordered  country,  is  fatal  to  the 
development  of  a  raw  and  new  one.  Although 
Germany  has,  in  order  to  increase  the  prosperity 
of  her  colonies,  encouraged  foreign  trade,  and 
followed  a  far  less  exclusive  policy  than  France, 
not  one  of  her  colonies,  except  the  little  West 
African  district  of  Togoland,  has   ever  paid  its 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES         185 

own  expenses.  In  the  first  generation  of  its 
existence  the  German  colonial  empire,  small 
though  it  is  in  comparison  with  the  British  or  the 
French,  actually  cost  the  home  government  over 
£100,000,000  in  direct  outlay. 

The  main  cause  of  this  was  that  from  the  first 
the  Germans  showed  neither  skill  nor  sympathy 
in  the  handling  of  their  subject  populations.  The 
uniformed  official,  with  his  book  of  rules,  only 
bewilders  primitive  folk,  and  arouses  their  resent- 
ment. But  it  was  not  only  official  pedantry  whicli 
caused  trouble  with  the  subject  peoples ;  still 
more  it  was  the  ruthless  spirit  of  mere  domination, 
and  the  total  disregard  of  native  rights,  which  were 
displaj/ed  by  the  German  administration.  The  idea 
of  trusteeship,  which  had  gradually  established 
itself  among  the  rulers  of  the  British  dominions, 
and  in  the  French  colonies  also,  was  totally  lack- 
ing among  the  Germans.  They  ruled  their  primi- 
tive subjects  with  the  brutal  intolerance  of  Zabern, 
with  the  ruthless  cruelty  since  displayed  in  occupied 
Belgium.  This  was  what  made  the  rise  of  the 
German  dominion  a  terrible  portent  in  the  history 
of  European  imperialism.  The  spirit  of  mere 
domination,  regardless  of  the  rights  of  the  con- 
quered, had  often  shown  itself  in  other  European 
empires  ;  but  it  had  always  had  to  struggle  against 
another  and  better  ideal,  the  ideal  of  trusteeship  ; 
and,  as  we  have  seen,  the  better  ideal  had,  during 
the  nineteenth  century,  definitely  got  the  upper 
hand,  especially  in  the  British  realms,  whose 
experience  had  been  longest.     But  the  old  and 


186  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

bad  spirit  reigned  without  check  in  the  German 
realms.     And  even  when,  in  1907,  it  began  to  be 
seriously  criticised,  when  its  disastrous  and  unpro- 
fitable results  began  to  be  seen,  the  ground  on  which 
it  was  challenged  in  discussions  in  Germany  was 
mainly  the  materialist  ground  that  it  did  not  pay. 
The  justification  for  these  assertions  is  to  be  found 
in  the  history  of  the  principal  German  colonies.    In 
the  Cameroons  the  native  tribes,  who  had  been  so 
ready  to  receive  European  government  that  they 
had  repeatedly  asked  for  British  protection,  were 
driven  to  such  incessant  revolts  that  the  annals  of 
the  colony  seem  to  be  annals  of  continuous  blood- 
shed :  forty-six  punitive  expeditions  were  chronicled 
in  the  seventeen  years  from  1891 — long  after  the 
establishment  of  the  German  supremacy,  which 
took  place  in  1884.     The  record  of  East  Africa 
was  even  more  terrible  for  the  ferocity  with  which 
constant  revolts  were  suppressed.     But  worst  of 
all  was  the  story  of  South- West  Africa.     There 
were  endless  wars  against  the  various  tribes  ;  but 
they  culminated  in  the  hideous  Herero  war  of 
1903-6.     The  Hereros,  driven  to  desperation  by 
maltreatment,  had  revolted  and  killed  some  white 
farmers.     They    were    punished    by    an    almost 
complete  annihilation.     The  spirit  of  this  hideous 
slaughter  is  sufficiently  expressed  by  the  procla- 
mation of  the  governor.  General  von  Trotha,  in  1904. 
'  The  Herero  people  must  now  leave  the  land. 
Within  the  German  frontier  every  Herero,  with 
or  without  weapon,  with  or  without  cattle,  will  be 
shot.     I  shall  take  charge  of  no  more  women  and 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES         187 

children,  but  shall  drive  them  back  to  their  people, 
or  let  them  be  shot  at.'  Ten  thousand  of  these 
unhappy  people,  mainly  old  men,  women  and 
children,  were  driven  into  the  desert,  where  they 
perished.  There  is  no  such  atrocious  episode  in 
the  history  of  European  imperialism  since  Pizarro's 
slaughter  of  the  Incas ;  if  even  that  can  be  com- 
pared with  it. 

The  causes  of  these  ceaseless  and  ruinous  wars 
were  to  be  found  partly  in  the  total  disregard  of 
native  custom,  and  in  the  hide-bound  pedantry 
with  which  German-made  law  and  the  Prussian 
system  of  regimentation  were  enforced  upon  the 
natives  ;  but  it  was  to  be  found  still  more  in  the 
assumption  that  the  native  had  no  rights  as  against 
his  white  lord.  His  land  might  be  confiscated  ; 
his  cattle  driven  away  ;  even  downright  slavery 
was  not  unknown,  not  merely  in  the  form  of  forced 
labour,  which  has  been  common  in  German  colonies, 
but  in  the  form  of  the  actual  sale  and  purchase  of 
negroes.  Herr  Dernburg,  who  became  Colonial 
Secretary  in  1907,  himself  recorded  that  he  met 
in  East  Africa  a  yoimg  farmer  who  told  him  that 
he  had  just  bought  a  hundred  and  fifty  negroes  ; 
he  also  described  the  settlers'  pleasing  practice  of 
sitting  beside  the  wells  with  revolvers,  in  order 
to  prevent  the  natives  from  watering  their  cattle, 
and  to  force  them  to  leave  them  behind  ;  and  he 
noted  that  oflficials  nearly  always  carried  negro 
whips  with  them.  These  practices,  indeed,  were 
condemned  by  the  German  Government  itself,  but 
only  after  many  years,  and  mainly  because  they 


188  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

were  wasteful.  Government  representatives  have 
told  the  Reichstag,  as  Herr  Schleitwein  did  in  1904, 
that  they  must  pursue  a  'healthy  egoism,'  and 
forswear  '  humanitarianism  and  irrational  senti- 
mentality.' '  The  Hereros  must  be  forced  to  work, 
and  to  work  without  compensation  and  for  their 
food  only.  .  .  .  The  sentiments  of  Christianity  and 
philanthropy  with  which  the  missionaries  work 
must  be  repudiated  with  all  energy.'  This  is  what 
is  called  Realpolifik. 

Is  it  too  much  to  say  that  the  appearance  of  the 
spirit  thus  expressed  was  a  new  thing  in  the  history 
of  European  imperialism  ?  Is  it  not  plain  that 
if  this  spirit  should  triumph,  the  ascendancy  of 
Europe  over  the  non-European  world  must  prove 
to  be,  not  a  blessing,  but  an  unmitigated  curse  ? 
Yet  the  nation  which  had  thus  acquitted  itself 
in  the  rich  lands  which  it  had  so  easily  acquired  was 
not  satisfied ;  it  desired  a  wider  field  for  the  exhi- 
bition of  its  Kidtuy\  its  conception  of  civilisation. 

From  the  beginning  it  was  evident  that  the 
colonial  enthusiasts  of  Germany  had  no  intention 
of  resting  satisfied  with  the  considerable  dominions 
they  had  won,  but  regarded  them  only  as  a  begin- 
ning, as  bases  for  future  conquests.  The  colonies 
were  not  ends  in  themselves,  but  means  for  the 
acquisition  of  further  power  ;  and  it  was  this, 
even  more  than  the  ruthiessness  with  which  the 
subject  peoples  were  treated,  which  made  the 
growth  of  the  German  dominions  a  terrible  portent. 
For  since  the  whole  world  was  now  portioned  out, 
new  territories  could  only  be  acquired  at  the  cost 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES         189 

of  Germany's  neighbours.  This  was,  indeed,  at 
first  the  programme  only  of  extremists  ;  the  mass 
of  the  German  people,  like  Bismarck,  took  little 
interest  in  colonies.  But  the  extremists  proved 
that  they  could  win  over  the  government  to  their 
view  ;  the  German  people,  most  docile  of  nations, 
could  be  gradually  indoctrmated  with  it.  And 
because  this  was  so,  because  the  ugly  spirit  of 
domination  and  of  unbridled  aggressiveness  was 
in  these  years  gradually  mastering  the  ruling 
forces  of  a  very  powerful  state,  and  leading  them 
towards  the  catastrophe  which  was  to  prove  the 
culmination  of  European  imperialism,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  dwell,  at  what  may  seem  disproportionate 
length,  upon  the  development  of  German  policy 
during  the  later  years  of  our  period. 

Filled  with  pride  in  her  own  achievements, 
believing  herself  to  be,  beyond  all  rivalry,  the 
greatest  nation  in  the  world,  already  the  leader, 
and  destined  to  be  the  controller,  of  civilisation, 
Germany  could  not  bring  herself  to  accept  a  second 
place  in  the  imperial  sphere.  She  had  entered 
late  into  the  field,  by  no  fault  of  her  own,  and 
found  all  the  most  desirable  regions  of  the  earth 
already  occupied.  Now  that  '  world-power  '  had 
become  the  test  of  greatness  among  states,  she 
could  be  content  with  nothing  short  of  the  first 
rank  among  world-states  ;  if  this  rank  could  not 
be  achieved,  she  seemed  to  be  sentenced  to  the 
same  sort  of  fate  as  had  befallen  Holland  or  Den- 
mark :  she  might  be  ever  so  prosperous,  as  these 
little  states  were,  but  she  would  be  dwarfed  by  the 


190  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

vast  powers  which  surrounded  her.  But  the 
German  world-state  was  not  to  be  the  result  of  a 
gradual  and  natural  growth,  like  the  Russian,  the 
British  or  the  American  world-states.  The  possi- 
bility of  gradual  growth  was  excluded  by  the  fact 
that  the  whole  world  had  been  partitioned.  Great- 
ness in  the  non-European  world  must  be,  and  might 
be,  carved  out  in  a  single  generation,  as  supremacy 
in  Europe  had  been  already  attained,  by  the  strong 
will,  efficient  organisation,  and  military  might  of 
the  German  government. 

It  was  natural,  perhaps  inevitable,  that  a  nation 
with  the  history  of  the  German  nation,  with  its 
ruling  ideas,  and  with  its  apparently  well-tried 
confidence  in  the  power  of  its  government  to 
achieve  its  ends  by  force,  should  readily  accept 
such  a  programme.  The  date  at  which  this  pro- 
gramme captured  the  government  of  Germany, 
and  became  the  national  policy,  can  be  quite 
clearly  fixed  :  it  was  in  1890,  when  Bismarck,  the 
'  no  colony  man,'  was  driven  from  power,  and  the 
supreme  direction  of  national  affairs  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  Emperor  William  ii.  An  impression- 
able, domineering  and  magniloquent  prince,  in- 
flated by  the  hereditary  self-assurance  of  the 
HohenzoUerns,  and  sharing  to  the  full  the  modern 
German  belief  in  German  superiority  and  in 
Germany's  imperial  destiny,  William  ii.  became 
the  spokesman  and  leader  of  an  almost  insanely 
megalomaniac,  but  terribly  formidable  nation. 
During  the  first  decade  of  his  government  the  new 
ambitions  of  Germany  were  gradually  formulated, 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES         191 

and  became  more  distinct.  They  were  not  yet 
very  apparent  to  the  rest  of  the  world,  in  spite  of 
the  fact  that  they  were  expounded  with  vigour 
and  emphasis  in  a  multitude  of  pamphlets  and 
books.  The  world  was  even  ready  to  believe  the 
Emperor's  assertion  that  he  was  the  friend  of 
peace  :  he  half  believed  it  himself,  because  he 
would  have  been  very  ready  to  keep  the  peace  if 
Germany's  '  rights  '  could  be  attained  without  war. 
But  many  episodes,  such  as  Kiao-Chau,  and  the 
Philippines,  and  the  ceaseless  warfare  in  the 
German  colonies,  and  the  restless  enterprises  of 
Pan-German  intrigue,  provided  a  commentary 
upon  these  pretensions  which  ought  to  have 
revealed  the  dangerous  spirit  which  was  conquering 
the  German  people. 

It  is  difficult,  in  tlie  midst  of  a  war  forced  upon 
the  world  by  German  ambition,  to  take  a  sane  and 
balanced  view  of  the  aims  which  German  policy 
was  setting  before  itself  during  these  years  of 
experiment  and  preparation.  What  did  average 
German  opinion  mean  by  the  phrase  Weltmachty 
world-power,  which  had  become  one  of  the  com- 
monplaces of  its  political  discussions  ?  We  may 
safely  assume  that  by  the  mass  of  men  the  impli- 
cations of  the  term  were  never  very  clearly 
analysed  ;  and  that,  if  thej'^  had  been  analysable, 
the  results  of  the  analysis  would  have  been  widely 
different  in  1890  and  in  1014,  except  for  a  few 
fanatics  and  extremists.  Was  the  world-power  at 
which  Germany  v/as  aiming  a  real  supremacy  over 
the  whole  world  ?     In  a  vague  way,  no  doubt,  im- 


192  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

portant  bodies  of  opinion  held  that  such  a  supre- 
macy was  the  ultimate  destiny  of  German}'^  in  the 
more  or  less  distant  future  ;  and  the  existence  of 
such  a  belief,  however  undefined,  is  important 
because  it  helped  to  colour  the  attitude  of  the 
German  mind  towards  more  immediately  practical 
problems  of  national  policy.  But  as  a  programme 
to  be  immediately  put  into  operation,  world-power 
was  not  conceived  in  this  sense  by  any  but  a  few 
Pan-German  fanatics  ;  and  even  they  would  have 
recognised  that  of  course  other  states,  and  even 
other  world-powers,  would  certainly  survive  the 
most  successful  German  war,  though  they  would 
have  to  submit  (for  their  own  good)  to  Germany's 
will.  Again,  did  the  demand  for  world-power 
mean  no  more  than  that  Germany  must  have 
extra-European  territories,  like  Britain  or  France  ? 
She  already  possessed  such  territories,  though  on  a 
smaller  scale  than  her  rivals.  Did  the  claim  mean, 
then,  that  her  dominions  must  be  as  extensive 
and  populous  as  (say)  those  of  Britain  ?  Such  an 
aim  could  only  be  obtained  if  she  could  succeed  in 
overthrowing  all  her  rivals,  at  once  or  in  succession. 
And  if  she  did  that,  she  would  then  become,  what- 
ever her  intentions,  a  world-power  in  the  first  and 
all-embracing  sense.  It  is  probably  true  that  the 
German  people,  and  even  the  extreme  Pan-Ger- 
mans, did  not  definitely  or  consciously  aim  at 
world-supremacy.  But  they  had  in  the  back  of 
their  minds  the  conviction  that  this  was  their 
ultimate  destiny,  and  in  aiming  at  '  world-power  ' 
in  a  narrower  sense,  they  so  defined  their  end  as 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES         193 

to  make  it  impossible  of  achievement  unless  the 
complete  mastery  of  Europe  (which,  as  things  are, 
means  the  mastery  of  most  of  the  world)  could  be 
first  attained.  Certainly  the  ruling  statesmen  of 
Germany  must  have  been  aware  of  the  implications 
of  their  doctrine  of  world-power.  They  were 
aware  of  it  in  1914,  when  they  deliberately  struck 
for  the  mastery  of  Europe  ;  they  must  have  been 
a.ware  of  it  in  1890,  when  they  began  to  lay  numer- 
ous plans  and  projects  in  all  parts  of  the  world, 
such  as  were  bound  to  arouse  the  fears  and  sus- 
picions of  their  rivals. 

It  is  necessary  to  dwell  for  a  little  upon  these 
plans  and  projects  of  the  decade  1890-1900, 
because  they  illustrate  the  nature  of  the  peril 
which  was  looming  over  an  unconscious  world. 
It  would  be  an  error  to  suppose  that  all  these 
schemes  were  systematically  and  continuously 
pursued  with  the  whole  strength  of  the  German 
state.  They  appealed  to  different  bodies  of 
opinion.  Some  of  them  were  eagerly  taken  up  for 
a  time,  and  then  allowed  to  faU  into  the  back- 
ground, though  seldom  wholly  dropped.  But 
taken  as  a  whole  they  showed  the  existence  of  a 
restless  and  insatiable  ambition  without  very 
clearly  defined  aims,  and  an  eagerness  to  make 
use  of  every  opening  for  the  extension  of  power, 
which  constituted  a  very  dangerous  frame  of 
mind  in  a  nation  so  strong,  industrious,  and 
persistent  as  the  German  nation. 

In  spite  of  the  disappointing  results  of  colonisa- 
tion in  Africa,  the  German  colonial  enthusiasts 


194  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

hoped  that  something  suitably  grandiose  might  yet 
be  erected  there :  if  the  Belgian  Congo  could 
somehow  be  acquired,  and  if  the  Portuguese 
would  agree  to  sell  their  large  territories  on  the 
east  and  west  coasts,  a  great  empire  of  Tropical 
Africa  might  be  brought  into  being.  This  vision 
has  not  been  abandoned  :  it  is  the  theme  of  many 
pamphlets  published  during  the  course  of  the  war, 
and  if  Germany  were  to  be  able  to  impose  her  own 
terms,  all  the  peoples  of  Central  Africa  might  yet 
hope  to  have  extended  to  them  the  blessings  of 
German  government  as  they  have  been  displayed 
in  the  Cameroons  and  in  the  South- West. 

In  the  'nineties  there  seemed  also  to  be  hope  in 
South  Africa,  where  use  might  be  made  of  the 
strained  relations  between  Britain  and  the  Boer 
Republics.  German  South- West  Africa  formed  a 
convenient  base  for  operations  in  this  region  :  it 
was  equipped  with  a  costly  system  of  strategic 
railways,  far  more  elaborate  than  the  commerce 
of  the  colony  required.  There  is  no  doubt  that 
President  Kruger  was  given  reason  to  anticipate 
that  he  would  receive  German  help  :  in  1895 
(before  the  Jameson  Raid)  Kruger  publicly  pro- 
claimed that  the  time  had  come  '  to  form  ties  of 
the  closest  friendship  between  Germany  and  the 
Transvaal,  ties  such  as  are  natural  between  fathers 
and  children '  ;  in  1896  (after  the  Jameson  Raid) 
came  the  Emperor's  telegram  congratulating 
President  Kruger  upon  having  repelled  the  in- 
vaders '  without  recourse  to  the  aid  of  friendly 
powers '  ;  in  1897  a  formal  treaty  of  friendship 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES        195 

and  commerce  was  made  between  Germany  and 
the  Orange  Free  State,  with  which  the  Transvaal 
had  just  concluded  a  treaty  of  perpetual  alliance. 
And  meanwhile  German  munitions  of  war  were 
pouring  into  the  Transvaal  through  Delagoa  Bay. 
But  when  the  crisis  came,  Germany  did  nothing. 
She  could  not,  because  the  British  fleet  stood  in 
the  way. 

South  America,  again,  offered  a  very  promising 
field.  There  were  many  thousands  of  German 
settlers,  especially  in  southern  Brazil:  the  Pan- 
German  League  assiduously  laboured  to  organise 
these  settlers,  and  to  fan  their  patriotic  zeal,  by 
means  of  schools,  books,  and  newspapers.  But 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  stood  in  the  way  of  South 
American  annexations.  Perhaps  Germany  might 
have  been  ready  to  see  how  far  she  could  go  with 
the  United  States,  the  least  military  of  great 
powers.  But  there  was  good  reason  to  suppose 
that  the  British  fleet  would  have  to  be  reckoned 
with ;  and  a  burglarious  expedition  to  South 
America  with  that  formidable  watchdog  at  large 
and  unmuzzled  was  an  uninviting  prospect. 

In  the  Far  East  the  prospects  of  immediate 
advance  seemed  more  favourable,  since  the  Chinese 
Empire  appeared  to  be  breaking  up.  The  seizure 
of  Kiao-chau  in  1897  was  a  hopeful  beginning. 
But  the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance  of  1902  formed 
a  serious  obstacle  to  any  vigorous  forward  policy 
in  this  region.  Once  more  the  British  fleet  loomed 
up  as  a  barrier. 

Yet  another  dream,  often  referred  to  by  the 


196  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

pamplileteers  though  never  brought  to  overt 
action  by  the  government,  was  the  dream  that 
the  rich  empire  of  the  Dutch  in  the  Malay 
Archipelago  should  be  acquired  by  Germany. 
Holland  herself,  according  to  all  the  political 
ethnologists  of  the  Pan-German  League,  ought  to 
be  part  of  the  German  Empire  ;  and  if  so,  her 
external  dominions  would  follow  the  destiny  of 
the  ruling  state.  But  this  was  a  prospect  to 
be  talked  about,  not  to  be  worked  for  openly. 
It  would  naturally  follow  from  a  successful  Euro- 
pean war. 

A  more  immediately  practicable  field  of  opera- 
tions was  to  be  found  in  the  Turkish  Empire.  It 
was  here  that  the  most  systematic  endeavours 
were  made  during  this  period :  the  Berlin-Bagdad 
scheme,  which  was  to  be  the  keystone  of  the  arch 
of  German  world-power,  had  already  taken  shape 
before  our  period  closed,  though  the  rest  of  the 
world  was  strangely  blind  to  its  significance. 
Abstractly  regarded,  a  German  dominion  over 
the  wasted  and  misgoverned  lands  of  the  Turkish 
Empire  would  have  meant  a  real  advance  of 
civilisation,  and  would  have  been  no  more  un- 
justifiable than  the  British  control  of  Egypt 
or  India.  This  feeling  perhaps  explained  the 
acquiescence  with  which  the  establishment  of 
German  influence  in  Turkey  was  accepted  by  most 
of  the  powers.  They  had  yet  to  realise  that  it 
was  not  pursued  as  an  end  in  itself,  but  as  a  means 
to  further  domination. 

But  neither  the  great  Berlin-Bagdad  project, 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES         197 

nor  any  of  the  other  dreams  and  visions,  had  been 
definitely  put  into  operation  during  the  decade 
1890-1900.  Germany  was  as  yet  feehng  the  way, 
preparing  the  ground,  and  building  up  her  resources 
both  military  and  industrial.  Perhaps  the  main 
result  which  emerged  from  the  tentative  experi- 
ments of  these  years  was  that  at  every  point  the 
obstacle  was  the  sprawling  British  Empire,  and 
the  too-powerful  British  fleet.  The  conviction 
grew  that  the  overthrow  of  this  fat  and  top-heavy 
colossus  was  the  necessary  preliminary  to  the 
creation  of  the  German  world-state. 

This  was  a  doctrine  which  had  long  been  preached 
by  the  chief  political  mentor  of  modern  Germany, 
Treitschke,  who  died  in  1896.  He  was  never 
tired  of  declaring  that  Britain  was  a  decadent  and 
degenerate  state,  that  her  empire  was  an  unreal 
empire,  and  that  it  would  collapse  before  the  first 
serious  attack.  It  would  break  up  because  it  was 
not  based  upon  force,  because  it  lacked  organi- 
sation, because  it  was  a  medley  of  disconnected 
and  discordant  fragments,  worshipping  an  un- 
disciplined freedom.  That  it  should  ever  have 
come  into  being  was  one  of  the  paradoxes  of 
history ;  for  it  was  manifestly  not  due  to  straight- 
forward brute  force,  like  the  German  Empire  ; 
and  the  modern  German  mind  could  not 
understand  a  state  which  did  not  rest  upon  power, 
but  upon  consent,  which  had  not  been  built  up, 
like  Prussia,  by  the  deliberate  action  of  govern- 
ment, but  which  had  grown  almost  at  haphazard, 
through  the  spontaneous  activity  of  free  and  self- 


198  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

governing  citizens.  Treitschke  and  his  disciples 
could  only  explain  the  paradox  by  assuming  that 
since  it  had  not  been  created  by  force,  it  must  have 
been  created  by  low  cunning  ;  and  they  invented 
the  theory  that  British  statesmen  had  for 
centuries  pursued  an  undeviating  and  Machia- 
vellian policy  of  keeping  the  more  virile  states 
of  Europe  at  cross-purposes  with  one  another  by 
means  of  the  cunning  device  called  the  Balance  of 
Power,  while  behind  the  backs  of  these  tricked 
and  childUke  nations  Britain  was  meanly  snapping 
up  all  the  most  desirable  regions  of  the  earth. 
Accordmg  to  this  view  it  was  in  some  mysterious 
way  Britain's  fault  that  France  and  Germany 
were  not  the  best  of  friends,  and  that  Russia  had 
been  ahenated  from  her  ancient  ally.  But  the 
day  of  reckoning  would  come  when  these  mean 
devices  would  no  longer  avail,  and  the  pampered, 
selfish,  and  overgrown  colossus  would  find  her- 
self faced  by  hard-trained  and  finely  tempered 
Germany,  clad  in  her  shining  armour.  Then,  at 
the  first  shock,  India  would  revolt ;  and  the  Dutch 
of  South  Africa  would  welcome  their  German 
liberators ;  and  the  great  colonies,  to  which 
Britain  had  granted  a  degree  of  independence 
that  no  virile  state  would  ever  have  permitted, 
would  shake  ofi  the  last  shreds  of  subordination  ; 
and  the  ramshackle  British  Empire  would  fall  to 
pieces  ;  and  Germany  would  emerge  triumphant, 
free  to  pursue  all  her  great  schemes,  and  to  create 
a  lasting  world-power,  based  upon  Force  and 
System  and  upon  '  a  healthy  egoism,'  not  upon 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  WORLD-STATES         199 

'  irrational  sentimentalities '   about  freedom  and 
justice. 

These  were  the  doctrines  and  calculations  of 
Realpolitik.  They  were  becoming  more  and  more 
prevalent  in  the  'nineties.  They  seem  definitely 
to  have  got  the  upper  hand  in  the  direction  of 
national  policy  during  the  last  years  of  the  century, 
when  Germany  refused  to  consider  the  projects  of 
disarmament  put  forward  at  the  Hague  in  1899, 
when  the  creation  of  the  German  navy  was  begun 
by  the  Navy  Acts  of  1898  and  1900,  and  when  the 
Emperor  announced  that  the  future  of  Germany 
lay  upon  the  water,  and  that  hets  must  be  the 
admiralty  of  the  Atlantic.  At  the  moment  when 
the  conquest  of  the  world  by  European  civilisa- 
tion was  almost  complete,  two  conceptions  of 
the  meaning  of  empire,  the  conception  of  brutal 
domination  pursued  for  its  own  sake,  which 
has  never  been  more  clearly  displayed  than  in 
the  administration  of  the  German  colonies,  and 
the  conception  of  trusteeship,  which  had  slowly 
emerged  during  the  long  development  of  the 
British  Empire,  stood  forth  already  in  sharp 
antithesis. 

The  dreadful  anticipation  of  coming  conflict 
weighed  upon  the  world.  France,  still  suffering 
from  the  wounds  of  1870,  was  always  aware  of 
it.  Russia,  threatened  by  German  policy  in  the 
Balkans,  was  more  and  more  clearly  realising  it. 
But  Britain  was  extraordinarily  slow  to  awaken 
to  the  menace.  As  late  as  1898  Mr.  Joseph 
Chamberlain  was  advocating  an  alliance  between 


200  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

Britain,  Germany,  and  America  to  maintain  the 
peace  of  the  world  ;  and  Cecil  Rhodes,  when  he 
devised  his  plan  for  turning  Oxford  into  the 
training-ground  of  British  youth  from  all  the 
free  nations  of  the  empire,  found  a  place  in  his 
scheme  for  German  as  well  as  for  American 
students.  The  telegram  to  President  Kruger  in 
1896  caused  only  a  passing  sensation.  The  first 
real  illumination  came  with  the  extraordinary 
display  of  German  venom  against  Britain  during 
the  South  African  war,  and  with  the  ominous 
doubling  of  the  German  naval  programme  adopted 
in  the  midst  of  that  war,  in  1900.  But  even  this 
made  no  profound  impression.  The  majority  of 
the  British  people  declined  to  believe  that  a  '  great 
and  friendly  nation,'  or  its  rulers,  could  deliberately 
enter  upon  a  scheme  of  such  unbridled  ambition 
and  of  such  unprovoked  aggression. 


VIII 

THE   BRITISH   EMPIRE  AMID   THE   WORLD- 
POWERS,  1878-1914 

Throughout  the  period  of  rivalry  for  world- 
power  which  began  in  1878  the  British  Empire 
had  continued  to  grow  in  extent,  and  to  undergo 
a  steady  change  in  its  character  and  organisation. 
In  the  partition  of  Africa,  Britain,  in  spite  of 
the  already  immense  extent  of  her  domains, 
obtained  an  astonishingly  large  share.  The  pro- 
tectorates of  British  East  Africa,  Uganda,  Nigeria, 
Nyasaland,  and  Somaliland  gave  her  nearly 
25,000,000  new  negro  subjects,  and  these,  added 
to  her  older  settlements  of  Sierra  Leone  and  the 
Gold  Coast,  whose  area  was  now  extended,  out- 
numbered the  whole  population  of  the  French 
African  empire.  But  besides  these  tropical  terri- 
tories she  acquired  control  over  two  African 
regions  so  important  that  they  deserve  separate 
treatment :  'Egypt,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
various  extensions  of  her  South  African  terri- 
tories on  the  other.  When  the  partition  of 
Africa  was  completed,  the  total  share  of  Britain 
amounted  to  3,500,000  square  miles,  with  a  popu- 
lation of  over  50,000,000  souls,  and  it  included 

201 


202  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

the  best  regions  of  the  continent :  the  British 
Empire,  in  Africa  alone,  was  more  than  three 
times  as  large  as  the  colonial  empire  of  Germany, 
which  was  almost  hmited  to  Africa. 

It  may  well  be  asked  why  an  empire  already 
so  large  should  have  taken  also  the  giant's  share 
of  the  last  continent  available  for  division  among 
the  powers  of  Europe.     No  doubt  this  was  in  part 
due  to  the  sentiment  of  imperialism,  which  was 
stronger  in  Britain  during  this  period  than  ever 
before.     But  there  were  other  and  more  powerful 
causes.     In    the    first   place,    during    the   period 
1815-78    British   influence    and   trade   had   been 
established   in  almost  every  part  of  Africa  save 
the  central  interior,  and  no  power  had  such  definite 
relations  with  various  native  tribes,  many  of  which 
desired    to    come    under   the    protectorate    of    a 
power  with  whom  the  protection  of  native  rights 
and   customs   was   an   established   principle.     In 
the   second  place,  Britain  was  the  only  country 
which   already  possessed   in   Africa   colonies   in- 
habited by  enterprising   European   settlers,   and 
the  activity  of  these  settlers  played  a  consider- 
able part  in  the  extension  of  the  British  African 
dominions.     And   in   the   third  place,   since   the 
continental  powers   had   adopted   the   policy   of 
fiscal  protection,  the  annexation  of  a  region  by 
any    of   them   meant    that    the    trade    of   other 
nations   might   be   restricted   or   excluded ;    the 
annexation  of  a  territory  by  Britain  meant  that 
it  would  be  open  freely  and  on  equal  terms  to  the 
trade  of  all  nations.     For  this  reason  the  trading 


BRITISH  EMPIRE  AMID  WORLD-POWERS     203 

interests  iii  Britain,  faced  by  the  possibility  of 
exclusion  from  large  areas  with  which  they  had 
carried  on  traffic,  were  naturally  anxious  that  as 
much  territory  as  possible  should  be  brought 
under  British  supremacy,  in  order  that  it  might 
remain  open  to  their  trade. 

It  is  the  main  justification  for  British  aimexa- 
tions  that  they  opened  and  developed  new  markets 
for  all  the  world,  instead  of  closing  them  ;  and 
it  was  this  fact  chiefly  which  made  the  acquisition 
of  such  vast  areas  tolerable  to  the  other  trading 
powers.  The  extension  of  the  British  Empire  was 
thus  actually  a  benefit  to  all  the  non-imperial 
states,  especially  to  such  active  trading  countries 
as  Italy,  Holland,  Scandinavia,  or  America.  If 
at  any  time  Britain  should  reverse  her  traditional 
policy,  and  reserve  for  her  own  merchants  the 
trade  of  the  immense  areas  which  have  been 
brought  under  her  control,  nothing  is  more  certain 
than  that  the  world  would  protest,  and  protest 
with  reason,  against  the  exorbitant  and  dispropor- 
tionate share  which  has  fallen  to  her.  Only  so 
long  as  British  control  means  the  open  door  for 
all  the  world  will  the  immense  extent  of  these 
acquisitions  continue  to  be  accepted  without 
protest  by  the  rest  of  the  world. 

In  the  new  protectorates  of  this  period  Britain 
found  herself  faced  by  a  task  with  which  she  had 
never  had  to  deal  on  so  gigantic  a  scale,  though 
she  had  a  greater  experience  in  it  than  any  other 
nation:  the  task  of  governing  justly  whole 
populations    of    backward    races,    among    whom 


204  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

white  men  couid  not  permanently  dwell,  and 
whom  they  visited  only  for  the  purposes  of  com- 
mercial exploitation.  The  demands  of  industry 
for  the  raw  materials  of  these  countries  mvolved 
the  employment  of  labour  on  a  very  large  scale  ; 
but  the  native  disliked  unfamiliar  toil,  and  as  his 
wants  were  very  few,  could  easily  earn  enough 
to  keep  him  in  the  idleness  he  loved.  Slavery 
was  the  customary  mode  of  getting  uncongenial 
tasks  performed  in  Africa  ;  but  against  slavery 
European  civilisation  had  set  its  face.  Again, 
the  ancient  unvarying  customs  whereby  the  rights 
and  duties  of  individual  tribesmen  were  enforced, 
and  the  primitive  societies  held  together,  were 
often  inconsistent  with  Western  ideas,  and  tended 
to  break  down  altogether  on  contact  with  Western 
industrial  methods.  How  were  the  needs  of 
industry  to  be  reconciled  with  justice  to  the 
subject  peoples  ?  How  were  their  customs  to 
be  reconciled  with  the  legal  ideas  of  their  new 
masters  ?  How  were  these  simple  folk  to  be 
taught  the  habits  of  labour  ?  How  were  the 
resources  of  their  land  to  be  developed  without 
interference  with  their  rights  of  property  and  with 
the  traditional  usages  arising  from  them  ?  These 
were  problems  of  extreme  difficulty,  which  faced 
the  rulers  of  all  the  new  European  empires.  The 
attempt  to  solve  them  m  a  high-handed  way,  and 
with  a  view  solely  to  the  interests  of  the  ruling 
race,  led  to  many  evils  :  it  produced  the  atrocities 
of  the  Congo  ;  it  produced  in  the  German  colonies 
the  practical  revival  of  slavery,  the  total  disregard 


BRITISH  EMPIRE  MUD  WORLD-POWERS     205 

of  native  customs,  and  the  horrible  sequence  of 
wars  and  slaughters  of  which  we  have  already 
spoken.  In  the  British  dominions  a  long  tradition 
and  a  long  experience  saved  the  subject  peoples 
from  these  iniquities.  We  dare  not  claim  that 
there  were  no  abuses  in  the  British  lands  ;  but  at 
least  it  can  be  claimed  that  government  has  always 
held  it  to  be  its  duty  to  safeguard  native  rights, 
and  to  prevent  the  total  break-up  of  the  tribal 
system  which  could  alone  hold  these  communities 
together.  The  problem  was  not  fully  solved ; 
perhaps  it  is  insoluble.  But  at  least  the  native 
populations  were  not  driven  to  despair,  and  were 
generally  able  to  feel  that  they  were  justly  treated. 
'  Let  me  teU  you,'  a  Herero  is  recorded  to  have 
written  from  British  South  Africa  to  his  kinsmen 
under  German  rule,  '  Let  me  tell  you  that  the  land 
of  the  English  is  a  good  land,  since  there  is  no  ill- 
treatment.  White  and  black  stand  on  the  same 
level.  There  is  much  work  and  much  money, 
and  your  overseer  does  not  beat  you,  or  if  he 
does  he  breaks  the  law  and  is  punished.'  There 
was  a  very  striking  contrast  between  the  steady 
peace  which  has  on  the  whole  reigned  in  all 
the  British  dominions,  and  the  incessant  war- 
fare which  forms  the  history  of  the  German 
colonies.  The  tradition  of  protection  of  native 
rights,  established  during  the  period  1815-78, 
and  the  experience  then  acquired,  stood  the 
British  in  good  stead.  During  the  ordeal  of  the 
Great  War  it  has  been  noteworthy  that  there  has 
been    no    serious    revolt    among    these    recently 


206  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

conquered  subjects  ;  and  one  of  the  most  touching 
features  of  the  war  has  been  the  eagerness  of  chiefs 
and  their  peoples  to  help  the  protecting  power, 
and  the  innumerable  humble  gifts  which  they 
have  spontaneously  offered.  Much  remains  to  be 
done  before  a  perfect  solution  is  found  for  the 
problems  of  these  dominions  of  yesterday.  But 
it  may  justly  be  claimed  that  trusteeship,  not 
domination,  has  been  the  spirit  in  which  they 
have  been  administered ;  and  that  this  is  re- 
cognised by  their  subjects,  despite  all  the  mistakes 
and  defects  to  which  all  human  governments  must 
be  liable  in  dealing  with  a  problem  so  complex. 

Administrative  problems  of  a  yet  more  complex 
kind  were  raised  in  the  two  greatest  acquisitions 
of  territory  made  by  Britain  during  these  years, 
in  Egypt  and  the  Soudan,  and  in  South  Africa. 
The  events  connected  with  these  two  regions  have 
aroused  greater  controversy  than  those  connected 
with  any  other  British  dominions  ;  the  results 
of  these  events  have  been  more  striking,  and  in 
different  ways  more  instructive  as  to  the  spirit 
and  methods  of  British  imperialism,  than  those 
displayed  in  almost  any  other  field  ;  and  for  these 
reasons  we  shall  not  hesitate  to  dwell  upon  them 
at  some  length. 

The  establishment  of  British  control  over 
Egj^t  was  due  to  the  most  curious  chain  of 
unforeseen  and  unexpected  events  which  even 
the  records  of  the  British  Empire  contain.  Nomi- 
nally a  part  of  the  Turkish  Empire,  Egypt  had 
been   in    fact    a    practically    independent    state, 


BRITISH  EMPIRE  AMID  WORLD-POWERS     207 

paying  only  a  small  fixed  tribute  to  the  Sultan, 
ever  since  the  remarkable  Albanian  adventurer, 
Mehemet  Ali,  had  established  himself  as  its 
Pasha  in  the  confusion  following  the  French 
occupation  (1806).  Mehemet  Ah  had  been  an  ex- 
traordinarily enterprising  prince.  He  had  created 
a  formidable  army,  had  conquered  the  great 
desert  province  of  the  Soudan  and  founded  its 
capital,  Khartoum,  and  had  nearly  succeeded 
in  overthrowing  the  Turkish  Empire  and  estab- 
lishing his  own  power  in  its  stead :  during  the 
period  1825-40  he  had  played  a  leading  role  in 
European  politics.  Though  quite  illiterate,  he  had 
posed  as  the  introducer  of  Western  civihsation 
into  Egypt ;  but  his  grandiose  and  expensive 
policy  had  imposed  terrible  burdens  upon  the 
fellahin  (peasantry),  and  the  heavy  taxation 
which  was  necessary  to  maintain  his  armies  and 
the  spurious  civilisation  of  his  capital  was  only 
raised  by  cruel  oppressions. 

The  tradition  of  lavish  expenditure,  met  by 
grinding  the  peasantry,  was  accentuated  by 
Mehemet' s  successors.  It  inevitably  impoverished 
the  country.  Large  loans  were  raised  in  the 
West,  to  meet  increasing  deficits  ;  and  the  Euro- 
pean creditors  in  course  of  time  found  it  neces- 
sary to  insist  that  specific  revenues  should  be 
ear-marked  as  a  security  for  their  interest,  and  to 
claim  powers  of  supervision  over  finance.  The 
construction  of  the  Suez  Canal  (opened  1869), 
which  was  due  to  the  enterprise  of  the  French, 
promiised  to  bring  increased  prosperity  to  Egjrpt ; 


208  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

but  in  the  meanwhile  it  uivolved  an  immense 
outlay.  At  the  beginning  of  our  period  Egypt 
was  already  on  the  verge  of  bankruptcy,  and  the 
Khedive  was  compelled  to  sell  his  liolding  of 
Suez  Canal  shares,  which  were  shrewdly  acquired 
for  Britain  by  Disraeli. 

But  financial  chaos  was  not  the  only  evil  from 
which  Egypt  suffered.  There  was  administrative 
chaos  also,  and  this  was  not  diminished  by  the 
special  jurisdictions  which  had  been  allowed  to 
the  various  groups  of  Europeans  settled  in  the 
country.  The  army,  unpaid  and  undisciplined,  was 
ready  to  revolt ;  and  above  all,  the  helpless  mass 
of  the  peasantry  were  reduced  to  the  last  degree 
of  penury,  and  exposed  to  the  merciless  and 
arbitrary  severity  of  the  officials,  who  fleeced 
them  of  their  property  under  the  lash.  All  the 
trading  nations  were  affected  by  this  state  of 
anarchy  in  an  important  centre  of  trade ;  all  the 
creditors  of  the  Egyptian  debt  observed  it  with 
alarm.  But  the  two  powers  most  concerned  were 
France  and  Britain,  which  between  them  held 
most  of  the  debt,  and  conducted  most  of  the 
foreign  trade,  of  Egypt ;  while  to  Britain  Egypt 
had  become  supremely  important,  since  it  now 
controlled  the  main  avenue  of  approach  to 
India. 

When  a  successful  military  revolt,  led  by  Arabi 
Pasha,  threatened  to  complete  the  disorganisa- 
tion of  the  country  (1882),  France  and  Britam 
decided  that  they  ought  to  intervene  to  restore 
order,  the  other  powers  all  agreemg.     But  at  the 


BRITISH  EMPIRE  AMID  WORLD-POWERS     209 

last  moment  France  withdrew,  and  the  task  was 
undertaken  by  Britam  smgle-handed.^  In  a  short 
campaign  Arabi  was  overthrown  ;  and  now  Britain 
had  to  address  herself  to  the  task  of  reconstruct- 
ing the  political  and  economic  organisation  of 
Eg3rpt.  It  was  her  hope  and  intention  that  the 
work  should  be  done  as  rapidly  as  possible,  in 
order  that  she  might  be  able  to  withdraw  from  a 
difficult  and  thankless  task,  which  brought  her 
into  very  dehcate  relations  with  the  other  powers 
interested  m  Egypt.  But  withdrawal  was  not 
easy.  The  task  of  reorganisation  proved  to  be  a 
much  larger  and  more  comphcated  one  than  had 
been  anticipated ;  and  it  was  greatly  increased 
when  the  strange  wave  of  religious  fanaticism 
aroused  by  the  preaching  of  the  Mahdi  swept 
over  the  Soudan,  raised  a  great  upheaval,  and 
led  to  the  destruction  of  the  Eg3rptian  armies  of 
occupation.  Britain  had  now  to  decide  whether 
the  revolting  province  should  be  reconquered  or 
abandoned.  Reconquest  could  not  be  effected 
by  the  utterly  disorganised  Egj^tian  army ;  if 
it  was  to  be  attempted,  it  must  be  by  means  of 
British  troops.  But  this  would  not  only  mean  a 
profitless  expenditure,  it  would  also  indefinitely 
prolong  the  British  occupation,  which  Britain  was 
desirous  of  brmging  to  an  end  at  the  earliest 
possible  moment. 

The  romantic  hero,  Gordon,  was  therefore  sent 
to  Khartoum  to  carry  out  the  withdrawal  from 
the  Soudan  of  all  the  remaining  Eg3rptian  garri- 

^  See  above,  p.  164. 
O 


210  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

sons.  On  his  arrival  he  came  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  position  was  not  untenable,  and  took  no 
steps  to  evacuate.  There  was  much  dangerous 
delay  and  vacillation ;  and  in  the  end  Gordon 
was  besieged  in  Khartoum,  and  killed  by  the 
bands  of  the  Mahdi,  before  a  rehef  force  could 
reach  him.  But  this  triumph  of  Mahdism  in- 
creased its  menace  to  Egypt.  The  country  could 
not  be  left  to  its  own  resources  until  this  peril 
had  been  removed,  or  until  the  Egjrptian  army 
had  been  fully  reorganised.  So  the  occupation 
prolonged  itself,  year  after  year. 

The  situation  was,  in  fact,  utterly  anomalous. 
Egypt  was  a  province  of  Turkey,  ruled  by  a 
semi-independent  Khedive.  Britain's  chief  agent 
in  the  country  was  in  form  only  in  the  position 
of  a  diplomatic  representative.  But  the  very 
existence  of  the  country  depended  upon  the 
British  army  of  occupation,  and  upon  the  work 
of  the  British  officers  who  were  reconstructing 
the  Egyptian  army.  And  its  hope  of  future 
stability  depended  upon  the  work  of  the  British 
administrators,  financiers,  jurists,  and  engineers 
who  were  labouring  to  set  its  affairs  in  order. 
These  officials,  with  Sir  Evelyn  Baring  (Lord 
Cromer)  at  their  head,  had  an  extraordinarily 
difficult  task  to  perform.  Their  relations  with 
the  native  government,  which  they  constantly 
had  to  overrule,  were  difficult  enough.  But 
besides  this,  they  had  to  deal  with  the  agents  of 
the  other  European  powers,  who,  as  representing 
the  European  creditors  of  the  Egjrptian  debt,  had 


BRITISH  EMPIRE  AMID  WORLD-POWERS     211 

the  right  to  interfere  in  practically  all  financial 
questions,  and  could  make  any  logical  fhiancial 
reorganisation,  and  any  free  use  of  the  country's 
financial  resources  for  the  restoration  of  its  pro- 
sperity, all  but  impossible. 

Yet  in  the  space  of  a  very  few  years  an  amaz- 
ing work  of  restoration  and  reorganisation  was 
achieved.  Financial  stability  was  re-estabUshed, 
while  at  the  same  time  taxation  was  reduced. 
The  forced  labour  which  had  been  exacted  from 
the  peasantry  was  abolished ;  they  were  no 
longer  robbed  of  their  property  mider  the  lash  ; 
they  obtained  a  secure  tenure  in  their  land ;  and 
they  found  that  its  productive  power  was  in- 
creased, by  means  of  great  schemes  of  irrigation. 
An  impartial  system  of  justice  was  organised — for 
the  first  time  in  all  the  long  history  of  Egypt  since 
the  fall  of  the  Roman  Empire.  The  army  was 
remodelled  by  British  officers.  Schools  of  lower 
and  higher  grade  were  established  in  large 
numbers.  In  short,  Egypt  began  to  assume  the 
aspect  of  a  prosperous  and  well-organised  modern 
commimity.  And  aU  this  was  the  work,  in  the 
main,  of  some  fifteen  years. 

Meanwhile  in  the  Soudan  triumphant  barbarism 
had  produced  an  appalling  state  of  things.  It  is 
impossible  to  exaggerate  the  hideousness  of  the 
regime  of  Mahdism.  A  ferocious  tyramiy  terror- 
ised and  reduced  to  desolation  the  whole  of  the 
upper  basin  of  the  Nile  ;  and  the  population  is 
said  to  have  shrunk  from  12,000,000  to  2,000,000, 
although  exact  figures  are  of  course  unattainable. 


212  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

One  ot  the  evil  consequences  oi  tins  regnne  was 
that  it  prevented  a  scientific  treatment  of  the  flow 
of  the  Nile,  on  which  the  very  hie  of  Egypt  de- 
pended. Scientific  irrigation  had  already  worked 
wonders  in  increasing  the  productivity  of  Egypt, 
but  to  complete  this  work,  and  to  secure  avoid- 
ance of  the  famines  which  follow  any  deficiency 
in  the  ISIile-fiow,  it  was  necessary  to  deal  with 
the  upper  waters  of  the  great  river.  On  this 
ground,  and  in  order  to  remove  the  danger  of  a 
return  of  barbarism,  which  was  threatened  by 
frequent  Mahdist  attacks,  and  finally  m  order  to 
rescue  captives  who  were  enduring  terrible  suffer- 
ings in  the  hands  of  the  Mahdi,  it  appeared  that 
the  reconquest  of  the  Soudan  must  be  imder- 
taken  as  the  inevitable  sequel  to  the  reorganisa- 
tion of  Egypt.  It  was  achieved,  with  a  wonderful 
efficiency  which  made  the  name  of  Kitchener 
famous,  in  the  campaigns  oi  1896-98.  The  re- 
conquered province  was  nominaUy  placed  mider 
the  joint  administration  of  Britam  and  Egypt; 
but  in  fact  the  very  remarkable  work  of  civihsa- 
tion  which  was  carried  out  m  it  durmg  the  years 
preceding  the  Great  War  was  whoUy  directed  by 
British  agents  and  officers. 

The  occupation  of  the  Soudan  necessitated  a 
prolongation  of  the  British  occupation  of  Egypt. 
But,  indeed,  such  a  prolongation  was  in  any  case 
inevitable ;  ior  the  beneficial  reforms  in  justice, 
administration,  finance,  and  the  organisation  of 
the  country's  resources,  which  had  been  effected 
in   half   a   generation,    required   to   be   carefuffy 


BRITISH  EMPIRE  AMID  WORLD-POWERS     213 

watched  and  nursed  until  they  should  be  securely 
rooted  :   to  a  certainty  they  would  have  collapsed 
if  the  guardianship  of  Britain  had  been  suddenly 
and  completely  withdrawn.       The  growing  pro- 
sperity  of   Egypt,  however,  and   still   more   the 
diffusion  of  Western  education  among  its  people, 
has  naturally  brought  into  existence  a  nationahst 
party,  who  resent  what  they  feel  to  be  a  foreign 
dominance  in  their  country,  and  aspire  after  the 
institutions  of  Western  self-government.     But  it 
has  to  be  noted  that  the  classes  among  whom  this 
movement  has  sprung  up  are  not  the  classes  who 
form  the  bulk  of  the  population  of  Egypt — the 
felldhin,    who    from   the   time   of   the   Pharaohs 
downwards  have  been  exploited   and  oppressed 
by  every  successive  conqueror  who  has  imposed 
his  rule  on  the  country.     This  class,  which  has 
profited  more  than  any  other  from  the  British 
regime,  which  has,  under  that  regime,  known  for 
the  first  fme  justice,  freedom  from  tyranny,  and 
the  opportunity  of  enjoying  a  fair  share  of  the 
fruits  of  its  own  labour,  is  as  yet  unvocal.     Accus- 
tomed through  centuries  to  submission,  accepting 
good  or  bad  seasons,  just  or  unjust  masters,  as 
the  gods  may  send  them,  the  fellah  has  not  yet 
had   time   even   to   begin   to   have   thoughts   or 
opinions  about  his  place  in  society  and  his  right 
to  a  share  in  the  control  of  his  own  destinies  ; 
and  if  the  rule  which  has  endeavoured  to  nurture 
him  into  prosperity  and  self-reliance  were  with- 
drawn, he  would   accept  with  blind  submissive- 
ness  whatever  might  take  its  place.     The  classes 


214  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

among  whom  the  nationahst  movement  finds  its 
strength  are  the  classes  which  have  been  in  the 
past  accustomed  to  enjoy  some  degree  of  domina- 
tion ;  the  rehcs  of  the  conquermg  races,  Arabs  or 
Turks,  who  have  succeeded  one  another  in  the 
rule  of  Egypt,  the  small  traders  and  shopkeepers 
of  the  towns,  drawn  from  many  different  races, 
the  students  who  have  been  influenced  by  the 
knowledge  and  the  political  ideas  of  the  West. 
It  is  natural  and  healthy  that  a  desire  to  share  in 
the  government  of  their  country  should  grow  up 
among  these  classes  :  it  is  in  some  degree  a  proof 
that  the  influence  of  the  regime  under  which 
they  live  has  been  stimulating.  But  it  is  also 
obvious  that  if  these  classes  were  at  once  to 
reassume,  under  parliamentary  forms,  the  domin- 
ance which  they  wielded  so  disastrously  until 
thirty  years  ago,  the  result  must  be  unhappy. 
They  are  being,  under  British  guidance,  gradually 
introduced  to  a  share  in  public  affairs.  But  the 
establishment  of  a  system  of  full  self-government 
and  national  independence  in  Egj^pt,  if  it  is  to  be 
successful,  must  wait  until  not  only  these  classes, 
but  also  the  classes  beneath  them,  have  been 
habituated  to  the  sense  of  self-respect  and  of 
civic  obligation  by  a  longer  acquaintance  with 
the  working  of  the  Reign  of  Law. 

Since  the  Great  War  broke  out,  the  British 
position  in  Eg5rpt  has  been  regularised  by  the 
proclamation  of  a  formal  British  protectorate. 
Perhaps  the  happiest  fate  which  can  befall  the 
country  is  that  it  should  make  that  gradual  pro- 


BRITISH  EMPIRE  AMID  WORLD-POWERS     215 

gress  in  political  freedom,  which  is  alone  last- 
ing, under  the  guidance  of  the  power  which  has 
already  given  it  prosperity,  the  ascendancy  of 
an  impartial  law,  freedom  from  arbitrary  autho- 
rity, freedom  of  speech  and  thought,  and  emanci- 
pation from  the  thraldom  of  foreign  financial 
interests  ;  and  in  the  end  it  may  possibly  be  the 
destiny  of  this  ancient  land,  after  so  many 
vicissitudes,  to  take  its  place  as  one  among  a 
partnership  of  free  nations  in  a  world-encircling 
British  Commonwealth  of  self-governing  peoples. 

The  most  vexed,  difficult,  and  critical  problems 
in  the  history  of  the  British  Empire  since  1878 — 
perhaps  the  most  difficult  in  the  whole  course  of 
its  history — have  been  those  connected  with  the 
South  African  colonies.  In  1878  there  were  four 
distinct  European  provinces  in  South  Africa, 
besides  protected  native  areas,  like  Basutoland. 
All  four  had  sprung  from  the  original  Anglo- 
Dutch  colony  of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  In 
two  of  them — Cape  Colony  and  Natal — the  two 
European  peoples,  British  and  Dutch,  dwelt  side 
by  side,  the  Dutch  being  in  a  majority  in  the 
former,  the  British  in  the  latter ;  but  in  both  the 
difficulty  of  their  relationship  was  complicated  by 
the  presence  of  large  coloured  populations,  which 
included  not  only  the  native  African  peoples, 
Hottentots,  Kaffirs,  Zulus,  and  so  forth,  but  also 
a  large  number  of  Asiatics,  Malays  who  had  been 
brought  in  by  the  Dutch  before  the  British  con- 
quest, and  Indians  who  had  begun  to  come  in 
more    recently    in    large    numbers,    especially    to 


216  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

Natal.  Difference  of  attitude  towards  these 
peoples  between  the  British  authorities  and  the 
Dutch  settlers  had  been  in  the  past,  as  we  have 
seen,  a  main  cause  of  friction  between  the  two 
European  peoples,  and  had  caused  the  long  post- 
ponement of  full  self-government.  In  the  other 
two  provinces,  the  Transvaal  and  the  Orange 
Free  State,  the  white  inhabitants  were,  in  1878, 
almost  exclusively  Dutch.  The  native  popula- 
tions in  these  states  were  no  longer  in  a  state 
of  formal  slavery,  but  they  were  treated  as 
definitely  subject  and  inferior  peoples  :  a  law  of 
the  Transvaal  laid  it  down  that  '  there  shall  be 
no  equahty  in  Church  or  State  between  white 
and  black.'  Thus  the  mutual  distrust  originally 
aroused  by  the  native  question  still  survived. 
It  was  intensified  by  ill-feeling  between  the  Boers 
and  British  missionaries.  When  Livingstone,  the 
British  missionary  hero,  reported  the  difficulties 
which  the  Boers  had  put  in  his  way,  British 
opinion  was  made  more  hostile  than  ever.  Of 
the  two  Boer  republics,  the  Orange  Free  State 
had  enjoyed  complete  independence  since  1854  ; 
and  no  serious  friction  ever  arose  between  it  and 
the  British  government.  But  the  Transvaal, 
which  had  been  turbulent  and  restless  from  the 
first,  had  been  annexed  in  1878,  largely  because 
it  seemed  to  be  drifting  into  a  war  of  extermina- 
tion with  the  Zulus.  As  a  consequence,  Britain 
was  drawn  into  a  badly  managed  Zulu  War  ;  and 
when  this  dangerous  tribe  had  been  conquered, 
the  Transvaal  revolted.     The  Boers  defeated   a 


BRITISH  EMPIRE  AMID  WORLD-POWERS     217 

small  British  force  at  Majuba  ;  whereupon,  in- 
stead of  pursuing  the  struggle,  the  British  govern- 
ment resolved  to  try  the  effect  of  magnanimity, 
and  conceded  (1881  and  1884)  full  loc^l  inde- 
pendence to  the  Transvaal,  subject  only  to  a 
vague  recognition  of  British  suzerainty. 

This  was  the  beginning  of  many  ills.  The 
Transvaal  Boers,  knowing  little  of  the  world, 
thought  they  had  defeated  Britain ;  and  under 
the  lead  of  Paul  Kruger,  a  shrewd  old  farmer 
who  henceforth  directed  their  policy  with  all  but 
autocratic  power,  began  to  pursue  the  aim  of 
creating  a  purely  Dutch  South  Africa,  and  of 
driving  the  British  into  the  sea.  Kruger's  pohcy 
was  one  of  pure  racial  dominance,  not  of  equality 
of  rights.  It  was  a  natural  aim,  under  all  the 
conditions.  But  it  was  the  source  of  grave  evils. 
Inevitably  it  stimulated  a  parallel  movement  in 
Cape  Colony,  where  Dutch  and  British  were 
learning  to  live  peaceably  together.  The  Boer 
extremists  also  began  to  look  about  ^or  allies, 
and  were  tempted  to  hope  for  aid  from  Germany, 
who  had  just  established  herself  in  South- West 
Africa.  Full  of  pride,  the  Transvaalers,  though 
they  already  held  a  great  and  rich  country  which 
was  very  thinly  peopled,  began  to  push  outwards, 
and  especially  to  threaten  the  native  tribes  in 
the  barren  region  of  Bechuanaland,  which  lay 
between  the  Transvaal  and  the"  German  territory. 
To  th^s  Britain  replied  by  establishing  a  pro- 
tectorate over  Bechuana'and  (1884)  at  the  re- 
quest of  nafve  chiefs  :   the  motive  of  this  aimexa- 


218  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

tion  was,  not  suspicion  of  Germany,  for  this 
suspicion  did  not  yet  exist,  but  the  desire  to 
protect  the  native  population. 

Kruger's  vague  project  of  a  Dutch  South  Africa 
would  probably  have  caused  little  anxiety  so  long 
as  his  resources  were  limited  to  the  strength  of 
the  thinly  scattered  Boer  farmers.  But  the 
situation  was  fundamentally  altered  by  the  dis- 
covery of  immense  deposits  first  of  diamonds  and 
then  of  gold  in  South  Africa,  and  most  richly  of 
all  m  the  Rand  district  of  the  Transvaal.  These 
discoveries  brought  a  rapid  inrush  of  European 
miners,  financiers,  and  their  miscellaneous  camp- 
followers,  and  in  a  few  years  a  very  rich  and 
populous  European  community  had  established 
itself  in  the  Transvaal,  and  had  created  as  its 
centre  the  mushroom  new  city  of  Johannesburg 
(founded  1884).  These  immigrants,  who  came 
from  many  countries,  but  especially  from  Britain, 
changed  the  situation  in  the  Transvaal ;  it 
seemed  as  though  the  majority  among  the  white 
men  in  that  state  would  soon  be  British. 

A  simple  and  primitive  organisation  of  govern- 
ment, such  as  sufficed  for  the  needs  of  Boer 
farmers,  was  manifestly  inadequate  for  the  needs 
of  the  new  population,  which  included,  in  the 
nature  of  things,  many  undesirable  elements ; 
and  it  was  natural  that  the  minmg  population 
should  desire  to  be  brought  under  a  more  modern 
t3rpe  of  government,  or  to  obtain  an  effective 
share  in  the  control  of  their  own  affairs.  But 
this  was  precisely  what  the   Boers  of  Kruger's 


BRITISH  EIUPIRE  MUD  WORLD-POWERS     219 

way  of  thinking  were  determined  to  refuse  them. 
They  were  resolved  that  Boer  ascendancy  in  the 
Transvaal  should  not  be  weakened.  They  there- 
fore denied  to  the  new  immigrants  aU  the  rights 
of  citizenship,  and  would  not  even  permit  them 
to  manage  the  local  affairs  of  Johannesburg.  At 
the  same  time  Kruger  imposed  heavy  taxation 
upon  the  gold  industry  and  the  people  who  con- 
ducted it ;  and  out  of  the  proceeds  he  was  able 
not  only  to  pay  the  expenses  of  government 
without  burdening  the  Boer  farmers,  but  to 
build  up  the  miUtary  power  by  means  of  which 
he  hoped  ultimately  to  carry  out  his  great  project. 
Thus  the  '  Uitlanders  '  found  themselves  treated 
as  an  inferior  race  in  the  land  which  their  industry 
was  enriching.  They  practically  paid  the  cost 
of  the  government,  but  had  no  share  in  direct- 
ins;  it. 

The  policy  of  racial  ascendancy  has  seldom 
been  pursued  in  a  more  mischievous  or  dangerous 
form.  One  cannot  but  feel  a  certain  sympathy 
with  the  Boers'  desire  to  maintain  Boer  ascend- 
ancy in  the  land  which  they  had  conquered.  Yet 
it  must  be  remembered  that  they  were  themselves 
very  recent  immigrants :  the  whole  settlement  of 
the  Transvaal  had  taken  place  in  Paul  Kruger' s 
lifetime. 

The  diamonds  and  the  gold  of  the  recent  dis- 
coveries had  produced  in  South  Africa  a  new 
element  of  power :  the  power  of  great  wealth, 
wielded  by  a  small  number  of  men.  Some  of 
these  were,  of  course,  mean  and  sordid  souls,  to 


220  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

whom  wealth  was  an  end  in  itself.  But  among 
them  one  emerged  who  was  more  than  a  million- 
aire, who  was  capable  of  dreaming  great  dreams, 
and  had  acquired  his  wealth  chiefly  in  order  that 
he  might  have  the  power  to  realise  them.  This 
was  Cecil  Rhodes,  an  almost  unique  combination 
of  the  financier  and  the  idealist.  If  he  was  some- 
times tempted  to  resort  to  the  questionable  devices 
that  high  finance  seems  to  cultivate,  and  if  his 
ideals  took  on  sometimes  a  rather  vulgar  colour, 
reflected  from  his  money-bags,  nevertheless  ideals 
were  the  real  governing  factors  in  his  life. 

He  dreamed  of  a  great  united  state  of  South 
Africa ;  it  was  to  be  a  British  South  Africa ;  but 
it  was  to  be  British,  not  in  the  sense  in  which 
Kruger  wished  it  to  be  Dutch,  but  in  the  sense 
that  equality  of  treatment  between  the  white  races 
should  exist  within  it,  as  in  all  the  British  lands. 
He  dreamed  also  of  a  great  brotherhood  of  British 
communities,  or  communities  governed  by  British 
ideals,  girdling  the  world,  perhaps  dominating 
it  (for  Rhodes  was  inclined  to  be  a  chauvinist), 
and  leading  it  to  peace  and  liberty.  As  a  lad 
fresh  from  Oxford,  in  long  journeyings  over 
the  African  veldt,  he  had  in  a  curious,  child- 
like way  thought  out  a  theology,  a  system 
of  politics,  and  a  mode  of  life  for  himself ; 
having  reached  the  conclusion  that  the  British 
race  had  on  the  whole  more  capacity  for  leading 
the  world  successfully  than  any  other,  he  had 
resolved  that  it  should  be  his  life's  business  to 
forward    and    increase    the    influence    of    British 


BRITISH  E]\IP1RE  AMID  WORLD-POWERS     221 

ideas  and  ot  iiritisii  modes  o±  iile;  and  he  had 
systematically  built  up  a  colossal  fortune  in  order 
that  he  might  have  the  means  to  do  this  work. 
At  the  roots  of  this  strange  medley  of  poetry 
and  chauvinism  which  filled  his  mind  was  an 
unchanging  and  deep  veneration  for  the  out- 
standing memory  of  his  youth,  Oxford,  which  in 
his  mind  stood  for  aU  the  august  venerable  past 
of  England,  and  was  the  expression  of  her  moral 
essence.  When  he  died,  after  a  life  of  money- 
making  and  mtrigue,  in  a  remote  and  haK- 
developed  colony,  it  was  found  that  most  of  his 
immense  fortune  had  been  left  either  to  enrich 
the  college  where  he  had  spent  a  short  time  as  a 
lad,  or  to  bring  picked  youths  from  all  the  British 
lands,  and  from  what  he  regarded  as  the  two  great 
sister  commimities  of  America  and  Germany,  so 
that  they  might  drink  in  the  spirit  of  England,  at 
Oxford,  its  sanctuary. 

His  mimediate  task  lay  in  South  Africa,  where, 
from  the  moment  of  his  entry  upon  public  life, 
he  became  the  leader  of  the  British  cause  as 
Kruger  was  the  leader  of  the  Dutch  :  miliionaire- 
dreamer  and  shrewd,  obstuiate  farmer,  they  form 
a  strange  contrast.  The  one  stood  for  South 
Airican  unity  based  upon  equahty  of  the  white 
races  :  the  other  also  for  unity,  but  for  unity 
based  upon  the  ascendancy  of  one  of  the  white 
races.  In  the  politics  of  Cape  Colony  Rhodes 
achieved  a  remarkable  success :  he  made  friends 
with  the  Dutch  party  and  its  leader  Hofmeyr, 
who  for  a  long  time  gave  steady  support  to  his 


222  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

schemes  and  maintained  him  in  the  premiership. 
It  was  a  good  beginning  for  the  poUcy  of  racial 
co-operation.  But  Rhodes' s  most  remarkable 
achievement  was  the  acquisition  of  the  fertile 
upland  regions  of  Mashonaland  and  Matabililand, 
now  called  Rhodesia  in  his  honour.  There  were 
episodes  which  smelt  of  the  shady  practices  of 
high  finance  in  the  events  which  led  up  to  this 
acquisition.  But  in  the  result  its  settlement  was 
well  organised,  after  some  initial  difficulties, 
by  the  Chartered  Company  which  Rhodes  formed 
for  the  purpose.  Now  one  important  result  of 
the  acquisition  of  Rhodesia  was  that  it  hemmed 
in  the  Transvaal  on  the  north  ;  and,  joined  with 
the  earlier  annexation  of  Bechuanaland,  isolated 
and  insulated  the  two  Dutch  repubUcs,  which 
were  now  surrounded,  everywhere  except  on  the 
east,  by  British  territory.  From  Cape  Town  up 
through  Bechuanaland  and  through  the  new 
territories  Rhodes  drove  a  long  railway  hne.  It 
was  a  business  enterprise,  but  for  him  it  was 
also  a  great  imaginative  conception,  a  link  of 
empire,  and  he  dreamed  of  the  day  when  it 
should  be  continued  to  join  the  Ime  which  was 
being  pushed  up  the  Nile  from  Cairo  through  the 
hot  sands  of  the  Soudan. 

But  Rhodes' s  final  and  most  unhappy  venture 
was  the  attempt  to  force,  by  violent  means,  a 
solution  of  the  Transvaal  problem.  He  hoped 
that  the  Uitlanders  might  be  able,  by  a  revolu- 
tion, to  overthrow  Kruger's  government,  and, 
perhaps  in  conjunction  with  the  more  moderate 


BRITISH  EMPIRE  AMID  WORLD-POWERS     223 

Boers,  to  set  up  a   system   of   equal   treatment 
which  would  make  co-operation  with  the  other 
British  colonies  easy,  and   possibly  bring  about 
a  federation  of  the  whole  group  of  South  African 
States.     He  was  too  impatient  to  let  the  situa- 
tion  mature   quietly.      He   forced   the    issue   by 
encouraging  the  foolish  Jameson  Raid  of  1895. 
This,    like    all   wiKul    resorts    to    violence,    only 
made   things  worse.      It   alienated   and   angered 
the  more  moderate  Boers  in  the  Transvaal,  who 
were  not  without  sympathy  with  the  Uitlanders. 
It  aroused  the  indignation  of  the  Cape  Colony 
Boers,   and   embittered   racial  feeling   there.     It 
put  the  British  cause  in  the  wrong  in  the  eyes 
of  the  whole  world,  and  made  the  Boers  appear 
as  a  gallant  little  people  struggling  in  the  folds 
of  a  merciless  python-empire.      It  increased  im- 
mensely the  difficulty  of  the  British  government 
in    negotiatmg    with    the    Transvaal    for    better 
treatment    of   the    Uitlanders.     It    stiffened    the 
backs   of   Kruger   and  his  party.     The   German 
Kaiser    telegraphed   his    congratulations    on    the 
defeat  of  the  Raid  '  without  the  aid  of  friendly 
powers,'  and  the  implication  that  this  aid  would 
be  forthcoming  in  case  of  necessity  led  the  Boers 
to  believe  that  they  could  count  on  German  help 
in  a  struggle  with  Britain.     So  every  concession 
to  the  Uitlanders  was  obstinately  refused  ;    and 
after   three   years   more   of   fruitless   negotiation, 
during  which  German  munitions  were  pouring  into 
the   Transvaal,  the    South    African  War   began. 
It  mav  be  that  the  wor  could  have  been  avoided 


224  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

by  the  exercise  of  patience.  It  may  be  that  the 
imperiahst  spirit,  whicli  was  very  strong  in  Britain 
at  that  period,  led  to  the  adoption  of  a  needlessly 
high-handed  tone.  But  it  was  neither  greed  nor 
tyranny  on  Britain's  part  which  brought  about  the 
conflict,  but  simply  the  demand  for  equal  rights. 

The  war  was  one  in  which  all  the  appearances 
were  against  Britain,  and  the  whole  world  con- 
demned British  greed  and  aggression.  It  was  a 
case  of  Goliath  fighting  David,  the  biggest  empire 
ui  the  world  attacking  two  tmy  repubhcs ;  yet 
the  weaker  side  is  not  necessarily  always  in  the 
right.  It  seemed  to  be  a  conflict  for  the  posses- 
sion of  gold-mines  ;  yet  Britain  has  never  made, 
and  never  hoped  to  make,  a  penny  of  profit  out 
of  these  mines,  which  remamed  after  the  war  in 
the  same  hands  as  before  it.  It  was  a  case  of 
the  interests  of  financiers  and  gold-hunters  against 
those  of  simple  and  honest  farmers ;  yet  even 
financiers  have  rights,  and  even  farmers  can  be 
unjust.  In  reahty  the  issue  was  a  quite  simple 
and  straightforward  one.  It  was  the  issue  of 
racial  ascendancy  against  racial  equafity,  and  as 
her  traditions  bade  her,  Britain  strove  for  racial 
equahty.  It  was  the  issue  of  self-government  for 
the  whole  community  as  against  the  entrenched 
dominion  of  one  section ;  and  there  was  no 
question  on  which  side  the  history  of  Britam 
must  lead  her  to  range  herself.  Whatever  the 
rest  of  the  world  might  say,  the  great  self-govern- 
ing colonies,  which  were  free  to  help  or  not  as 
they  thought  fit,  had  no  doubts  at  all.     They  all 


BRITISH  EMPIRE  AMID  WORLD-POWERS     225 

sent  contingents  to  take  part  in  the  war,  because 
they  laiew  it  to  be  a  war  for  principles  funda- 
mental to  themselves. 

The  war  dragged  its  weary  course,  and  the 
Boers  fought  with  such  heroism,  and  often  with 
such  chivalry,  as  to  win  the  cordial  respect  and 
admiration  of  their  enemies.  It  is  always  a  pity 
when  men  fight ;  but  sometimes  a  fight  lets  bad 
blood  escape,  and  makes  friendship  easier  between 
foes  who  have  learnt  mutual  respect.  Four  years 
after  the  peace  which  added  the  Transvaal  and 
the  Orange  Free  State  as  conquered  dominions 
to  the  British  Empire,  the  British  government 
established  in  both  of  these  provinces  the  full 
institutions  of  responsible  self-government.  As 
in  Canada  sixty  years  earlier,  the  two  races  were 
bidden  to  work  together  and  make  the  best  of 
one  another  ;  because  now  their  destinies  were 
freely  under  their  own  control.  Yet  this  was 
even  a  bolder  experiment  than  that  of  Canada, 
and  showed  a  more  venturesome  confidence  in 
the  heahng  power  of  self-government.  How  has 
it  turned  out  ?  Within  five  years  more,  the  four 
divided  provinces  which  had  presented  such 
vexed  problems  in  1878,  were  combined  in  the 
federal  Union  of  South  Africa,  governed  by  insti- 
tutions which  reproduced  those  of  Britain  and 
her  colonies. 

In  handing  over  to  the  now  united  states  of 
South  Africa  the  unqualified  control  of  their  own 
affairs,  Britain  necessarily  left  to  them  the  vexed 
problem  of  devising  a  just  relation  between  the 


226  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

ruling  races  and  their  subjects  of  backward  or  alien 
stocks ;  the  problem  which  had  been  the  source 
of  most  of  the  difficulties  of  South  Africa  for  a 
century  past,  and  which  had  long  delayed  the 
concession  of  full  self-government.  Nowhere  in 
the  world  does  this  problem  assume  a  more  acute 
form  than  in  South  Africa,  where  there  is  not  only 
a  majority  of  negroes,  mostly  of  the  vigorous 
Bantu  stock,  but  also  a  large  number  of  immigrants 
mainly  from  India,  who  as  subjects  of  the  British 
crown  naturally  claim  special  rights.  South 
Africa  has  to  find  her  own  solution  for  this  complex 
problem ;  and  she  has  not  yet  fuUy  found  it. 
But  in  two  ways  her  association  with  the  British 
Empire  has  helped,  and  will  help,  her  to  find  her 
way  towards  it.  If  the  earlier  policy  of  the  British 
government,  guided  by  the  missionaries,  laid  too 
exclusive  an  emphasis  upon  native  rights,  and  in 
various  ways  hampered  the  development  of  the 
colony  by  the  way  in  which  it  interpreted  these 
rights,  at  least  it  had  established  a  tradition 
hostile  to  that  policy  of  mere  ruthless  exploitation 
of  which  such  an  ugly  illustration  was  being  given 
in  German  South- West  Africa.  An  absolute  parity 
of  treatment  between  white  and  black  must  be  not 
only  impracticable,  but  harmful  to  both  sides. 
But  between  the  two  extremes  of  a  visionary 
equality  and  a  white  ascendancy  ruthlessly  em- 
ployed for  exploitation,  a  third  term  is  possible — 
the  just  tutelage  of  the  white  man  over  the  black, 
with  a  reasonable  freedom  for  native  custom.  '  A 
practice  has  grown  up  in  South  Africa,'  says  the 


BRITISH  EMPIRE  AMID  WORLD-POWERS     227 

greatest  of  South  African  statesmen/  *of  creating 
parallel  institutions,  giving  the  natives  their  own 
separate  institutions  on  parallel  lines  with  institu- 
tions for  whites.  It  may  be  that  on  these  lines  we 
may  yet  be  able  to  solve  a  problem  which  may 
otherwise  be  insoluble.'  It  is  a  solution  which 
owes  much  to  the  British  experiments  of  the 
previous  period  ;  and  the  principle  which  inspires 
it  was  incorporated  in  the  Act  of  Union.  This  is 
one  of  the  innumerable  fruitful  experiments  in 
government  in  which  the  British  system  is  so 
prolific.  Again,  the  problem  of  the  relationship 
between  Indian  immigrants  and  white  colonists  is 
an  acutely  difficult  one.  It  cannot  be  said  to  have 
been  solved.  But  at  least  the  fact  that  the  South 
African  Union  and  the  Indian  Empire  are  both 
partners  in  the  same  British  commonwealth 
improves  the  chances  of  a  just  solution.  It 
helped  to  find  at  least  a  temporary  adjustment 
in  1914;  in  the  future  also  it  may  contribute,  in 
this  as  in  many  other  ways,  to  ensure  that  a  fair 
consideration  is  given  to  both  sides  of  the  thorny 
question  of  inter-racial  relationship. 

The  events  which  led  up  to,  and  still  more  the 
events  which  followed,  the  South  African  War  had 
thus  brought  a  solution  for  the  South  African 
problem,  which  had  been  a  continuous  vexation 
since  the  moment  of  the  British  conquest.  It 
was  solved  by  the  British  panacea  of  self-govern- 
ment and  equal  rights.  Who  could  have  anti- 
cipated, twenty  years  or  fifty  years  ago,  the  part 

1  General  Smuts,  May  22,  1917. 


228  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

which  has  been  played  by  South  Africa  in  the 
Great  War  ?  Is  there  any  parallel  to  these  events, 
which  showed  the  gallant  general  of  the  Boer 
forces  playing  the  part  of  prime  minister  in  a 
united  South  Africa,  crushing  with  Boer  forces  a 
revolt  stirred  up  among  the  more  ignorant  Boers 
by  German  intrigue,  and  then  leading  an  army, 
half  Boer  and  half  British,  to  the  conquest  of 
German  South-West  Africa  ? 

The  South  African  War  had  proved  to  be  the 
severest  test  which  the  modern  British  Empire 
had  yet  had  to  undergo.  But  it  had  emerged,  not 
broken,  as  in  1782,  but  rejuvenated,  purged  of  the 
baser  elements  which  had  alloyed  its  imperial 
spirit,  and  confirmed  in  its  faith  in  the  principles 
on  which  it  was  built.  More  than  that,  on  the 
first  occasion  on  which  the  essential  principles  or 
the  power  of  the  empire  had  been  challenged  in 
war,  all  the  self-governing  colonies  had  voluntarily 
borne  their  share.  Apart  from  a  small  contingent 
sent  from  Austraha  to  the  Soudan  in  1885,  British 
colonies  had  never  before — uideed,  no  European 
colony  had  ever  before — sent  men  oversea  to  fight 
in  a  common  cause  :  and  this  not  because  their 
immediate  mterests  were  threatened,  but  for  the 
sake  of  an  idea.  For  that  reason  the  South  African 
War  marks  an  epoch  not  merely  m  the  history  of 
the  British  Empire,  but  of  European  imperiahsm 
as  a  whole. 

The  unity  of  sentiment  and  aim  which  was 
thus  expressed  had,  however,  been  steadily  grow- 
ing throughout  the  period  of  European  rivahy ; 


BRITISH  EMPIRE  AJMID  WORLD-POWERS     229 

and  doubtless  in  the  colonies,  as  in  Britain,  the 
new  value  attached  to  the  imperial  tie  was  due 
in  a  large  degree  to  the  very  fact  of  the  eagerness 
of  the  other  European  powers  for  extra-European 
possessions.       Imperiahst    sentiment    began    to 
become  a  factor  in  British  pohtics  just  about  the 
begiiming  of  this  period:    in  1878  the  Imperial 
Federation  Society  was  founded,  and  about  the 
same  time  Disraeh,  who  had  once  spoken  of  the 
colonies  as   '  millstones  aromid  our  necks,'   was 
making    himself    the    mouthpiece    of    the    new 
imperialist  spirit.     To  this  wave  of  feehng  a  very 
notable    contribution    was    made    by    Sir    John 
Seeley's  briUiant  book,  The  Expansion  of  Englnnd. 
Slight  as  it  was,  and  containing  no  facts  not  akeady 
familiar,  it  gave  a  new  perspective  to  the  events 
of  the  last  four  centuries  of  British  history,  and 
made  the  growth  of  the  Empire  seem  something 
not  merely  casual  and  incidental,  but  a  vital  and 
most  significant  part  of  the  British  achievement. 
Its    defect   was,    perhaps,    that   it   concentrated 
attention  too  exclusively  upon  the  external  aspects 
of  the  wonderful  story,  and  dwelt  too  little  upon 
its  inner  spirit,  upon  the  force  and  influence  of  the 
instinct  of  self-government  which  has  been  the 
most  potent  factor  in  British  history.     The  power- 
ful impression  which  it  created  was  deepened  by 
other  books,  like  Froude's  Oceana  and  Sir  Charles 
Dilke's  Greater  Britain,  the  title  of  which  alone  was 
a  proclamation  and  a  prophecy.     It  was  strength- 
ened also  by  the  wonderful  imperial  pageants,  like 
nothing  else  ever  witnessed  in  the  world,  which 


230  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

began  with  the  two  Jubilee  celebrations  of  1887 
and  1897,  and  were  continued  in  the  funerals  of 
Queen  Victoria  and  Edward  vn.,  the  coronations 
of  Edward  vn.  and  George  v.,  and  the  superb 
Durbars  of  Delhi.  The  imaginative  appeal  of 
such  solemn  representations  of  a  world-scattered 
fellowship  of  peoples  and  nations  and  tongues 
must  not  be  underestimated.  At  first  there  was 
perhaps  a  suggestion  of  blatancy,  and  of  mere 
pride  in  dominion,  in  the  way  in  which  these 
celebrations  were  received  ;  the  graver  note  of 
Kipling's  *  Recessional,'  inspired  by  the  Jubilee 
of  1897,  was  not  unneeded.  But  after  the  strain 
and  anxiety  of  the  South  African  War,  a  different 
temper  visibly  emerged. 

More  important  than  the  pageants  were  the 
conferences  of  imperial  statesmen  which  arose 
out  of  them.  The  prime  ministers  of  the  great 
colonies  began  to  deliberate  m  common  with  the 
statesmen  of  Britain  ;  and  the  discussions,  though 
at  first  quite  informal  and  devoid  of  authority, 
have  become  more  intimate  and  vital  as  time  has 
passed  :  a  beginning  at  least  has  been  made  in 
the  common  discussion  of  problems  affecting  the 
Empire  as  a  whole.  And  alongside  of,  and  in 
consequence  of,  all  this,  imperial  questions  have 
been  treated  with  a  hew  seriousness  in  the  British 
parliament,  and  the  offices  which  deal  with  them 
have  ceased  to  be,  as  they  once  were,  reserved 
for  statesmen  of  the  second  rank.  The  new 
attitude  was  pointedly  expressed  when  in  1895 
Mr.  Joseph  Chamberlain,  the  most  brilliant  poli- 


BRITISH  EMPIRE  AMLD  WORLD-POWERS     231 

tician   of   his   generation,    who    could    have   had 
almost  any  office  he  desired,  deliberately  chose 
the   Colonial   Office.      His   tenure   of  that  office 
was  not,  perhaps,  memorable  for  any  far-reachmg 
change  in  colonial  pohcy,  though  he  introduced 
some  admirable  improvements  in  the  administra- 
tion of  the   tropical  colonies;   but  it  was  most 
assuredly  memorable  for  the  increased  intensity  of 
interest  which  he  succeeded  in  arousing  in  imperial 
questions,  both  at  home  and  in  the  colonies.    The 
campaign   which   he    initiated,    after   the    South 
African  War,  for  the  institution  of  an  Imperial 
Zollverein  or  a  system  of  Colonial  Preference  was 
a  failure,   and  indeed  was  probably  a  blunder, 
since  it   implied   an   attempt   to   return  to  that 
material  basis  of  imperial  miity  which  had  formed 
the  core  of  the  old  colonial  system,  and  had  led 
to  the  most  unhappy  results  in  regard  to  the 
American    colonies.     But    at    least    it    was    an 
attempt  to  reaUse  a  fuller  unity  than  had  yet 
been  achieved,  and  in  its  first  form  included  an 
inspiring   appeal  to   the   British   people   to   face 
sacrifices,  should  they  be  necessary,  for  that  high 
end.     Whether  these  ideas  contribute  to  the  ulti- 
mate solution  of  the  imperial  problem  or  not,  it 
was  at  least  a  good  thing  that  the  question  should 
be  raised  and  discussed. 

One  further  feature  among  the  many  develop- 
ments of  this  era  must  not  be  left  untouched.  It 
is  the  rise  of  a  definitely  national  spirit  in  the 
greater  members  of  the  Empire.  To  this  a  great 
encouragement  has  been  given  by  the  poHtical 


232  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

unity  which  some  of  these  communities  have 
for  the  first  time  attained  during  these  years. 
National  sentiment  in  the  Dominion  of  Canada 
was  stimulated  into  existence  by  the  Federation 
of  1867.  The  unification  of  Australia  which  was 
at  length  achieved  in  the  Federation  of  1900  did 
not  indeed  create,  but  it  greatly  strengthened,  the 
rise  of  a  similar  spirit  of  Australian  nationality. 
A  national  spirit  in  South  Africa,  merging  m 
itself  the  hostile  racial  sentiments  of  Boer  and 
Briton,  m_ay  well  prove  to  be  the  happiest  result 
of  the  Union  of  South  Africa.  In  India  also  a 
national  spirit  is  coming  to  birth,  bred  among  a 
deeply  divided  people  by  the  political  unity,  the 
peace,  and  the  equal  laws,  which  have  been  the 
greatest  gifts  of  British  rule  ;  its  danger  is  that 
it  may  be  too  quick  to  imagine  that  the  unity 
which  makes  nationhood  can  be  created  merely 
by  means  of  resolutions  declaring  that  it  exists, 
but  the  desire  to  create  it  is  an  altogether  healthy 
desire.  On  the  surface  it  might  appear  that  the 
rise  of  a  national  spirit  in  the  great  members  of 
the  Empire  is  a  danger  to  the  ideal  of  imperial 
unity ;  but  that  need  not  be  so,  and  if  it  were  so, 
the  danger  must  be  faced,  since  the  national  spirit 
is  too  valuable  a  force  to  be  restricted.  The 
sense  of  nationhood  is  the  inevitable  outcome  of 
the  freedom  and  co-operation  which  the  British 
system  everywhere  encourages;  to  attempt  to 
repress  it  lest  it  should  endanger  imperial  unity 
would  be  as  short-sighted  as  the  old  attempt  to 
restrict   the   natural   growth   of   self-government 


BRITISH  EMPIRE  AMID  WORLD-POWERS     233 

because  it  also  seemed  a  danger  to  imperial  unity. 
The  essence  of  the  British  system  is  the  free  de- 
velopment of  natural  tendencies,  and  the  encour- 
agement of  variety  of  types ;  and  the  future 
towards  which  the  Empire  seems  to  be  tending 
is  not  that  of  a  highly  centralised  and  unified 
state,  but  that  of  a  brotherhood  of  free  nations, 
united  by  community  of  ideas  and  institutions, 
co-operating  for  many  common  ends,  and  above 
all  for  the  common  defence  in  case  of  need,  but 
each  freely  following  the  natural  trend  of  its  own 
development. 

That  is  the  conception  of  empire,  unlike  any 
other  ever  entertained  by  men  upon  this  planet, 
which  was  already  shaping  itself  among  the 
British  communities  when  the  terrible  ordeal  of 
the  Great  War  came  to  test  it,  and  to  prove  as 
not  even  the  staunchest  believer  could  have 
anticipated,  that  it  was  capable  of  standing  the 
severest  trial  which  men  or  institutions  have  ever 
had  to  undergo. 


IX 

THE  GREAT  CHALLENGE,  1900-1914 

At  the  opening  of  the  twentieth  century  the  long 
process  whereby  the  whole  globe  has  been  brought 
under  the  influence  of  European  civiUsation  was 
practically  completed ;  and  there  had  emerged 
a  group  of  gigantic  empires,  which  in  size  far  sur- 
passed the  ancient  Empire  of  Rome ;  each  resting 
upon,  and  drawing  its  strength  from,  a  unified 
nation-state.  In  the  hands  of  these  empires  the 
political  destinies  of  the  world  seemed  to  rest,  and 
the  lesser  nation-states  appeared  to  be  altogether 
overshadowed  by  them.  Among  the  vast  questions 
which  fate  was  putting  to  humanity,  there  were 
none  more  momentous  than  these  :  On  what  prin- 
ciples, and  in  what  spirit,  were  these  nation-empires 
going  to  use  the  power  which  they  had  won  over 
their  vast  and  varied  multitudes  of  subjects  ? 
What  were  to  be  their  relations  with  one  another  ? 
Were  they  to  be  relations  of  conflict,  each  striving 
to  weaken  or  destroy  its  rivals  in  the  hope  of 
attaining  a  final  world-supremacy  ?  Or  were 
they  to  be  relations  of  co-operation  in  the  develop- 
ment of  civilisation,  extending  to  the  whole  world 
those  tentative  but  far  from  unsuccessful  efforts 


THE  GREAT  CHALLENGE  235 

after  international  co-operation  which  the  Euro- 
pean states  had  long  been  endeavouring  to  work 
out  among  themselves  ?  ^  At  first  it  seemed  as 
if  the  second  alternative  might  be  adopted,  for 
these  were  the  days  of  the  Hague  Conferences ; 
but  the  development  of  events  durmg  the  first 
fourteen  years  of  the  century  showed  with  in- 
creasing clearness  that  one  of  the  new  world-states 
was  resolute  to  make  a  bid  for  world-supremacy, 
and  the  gradual  maturing  of  this  challenge, 
culminating  in  the  Great  War,  constitutes  the 
supreme  interest  of  these  years. 

The  oldest,  and  (by  the  rough  tests  of  area, 
population,  and  natural  resources)  by  far  the 
greatest  of  these  new  composite  world-states,  was 
the  British  Empire,  which  included  12,000,000 
square  miles,  or  one-quarter  of  the  land-surface 
of  the  globe.  It  rested  upon  the  wealth,  vigour, 
and  skill  of  a  population  of  45,000,000  in  the 
homeland,  to  which  might  be  added,  but  only 
by  their  own  consent,  the  resources  of  five  young 
daughter-nations,  whose  population  only  amounted 
to  about  15,000,000.  Thus  it  stood  upon  a  rather 
narrow  foundation.  And  while  it  was  the  greatest, 
it  was  also  beyond  comparison  the  most  loosely 
organised  of  all  these  empires.  It  was  rather  a 
partnership  of  a  multitude  of  states  in  every 
grade  of  civilisation  than  an  organised  and  con- 
solidated dominion.  Five  of  its  chief  members 
were  completely  self-governing,  and  shared  in  the 

'  See  the  Essay  on  Inteinationalism  {Nationalism  and  Inter- 
nationalism, p.  124  ff.). 


236  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

common  burdens  only  by  their  own  free  will. 
All  the  remaining  members  were  organised  as 
distinct  units,  though  subject  to  the  general 
control  of  the  home  government.  The  resources 
of  each  unit  were  employed  exclusively  for  the 
development  of  its  own  welfare.  They  paid  no 
tribute  ;  they  were  not  required  to  provide  any 
soldiers  beyond  the  minimum  needed  for  their 
own  defence  and  the  maintenance  of  internal 
order.  This  empire,  in  short,  was  not  in  any 
degree  organised  for  military  purposes.  It  pos- 
sessed no  great  land-army,  and  was,  therefore, 
incapable  of  threatening  the  existence  of  any  of 
its  rivals.  It  depended  for  its  defence  firstly 
upon  its  own  admirable  strategic  distribution, 
since  it  was  open  to  attack  at  singularly  few 
points  otherwise  than  from  the  sea ;  it  depended 
mainly,  for  that  reason,  upon  naval  power,  and 
secure  command  of  the  sea-roads  by  which  its 
members  were  linked  was  absolutely  vital  to  its 
existence.  Only  by  sea-power  (which  is  always 
weak  in  the  offensive)  could  it  threaten  its  neigh- 
bours or  rivals  ;  and  its  sea-power,  during  four 
centuries,  had  always,  in  war,  been  employed  to 
resist  the  threatened  domination  of  any  single 
power,  and  had  never,  in  time  of  peace,  been 
employed  to  restrict  the  freedom  of  mov^ement  of 
any  of  the  world's  peoples.  On  the  contrary,  the 
Freedom  of  the  Seas  had  been  established  by  its 
victories,  and  dated  from  the  date  of  its  ascend- 
ancy. The  life-blood  of  this  empire  was  trade  ; 
its  supreme  interest  was  manifestly  peace.     The 


THE  GREAT  CHALLENGE  237 

conception  of  the  meaning  of  empire  which  had 
been  developed  by  its  history  was  not  a  concep- 
tion of  dominion  for  dominion's  sake,  or  of  the 
exploitation  of  subjects  for  the  advantage  of  a 
master.  On  the  contrary,  it  had  come  to  mean 
(especially  during  the  nineteenth  century)  a 
trust ;  a  trust  to  be  administered  in  the  interests 
of  the  subjects  primarily,  and  secondarily  in  the 
interests  of  the  whole  civihsed  world.  That  this 
is  not  the  assertion  of  a  theory  or  an  ideal,  but 
of  a  fact  and  a  practice,  is  sufficiently  demon- 
strated by  two  unquestionable  facts :  the  first 
that  the  units  which  formed  this  empire  were 
not  only  free  from  all  tribute  in  money  or  men, 
but  were  not  even  required  to  make  any  contribu- 
tion towards  the  upkeep  of  the  fleet,  upon  which 
the  safety  of  all  depended  ;  the  second  that  every 
port  and  every  market  in  this  vast  empire,  so  far 
as  they  were  under  the  control  of  the  central 
government,  were  thrown  open  as  freely  to  the 
citizens  of  all  other  states  as  to  its  own.  Finally, 
in  this  empire  there  had  never  been  any  attempt 
to  impose  a  uniformity  of  method  or  even  of 
laws  upon  the  infinitely  various  societies  which 
it  included  :  it  not  merely  permitted,  it  culti- 
vated and  admu-ed,  varieties  of  type,  and  to  the 
maximum  practicable  degree  beHeved  in  seK- 
govemment.  Because  these  were  the  principles 
upon  which  it  was  administered,  the  real  strength 
of  this  empire  was  far  greater  than  it  appeared. 
But  beyond  question  it  was  ill-prepared  and 
ill-organised  for  war ;    desiring  peace  beyond  all 


238  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

things,  and  having  given  internal  peace  to  one- 
quarter  of  the  earth's  population,  it  was  apt  to 
be  over-sanguine  about  the  maintenance  of  peace. 
And  if  a  great  clash  of  empires  should  come,  this 
was  hkely  to  tell  against  it. 

The  second  oldest — ^perhaps  it  ought  to  be 
described  as  the  oldest — of  the  world-empires, 
and  the  second  largest  in  area,  was  the  Russian 
Empire,  which  covered  8,500,000  square  miles  of 
territory.  Its  strength  was  that  its  vast  domains 
formed  a  single  continuous  block,  and  that  its 
population  was  far  more  homogeneous  than  that 
of  its  rivals,  three  out  of  four  of  its  subjects  being 
either  of  the  Russian  or  of  kindred  Slavonic  stock. 
Its  weaknesses  were  that  it  was  almost  land- 
locked, nearly  the  whole  of  its  immense  coast- 
line being  either  inaccessible,  or  ice-boimd  during 
half  of  the  year  ;  and  that  it  had  not  adopted 
modern  methods  of  government,  being  subject  to 
a  despotism,  working  through  an  inefficient, 
tyrannical,  and  corrupt  bureaucracy.  In  the 
event  of  a  European  war  it  was  further  bound  to 
suffer  from  the  facts  that  its  means  of  communica- 
tion and  its  capacity  for  the  movement  of  great 
armies  were  ill-developed  ;  and  that  it  was  far 
behind  all  its  rivals  in  the  control  of  industrial 
machinery  and  applied  science,  upon  which 
modern  warfare  depends,  and  without  which  the 
greatest  wealth  of  man-power  is  ineffective.  At 
the  opening  of  the  twentieth  century  Russia  was 
still  pursuing  the  policy  of  Eastward  expansion  at 
the  expense  of  China,  which  the  other  Western 


THE  GREAT  CHALLENGE  339 

powers  had  been  compelled  to  abandon  by  the 
formation  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance.  Able 
to  bring  pressure  upon  China  from  the  landward 
side,  she  was  not  deterred  by  the  naval  predomi- 
nance which  this  alliance  enjoyed,  and  she  still 
hoped  to  control  Manchuria,  and  to  dominate  the 
policy  of  China.  But  these  aims  brought  her  in 
conflict  with  Japan,  who  had  been  preparing  for 
the  conflict  ever  since  1895.  The  outcome  of  the 
war  (1904),  which  ended  in  a  disastrous  Russian 
defeat,  had  the  most  profound  influence  upon  the 
politics  of  the  world.  It  led  to  an  internal  re- 
volution in  Russia.  It  showed  that  the  feet  of  the 
colossus  were  of  clay,  and  that  her  bureaucratic 
government  was  grossly  corrupt  and  incompetent. 
It  forbade  Russia  to  take  an  effective  part  in  the 
critical  events  of  the  following  years,  and  notably 
disabled  her  from  checking  the  progress  of  German 
and  Austrian  ascendancy  in  the  Balkans.  Above 
all  it  increased  the  self-confidence  of  Germany,  and 
inspired  her  rulers  with  the  dangerous  conviction 
that  the  opposing  forces  with  which  they  would 
have  to  deal  in  the  expected  contest  for  the 
mastery  of  Europe  could  be  more  easily  over- 
thrown than  they  had  anticipated.  To  the 
Russian  defeat  must  be  mainly  attributed  the 
blustering  insolence  of  German  policy  during  the 
next  ten  years,  and  the  boldness  of  the  final 
challenge  in  1914. 

The  third  of  the  great  empires  was  that  of 
France,  with  5,000,000  square  miles  of  territory, 
mostly  acquired  in  very  recent  years,  but  having 


240  THE  EXPz\NSION  OF  EUROPE 

roots  in  the  past.  It  rested  upon  a  home  popula- 
tion of  only  39,000,000,  but  these  belonged  to 
the  most  enlightened,  the  most  inventive,  and 
the  most  chivalrous  stock  in  Christendom.  As 
France  had,  a  hundred  years  before,  raised  the 
standard  of  human  rights  among  the  European 
peoples,  so  she  was  now  bringing  law  and  justice 
and  peace  to  the  backward  peoples  of  Africa  and 
the  East ;  and  was  finding  in  the  pride  of  this 
achievement  some  consolation  for  the  brutality 
with  which  she  had  been  hurled  from  the  leadership 
of  Europe. 

The  fourth  of  the  great  empires  was  America, 
with  some  3,000,000  square  miles  of  territory,  and 
a  vague  claim  of  suzerainty  over  the  vast  area  of 
Central  and  South  America.  Her  difficult  task 
of  welding  into  a  nation  masses  of  people  of  the 
most  heterogeneous  races  had  been  made  yet  more 
difficult  by  the  enormous  flood  of  immigrants, 
mainly  from  the  northern,  eastern,  and  south- 
eastern parts  of  Europe,  which  had  poured  into 
her  cities  during  the  last  generation  :  they  proved 
to  be  in  many  ways  more  difficult  to  digest  than 
their  predecessors,  and  they  tended,  in  a  dangerous 
way,  to  live  apart  and  to  organise  themselves  as 
separate  communities.  The  presence  of  these 
organised  groups  made  it  sometimes  hard  for 
America  to  maintain  a  quite  clear  and  distinctive 
attitude  in  the  discussions  of  the  powers,  most  of 
which  had,  as  it  were,  defmite  bodies  of  advocates 
among  her  citizens  ;  and  it  was  perhaps  in  part 
for  this  reason  that  she  had  tended  to  fall  back 


THE  GREAT  CHALLENGE  241 

again  to  that  attitude  of  aloofness  towards  the 
affairs  of  the  non- American  world  from  which  she 
seemed  to  have  begun  to  depart  in  the  later  years 
of  the  last  century.     Although  she  had  herself 
taken  a  hand  in  the  imperialist  activities  of  the 
'nineties,    the    general    attitude    of    her    citizens 
towards  the  imperial  controversies  of  Europe  was 
one  of  contempt  or  undiscriminating  condemna- 
tion.    Her   old   tradition   of   isolation   from   the 
affairs  of  Europe  was  still  very  strong — still  the 
dominating  factor  in  her  policy.     She  had  not  yet 
grasped  (indeed,  who,  in  any  country,  had  ?)  the 
political  consequences  of  the  new  era  of  world- 
economy  into  which  we  have  passed.     And  there- 
fore she  could  not  see  that  the  titanic  conflict 
of  Empires  which  was  looming  ahead  was  of  an 
altogether  different  character  from  the  old  conflicts 
of  the  European  states,  that  it  was  fmidamentally 
a  conflict  of  prmciples,  a  fight  for  existence  between 
the   ideal   of   self-government   and   the   ideal   of 
dominion,  and  that  it  must  therefore  involve,  for 
good  or  ill,  the  fortunes  of  the  whole  globe.     She 
watched  the  events  which  led  up  to  the  great  agony 
with    impartial    and    deliberate    interest.      Even 
when  the  war  began  she  clung  with  obstinate  faith 
to  the  belief  that  her  tradition  of  aloofness  might 
still  be  maintained.     It  is  not  surprising,  when  we 
consider  how  deep-rooted  this  tradition  was,  that 
it  took  two  and  a  half  years  of  carnage  and  horror 
to  convert  her  from  it.     But  it  was  inevitable  that 
m  the  end  her  still  more  deeply  rooted  tradition  of 
liberty  should  draw  her  into  the  conflict,  and  lead 

Q 


242  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

her  at  last  to  play  her  proper  part  m  the  attempt 
to  shape  a  new  world-order. 

We  cannot  stop  to  analyse  the  muior  world- 
states,  Italy  and  Japan;  both  of  which  might 
have  stood  aside  from  the  conflict,  but  that  both 
realised  its  immense  significance  for  themselves 
and  for  the  world. 

Last  among  the  world-states,  both  in  the  date 
of  its  foimdation  and  in  the  extent  of  its  domains, 
was  the  empire  of  Germany,  which  covered  con- 
siderably less  than  1,500,000  square  miles,  but 
rested  upon  a  home  population  of  nearly 
70,000,000,  more  docile,  more  industrious,  and 
more  highly  organised  than  any  other  human 
society.  The  empire  of  Germany  had  been  more 
easily  and  more  rapidly  acquired  than  any  of  the 
others,  yet  smce  its  foundation  it  had  known 
many  troubles,  because  the  hard  and  domhieering 
spirit  in  which  it  was  ruled  did  not  know  how 
to  win  the  affections  of  its  subjects.  A  parvenu 
among  the  great  states — having  only  attained  the 
dignity  of  nationhood  m  the  mid-nmeteenth 
century — Germany  has  shown  none  of  that '  genius 
for  equahty '  which  is  the  secret  of  good  manners 
and  of  friendship  among  nations  as  among  indi- 
viduals. Her  conversation,  at  home  and  abroad, 
had  the  vulgar  self-assertiveness  of  the  parvenu, 
and  turned  always  and  wholly  upon  her  own  great- 
ness. And  her  conduct  has  been  the  echo  of  her 
conversation.  She  has  persuaded  herself  that  she 
has  a  monopoly  of  power,  of  wisdom,  and  of 
Imowledge,  and  deserves  to  rule  the  earth.     Of 


THE  GREAT  CHALLENGE  243 

the   magnitude   and   far-reaching   nature   of   her 
imperiahst  ambitions,  we  have  said  something  m 
a  previous  chapter.      She  had    as  yet  failed  to 
reahse  any  of  these  vaulting  schemes,  but  she 
had  not  for  that  reason  abandoned  any  of  them, 
and  she  kept  her  clever  and  uisidious  preparations 
on  foot  in  every  region  of  the  world  upon  which 
her  acquisitive  eyes  had  rested.     But  the  exaspera- 
tion of  her  steady  failure  to  achieve  the  place  in 
the  world  which  she  had  marked  out  as  her  due 
had  driven  her  rulers  more  and  more  definitely  to 
contemplate,  and  prepared  her  people  to  uphold, 
a  direct  challenge  to  all  her  rivals.     The  object 
of  this  challenge  was  to  win  for  Germany  her  due 
share  in  the  non-European  world,  her  '  place  in  the 
sun.'     Her  view  of  what  that  share  must  be  was 
such  that  it  could  not  be  attained  without  the 
overthrow  of  all  her  European  rivals,  and  this 
would  bring  with  it  the  lordship  of  the  world.     It 
must  be  all  or  nothing.     Though  not  quite  realis- 
ing this  alternative,  the  mind  of  Germany  was  not 
afraid  of  it.     She  was  in  the  mood  to  make  a  bold 
attempt,  if  need  be,  to  grasp  even  the  sceptre  of 
world-supremacy.     The  world  could  not  believe 
that  any  sane  people  could  entertain  such  mega- 
lomaniac  visions ;    not   even   the   events   of   the 
decade  1904-14  were  enough  to  bring  conviction ; 
it  needed  the  tragedy  and  desolation  of  the  war 
to  prove   at   once   their  reality   and   their  folly. 
For  they  were  folly  even  if  they  could  be  momen- 
tarily reahsed.     They  sprang  from  the  traditions 
of  Prussia,  which  seemed  to  demonstrate  that  all 


244  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

things  were  possible  to  him  who  dared  all,  and 
scrupled  nothing,  and  calculated  his  chances  and 
his  means  with  precision.  By  force  and  fraud 
the  greatness  of  Prussia  had  been  built ;  by  force 
and  fraud  Prussia-Germany  had  become  the  lead- 
ing state  of  Europe,  feared  by  all  her  rivals  and 
safe  from  all  attack.  Force  and  fraud  appeared 
to  be  the  determining  factors  in  human  affairs  ; 
even  the  philosophers  of  Germany  devoted  their 
powers  to  justifying  and  glorifying  them.  By 
force  and  fraud,  aided  by  science,  Germany  should 
become  the  leader  of  the  world,  and  perhaps  its 
mistress.  Never  has  the  doctrine  of  power  been 
j)roclaimed  with  more  unflinching  directness  as 
the  sole  and  sufficient  motive  for  state  action. 
There  was  practically  no  pretence  that  Germany 
desired  to  improve  the  condition  of  the  lands  she 
wished  to  possess,  or  that  they  were  misgoverned, 
or  that  the  existmg  German  territories  were 
threatened :  what  pretence  there  was,  was  in- 
vented after  war  began.  The  sole  and  sufficient 
reason  put  forward  by  the  advocates  of  the  policy 
which  Germany  was  pursuing  was  that  she  wanted 
more  power  and  larger  dominions  ;  and  what  she 
wanted  she  proposed  to  take 

On  the  surface  it  seemed  mere  madness  for 
the  least  and  latest  of  the  great  empires  to 
challenge  all  the  rest,  just  as  it  had  once  seemed 
madness  for  Frederick  the  Great,  with  his  httle 
state,  to  stand  up  against  all  but  one  of  the 
great  European  powers.  But  Germany  had  calcu' 
iated   her    chances,    and   knew    that    there   were 


THE  GREAT  CHALLENGE  245 

many  things  in  her  favour.  She  knew  that  in 
the  last  resort  the  strength  of  the  world-states 
rested  upon  their  European  foundations,  and  here 
the  inequality  was  much  less.  In  a  European 
struggle  she  could  draw  great  advantage  from 
her  central  geographical  position,  which  she  had 
improved  to  the  highest  extent  by  the  construc- 
tion of  a  great  system  of  strategic  railways.  She 
could  trust  to  her  superbly  organised  military 
system,  more  perfect  than  that  of  any  other 
state,  just  because  no  other  state  has  ever  regarded 
vv^ar  as  the  final  aim  and  the  highest  form  of 
state  action.  She  commanded  unequalled  re- 
sources in  all  the  mechanical  apparatus  of  war ; 
she  had  spared  no  pains  to  build  up  her  armament 
works,  which  had,  indeed,  supplied  a  great  part 
of  the  world  ;  she  had  developed  all  the  scientific 
industries  in  such  a  way  that  their  factories  could 
be  rapidly  and  easily  turned  to  war  purposes  ; 
and  having  given  all  her  thoughts  to  the  coming 
struggle  as  no  other  nation  had  done,  she  knew, 
better  than  any  other,  how  largely  it  would  turn 
upon  these  things.  She  counted  securely  upon 
winning  an  immense  advantage  from  the  fact 
that  she  would  herself  fix  the  date  of  war,  and 
enter  upon  it  with  a  sudden  spring,  fully  pre- 
pared, against  rivals  who,  clinging  to  the  hope 
of  peace,  would  be  unready  for  the  onset.  She 
hoped  to  sow  jealousies  among  her  rivals ;  she 
trusted  to  catch  them  at  a  time  when  they  were 
engrossed  in  their  domestic  concerns,  and  in  this 
respect  fate  seemed  to  play  into  her  hands,  since 


246  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

at  the  moment  which  she  had  predetermined, 
Britain,  France,  and  Russia  were  all  distracted 
by  domestic  controversies.  She  trusted  also  to 
her  reading  of  the  minds  and  temper  of  her 
opponents  ;  and  here  she  went  wildly  astray,  as 
must  always  be  the  fate  of  the  nation  or  the  man 
who  is  blinded  by  self-complacency  and  by  con- 
tempt for  others. 

But,  above  all,  she  put  her  trust  in  a  vast 
political  combination  which  she  had  laboriously 
prepared  during  the  years  preceding  the  great 
conflict :  the  combination  which  we  have  learned 
to  call  Mittel-Europa.  None  of  us  reahsed  to 
how  great  an  extent  this  plan  had  been  put  in 
operation  before  the  war  began.  Briefly  it  de- 
pended on  the  possibihty  of  obtaining  an  inti- 
mate union  with  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire, 
a  control  over  the  Turkish  Empire,  and  a  sufficient 
influence  or  control  among  the  little  Balkan 
states  to  ensure  through  communication.  If  the 
scheme  could  be  carried  out  in  fuU,  it  would 
involve  the  creation  of  a  practically  continuous 
empire  stretching  from  the  North  Sea  to  the 
Persian  Gulf,  and  embracing  a  total  population 
of  over  150,000,000.  This  would  be  a  dominion 
worth  acquiring  for  its  own  sake,  since  it  would 
put  Germany  on  a  level  with  her  rivals.  But  it 
would  have  the  further  advantage  that  it  would 
hold  a  central  position  in  relation  to  the  other 
world-powers,  coi responding  to  Germany's  central 
position  in  relation  to  the  other  nation-states  of 
Europe.     Russia   could  be   struck   at   along   the 


THE  GREAT  CHALLENGE  247 

whole  length  of  her  western  and  south-western 
frontier  ;  the  British  Empire  could  be  threatened 
in  Egypt,  the  centre  of  its  ocean  lines  of  com- 
munication, and  also  from  the  Persian  Gulf  in 
the  direction  of  India  ;  the  French  Empire  could 
be  struck  at  the  heart,  in  its  European  centre  ; 
and  all  without  seriously  laymg  open  the  attacking 
powers  to  the  invasion  of  sea-power. 

It  was  a  bold  and  masterful  scheme,  and  it 
was  steadily  pursued  during  the  years  before  the 
war.     Austro-Hungary  was  easily  influenced.    The 
ascendancy  of  her  ruling  races— nay,   the  very 
existence  of  her  composite  anti-national  empire — 
was   threatened   by   the   nationahst   movements 
among  her  subject-peoples,  who,  cruelly  oppressed 
at  home,  were  more  and  more  beginning  to  turn 
towards  their  free  brothers  over  the  border,  in 
Serbia  and  Rumania  ;    and  behind  these  loomed 
Russia,    the    traditional    protector    of    the    Slav 
peoples    and    of    the    Orthodox    faith.      Austro- 
Hungary,  therefore,  leant  upon  the  support  of 
Germany,  and  her  dominant  races  would  be  very 
wiUing  to  join  in  a  war  which  should  remove 
the  Russian  menace  and  give  them  a  chance  of 
subjugating  the  Serbs.     This  latter  aim  suited  the 
programme  of  Germany  as  well  as  it  suited  that 
of  Austria,  since  the  railways  to  Constantinople 
and  Salonika  ran  through  Serbia.     Serbia,  there- 
fore, was  doomed  ;    she  stood  right  in  the  path 
of  the  Juggernaut  car. 

The  acquisition  of  influence  in  Turkey  was  also 
comparatively    easy.     Constantinople    is    a    city 


248  THE  EXPANSION  OP  EUROPE 

where  lavish  corruption  can  work  wonders.  More- 
over Turkey  was,  in  the  last  years  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  in  bad  odour  with  Europe  ;  and 
Germany  was  able  to  earn  in  1897  the  lasting 
gratitude  of  the  infamous  Sultan  Abdul  Hamid 
by  standing  between  him  and  the  other  European 
powers,  who  were  trying  to  interfere  with  his 
indulgence  in  the  pastime  of  massacring  the 
Armenians.  Turkey  had  had  many  protectors 
among  the  European  powers.  She  had  never 
before  had  one  so  complaisant  about  the  murder 
of  Christians.  From  that  date  Germany  was  all- 
powerful  in  Turkey.  The  Turkish  army  was 
reorganised  under  her  direction,  and  practically 
passed  under  her  control.  Most  of  the  Turkish 
railways  were  acquired  and  managed  by  German 
companies.  And  presently  the  great  scheme  of 
the  Bagdad  railway  began  to  be  carried  through. 
The  Young  Turk  revolution  in  1908  and  the  fall 
of  Abdul  Hamid  gave,  indeed,  a  shock  to  the 
German  ascendancy ;  but  only  for  a  moment. 
The  Young  Turks  were  as  amenable  to  corrup- 
tion as  their  predecessors  ;  and  under  the  guid- 
ance of  Enver  Bey  Turkey  relapsed  into  German 
suzerainty.  Thus  the  most  important  parts  of 
the  great  scheme  were  in  a  fair  way  of  success 
by  1910.  One  of  the  merits  of  this  scheme  was 
that  as  the  Sultan  of  Turkey  was  the  head  of 
the  Mahomedan  religion,  the  German  protectorate 
over  Turkey  gave  a  useful  mode  of  appealing  to 
the  religious  sentiments  of  Mahomedans  every- 
where.    Twice  over,   in   1898   and   in   1904,   the 


THE  GREAT  CHALLENGE  f>40 

Kaiser  had  declared  that  he  was  the  protector  of 
all  Mahomedans  throughout  the  world.  Most  of 
the  Mahomedans  were  subjects  either  of  Britain, 
France,  or  Russia — the  three  rival  empires  that 
were  to  be  overthrown.  As  General  Bernhardi 
put  it,  Germany  in  her  struggle  for  WeltmacM 
must  supplement  her  material  weapons  with 
spiritual  weapons. 

To  obtain  a  similar  ascendancy  over  the  Balkan 
states  was  more  difficult ;  ^or  the  Turk  was  the 
secular  enemy  of  all  of  them,  and  Austria  was 
the  foe  of  two  of  the  four,  and  to  bring  these 
Httle  states  into  partnership  with  their  natural 
enemies  seemed  an  all  but  impossible  task.  Yet 
a  good  deal  could  be,  and  was,  done.  In  two  of 
the  four  chief  Balkan  states  German  princes 
occupied  the  thrones,  a  Hohenzollern  in  Rumania, 
a  Cobiu-ger  in  Bulgaria ;  in  a  third,  the  heir- 
apparent  to  the  Greek  throne  was  honoured  with 
the  hand  of  the  Kaiser's  own  sister.  Western 
peoples  had  imagined  that  the  day  had  gone  by 
when  the  policy  of  states  could  be  deflected  by 
such  facts  ;  especially  as  the  Balkan  states  all 
had  democratic  parliamentary  constitutions.  But 
the  Germans  knew  better  than  the  West.  They 
knew  that  kings  could  still  play  a  great  part  in 
countries  where  the  bulk  of  the  electorate  were 
illiterate,  and  where  most  of  the  class  of  pro- 
fessional pohticians  were  always  open  to  bribes. 
Their  calculations  were  justified.  King  Carol  of 
Rumania  actually  signed  a  treaty  of  alliance 
with  Germany  without  consulting  his  ministers 


250  THE  EXPANkSION  OF  EUROPE 

or  parliament.  King  Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria  was 
able  to  draw  his  subjects  into  an  alliance  with 
the  Turks,  who  had  massacred  their  fathers  in 
1876,  against  the  Russians,  who  had  saved  them 
from  destruction.  King  Constantine  of  Greece 
was  able  to  humiliate  8.nd  disgrace  the  country 
over  which  he  ruled,  in  order  to  serve  the  pur- 
poses of  his  brother-in-law.  These  sovereigns 
may  have  been  the  unconscious  implements  of  a 
policy  which  they  did  not  understand.  But  they 
earned  their  wages. 

There  were,  indeed,  two  moments  when  the 
great  scheme  came  near  being  wrecked.  One  was 
w^lien  Italy,  the  sleeping  partner  of  the  Triple 
Alliance,  who  was  not  made  a  sharer  in  these 
grandiose  and  vile  projects,  attacked  and  con- 
quered the  Turkish  province  of  Tripoli  in  1911, 
and  strained  to  breaking-point  the  loyalty  of  the 
Turks  to  Germany.  The  other  was  when,  under 
the  guidance  of  the  two  great  statesmen  of  the 
Balkans,  Venizelos  of  Greece  and  Pashitch  of 
Serbia,  the  Balkan  League  was  formed,  and  the 
power  of  Turkey  in  Europe  broken.  If  the 
League  had  held  together,  the  great  German 
project  would  have  been  ruined,  or  at  any  rate 
gravely  imperilled.  But  Germany  and  Austria 
contrived  to  throw  an  apple  of  discord  among 
the  Balkan  allies  at  the  Conference  of  London  in 
1912,  and  then  stimulated  Bulgaria  to  attack 
Serbia  and  Greece.  The  League  was  broken  up 
irreparably  ;  its  members  had  been  brought  into 
a  sound  condition  of  mutual  hatred  ;  and  Bulgaria, 


THE  GREAT  CHALLENGE  251 

isolated  among  distrustful  neighbours,  was  ready- 
to  become  the  tool  of  Germany  in  order  that 
by  her  aid  she  might  achieve  (fond  hope  !)  the 
hegemony  of  the  Balkans.  This  brilUant  stroke 
was  effected  in  1913 — the  year  before  the  Great 
War.  All  that  remained  was  to  ruin  Serbia. 
For  that  purpose  Austria  had  long  been  straining 
at  the  leash.  She  had  been  on  the  point  of 
making  an  attack  in  1909,  in  1912,  in  1913. 
In  1914  the  leash  was  slipped.  If  the  rival 
empires  chose  to  look  on  while  Serbia  was 
destroyed,  weU  and  good :  in  that  case  the 
Berhn-Bagdad  project  could  be  systematically 
developed  and  consolidated,  and  the  attack  on 
the  rival  empires  could  come  later.  If  not,  still 
it  was  well;  for  all  was  ready  for  the  great 
challenge. 

We  have  dwelt  at  some  length  upon  this 
gigantic  project,  because  it  has  formed  during  all 
these  years  the  heart  and  centre  of  the  German 
designs,  and  even  to-day  it  is  the  dearest  of 
German  hopes.  Not  until  she  is  utterly  defeated 
will  she  abandon  it ;  because  its  abandonment 
must  involve  the  abandonment  of  every  hope  of 
a  renewed  attempt  at  world-supremacy,  after  an 
interval  for  reorganisation  and  recovery.  Not 
until  the  German  control  over  Austria  and 
Turkey,  more  complete  to-day,  after  two  and  a 
half  years  of  war,  than  it  has  ever  been  before, 
has  been  destroyed  by  the  splitting  up  of  Austria 
among  the  nationalities  to  which  her  territory 
belongs,  and  by  the  final  overthrow  of  the  Turkish 


252  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

Empire,  will  the  German  dream  of  world-dominion 
be  shattered. 

But  while  this  fundamentally  important  pro- 
ject was  being  worked  out,  other  events,  almost 
equally  momentous  in  their  bearing  upon  the 
coming  conflict,  were  taking  place  elsewhere.  It 
was  the  obvious  policy  of  Germany  to  keep  her 
rivals  on  bad  terms  with  one  another.  The 
tradition  of  Bismarck  bade  her  isolate  each  victim 
before  it  was  destroj^^ed.  But  the  insolence  and 
the  megalomania  of  modern  Germany  made  this 
difficult.  German  writers  were  busily  and  openly 
explaining  the  fate  marked  out  for  all  the  other 
powers.  France  was  to  be  so  crushed  that  she 
would  '  never  again  be  8.ble  to  stand  in  our 
path.'  The  bloated  and  unconsolidated  empire 
of  Britain  was  to  be  shattered.  The  Russian 
barbarians  were  to  be  thrust  back  into  Asia. 
And  what  the  pamphleteers  and  journalists  wrote 
was  expressed  with  almost  equal  clearness  in  the 
tone  of  German  diplomacy.  In  face  of  all  this, 
the  clumsy  attempts  of  the  German  government 
to  isolate  their  rivals  met  with  small  success, 
even  though  these  rivals  had  many  grounds  of 
controversy  among  themselves.  France  knew 
what  she  had  to  fear ;  and  the  interpolation  of  a 
few  clumsy  bids  for  her  favour  amid  the  torrent 
of  insults  against  her  which  filled  the  German 
press,  were  of  no  avail ;  especially  as  she  had  to 
look  on  at  the  unceasing  petty  persecution  prac- 
tised in  the  lost  provinces  of  Alsace-Lorraine. 
Russia  had  been  alienated  by  the  first  evidences 


THE  GREAT  CHALLENGE  253 

of  German  designs  in  the  Ballians,  and  driven 
into  a  close  alliance  with  France.  Britain,  hitherto 
obstinately  friendly  to  Germany,  began  to  be 
perturbed  by  the  growing  German  programmes  of 
naval  construction  from  1900  onwards,  by  the 
absolute  refusal  of  Germany  to  consider  any 
proposal  for  mutual  disarmament  or  retardation 
of  construction,  and  above  all  by  the  repeated 
assertions  of  the  head  of  the  German  state  that 
Germany  aspired  to  naval  supremacy,  that  her 
future  was  on  the  sea,  that  the  trident  must  be 
in  her  hands.  Should  the  trident  fall  into  any 
but  British  hands,  the  existence  of  the  British 
Empire,  and  the  very  livelihood  of  the  British 
homeland,  would  rest  at  the  mercy  of  him  who 
wielded  it.  So,  quite  inevitably,  the  three 
threatened  empires  drew  together  and  reconciled 
their  differences  in  the  Franco-British  agreement 
of  1904  and  the  Russo-British  agreement  of 
1907. 

These  agreements  dealt  wholly  with  extra- 
European  questions,  and  therefore  deserve  some 
analysis.  In  the  Franco-British  agreement  the 
mam  feature  was  that  while  France  withdrew 
her  opposition  to  the  British  position  in  Egypt, 
Britain  on  her  side  recognised  the  paramount 
pohtical  interest  of  France  m  Morocco.  It  was 
the  agreement  about  Morocco  which  counted  for 
most ;  because  it  was  the  beginning  of  a  contro- 
versy which  lasted  for  seven  years,  which  was 
twice  used  by  Germany  as  a  means  for  testing, 
and  endeavouring  to  break,  the  friendship  of  her 


254  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

rivals,  and  which  twice  brought  Europe  to  the 
verge  of  war. 

Morocco  is  a  part  of  that  single  region  of  moun- 
tainous North  Africa  of  which  France  already 
controlled  the  remainder,  Tunis  and  Algeria. 
Peoples  of  the  same  t3rpe  inhabited  the  whole 
region,  but  while  in  Tmiis  and  Algeria  they  were 
being  brought  under  the  influence  of  law  and 
order,  in  Morocco  they  remained  in  anarchy. 
Only  a  conventional  line  divided  Morocco  from 
Algeria,  and  the  anarchy  among  the  tribesmen  on 
one  side  of  the  line  inevitably  had  an  unhappy 
effect  upon  the  people  on  the  other  side  of  the 
line.  More  than  once  France  had  been  com- 
pelled, for  the  sake  of  Algeria,  to  intervene  in 
Morocco.  It  is  impossible  to  exaggerate  the 
anarchy  which  existed  in  the  interior  of  this  rich 
and  wasted  comitry.  It  was,  indeed,  the  most 
lawless  region  remainmg  in  the  world  :  when  Mi\ 
Bernard  Shaw  wished  to  find  a  scene  for  a  play 
in  which  the  hero  should  be  a  brigand  chief 
leading  a  band  of  rascals  and  outlaws  from  all 
countries,  Morocco  presented  the  only  possible 
scene  remaining  in  the  world.  And  this  anarchy 
was  the  more  unfortunate,  not  only  because  the 
country  was  naturally  rich  and  ought  to  have 
been  prosperous,  but  also  because  it  lay  in  close 
proximity  to  great  civilised  states,  and  on  one 
of  the  main  routes  of  commerce  at  the  entrance 
to  the  Mediterranean.  In  its  ports  a  consider- 
able traffic  was  carried  on  by  European  traders, 
but  this  traffic  was,  ov/ing  to  the  anarchic  con- 


THE  GREAT  CHALLENGE  265 

dition  of  the  country,  nothing  hke  as  great  as  it 
ought  to  have  been.  In  1905,  39  per  cent,  of  it 
was  controlled  by  French  traders,  32  per  cent, 
by  British  traders,  12  per  cent,  by  German 
traders,  and  5  per  cent,  by  Spanish  traders. 
Manifestly  this  was  a  region  where  law  and  order 
ought  to  be  established,  in  the  interests  of  civilisa- 
tion. The  powers  most  directly  concerned  were 
in  the  first  place  France,  with  her  neighbouring 
territory  and  her  preponderant  trade ;  in  the 
second  place  Britain,  whose  strategic  interests  as 
well  as  her  trading  interests  were  involved ;  in  the 
third  place  Spain,  which  directly  faced  the 
Morocco  coast ;  while  Germany  had  only  trading 
interests  involved,  and  so  long  as  these  were 
safeguarded,  had  no  ground  of  complaint.  If  any 
single  power  was  to  intervene,  manifestly  the  first 
claim  was  upon  France. 

In  1900  France  had  directed  the  attention  of 
Europe  to  the  disorderly  condition  of  Morocco, 
and  had  proposed  to  intervene  to  restore  order, 
on  the  understanding  that  she  should  not  annex 
the  country,  or  interfere  with  the  trading  rights 
of  other  nations.  Some  states  agreed  ;  Germany 
made  no  reply,  but  made  no  objection.  But 
owing  to  the  opposition  of  Britain,  who  was  then 
on  bad  terms  with  France  and  feared  to  see  an 
unfriendly  power  controUing  the  entrance  to  the 
Mediterranean,  no  action  was  taken  ;  and  in  the 
next  years  the  chaos  in  Morocco  grew  worse. 
By  the  agreement  of  1904  Britain  withdrew  her 
objection  to  French  intervention,  and  recognised 


256  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

the  prior  political  rights  of  France  in  Morocco, 
on  the  condition  that  the  existing  government  of 
Morocco  should  be  maintained,  that  none  of  its 
territory  should  be  annexed,  and  that  '  the  open 
door '  should  be  preserved  for  the  trade  of  all 
nations.  But,  of  course,  it  was  possible,  and 
even  probable,  that  the  existing  Moroccan  govern- 
ment could  not  be  made  efficient.  In  that  case, 
what  should  happen  ?  The  possibihty  had  to 
be  contemplated  by  reasonable  statesmen,  and 
provided  against.  But  to  do  so  in  a  pubhc 
treaty  would  have  been  to  condemn  beforehand 
the  existing  system.  Therefore  a  hjrpothetical 
arrangement  was  made  for  this  possible  future 
event  in  a  secret  treaty,  to  which  Spain  was 
made  a  party ;  whereby  it  \^^as  provided  that  if 
the  arrangement  should  break  down,  and  France 
should  have  to  estabhsh  a  definite  protectorate, 
the  vital  part  of  the  north  coast  should  pass  mider 
the  control  of  Spain. 

To  the  public  part  of  these  arrangements,  which 
alone  were  of  immediate  importance,  no  objection 
was  mads  by  any  of  the  other  powers,  and  the 
German  Chancellor  told  the  Reichstag  that  German 
interests  were  not  affected.  France  accordingly 
drew  up  a  scheme  of  reforms  in  the  government 
of  Morocco,  which  the  Sultan  was  invited  to 
accept.  But  before  he  had  accepted  them  the 
German  Kaiser  suddenly  came  to  Tangier  in  his 
yacht,  had  an  mterview  with  the  Sultan  in  which 
he  urged  him  to  reject  the  French  demands,  and 
made  a  public  speech  in  which  he  declared  himself 


THE  GREAT  CHALLENGE  257 

the  protector  of  the  Mahomedans,  asserted  that 
no  European  power  had  special  rights  in  Morocco, 
and  announced  his  determination  to  support  the 
'  independence  and  integrity  '  of  Morocco — which 
in  existing  circumstances  meant  the  maintenance 
of  anarchy.  What  was  the  reason  for  this  sudden 
and  insolent  intervention — made  without  any 
previous  communication  with  France  ?  The  main 
reason  was  that  France's  ally,  Russia,  had  just 
been  severely  defeated  by  Japan,  and  would  not 
be  able  to  take  part  in  a  European  war.  There- 
fore, it  appeared,  France  might  be  bulhed ; 
Britain  might  not  be  willing  to  risk  war  on  such 
an  issue ;  the  Entente  of  1904  might  be  de- 
stroyed ;  the  extension  of  French  influence  might 
be  prevented ;  and  the  preservation  of  a  state 
of  anarchy  in  Morocco  would  leave  open  the 
chance  of  a  seizure  of  tha.t  country  by  Germany 
at  a  later  date,  thus  enabhng  her  to  dominate 
the  entrance  to  the  Mediterranean,  and  to  threaten 
Algeria.  But  this  pretty  scheme  did  not  succeed. 
The  Entente  held  firm.  Britain  gave  steady 
support  to  France,  as  indeed  she  was  bound  in 
honour  to  do  ;  and  in  the  end  a  conference  of 
the  powers  was  held  at  Alge^iras  (Spain).  At 
this  conference  the  predominating  right  of  France 
to  political  influence  in  Morocco  was  formally 
recognised  ;  and  it  was  agreed  that  the  govern- 
ment of  the  Sultan  should  be  maintained,  and 
that  all  countries  should  have  equal  trading  rights 
in  Morocco.  This  was,  of  course,  the  very  basis 
of  the  Franco-British  agreement.     On  every  point 

B 


258  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

at  which  she  tried  to  score  a  success  over  France, 
Germany  was  defeated  by  the  votes  of  the  other 
powers,  even  her  own  ally,  Italy,  deserting  her. 

But  the  German  intervention  had  had  its 
effect.  The  Sultan  had  refused  the  French  scheme 
of  reform.  The  elements  of  disorder  in  Morocco 
were  encouraged  to  believe  that  they  had  the 
protection  of  Germany,  and  the  activity  of  German 
agents  strengthened  this  belief.  The  anarchy  grew 
steadily  worse.  In  1907  Sir  Harry  Maclean  was 
captured  by  a  brigand  chief,  and  the  British 
government  had  to  pay  £20,000  ransom  for  his 
release.  In  the  same  year  a  number  of  European 
workmen  engaged  on  harbour  works  at  Casablanca 
were  murdered  by  tribesmen  ;  and  the  French 
had  to  send  a  force  which  had  a  year's  fighting 
before  it  reduced  the  district  to  order.  In  1911 
the  Sultan  was  besieged  in  his  capital  (where  there 
were  a  number  of  European  residents)  by  insur- 
gent tribesmen,  and  had  to  invite  the  French  to 
send  an  army  to  his  rehef. 

This  was  seized  upon  by  Germany  as  a  pretext. 
Morocco  was  no  longer  '  independent.'  The  agree- 
ment of  Alge9iras  was  dead.  Therefore  she  re- 
sumed her  right  to  put  forward  what  claims  she 
pleased  in  Morocco.  Suddenly  her  gunboat,  the 
Panther,  appeared  off  Agadir.  It  was  meant  as 
an  assertion  that  Germany  had  as  much  right 
to  intervene  in  Morocco  as  France.  And  it  was 
accompanied  by  a  demand  that  if  France  wanted 
to  be  left  free  in  Morocco,  she  must  buy  the 
approval  of  Germany.     The  settlement  of  Morocco 


THE  GREAT  CHALLENGE  259 

was  to  be  a  question  solely  between  France  and 
Germany.  The  Entente  of  1904,  the  agreement 
of  1906,  the  Moroccan  interests  of  Britain  (much 
more  important  than  those  of  Germany),  and  the 
interests  of  the  other  powers  of  the  Algegiras 
Conference,  were  to  count  for  nothing.  Ger- 
many's voice  must  be  the  determining  factor. 
But  Germany  announced  that  she  was  willing  to 
be  bought  off  by  large  concessions  of  French 
territory  elsewhere — provided  that  Britain  was 
not  allowed  to  have  anything  to  say :  provided, 
that  is,  that  the  agreement  of  1904  was  scrapped. 
This  was  a  not  too  subtle  way  of  trying  to  drive 
a  wedge  between  two  friendly  powers.  It  did  not 
succeed.  Britain  insisted  upon  being  consulted. 
There  was  for  a  time  a  real  danger  of  war.  In  the 
end  peace  was  maintained  by  the  cession  by  France 
of  considerable  areas  in  the  Congo  as  the  price  of 
German  abstention  from  intervening  in  a  sphere 
where  she  had  no  right  to  intervene.  But  Morocco 
was  left  under  a  definite  French  protectorate. 

We  have  dwelt  upon  the  Morocco  question  at 
some  length,  partly  because  it  attracted  a  vast 
amount  of  interest  during  the  years  of  prepara- 
tion for  the  war ;  partly  because  it  affords  an 
extraordinarily  good  illustration  of  the  difficulty 
of  maintaining  peaceable  relations  with  Germany, 
and  of  the  spirit  in  which  Germany  approached 
the  dehcate  questions  of  inter-imperial  relation- 
ships— a  spirit  far  removed  indeed  from  that 
friendly  willingness  for  compromise  and  co-opera- 
tion by  which  alone  the  peace  of  the  world  could 


260  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

be  maintained  ;  and  partly  because  it  illustrates 
the  crudity  and  brutality  of  the  methods  by  which 
Germany  endeavoured  to  separate  her  intended 
victims.  It  is  improbable  that  she  ever  meant  to 
go  to  war  on  the  Moroccan  question.  She  meant 
to  go  to  war  on  whatever  pretext  might  present 
itself  when  all  her  preparations  were  ready ;  but 
in  the  meanwhile  she  would  avoid  war  on  all 
questions  but  one  :  and  that  one  was  the  great 
Berlin-Bagdad  project,  the  keystone  of  her  soar- 
ing arch  of  Empire.  She  would  fight  to  prevent 
the  ruin  of  that  scheme.  Otherwise  she  would 
preserve  the  peace,  she  would  even  make  conces- 
sions to  preserve  the  peace,  until  the  right  moment 
had  come.  In  that  sense  Germany  was  a  peace- 
loving  power :  in  that  sense  alone. 

On  the  agreement  between  Russia  and  Britain 
in  1907  it  is  unnecessary  to  dwell  with  such  ful- 
ness. The  agreement  turned  mainly  upon  the 
removal  of  causes  of  friction  in  the  Middle  East — 
in  Persia  and  the  Persian  GuK,  and  in  Tibet. 
These  were  in  themselves  interesting  and  thorny 
questions,  especially  the  question  of  Persia,  where 
the  two  powers  established  distinct  spheres  of 
interest  and  a  sort  of  joint  protectorate.  But 
they  need  not  detain  us,  because  they  had  no 
direct  bearing  upon  the  events  leading  up  to  the 
war,  except  in  so  far  as,  by  removing  friction 
between  two  rivals  of  long  standing,  they  made  it 
possible  for  them  to  co-operate  for  their  common 
defence  against  a  menace  that  became  more  and 
more  apparent. 


THE  GREAT  CHALLENGE  261 

From    1907    onwards    Germany   found   herself 
confronted   by   united    defensive    action    on    the 
part  of   the   three   empires   whose  downfall   she 
intended  to  compass.     It  was  not  (except  as  re- 
garded  France    and    Russia)    a    formal    aUiance 
which  bound  these  powers.     There  was  no  fixed 
agreement  between  them  as  to  military  co-opera- 
tion.    France  and  Britain  had  indeed,   in   1906 
and  in  1911,  consulted  as  to  the  mihtary  steps 
they  should  take  if  they  were  drawn  into  war, 
as  seemed  likely  m  those  years,  but  neither  was 
in  any  way  bound  to  help  the  other  under  all 
circumstances.      France    and    Britain    had    also 
agreed  that  the  French  fleet  should  be  concen- 
trated in   the  Mediterranean,   the   main   British 
fleet  in  the  North  Sea.     This  aiTangement  (which 
was  universally  known,  and,  indeed,  could  not  be 
concealed)  put  Britain  mider  a  moral  obUgation 
to  defend  France  against  naval  attack,  but  only 
if  France  were  the  object  of  aggression.     It  was, 
therefore,  actually  a  safeguard  of  peace,  since  it 
ensured  that  neither  France  nor,  consequently, 
her  ally,  Russia,  would  begin  a  war  without  being 
sure    of   the   concurrence   of   Britain,    the    most 
pacific    of   powers.     As    the    diplomatic    records 
show,   at  the   opening   of   the   Great  War   they 
were  not  sure  of  this  concurrence,  even  for  naval 
purposes,    until    August    1,    when    the    die    was 
aheady   cast.      The    Triple    Entente,    therefore, 
was  not  an  aUiance  ;    it  was  only  an  agreement 
for   common   diplomatic   action   m   the   hope   of 
averting  a  terrible  menace. 


262  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

Until  1911  Germany,  or  some  elements  in  Ger- 
many, seem  to  have  hoped  that  she  could  get 
her  own  way  by  bully mg  and  ratthng  her  sabre, 
and  that  by  these  means  she  could  frighten  her 
rivals,  make  them  mutually  distrustful,  and  so 
break  up  their  combination  and  deal  with  them 
in  detail.  Those  who  held  this  view  were  the 
peace-party  (so-called),  and  they  included  the 
Kaiser  and  his  Chancellor.  They  would  probably 
not  themselves  have  accepted  this  description  of 
their  policy,  but  in  practice  this  is  what  it  meant. 
But  there  was  always  a  formidable  and  influential 
party  in  Germany  which  had  no  patience  with 
these  hesitations,  and  was  eager  to  draw  the  sabre. 
It  included  the  men  of  the  General  Staff,  backed 
by  the  numerous  Pan-German  societies  and  news- 
papers. The  issue  of  the  Morocco  question  in 
1911,  which  showed  that  the  policy  of  bullying 
had  failed,  played  into  the  hands  of  the  men  of 
violence  ;  and  from  this  moment  began  the  last 
strenuous  burst  of  military  preparation  which  pre- 
ceded the  war.  In  1911  was  passed  the  first  of 
a  series  of  Army  Acts  for  the  increase  of  the  already 
immense  German  army,  and  still  more  for  the  pro- 
vision of  vast  equipment  and  the  scientific  apparatus 
of  destruction ;  two  further  Acts  for  the  same  pur- 
pose followed  in  1912  and  in  1913.  In  1911  also 
was  published  General  Bernhardi's  famous  book, 
which  defined  and  described  the  course  of  future 
action,  and  the  aim  which  Germany  was  hence- 
forth to  pursue  with  all  her  strength  :  Weltmacht 
oder  Niedergang,  world-power  or  downfall. 


THE  GREAT  CHALLENGE  263 

The  events  in  the  Balkans  m  1912  and  1913 
completed  the  conversion  of  those  who  still  clung 
to  the  poUcy  of  peaceful  bullying.  The  formation 
and  triumph  of  the  Balkan  League  in  1912  formed 
a  grave  set-back  for  the  Berlin-Bagdad  project, 
which  would  be  ruined  if  these  little  states 
became  strong  enough,  or  united  enough,  to  be 
independent.  The  break-up  of  the  Balkan  League 
and  the  second  Balkan  War  of  1913  improved  the 
situation  from  the  German  point  of  view.  But 
they  left  Serbia  unsatisfactorily  strong,  and 
Serbia  distrusted  Austria,  and  controlled  the  com- 
munications with  Constantinople.  Serbia  must 
be  destroyed  ;  otherwise  the  Berlin-Bagdad  pro- 
ject, and  with  it  the  world-power  of  which  it  was 
to  be  the  main  pillar,  would  be  always  insecure. 
Austria  was  for  attacking  Serbia  at  once  in 
1913.  Germany  held  her  back :  the  widening 
of  the  Kiel  Canal  was  not  completed,  and  the 
fruits  of  the  latest  Army  Acts  were  not  yet  fully 
reaped.  But  all  was  ready  in  1914 ;  and  the 
Great  Challenge  was  launched.  It  would  have 
been  launched  at  or  about  that  time  even  if  an 
unpopular  Austrian  archduke,  significantly  un- 
guarded by  the  Austrian  police,  had  not  been 
most  opportunely  murdered  by  an  Austrian 
subject  on  Austrian  territory.  The  murder  was 
only  a  pretext.  The  real  cause  of  the  war  was 
the  resolution  of  Germany  to  strike  for  world- 
supremacy,  and  her  belief  that  the  time  was 
favourable  for  the  great  adventure. 

Meanwhile,  what  had  the  threatened  empires 


264  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

been  doing  during  the  years  of  strenuous  German 
preparation  which  began  in  1911  ?  Their  govern- 
ments could  not  but  be  aware  of  the  enormous 
activity  which  was  taking  place  in  that  comitry — 
which  was  unthreatened  on  any  side — though  they 
probably  did  not  know  how  thorough  and  how 
elaborate  it  was.  What  steps  did  they  take  to 
guard  against  the  danger  ?  Russia  was  busy  con- 
structing strategic  railways,  to  make  the  move- 
ment of  troops  easier ;  she  was  erecting  new 
munition  factories.  But  neither  could  be  quickly 
got  ready.  France  imposed  upon  the  whole  of 
her  manhood  the  obhgation  of  serving  for  three 
instead  of  for  two  years  in  the  army.  Britain 
reorganised  her  small  professional  army,  created 
the  Territorial  Force,  and  began  the  training  of  a 
large  officer  class  in  all  the  universities  and  public 
schools.  But  she  did  not  attempt  to  create  a 
national  army.  If  she  had  done  so,  this  would 
have  been  a  signal  for  the  precipitation  of  the 
war.  Besides,  Britain  obstinately  clung  to  the 
behef  that  so  monstrous  a  crime  as  Germany 
seemed  to  be  contemplatmg  could  never  be  com- 
mitted by  a  civihsed  nation;  and  she  trusted 
mainly  to  her  fleet  for  her  own  security. 

But  Britain  unquestionably  laboured  with  all 
her  might  to  conjure  away  the  nightmare.  From 
1906  onwards  she  had  made,  in  vain,  repeated 
attempts  to  persuade  Germany  to  accept  a 
mutual  disarmament  or  retardation  of  naval 
construction.  In  1912  she  resolved  upon  a  more 
definite  step.     The  German  newspapers  were  full 


THE  GREAT  CHALLENGE  265 

of  talk  about  the  British  pohcy  of  '  encircling ' 
Germany  in  order  to  attack  and  destroy  her, 
which  they  attributed  mainly  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. 
It  was  a  manifest  absurdity,  since  the  Franco- 
Russian  alliance  was  formed  m  1894,  at  a  time 
when  Britain  was  on  bad  terms  with  both  France 
and  Russia,  and  the  agreements  later  made  with 
these  two  countries  were  wholly  devoted  to 
removing  old  causes  of  dispute  between  them. 
But  the  German  people  obviously  believed  it. 
Perhaps  the  German  government  also  beheved 
it  ?  Britain  resolved  to  remove  this  apprehen- 
sion. Accordingly  in  1912  Lord  Haldane  was 
sent  to  Germany  with  a  formal  and  definite 
statement,  authorised  by  the  Cabinet,  to  the 
effect  that  Britain  had  made  no  alliance  or  under- 
standing which  was  aimed  against  Germany,  and 
had  no  intention  of  doing  so.  That  being  so, 
since  Germany  need  have  no  fear  of  an  attack 
from  Britain,  why  should  not  the  two  powers 
agree  to  reduce  their  naval  expenditure  ?  The 
German  reply  was  that  to  stop  the  naval  pro- 
gramme was  impossible,  but  that  construction 
might  be  delayed,  on  one  condition — that  both 
powers  should  sign  a  formal  agreement  drawn 
up  by  Germany.  Each  power  was  to  pledge 
itself  to  absolute  neutrality  in  any  Em-opean  war 
in  which  the  other  was  engaged.  Each  power 
was  to  undertake  to  make  no  new  alliances.  But 
this  agreement  was  not  to  affect  existing  alliances 
or  the  duties  arising  under  them.  This  proposal 
was  an  obvious  trap,  and  the  German  ministers 


266  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

who  proposed  it  must  have  had  the  poorest 
opinion  of  the  intelhgence  of  EngHsh  statesmen 
if  they  thought  it  was  likely  to  be  accepted.  For 
observe  that  it  left  Germany,  in  conj miction 
with  Austria,  free  to  attack  France  and  Russia. 
It  left  the  formidable  Triple  Alliance  unimpaired. 
But  it  tied  the  hands  of  Britain,  who  had  no 
existing  European  aUiances,  enforced  neutrality 
upon  her  in  such  a  war,  and  compelled  her  to 
look  on  idly  and  wait  her  turn.  In  the  present 
war,  Germany  could  have  pleaded  that  she  was 
bound  to  take  part  by  the  terms  of  her  alliance 
with  Austria,  who  began  it ;  but  Britain  would 
have  been  compelled  to  stand  aloof.  A  very 
convenient  arrangement  for  Germany,  but  not 
an  arrangement  that  promised  weU  for  the  peace 
of  the  world  ! 

Even  this  rebuff  did  not  dishearten  Britain. 
Feeling  that  Germany  might  have  some  reason- 
able ground  of  complaint  in  the  fact  that  her 
share  of  the  extra-European  world  was  so  much 
less  than  that  of  France  or  of  Britain  herself, 
Britain  attempted  to  come  to  an  agreement  on 
this  head,  such  as  would  show  that  she  had  no 
desire  to  prevent  the  imperial  expansion  of 
Germany.  A  treaty  was  proposed  and  discussed, 
and  was  ready  to  be  submitted  to  the  proper 
authorities  for  confirmation  in  June  1914.  It  has 
never  been  made  public,  because  the  war  cancelled 
it  before  it  came  into  effect,  and  we  do  not  know 
its  terms.  But  we  do  know  that  the  German 
colonial  enthusiast,  Paul  Rohrbach,  who  has  seen 


THE  GREAT  CHALLENGE  267 

the  draft  treaty,  has  said  that  the  concessions 
made  by  Britain  were  astonishingly  extensive, 
and  met  every  reasonable  German  demand.  This 
sounds  as  if  the  proposals  of  the  treaty,  whatever 
they  were,  had  been  recklessly  generous.  But 
this  much  is  clear,  that  the  government  which 
had  this  treaty  in  its  possession  when  it  forced 
on  the  war  was  not  to  be  easily  satisfied.  It  did 
not  want  merely  external  possessions.  It  wanted 
supremacy ;  it  wanted  world-dominion. 

One  last  attempt  the  British  government  made 
in  the  frenzied  days  of  negotiation  which  preceded 
the  war.  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  begged  the 
German  government  to  make  any  proposal  which 
would  make  for  peace,  and  promised  his  support 
beforehand  ;  he  had  received  no  reply.  He  had 
undertaken  that  if  Germany  made  any  reason- 
able proposal,  and  France  or  Russia  objected,  he 
would  have  nothing  further  to  do  with  France  or 
Russia.  Still  there  was  no  reply.  Imagining 
that  Germany  might  stiU  be  haunted  by  what 
Bismarck  called  '  the  nightmare  of  coalition,'  and 
might  be  rushing  into  war  now  because  she 
feared  a  war  in  the  future  under  more  unfavour- 
able conditions,  he  had  pledged  himself,  if  Ger- 
many would  only  say  the  word  which  would 
secure  the  peace,  to  use  every  effort  to  bring 
about  a  general  understanding  among  the  great 
powers  which  would  banish  all  fears  of  an  anti- 
German  combination.  It  was  of  no  use.  The 
reply  was  the  suggestion  that  Britain  should  bind 
herself  to  neutrality  in  this  war  on  the  following 


268  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

conditions :  (a)  that  Germany  should  be  given  a 
free  hand  to  violate  the  neutrahty  of  Belgium 
(which  Britain  was  bomid  by  treaty  to  defend), 
on  the  understandmg  that  Belgium  should  be 
remstated  after  she  had  served  her  purpose,  if 
she  had  offered  no  resistance ;  Belgium,  be  it 
noted,  being  bound  in  honour  to  offer  resistance 
by  the  very  treaty  which  Germany  proposed  to 
violate ;  and  (b)  that  after  France  had  been 
humiliated  and  beaten  to  the  earth  for  the  crime 
of  possessing  territories  which  Germany  coveted, 
she  should  be  restored  to  independence,  and 
Germany  should  be  content  to  amiex  her  5,000,000 
square  miles  of  colonies.  In  return  for  this 
undertaking  Britam  was  to  be — allowed  to  hold 
aloof  from  the  war,  and  await  her  turn. 

There  is  no  getting  over  these  facts.  The  aim 
of  Germany  had  come  to  be  nothing  less  than 
world-supremacy.  The  destiny  of  the  whole  globe 
was  to  be  put  to  the  test.  Surely  this  was  the 
very  insanity  of  megalomania. 


I 


X 

WHAl^  OF  THE  NIGHT  ? 

The  gigantic  conflict  into  which  the  ambitions 
of  Germany  have  phmged  the  world  is  the  most 
tremendous  event  in  human  history,  not  merely 
because  of  the  vast  forces  engaged,  and  the 
appalling  volume  of  suffering  which  has  resulted 
from  it,  but  still  more  because  of  the  magnitude 
of  the  principles  for  which  it  is  being  fought.  It 
is  a  war  to  secure  the  right  of  communities  which 
are  linked  together  by  the  national  spirit  to 
determine  their  own  destinies ;  it  is  a  war  to 
maintain  the  principles  of  humanity,  the  sanctity 
of  formal  undertakings  between  states,  and  the 
possibility  of  the  co-operation  of  free  peoples  in 
the  creation  of  a  new  and  better  world-order ;  it 
is  a  war  between  two  principles  of  government, 
the  principle  of  military  autocracy  and  the 
principle  of  self-government.  With  all  these 
aspects  of  the  mighty  struggle  we  are  not  here 
immediately  concerned,  though  they  have  an 
intimate  bearing  upon  our  main  theme :  some  of 
them  have  been  analysed  elsewhere.^  But  what 
does  concern  us  most  directly,  and  what  makes  this 
war  the  culmination  of  the  long  story  which  we 

^  In    Nationalism    and    Internationalism,    and    in    National    Self- 
Oovernment. 

269 


270  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

have  endeavoured  to  survey,  is  that  this  is  a  war 
in  which,  as  in  no  earher  war,  the  whole  fate  and 
future  of  the  now  unified  world  is  at  stake.  For 
just  because  the  world  is  now,  as  never  before, 
an  indissoluble  economic  and  political  unity,  the 
challenge  of  Germany,  whatever  view  we  m.ay 
take  of  the  immediate  aims  of  the  German  state, 
inevitably  raises  the  whole  question  of  the  principles 
upon  which  this  unified  world,  unified  by  the 
victory  of  European  civilisation,  is  to  be  in  future 
directed.  And  the  whole  world  knows,  if  vaguety, 
that  these  vast  issues  are  at  stake,  and  that  this 
is  no  merely  European  conflict.  That  is  why  we 
see  arrayed  upon  the  fields  of  battle  not  only 
French,  British,  Russian,  Italian,  Serbian,  Belgian, 
Rumanian,  Greek  and  Portuguese  soldiers,  but 
Canadians,  Australians,  New  Zealanders,  South 
Africans,  Indians,  Algerians,  Senegalese,  Cam- 
bodians ;  and  now,  alongside  of  all  these,  the 
citizens  of  the  American  Republic.  That  is  why 
Brazil  and  other  states  are  hovering  on  the  edge 
of  the  fray  ;  whj^  Japanese  ships  are  helping  to 
patrol  the  Mediterranean,  why  Arab  armies  are 
driving  the  Turk  from  the  holy  places  of  Mahome- 
danism,  why  African  tribesmen  are  enrolled  in 
new  levies  to  clear  the  enemy  out  of  his  footholds 
in  that  continent.  Almost  the  whole  world  is 
arrayed  against  the  outlaw-power  and  her  vassals. 
And  the  ultimate  reason  for  this  is  that  the  whole 
world  is  concerned  to  see  this  terrible  debate 
rightly  determined. 

For  the  issue  is  as  simple  as  this.     Now  that 


WHAT  OF  THE  NIGHT  ?  271 

the  world  has  been  made  one  by  the  victory  of 
Western  civiUsation,  in  what  spirit  is  that  supre- 
macy to  be  used  ?  Is  it  to  be  in  the  spirit  expressed 
in  the  German  Doctrine  of  Power,  the  spirit  of 
mere  dominion,  ruthlessly  imposed  and  ruthlessly 
exploited  for  the  sole  advantage  of  the  master- 
power  ?  That  way  ruin  lies.  Or  is  it  to  be  in  the 
spirit  which  has  on  the  whole,  and  in  spite  of 
lapses,  guided  the  progress  of  Western  civilisation 
in  the  past,  the  spirit  of  respect  for  law  and  for 
the  rights  of  the  weak,  the  spirit  of  liberty  which 
rejoices  in  variety  of  type  and  method,  and  which 
believes  that  the  destiny  towards  which  all  peoples 
should  be  guided  is  that  of  self-government  in 
freedom,  and  the  co-operation  of  free  peoples  in 
the  maintenance  of  common  interests  ?  Britain, 
France,  and  America  have  been  the  great  advocates 
and  exponents  of  these  principles  in  the  govern- 
ment of  their  own  states  :  they  are  all  ranged  on 
one  side  to-day.  Britain,  also,  as  we  have  tried 
to  show,  has  been  led  by  Fate  to  take  a  chief  part 
in  the  extension  of  these  principles  of  Western 
civilisation  to  the  non-European  regions  of  the 
world ;  and,  after  many  mistakes  and  failures, 
has  in  the  direction  of  her  own  wide  dominions 
found  her  way  to  a  system  which  reconciles 
freedom  with  unity,  and  learned  to  regard  herself 
as  being  only  the  trustee  of  civilisation  in  the 
government  of  the  backward  peoples  whom  she 
rules.  For  the  just  and  final  determination  of 
such  gigantic  issues  not  even  the  terrible  price  we 
are  paying  is  too  high. 


272  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

The  issue  of  the  great  conflict  hes  still  upon  the 
lap  of  the  gods.  Yet  one  thing  is,  we  may  hope, 
already  assured.  Although  at  the  beginning  of 
the  war  they  came  near  to  winning  it,  the  Ger- 
mans are  not  now  likely  to  win  that  complete 
victory  upon  which  they  had  calculated,  and 
which  would  have  brought  as  its  prize  the  mastery 
of  the  world.  We  can  now  form  some  judgment 
of  the  extent  of  the  calamity  which  this  would 
have  meant  for  humanity.  There  would  have 
remained  in  the  world  no  power  capable  of  re- 
sisting this  grim  and  ugly  tyrant-state,  with  its 
brute  strength  and  bestial  cruelty  as  of  a  gorilla 
in  the  primaeval  forest,  reinforced  by  the  cold 
and  pitiless  calculus  of  the  man  of  science  in  his 
laboratory ;  unless,  perhaps,  Russia  ha,d  in  time 
recovered  her  strength,  or  unless  America  had  not 
merely  thrown  over  her  tradition  of  aloofness 
and  made  up  her  mind  to  intervene,  but  had 
been  allowed  the  time  to  organise  her  forces  for 
resistance.  Of  the  great  empires  which  the 
modern  age  has  brought  into  being,  the  Russian 
would  have  survived  as  a  helpless  and  blinded 
mammoth ;  the  French  Empire  would  have 
vanished,  and  the  proud  and  noble  land  of  France 
would  have  sunk  into  vassalage  and  despair ;  the 
British  Empire  would  assuredly  have  dissolved 
into  its  component  parts,  for  its  strength  is  still 
too  much  concentrated  in  the  motherland  for  it 
to  be  able  to  hold  together  once  her  power  was 
broken.  After  a  few  generations,  that  will  no 
longer  b^  the  case  ;    but  to-day  it  is  so,  and  the 


WHAT  OF  THE  NIGHT  ?  273 

dream  of  a  partnership  of  free  nations  which  had 
begun  to  dawn  upon  us  would  have  been  shattered 
for  ever  by  a  complete  German  victory.  Some 
of  the  atoms  of  what  once  was  an  empire  might 
have  been  left  in  freedom,  but  they  would  have 
been  powerless  to  resist  the  decrees  of  the  Master- 
state.  There  would  have  been  one  supreme  world- 
power  ;  and  that  a  power  whose  attitude  towards 
backward  races  has  been  illustrated  by  the 
ruthless  massacre  of  the  Hereros  ;  whose  attitude 
towards  ancient  but  disorganised  civihsations  has 
been  illustrated  by  the  history  of  Kiao-chau  and 
by  the  celebrated  allocution  of  the  Kaiser  to  his 
soldiers  on  the  eve  of  the  Boxer  expedition,  when 
he  bade  them  outdo  the  ferocity  of  Attila  and 
his  Huns  ;  whose  attitude  towards  kindred  civihsa- 
tions on  the  same  level  as  their  own  has  been 
illustrated  before  the  war  in  the  treatment  of 
Danes,  Poles,  and  Alsatians,  and  during  the  war 
in  the  treatment  of  Belgium,  of  the  occupied 
districts  in  France,  of  Poland  and  of  Serbia.  The 
world  would  have  lain  at  the  mercy  of  an  insolent 
and  ruthless  t3n:anny,  the  tyranny  of  a  Kultur 
whose  ideal  is  the  uniformity  of  a  perfect  mechan- 
ism, not  the  variety  of  hfe.  Such  a  fate  humanity 
could  not  long  have  tolerated  ;  yet  before  the 
iron  mechanism  could  have  been  shattered,  if 
once  it  had  been  established,  there  must  have 
been  inconceivable  suffering,  and  civihsation  must 
have  fallen  back  many  stages  towards  barbarism. 
From  this  fate,  we  may  perhaps  claim,  the  world 
was  saved  from  the  moment  when  not  Britain 


274  THE  EXPANSION  OE  EUROPE 

only,  but  the  British  Empire,  refused  to  await 
its  turn  according  to  the  German  plan,  threw  its 
whole  weight  into  the  scale,  and  showed  that, 
though  not  organised  for  war,  it  was  not  the 
effete  and  decadent  power,  not  the  fortuitous 
combination  of  discordant  and  incoherent  ele- 
ments, which  German  theory  had  supposed ; 
but  that  Freedom  can  create  a  unity  and  a 
virile  strength  capable  of  withstanding  even 
the  most  rigid  discipline,  capable  of  enduring 
defeat  and  disappointment  undismayed ;  but 
incapable  of  yielding  to  the  msolence  of  brute 
force. 

It  is  still  possible  that  the  war  may  end  in 
what  is  called  an  inconclusive  peace ;  and  as  it 
is  certain  that  of  all  her  unrighteous  gains  that 
to  which  Germany  will  most  desperately  cling 
will  be  her  domination  over  the  Austrian  and 
Turkish  Empires,  with  the  prospect  which  it 
affords  of  a  later  and  more  fortunate  attempt  at 
world-power,  an  inconclusive  peace  would  mean 
that  the  whole  world  would  live  in  constant 
dread  of  a  renewal  of  these  agonies  and  horrors 
in  a  stiU  more  awful  form.  What  the  effect  of 
this  would  be  upon  the  extra-European  dominions 
of  powers  which  would  be  dramed  of  their  man- 
hood and  loaded  with  the  burden  of  the  past 
war  and  the  burden  of  preparation  for  the  coming 
war,  it  is  beyond  our  power  to  imagine.  But  it 
seems  hkely  that  the  outer  world  would  very 
swiftly  begin  to  revise  its  judgment  as  to  the 
value  of  that  civilisation  which  it  has,  upon  the 


WPIAT  OF  THE  NIGHT  ?  275 

whole,  been  ready  to  welcome  ;   and  chaos  would 
soon  come  again. 

Finally,  it  is  possible  that  the  Evil  Power  may 
be  utterly  routed,  and  the  allied  empires,  tried 
by  fire,  may  be  given  the  opportunity  and  the 
obligation  of  making,  not  merely  a  new  Europe, 
but  a  new  world.  If  that  chance  should  come, 
how  will  they  use  it  ?  One  thing  at  least  is  clear. 
The  task  which  will  face  the  diplomats  who  take 
part  in  the  coming  peace-congress  will  be  differ- 
ent in  kind  as  well  as  in  degree  from  that  of  any 
of  their  predecessors  at  any  moment  in  human 
history.  They  will  be  concerned  not  merely  with 
the  adjustment  of  the  differences  of  a  few  leading 
states,  and  not  merely  with  the  settlement  of 
Europe  :  they  will  have  to  deal  with  the  whole 
world,  and  to  decide  upon  what  principles  and  to 
what  ends  the  leadership  of  the  peoples  of  Euro- 
pean stock  over  the  non-European  world  is  to 
be  exercised.  Whether  they  realise  it  or  not, 
whether  they  intend  it  or  not,  they  will  create 
either  a  world-order  or  a  world-disorder.  And 
it  will  inevitably  be  a  world-disorder  which  will 
result  unless  we  do  some  hard  thinking  on  this 
gigantic  problem  which  faces  us,  and  unless  we  are 
prepared  to  learn,  from  the  history  of  the  relations 
of  Europe  with  the  outer  world,  what  are  the 
principles  by  which  we  ought  to  be  guided.  We 
are  too  prone,  when  we  think  of  the  problems  of 
the  future  peace,  to  fix  our  attention  almost 
wholly  upon  Europe,  and,  if  we  think  of  the  noji- 
European  world  at  all,  to  assume  either  that  the 


276  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

problem  is  merely  one  of  power,  or  that  the 
principles  which  will  guide  us  in  the  settlement  of 
Euroj)e  can  be  equally  applied  outside  of  Europe. 
Both  of  these  assumptions  are  dangerous,  because 
both  disregard  the  teachings  of  the  past  which  we 
have  been  surveying. 

If,  on  the  one  hand,  we  are  content  to  regard  the 
problem  as  merely  one  of  power,  and  to  divide  out 
the  non-European  world  among  the  victors  as  the 
spoils  of  victory,  we  shall  indeed  have  been  con- 
quered by  the  very  spirit  which  we  are  fighting  ; 
we  shall  have  become  converts  to  the  German 
Doctrine  of  Power,  which  has  brought  upon  us  all 
these  ills,  and  may  bring  yet  more  appalling  evils 
in  the  future.  The  world  will  emerge  divided 
among  a  group  of  vast  empires  which  will  over- 
shadow the  lesser  states.  These  empires  will 
continue  to  regard  one  another  with  fear  and 
suspicion,  and  to  look  upon  their  subject-peoples 
merely  as  providing  the  implements  for  a  war  of 
destruction,  to  be  waged  by  cut-throat  commercial 
rivalry  in  time  of  peace,  and  by  man-power  and 
machine-power  in  war.  If  that  should  be  the 
result  of  all  our  agonies,  the  burden  which  must  be 
laid  upon  the  peoples  of  these  empires,  and  the 
intolerable  anticipation  of  what  is  to  come,  will 
make  their  yoke  seem  indeed  a  heavy  one ;  will 
probably  bring  about  their  disintegration ;  and 
will  end  that  ascendancy  of  Western  civilisation 
over  the  world  which  the  last  four  centuries  have 
established.  And  justly;  since  Western  civilisa- 
tion will  thus  be  made  to  stand  not  for  justice  and 


WHAT  OF  THE  NIGHT  ?  277 

liberty,  but  for  injustice  and  oppression.  Such 
must  be  the  inevitable  result  of  any  settlement  of 
the  non-European  world  which  is  guided  merely  by 
the  ambitions  of  a  few  rival  states  and  the  Doctrine 
of  Power. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  are  urged  by  enthusiasts 
for  liberty,  especially  in  Russia,  to  believe  that 
imperialism  as  such  is  the  enemy  ;    that  we  must 
put  an  end  for  ever  to  all  dominion  exercised  by 
one  people  over  another ;    and  that  outside  of 
Europe  as  within  it  we  must  trust  to  the  same 
principles    for    the    hope    of    future    peace — the 
principles  of  national  freedom  and  self-government 
— and   leave   all  peoples   everywhere   to   control 
freely  their  own  destinies.     But  this  is  a  misread- 
ing of  the  facts  as  fatal  as  the  other.     It  disregards 
the  value  of  the  work  that  has  been  done  in  the 
extension  of  European  civilisation  to  the  rest  of  the 
world  by  the  imperial  activities  of  the  European 
peoples.     It  fails  to  recognise  that  until  Europe 
began  to  conquer  the  world  neither  rational  law 
nor  political  liberty  had  ever  in  any  real  sense 
existed  in  the  outer  world,  and  that  their  dominion 
is  even  now  far  from  assured,  but  depends  for  its 
maintenance  upon  the  continued  tutelage  of  the 
European  peoples.     It  fails  to  realise  that  the 
economic  demands  of  the  modern  world  necessitate 
the  maintenance  of  civilised  administration  after 
the  Western  pattern,  and  that  this  can  only  be 
assured,  in  large  regions  of  the  earth,  by  means  of 
the  political  control  of  European  peoples.     Above 
all  this  view  does  not  grasp  the  essential  fact  that 


278  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

the  idea  of  nationhood  and  the  idea  of  self-govern- 
ment are  both  modern  ideas,  which  have  had  their 
origin  in  Europe,  and  which  can  only  be  realised 
among  peoples  of  a  high  political  development ; 
that  the  sense  of  nationhood  is  but  slowly  created, 
and  must  not  be  arbitrarily  defined  in  terms  of  race 
or  language ;  and  that  the  capacity  for  self-govern- 
ment is  only  formed  by  a  long  process  of  training, 
and  has  never  existed  except  among  peoples  who 
were  unified  by  a  strongly  felt  community  of  sen- 
timent, and  had  acquired  the  habit  and  instinct 
of  loyalty  to  the  law.  Assuredly  it  is  the  duty 
of  Europe  and  America  to  extend  these  fruitful 
conceptions  to  the  regions  which  have  passed 
under  their  influence.  But  the  process  must  be 
a  very  slow  one,  and  it  can  only  be  achieved 
under  tutelage.  It  is  the  control  of  the  European 
peoples  over  the  non-European  world  which  has 
turned  the  world  into  an  economic  unit,  brought 
it  within  a  single  political  system,  and  opened  to 
us  the  possibility  of  making  a  world-order  such  as 
the  most  daring  dreamers  of  the  past  could  never 
have  conceived.  This  control  cannot  be  suddenly 
withdrawn.  For  a  very  long  time  to  come  the 
world-states  whose  rise  we  have  traced  must 
continue  to  be  the  means  by  which  the  political 
discoveries  of  Europe,  as  well  as  her  material 
civilisation,  are  made  available  for  the  rest  of  the 
world.  The  world-states  are  such  recent  things 
that  we  have  not  yet  found  a  place  for  them 
in  our  political  philosophy.  But  unless  we  find 
a  place  for  them,  and  think  in  terms  of  them,  in 


WHAT  OF  THE  NIGHT  ?  279 

the  future,  we  shall  be  in  danger  of  a  terrible  ship- 
wreck. 

If,  then,  it  is  essential,  not  only  for  the  economic 
development  of  the  world,  but  for  the  political 
advancement  of  its  more  backward  peoples,  that 
the  political  suzerainty  of  the  European  peoples 
should  survive,  and  as  a  consequence  that  the 
world  should  continue  to  be  dominated  by  a  group 
of  great  world-states,  how  are  we  to  conjure  away 
the  nightmare  of  inter-imperial  rivalry  which  has 
brought  upon  us  the  present  catastrophe,  and 
seems  to  threaten  us  with  yet  more  appalling  ruin 
in  the  future  ?  Only  by  resolving  and  ensuring, 
as  at  the  great  settlement  we  may  be  able  to  do, 
that  the  necessary  political  control  of  Europe  over 
the  outer  world  shall  in  future  be  exercised  not 
merely  in  the  interests  of  the  mistress-states,  but 
in  accordance  with  principles  which  are  just  in 
themselves,  and  which  will  give  to  all  peoples  a 
fair  chance  of  making  the  best  use  of  their  powers. 
But  how  are  we  to  discover  these  principles,  if  the 
ideas  of  nationality  and  self-government,  to  which 
we  pin  our  faith  in  Europe,  are  to  be  held  in- 
applicable to  the  greater  part  of  the  non-European 
world  ?  There  is  only  one  possible  source  of 
instruction  :  our  past  experience,  which  has  now 
extended  over  four  centuries,  and  which  we  have 
in  this  book  endeavoured  to  survey. 

Now  while  it  is  mideniably  true  that  the  mere 
lust  of  power  has  always  been  present  in  the 
imperial  activities  of  the  European  peoples,  it  is 
certainly  untrue    (as   our   study  ought   to    have 


280  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

shown)  that  it  has  ever  been  the  sole  motive, 
except,  perhaps,  in  the  great  German  challenge. 
And  in  the  course  of  their  experience  the  colonis- 
ing peoples  have  gradually  worked  out  certain 
principles  in  their  treatment  of  subject  peoples, 
v/liich  ought  to  be  of  use  to  us.  The  fullest  and 
the  most  varied  experience  is  that  of  the  British 
Empire  :  it  is  the  oldest  of  all  the  world-states  ; 
it  alone  includes  regions  of  the  utmost  variety  of 
types,  new  lands  peopled  by  European  settlers, 
realms  of  ancient  civilisation  like  India,  and  regions 
inhabited  by  backward  and  primitive  peoples. 
It  would  be  absurd  to  claim  that  its  methods  are 
perfect  and  infallible.  But  they  have  been  very 
varied,  and  quite  astonishingly  successful.  And 
it  is  because  they  seem  to  afiord  clearer  guidance 
than  any  other  part  of  the  experiments  which 
we  have  recorded  that  we  have  studied  them, 
especially  in  their  later  developments,  with  what 
may  have  seemed  a  disproportionate  fulness. 
What  are  the  principles  which  experience  has 
gradually  worked  out  in  the  British  Empire  ? 
They  cannot  be  embodied  in  a  single  formula, 
because  they  vary  according  to  the  condition 
and  development  of  the  lands  to  which  they  apply. 
But  in  the  first  place  we  have  learnt  by  a  very 
long  experience  that  in  lands  inhabited  by  European 
settlers,  who  bring  with  them  European  traditions, 
the  only  satisfactory  solution  is  to  be  found  in  the 
concession  of  the  fullest  self-governing  rights,  since 
these  settlers  are  able  to  use  them,  and  in  the 
encouragement  of  that  sentiment  of  unity  which 


WHAT  OF  THE  NIGHT  ?  281 

we  call  the  national  spirit.  And  this  involves  a 
recognition  of  the  fact  that  nationality  is  never  to 
be  defined  solely  in  terms  of  race  or  language, 
but  can  arise,  and  should  be  encouraged  to  arise, 
among  racially  divided  communities  such  as 
Canada  and  South  Africa.  Any  attempt  to  in- 
terpret nationhood  in  terms  of  race  is  not  merely 
dangerous,  but  ruinous ;  and  such  endeavours  to 
stimulate  or  accentuate  racial  conflict,  as  Germany 
has  been  guilty  of  in  Brazil,  in  South  Africa,  and 
even  in  America,  must  be,  if  successful,  fatal  to 
the  progress  of  the  countries  affected,  and  danger- 
ous to  the  peace  of  the  world. 

In  the  second  place  we  have  learnt  that  in  lands 
of  ancient  civilisation,  where  ruling  castes  have  for 
centuries  been  in  the  habit  of  exploiting  their 
subjects,  the  supreme  gift  which  Europe  can  offer 
is  that  of  internal  peace  and  a  firmly  administered 
and  equal  law,  which  wiU  render  possible  the 
gradual  rise  of  a  sense  of  unity,  and  the  gradual 
training  of  the  people  in  the  habits  of  life 
that  make  self-government  possible.  How  soon 
national  unity  can  be  established,  or  self-govern- 
ment made  practicable  in  any  full  sense,  must  be 
matter  of  debate.  But  the  creation  of  these 
things  is,  or  ought  to  be,  the  ultimate  aim  of 
European  government  in  such  countries.  And 
in  the  meantime,  and  until  they  become  fully 
masters  of  their  own  fate,  these  lands,  so  our 
British  experience  tells  us,  ought  to  be  treated 
as  distinct  political  units  ;  they  should  pay  no 
tribute  ;    all  their  resources  should  be  devoted  to 


282  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

their  own  development ;  and  they  should  not  be 
expected  or  required  to  maintain  larger  forces  than 
are  necessary  for  their  own  defence.  At  the  same 
time,  the  ruling  power  should  claim  no  special 
privileges  for  its  own  citizens,  but  should  throw 
open  the  markets  of  such  realms  equally  to  all 
nations.  In  short  it  should  act  not  as  a  master, 
but  as  a  trustee,  on  behalf  of  its  subjects  and  also 
on  behalf  of  civilisation. 

In  the  third  place  we  have  learnt  that  in  the 
backward  regions  of  the  earth  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
ruling  power,  firstly,  to  protect  its  primitive  sub- 
jects from  unscrupulous  exploitation,  to  guard  their 
simple  customs,  proscribing  only  those  which  are 
immoral,  and  to  afford  them  the  means  of  a  gradual 
emancipation  from  barbarism ;  secondly,  to  develop 
the  economic  resources  of  these  regions  for  the 
needs  of  the  industrial  world,  to  open  them  up 
by  modern  communications,  and  to  make  them 
available  on  equal  terms  to  all  nations,  giving  no 
advantage  to  its  own  citizens. 

In  spite  of  lapses  and  defects,  it  is  an  undeniable 
historical  fact  that  these  are  the  principles  which 
have  been  wrought  out  and  applied  in  the  admini- 
stration of  the  British  Empire  during  the  nine- 
teenth century.  They  are  not  vague  and  Utopian 
dreams  ;  they  are  a  matter  of  daily  practice.  If 
they  can  be  applied  by  one  of  the  world-states, 
and  that  the  greatest,  why  should  they  not  be 
applied  by  the  rest  ?  But  if  these  principles 
became  universal,  is  it  not  apparent  that  aU  danger 
of  a  catastrophic  war  between  these  powers  would 


WHAT  OF  THE  NIGHT  ?  283 

be  removed,  since  every  reason  for  it  would  have 
vanished  ?  Thus  the  necessary  and  advantageous 
tutelage  of  Europe  over  the  non-European  world, 
and  the  continuance  of  the  great  world-states, 
could  be  combined  with  the  conjuring  away  of  the 
ever-present  terror  of  war,  and  with  the  gradual 
training  of  the  non-European  peoples  to  enjoy  the 
political  methods  of  Europe  ;  while  the  lesser 
states  without  extra-European  dominions  need  no 
longer  feel  themselves  stunted  and  reduced  to 
economic  dependence  upon  their  great  neighbours. 
Thus,  and  thus  alone,  can  the  benefits  of  the  long 
development  which  we  have  traced  be  reaped  in 
full ;  thus  alone  can  the  dominion  of  the  European 
peoples  over  the  world  be  made  to  mean  justice 
and  the  chance  for  all  peoples  to  make  the  best  of 
their  powers. 

But  it  is  not  only  the  principles  upon  which 
particular  areas  outside  of  Europe  should  be 
governed  which  we  must  consider.  We  must 
reflect  also  upon  the  nature  of  the  relations  that 
should  exist  between  the  various  members  of 
these  great  world-empires,  which  must  hence- 
forward be  the  dominating  factors  in  the  world's 
politics.  And  here  the  problem  is  urgent  only  in 
the  case  of  the  British  Empire,  because  it  alone 
is  developed  to  such  a  point  that  the  problem  is 
inevitably  raised.  Whatever  else  may  happen, 
the  war  must  necessarily  bring  a  crisis  in  the 
history  of  the  British  Empire.  On  a  vastly  greater 
scale  the  situation  of  1763  is  being  reproduced. 
Now,  as  then,  the  Empire  will  emerge  from  a  war 


284  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

for  existence,  in  which  mother  and  daughter  lands 
ahke  have  shared.  Now,  as  then,  the  strain  and 
pressure  of  the  war  will  have  brought  to  light 
deficiencies  in  the  system  of  the  Empire.  Now, 
as  then,  the  most  patent  of  these  deficiencies  will 
be  the  fact  that,  generous  as  the  self-governing 
powers  of  the  great  Dominions  have  been,  they 
still  have  limits  ;  and  the  irresistible  tendency  of 
self-government  to  work  towards  its  own  fulfil- 
ment will  once  more  show  itself.  For  there  are 
two  spheres  in  which  even  the  most  fully  self- 
governing  of  the  empire-nations  have  no  effective 
control :  they  do  not  share  in  the  determination 
of  foreign  policy,  and  they  do  not  share  in  the 
direction  of  imperial  defence.  The  responsibility 
for  foreign  policy,  and  the  responsibility,  and 
with  it  almost  the  whole  burden,  of  organising 
imperial  defence,  have  hitherto  rested  solely  with 
Britain.  Until  the  Great  War,  foreign  policy 
seemed  to  be  a  matter  of  purely  European  interest, 
not  directly  concerning  the  great  Dominions ;  nor 
did  the  problems  of  imperial  defence  appear  very 
pressing  or  urgent.  But  now  all  have  reahsed 
that  not  merely  their  interests,  but  their  very 
existence,  may  depend  upon  the  wise  conduct  of 
foreign  relations  ;  and  now  all  have  contributed 
the  whole  available  strength  of  their  manhood  to 
support  a  struggle  in  whose  direction  they  have 
had  no  effective  share.  These  things  must  hence- 
forth be  altered  ;  and  they  can  be  altered  only 
in  one  or  other  of  three  ways.  Either  the  great 
Dominions  will  become  independent  states,  as  the 


WHAT  OF  THE  NIGHT  ?  285 

American    colonies    did,    and    pui^sue    a    foreign 
policy  and  maintain  a  system  of  defence  of  their 
own ;    or  the  Empire  must  reshape  itself  as  a  sort 
of   permanent   offensive    and   defensive   alliance, 
whose  external  poHcy  and  modes  of  defence  will 
be   arranged  by  agreement ;    or  some  mode  of 
common  management  of  these  and  other  ques- 
tions must  be  devised.     The  first  of  these  solu- 
tions is  unlil^ely  to  be  adopted,  not  only  because 
the    component    members    of    the    Empire    are 
conscious  of  their  individual  weakness,  but  still 
more  because  the  memory  of  the  ordeal  through 
which  all  have  passed  must  form  an  indissoluble 
bond.     Yet  rashness  or  high-handedness  in  the 
treatment  of  the  great  issue  might  lead  even  to 
this  unlikely  result.     If  either  of  the  other  two 
solutions   is   adopted,  the  question  will  at  once 
arise  of  the  place  to  be  occupied,  in  the  league 
or   in  the   reorganised   super-state,   of   all   those 
innumerable  sections  of  the  Empire  which  do  not 
yet  enjoy,  and  some  of  which  may  never  enjoy, 
the  full  privileges  of  self-government ;   and  above 
all,  the  place  to  be  taken  by  the  vast  dominion  of 
India,  which  though  it  is  not,  and  may  not  for  a 
long  time  become,  a  fully  self-governing  state,  is 
yet  a  definite  and  vitally  important  unit  in  the 
Empu-e,  entitled  to  have  its  needs  and  problems  con- 
sidered, and  its  government  represented,  on  equal 
terms  with  the  rest.     The  problem  is  an  extra- 
ordinarily difficult  one  ;  perhaps  the  most  difficult 
political  problem  that  has  ever  faced  the  sons  of 
men.     But   it   is   essentially   the   same   problem 


286  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

which  has  continually  recurred  in  the  history  of 
British  imperialism,  though  it  now  presents  itself 
on  a  vastly  greater  scale,  and  in  a  far  more  com- 
plex form,  than  ever  before  :    it  is  the  problem 
of  reconcilmg  unity  with  liberty  and  variety  ;   of 
combining  nationality  and  self-government  with 
imperialism,    without    impairing    the    rights    of 
either.     And  beyond  any  doubt  the  most  tremend- 
ous and  fascinating  political  question  which  now 
awaits    solution    in    the   world,    is   the    question 
whether    the    political    instinct    of    the    British 
peoples,  and  the  genius  of  self-government,  will 
find  a  way  out  of  these  difficulties,  as  they  have 
found  a  way  out  of  so  many  others.     Patience, 
mutual  tolerance,  willingness  to  compromise,  will 
be  required  in  the  highest  measure  if  the  solution 
is  to  be  found  ;   but  these  are  the  quahties  which 
self-government  cultivates. 

'  A  thing  that  is  wholly  a  sham,'  said  Treitschke, 
speaking  of  the  British  Empire,  '  cannot  in  this 
world  of  ours,  endure  for  ever.'  Why  did  this 
Empire  appear  to  Treitschke  to  be  '  wholly  a 
sham '  ?  Was  it  not  because  it  did  not  answer 
to  any  definition  of  the  word  '  Empire '  to  be 
found  m  German  political  philosophy;  because 
it  did  not  mean  dominion  and  uniformity,  but 
liberty  and  variety ;  because  it  did  not  rest  upon 
Force,  as,  in  his  view,  every  firmly  established 
state  must  do ;  because  it  was  not  governed  by  a 
single  master,  whose  edicts  all  its  subjects  must 
obey  ?  But  for  '  a  thing  that  is  wholly  a  sham  ' 
men  do  not  lay  down  their  fives,  in  thousands  and 


WHAT  OF  THE  NIGHT  ?  287 

in  hundreds  of  thousands,  not  under  the  pressure 
of  compulsion,  but  by  a  willing  self-devotion  ; 
for  the  defence  of  '  a  thing  that  is  wholly  a 
sham  '  men  will  not  stream  in  from  all  the  ends 
of  the  earth,  abandoning  their  families  and  their 
careers,  and  offering  without  murmur  or  hesita- 
tion themselves  and  all  they  have  and  are.  There 
must  be  a  reality  in  the  thing  that  calls  forth 
such  sacrifices,  a  reality  of  the  kind  to  which 
RealpoUtik,  with  its  concentration  upon  purely 
material  concerns,  is  wholly  blind :  it  is  the 
reality  of  an  ideal  of  honour,  and  justice,  and 
freedom.  And  if  the  Germans  have  been  de- 
ceived in  their  calculations  of  RealpoUtik,  is  it  not 
perhaps  because  they  have  learnt  to  regard 
honour,  and  justice,  and  freedom  as  '  things  that 
are  wholly  shams  '  ? 

This  amazing  political  structure,  which  refuses 
to  fall  within  any  of  the  categories  of  political 
science,  which  is  an  empire  and  yet  not  an 
empire,  a  state  and  yet  not  a  state,  a  super- 
nation  incorporating  in  itself  an  incredible  variety 
of  peoples  and  races,  is  not  a  structure  which  has 
been  designed  by  the  ingenuity  of  man,  or  created 
by  the  purposive  action  of  a  government ;  it  is  a 
natural  growth,  the  product  of  the  spontaneous 
activity  of  innumerable  individuals  and  groups 
springing  from  among  peoples  whose  history  has 
made  liberty  and  the  tolerance  of  differences  their 
most  fundamental  instincts;  it  is  the  outcome  of 
a  series  of  accidents,  unforeseen,  but  turned  to 
advantage  by  the  unfailing  and  ever-new  resource- 


288  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

fulness  of  men  habituated  to  seK-go  v^ernment. 
There  is  no  logic  or  uniformity  in  its  system,  which 
has  arisen  from  an  mfinite  number  of  makeshifts 
and  tentative  experiments,  yet  in  all  of  these  a 
certain  consistency  appears,  because  they  have  been 
presided  over  by  the  genius  of  self-government. 
It  is  distributed  over  every  continent,  is  washed 
by  every  ocean,  includes  half  the  dust  of  islands 
that  Nature  has  scattered  about  the  seas  of  the 
v/orld,  controls  almost  all  the  main  avenues  of 
the  world's  sea-going  commerce,  and  is  linked 
together  by  ten  thousand  ships  perpetually  going 
to  and  fro.  Weak  for  offensive  purposes,  because 
its  resources  are  so  scattered,  it  is,  except  at  a 
few  points,  almost  impregnable  agamst  attack,  if 
its  forces  are  well  organised.  It  includes  among 
its  population  representatives  of  almost  every 
human  race  and  rehgion,  and  every  grade  of 
civihsation,  from  the  Australian  Bushman  to  the 
subtle  and  philosophic  Brahmin,  from  the  African 
dwarf  to  the  master  of  modern  industry  or  the 
scholar  of  universities.  Almost  every  form  of 
social  organisation  and  of  government  known  to 
man  is  represented  m  its  complex  and  many-hued 
fabric.  It  embodies  five  of  the  most  completely 
seK-governing  communities  which  the  world  has 
known,  and  four  of  these  control  the  future  of 
the  great  empty  spaces  that  remain  for  the 
settlement  of  white  men.  It  finds  place  for  the 
highly  organised  caste  system  by  which  the  teem- 
ing millions  of  India  are  held  together.  It  pre- 
serves the  simple  tribal  organisation  of  the  African 


WHAT  OF  THE  NIGHT  ?  289 

clans.  To  different  elements  among  its  subjects 
this  empire  appears  in  different  aspects.  To  the 
self-governmg  Dominions  it  is  a  brotherhood  of 
free  nations,  co-operating  for  the  defence  and 
diffusion  of  common  ideas  and  of  common  institu- 
tions. To  the  ancient  civihsations  of  India  or  of 
Egjrpt  it  is  a  power  which,  in  spite  of  all  its 
mistakes  and  hmitations,  has  brought  peace 
instead  of  turmoil,  law  instead  of  arbitrary 
might,  unity  mstead  of  chaos,  justice  instead  of 
oppression,  freedom  for  the  development  of  the 
capacities  and  characteristic  ideas  of  their  peoples, 
and  the  prospect  of  a  steady  growth  of  national 
unity  and  political  responsibility.  To  the  back- 
ward races  it  has  meant  the  suppression  of 
unending  slaughter,  the  disappearance  of  slavery, 
the  protection  of  the  rights  and  usages  of  primi- 
tive and  simple  folk  against  reckless  exploitation, 
and  the  chance  of  gradual  improvement  and 
emancipation  from  barbarism.  But  to  all  alike, 
to  one  quarter  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  world, 
it  has  meant  the  establishment  of  the  Reign  of 
Law,  and  of  the  Liberty  which  can  only  exist 
under  its  shelter.  In  some  degree,  though  im- 
perfectly as  yet,  it  has  reahsed  within  its  own 
body  all  the  three  great  political  ideas  of  the 
modern  world.  It  has  fostered  the  rise  of  a  sense 
of  nationhood  in  the  young  communities  of  the 
new  lands,  and  in  the  old  and  deca-ying  civilisa- 
tions of  the  most  ancient  historic  countries.  It 
has  given  a  freedom  of  development  to  self- 
government    such    as    history  has   never  before 


290  THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 

known.  And  by  linking  together  so  many 
diverse  and  contrasted  peoples  in  a  common 
peace,  it  has  already  realised,  for  a  quarter  of 
the  globe,  the  ideal  of  internationalism  on  a  scale 
undreamt  of  by  the  most  sanguine  prophets  of 
Europe. 

Truly  this  empire  is  a  fabric  so  wonderful,  so 
many-sided,  and  so  various  in  its  aspects,  that  it 
may  well  escape  the  rigid  categories  of  a  German 
professor,  and  seem  to  him  '  wholly  a  sham.' 
Now  is  the  crisis  of  its  fate  :  and  if  the  wisdom 
of  its  leaders  can  solve  the  riddle  of  the  Sphinx 
which  is  being  put  to  them,  the  Great  War  will 
indeed  have  brought,  for  a  quarter  of  the  world, 
the  culmination  of  modern  history. 


INDEX 


AsDUii  Hamid,  Sultan  of  Turkey, 
248. 

Abyssinia,  172,  173. 

Acadia  (Nova  Scotia),  French,  31 ; 
taken  by  English,  47,  49. 

Aden,  131,  132. 

Adowa,  battle,  172. 

Afghanistan,  87. 

Africa,  partition  of,  nineteenth- 
century  annexations  in,  160, 163- 
173,  201 ;  political-geographi- 
cal divisions  of,  162. 

See  also  South  Africa. 

Central,  British  annexation, 

171. 

East,    German    annexations 

in,  169,  184  ;  German  adminis- 
tration, 186,  187;  British, 
colonies  in,  201. 

North,  division  of,  80,  254. 

West,  French,  39  ;   German, 

168. 

South -West,     Germans     in, 

184,  194,  cruelty  of,  in  Herero 
war,  186,  188,  226. 

African  Association,  166. 

Agadir,  258. 

Albemarle,  Earl  of,  first,  41. 

Algegiras  Conference,  257,  258, 259. 

Algiers,  French  settlement  in,  80- 
82 ;  policy  in  Morocco,  254. 

AUeghanies,  the,  32. 

Alsace-Lorraine,  252. 

Amboyna,  Massacre  of,  26,  41. 

America,  Central,  Spanish  settle- 
ments in,  17  ;  decline  of  Spain 
in,  53,  93  ;  independence  of,  55  ; 
German  trade  in,  150 ;  the 
States'  claim  on,  240. 

North,     criminal     colonists, 

10, 11  ;  religious  refugee  settlers, 
11;  Dutch  settlers,  29;  Eng- 
lish settlers,  34,  42  ;  French 
settlers,  31,  39  ;    French  trade 


control,  49  ;  independence  of 
States,  54  ;  war  of  inde}>end- 
ence,  55-66,  98.  See  also  United 
States  and  Canada. 

America,  South,  Spanish  and 
Portuguese  settlers  in,  10,  17  ; 
decline  of  Spanish  and  Portu- 
guese power,  53,  93  ;  Dutch  con- 
quests, 28  ;  beneficial  effect  of 
Monroe  Doctrine,  55,  102  ; 
German  trade  in,  150  ;  German 
intrigues,  195  ;  the  States' 
claim  on,  240. 

Amsterdam,  25. 

Anaur  province,  89. 

Anglo-French  agreement,  173. 

Japanese  AHiance,  195,  239. 

Angola,  161. 

Annam,  83,  175. 

Antilles,  Leaser,  30. 

Arabi  Pasha,  208. 

Aracan,  108. 

Archangel,  route  to,  discovery,  21. 

Argentina,  93. 

Armada,  Grand,  22. 

Armenian  massacres  and  German 
pohtics,  248. 

Asia,  Central,  field  for  Victorian 
annexation,  160 ;  Russian 
menace,  173. 

Assam,  108. 

Australia,  discovery  of,  68  ;  cri- 
minal settlers,  11  ;  religious 
refugee  settlers,  11  ;  Dutch  in, 
28;  British  in,  108,  113,  114; 
self-government  in,  129. 

Austria,  constitution  of,  5  ;  race 
trouble  in  Hungary,  135  ;  Ger- 
man aim,  union  with,  246  ;  at- 
tempted colonisation,  46  ;  Bal- 
kan States  control,  aim  of,  157, 
250,  251  :  doom  of,  result  of 
Great  War,  251. 

Azores,  the,  17. 

291 


292 


THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 


Bagdad -Berlin,  railway,  project, 
174,  19G,  248,  251,  260,  263. 

Baker,  Sir  S.  W.,  161. 

Balboa,  14. 

Balkan  League,  250,  263. 

Balkans,  ware,  263  ;  German  aims 
in,  246,  249. 

Baltimore,  Lord,  36. 

Barbados,  37. 

Barbary,  corsairs,  81. 

Basutoland,  118,  215. 

Bechuanaland,  annexation  of, 
217,  222. 

Behaim,  Martin,  14. 

Belgium,  on  the  Congo,  166,  167, 
170 ;  neutrality  of,  pre-war 
negotiations,  268. 

Bengal,  British  rvile  established, 
52,  69  ;   land  question,  121. 

Berlin,  Conference  (1884-5),  170. 

Congress  (1875),  143. 

Bernhardi,  General,  249,  262. 

Bismarck  Archipelago,  178. 

Count    Otto,    relations   with 

France,  156  ;  early  colonial 
policy,  166  ;  later  colonial 
encouragement,  163,  168  ;  diplo- 
matic methods,  190.  252. 

Boer  War,  117-118,  215-217,  222- 
225.     See  also  South  Africa. 

Bokhara,  84,  87. 

Bombay,  British  settlement,  42. 

Botany  Bay  penal  settlement, 
69. 

Boxer  rising,  177,  273. 

Brandenbui'g,  46. 

Brazil,  Portuguese  settlement  in, 
16  ;  Dutch  conquest  of,  in  north, 
28  ;  development  of  trade,  93  ; 
Germans  in,  94,  195. 

Brazza,  Count  de,  166,  167. 

Britain,  Great,  Empire  of,  terri- 
torial acquisitions,  Victorian 
political  aim,  158-159. 

development      of       colonial 

governments,  107  ;  agreements 
and  treaties  with  France,  90, 
253  ;  relations  with  Germany, 
168-170,  195,  198,  199,  200,  223, 
259,  261,  264-268  ;  agreement 
( 1907)  with  Russia,  253,  260  ; 
friendly  relations  with  States, 
100,  102  ;  navy,  in  international 
pontics,  195,  197,  236,  237,  261  ; 
as  world-state,  201-233,  235  ; 
Triple  Entente,  261  ;   in  Africa, 


168,  171  ;  in  China,  177  ;  in 
Egypt,  206-215  ;  Japanese 
alliance,  177,  195  ;  Morocco, 
interest  in,  253-259 ;  Pacific 
annexations,  178  ;  in  Persia, 
180.     See  also  England. 

Britain  and  Great  War,  Lord 
Haldane's  mission,  265 ;  pre- 
war preparations,  264  ;  British 
neutrality,  demand  by  Germany, 
267  ;   draft  treaty,  1914,  266. 

British  Columbia,  108,  127. 

Buccaneer,  30. 

Bulgaria,  249. 

Buller,  Charles,  126. 

Burke,  Edmund,  58. 

Burmah,  108. 

Burton,  Sir  Richard,  161. 

Bussy,  Marquis  do,  51. 

Cabot,  George  and  John,  21. 

Cabral,  Pedro,  14. 

Calcutta,  first  traders  at,  52. 

California,  95. 

Cameron,  V.  L.,  161. 

Cameroons,  the,  chiefs  in,  English 
rule  desired,  161  ;  German 
treaty,  168  ;  German  cruelty 
'  in,  186. 

Canada,  explorers  in,  and  settlers, 
early,  8,  10  ;  early  French  pro- 
sperity, 31-33,  39  ;  taken  by 
English,  49  ;  cession  to  States 
advocated,  110  ;  rebellions  in, 
i      125  ;     self-government    of,    66, 

',    124-129. 

-^-—  Act  (1840),  126. 

— —  Dominion  of,  formation,  127. 

Canaries,  the,  55. 

Canning,  George,  100. 

Canterbury,  N.Z.,  113. 

Cape  Coast  Castle,  130. 

Colony,    taken    by    English, 

54,  119;  expansion,  108;  or- 
ganised emigration  to,  114; 
race  difficulties  in,  215 ; 
Rhodes's  success  in,  221.  See 
also  South  Africa. 

• of  Good  Hope,  Dutch  in,- 11, 

27,  215  ;   taken  by  England,  75. 

See  also  South  Africa. 

Carnatic,  the,  51,  52,  69. 

Carol,  King  (Rumania),  249. 

Carolina,  foundation  of,  42,  44. 

Carpini,  Joannes,  13. 

Carthage,  80,  162. 


INDEX 


293 


Cartier,  J.,  20. 

Casablanca  incident,  258. 

Caucasus,  the,  84,  86. 

Ceylon,  Dutch  in,  27  ;  taken  by 
English,  54. 

Chamberlain,  Joseph,  199,  231. 

Champlain,  de,  Samuel,  32. 

Chancellor,  Richard,  21. 

Charles  ii.  (England),  colonial 
policy,  41-46,  58. 

Charles  v.,  Emperor,  policy  with 
ancient  civilisations,  18,  81. 

ChUi,  93. 

China,  decline  of,  IGO  ;  Boxer 
rising,  177  ;  British  relations 
and  war  with,  90,  177  ;  French 
relations  and  war  with,  175, 
176 ;  Germans  in,  176,  195  ; 
Japanese  war  with,  175  ;  powers' 
intervention  against  Japan, 
176  ;  relatioiis  and  war  with 
Russia,  89,  157,  239. 

Clarendon,  Earl  of,  first,  41. 

Clive,  Robert,  51,  52. 

Cochin  China,  83,  175. 

Colbert,  Marquis  de  Croissy,  31, 
38,  40. 

Colonial  prefeience,  231. 

Colonies,  British,  conferences,  230 ; 
at  public  pageants,  229. 

Colonisation,  motives  of  great 
powers,  5-11  ;  by  buccaneering, 
21,  30,  49,  130;  criminal,  10,  11, 
69,  107  ;  doctrine  of  powers  in, 
error,  151  ;  emigration,  organ- 
ised, 113  ;  humanitarian  Eng- 
lish pohcy,  38-46,  109,  114- 
120;  exploring  adventures,  10; 
European  world-supremacy, 
143;  religious,  11,  32,  36,  42; 
Grerman  public  repudiation  of, 
188 ;  revolutionary  period,  54-77. 

Columbus,  Christopher,  8,  14,  17. 

Commerce.     See  Tra.de. 

Commonwealth,  the,  colonial  po- 
Ucy,  41,  42. 

Congo,  the,  Belgian  settlements, 
166,  167,  170  ;  French  and  Ger- 
mans on,  259  ;  Portuguese  on, 
167;  atrocities,  117,  183; 
Berlin  Conference,  170 ;  Brus- 
sels Conference,  166  ;  Stanley 
on,  167. 

Free  State,  182. 

Conquistadores,  the,  of  Spain,  10, 
17. 


Constantino,  King,  of  Greece,  250. 
Constantinople,  13,  247. 
Convicts,  as  colonists,  10,  11,  69, 
107. 
:  Cook,  Captain,  68,  177. 
Cornwallis,  Lord,  72,  121. 
Cortez,  Hernando,  17. 

■  Cromer,  Lord  (E.  Baring),  210. 
Cromwell,  Oliver,  colonial  policy, 

of,  41,  42. 
Crusaders,    influence    on,    in    in- 
j      vaded  countries,  8,  13. 
!  Cuba,  55,  178. 

■  Curayoa,  28. 

De  t.A  Salle,  Sieur,  39. 
Delaware,  foundation  of,  42. 
Delhi,  50. 
Democracy,    American,    the   first, 

64. 
Denmark,  5,  46,  189. 
Dernburg,  Herr,  187. 
Diaz,  Bartholomew,  14. 
Dilke,  Sir  Charles,  229. 
'  Dispatches,    American,-'    reading 

of,  colonial  policy,  48,  62. 
Disraeli,   Benjamin,  first    colonial 

pohcy,  1 10, 158  ;  change  in,  229 ; 

Suez  Canal,  208. 
Dogali,  battle,  172. 
Dominion  Act  (1867),  127. 
Drake,  Sir  Francis,  21,  22. 
Dupleix,  Fran9ois,  49,  51,  52. 
Diu-bars,  of  Delhi,  230. 
Durham,  Earl  of,  first,   123,   125, 

126. 
Dutch   Colonies,    etc.     See    under 

HoUand. 

East,  The,  early  trade  with,  6,  8, 
13,  21  ;  Portuguese,  15;  Rus- 
sian menace,  173. 

East  India  Co.,  Dutch,  25,  26,  34, 
English,  34,  42,  52,  69, 


71,  137. 


French,  39,  49. 


East  Indies,  25. 

Egvpt,  British  control  over,  164- 
165.  172,  201,  206-215  ;  Franco- 
British  agreement,  253  ; 
Napoleon,  165  ;  re-conquest  of 
Soudan,  172. 

Elgin,  Lord,  127. 

Elphinstone,  Moimtstuart,  121. 

Emigration,  106,  107;  organised 
113;      commercial.      6,      107; 


294 


THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 


1 


criminal,  source  of  imperialism, 
9,  69,  107  ;  political,  4,  9,  107  ; 
religious,  7. 

'  Empire,'  modern  meaning  of 
term,  1. 

England,  motives  of  expansion,  5  ; 
Elizabethan  adventurers,  10  ; 
colonial  government  svstem, 
early,  9,  33,  34,  38-46  ;  failure 
of,  47,  48  ;  colonial  supremacv, 
24,  34-53,  66  ;  colonial  conflict 
with  France,  46-53  ;  revolt 
against  Spanish  world  power, 
20 ;  navy,  22.    See  also  Britain. 

Enver  Bev,  248. 

Eritrea,  168,  172. 

Explorations,  great,  10, 14,  32, 161. 

Fashoda  Incident,  159,  173. 

Ferdinand,  King,  of  Bulgaria,  250. 

Finland,  85,  86.~' 

Florida,  94,  95. 

Formosa,  175. 

Fox,  Charles,  58. 

FraMauro,  13,  14. 

France,  supremacy  of,  in  Europe, 
38;  loss  of,  155;  colonisation,  5, 
8,  30 ;  system  of  governing,  33, 
38-46  ;  conflict  with  England, 
46-53,  158  ;  East  India  Com- 
pany, 31  ;  explorers,  161  ;  navy, 
261  ;  pre-war  treatment  by 
Germany,  252  ;  pre-war  pre- 
parations, 204  ;  Triple  Entente, 
261  ;  as  world-state,  181,  239  ; 
in  Africa,  80-84,  166,  172,  182  ; 
in  Asia,  83  ;  Canadian  settle- 
ment, 10,  31-33,  125  ;  in  China, 
90,  175  ;  in  Egypt,  164-166,  208, 
209;  in  India,  71,  73;  in 
Morocco,  253-259  ;  in  Tunis, 
163  ;   in  West  Indies,  30. 

Francis  i.  (France),  21. 

Franco-British  agreement  (1904), 
253,  257. 

Frederick  the  Great,  244. 

Free  Trade,  principle  of,  in  modern 
pontics,  153,  202,  203,  237. 

Froude,  J.  A.,  229. 

Gama,  Vasco  da,  14. 

Genghis  Khan,  empire  of,  13,  23. 

George    m.     (England),    Colonial 

policy,  57,  62. 
Germany,  as  world-state,  183-200. 

colonisation     policy,     5,     184 ; 


conception  of  civilisation,  188  ; 
crueltv  and  ruthless  statesman- 
ship, 'll7,  184,  185-188,  226, 
273  ;  doctrine  of  power,  162  ; 
emigration  to  States,  95  ;  Eng- 
land, relations  with,  168  170, 
195,  198,  199,  200,  223,  259,  261, 
264-268  ;  European  pohtics  do- 
minated by,  155  ;  foreign  trade 
policy,  mistaken,  149,  151  ; 
foreign  and  colonial  policv ; 
Africa,  162,  168;  the  Balkans, 
249-251;  Morocco,  253-259;  the 
Philippines,  103  ;  Pacific  Archi- 
pelago, 178;  Russia,  239;  South 
Africa,  194,  217,  223,  226; 
South  America,  94;  Turkey, 
173-174,  247-250;  great  war 
preparations  and  reasons  for, 
242-247,  259-268 ;  responsi- 
bihty  for,  269-290 ;  see  also 
Great  War  ;  militarism,  155  ; 
political  aims,  286,  287  ;  Berlin- 
Bagdad  scheme,  «ee  under 
Bagdad  ;  explorers,  161  ;  Navy 
Acts,  199,  200  ;  Triple  Alliance, 
163,  160  ;  Vandals  in  Africa,  81. 

Gibraltar,  government  of,  131,  132. 

Gladstone,  William  Ewart,  111. 

Goa,  15. 

Gold  Coast,  201. 

Goldie,  G.  Taubman,  107. 

Gordon,  General,  in  China,  90  ; 
in  Egypt,  209. 

Government,  different  theories  of, 

.   principles  at  stake  in  Great  War, 

.    269  ;     Australian,    129  ;     Cana- 

,    dian,  128  ;  Indian,  133  ;  United 

fc^  States,  128. 

Grahamstown,  114. 

Granville,  Earl,  first,  169. 

Great  Lakes,  8. 

Great  War,  the,  principles  at  stake, 
and  main  issues  of,  269-290 ; 
American  international  politics 
before,  180;  break-up  of  isolation 
poUey,  104;  disregard  of  warn- 
ings, 99  ;  Brilish  colonies  loyal, 
205,  225  ;  causes  of,  insidious 
German  policies,  151,  185-200; 
growth  of  German  militarism, 
154 ;  final  German  pretext,  263 ; 
imperial  rivalry,  144,  146 ; 
events  and  conditions  in  world 
states,  234-268 ;  Greece,  247, 
249,  250. 


INDEX 


295 


Grenville,  George,  colonial  policv, 

48,  57,  61,  62. 
Grej%  Sir  Edward  (Viscount),  265, 

267. 

Sir  George,  123. 

Griqualand,  East  and  West,  118. 
Guiana.  Dutch  in,  28. 

■ British,  1 30. 

French,   182. 

Guinea,  167,  168. 

Hague  Conferences,  199,  235. 

Haldane,  Lord,  265. 

Halhed,  Nathaniel,  120. 

Hastings,  Warren,  71,  120. 

Hawaii',  178. 

Hayti,  132. 

Henry  iv.  (France),  31. 

Henry  vn.  (England),  21. 

Herero  rebellion  and  massacre, 
186,  188,  205,  273. 

Hispaniola  (San  Domingo)  Span- 
ish settlers,  17  ;  French  posses- 
sion, 30  ;   Cromwell's  attack,  41. 

Hofmeyr,  L.,  221. 

Holland,  and  the  Dutch  Empire, 
colonisation,  early,  5,  10,  11,  25  ; 
colonial  supremacj'^  of,  24,  25- 
38  ;  colonial  dechne,  29,  46,  54, 
55,  75  ;  explorers,  68  ;  German 
aims  on  colonies,  196  ;  trade, 
free,  benefit  to,  203  ;  trade  com- 
panies, 25;  methods  of,  26,  27, 
28  ;  South  African  colonies,  75, 
114;  Spain  opposed  by,  20; 
trade  routes,  29  ;  trade  wars, 
40,  41,  42  ;  South  African  Wars, 
question  of  Dutch  in,  215-228  ; 
world  status,  189.  See  also 
Boers,  South  Africa. 

Honduras,  British,  130. 

Hong-Kong,  90,  131. 

Hudson,  river,  29. 

Hudson  Bay  Company,  42. 

Hudson's  Bay,  47. 

Huguenots,  the,  11. 

Humanitarianism,  political  prin- 
ciple, 114-120. 

Hungary,  135.     See  also  Austria. 

Huskisson,  William,  110. 

Hyderabad,  51,  52. 

Iberian  Monopoly  of  colonisa- 
tion, 13,  23.  See  also  Spain  and 
Portugal. 


Imperial  Federation  Society,  158, 
229. 

Imperialism,  deQnition  of,  1  ; 
influence  of  word,  2  ;  European, 
first  stage,  15  ;  Roman,  and 
European  compared,  3  ;  a 
nation's  motives.  4-12  ;  new 
aspect  (1878),  143;  modern 
brotherhood  ideal,  232  ;  leading 
to  Great  War,  144  ;  principle  of, 
to  siu-vive  Great  War,  279  ;  self- 
government  a  part  of,  q.v. 

India,  Empire  of,  establishment 
of  British  rule,  51,  52,  53,  69- 
75,  107;  civilisation,  early,  120; 
modern,  138-139  ;  fall  of  Mogul 
Empire,  50  ;  government,  133- 
141;  Supreme  Court.  120;  trade 
of,  early.  6,  13,  34  ;  Dutch 
settlements  in,  27  ;  French,  49, 
51  ;  German  trade,  150  ;  Portu- 
guese, 15,  16  ;  Russian  menace, 
73,  88. 

Indian  Act  (1833),  140. 

Indians  in  S.  Africa,  215. 

Industrialism,  first  steps  in,  79. 

International  African  Association, 
166. 

politics,  effect  of  colonial  self- 
government,  64  ;  American  pro- 
nouncement on  Venezuela,  179  ; 
Doctrine  of  Power,  151  ;  free 
trade  ideal,  150  ;  Monroe  doc- 
trine, 55  ;  Navigation  Act,  40, 
41,  47  ;  world-states,  new  aim 
in,  153. 

Isabella  of  Castille,  Queen,  8. 

Italy,  development  of,  157  :  colon- 
isation, 5  ;  African  Colonies, 
163,  168,  172,  250  ;  Great  War, 
self-interest  in,  242  ;  mediaeval 
trade  with  the  East,  13,  15 ; 
militarism,  155  ;  action  in 
Morocco,  58  ;  trade,  free,  bene- 
ficial, 203  ;  Triple  Alliance,  163, 
166,  250  ;    as  world-state,  183. 

Jamaica,  41. 

Jameson  Raid,  194,  223. 

Japan,  development  of,  91,  92, 
175  ;  Russian  menace  in  China, 
89,  157  ;  Chinese  war  with,  175  ; 
Russian  war,  177,  239  ;  alliance 
with  Britain,  177,  195  ;  self- 
interest  in  Great  War,  242, 

Java,  26,  53,  54,  55. 


296 


THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 


Jefferson,  Thomas,  100. 
Johannesburg,  218. 
Jones,  Sir  WilHam,  120. 

Kaffirs,  the,  immigrant  in  S. 
Africa,  119. 

Kaffraria,  118. 

Kanakas,  the  treatment  of,  117. 

Kars,  86. 

Khair-ed-din  Barbarossa,  81. 

Khalifa,  the,  173. 

Khartoum,  173,  207. 

Khiva,  84,  87. 

Khokand,  87. 

Kiao-ehau,  annexation  of  signifi- 
cance in  international  politics, 
176,  191  ;   German  rule  in,  273. 

Kiel  Canal,  widening,  263. 

Kipling,  Rudyard,  230. 

Kirghiz  desert,  87. 

Kitchener,  Horatio  (Viscount), 
and  Fashoda  incident,  173  ;  in 
the  Soudan,  212. 

Korea,  175. 

Kruger,  President,  friendship  with 
Germany,  194  ;  anti-British 
policy,  217,  218,  219;  Dutch 
supremacy,  aim  of,  221. 

Land-systems,  Indian,  121  ; 
Wakefield's  poUcy,  113. 

Law,  influence  on  imperialism,  3  ; 
Peron  on,  44 ;  reign  of.  in 
Lidia,  74,  136,  141;  instead  of 
anarchy,  North  Africa,  82  ;  in 
Egypt,  214  ;  modem  liberty 
result  of,  289. 

Law,  John,  46. 

Leopold  u.  (Belgiimi),  Congo 
settlements,  166,  167,  170  ;  con- 
stitution of  Congo  Free  State, 
182;  atrocities,  183. 

Liao-Tang  Peninsula,  176;  Russian 
annexation,  176. 

Liberty  and  freedom,  world  ideal, 
65  ;  after  French  Revolution, 
67  ;  American,  96  ;  aim  of 
Monroe  Doctrine,  101,  102  ; 
British  imperial  aim,  Russian 
ideal,  277  ;  true,  in  self-govern- 
ing imperialism,  290. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  96. 

Livingstone,  David,  161,  160,  216. 

Locke,  John,  colonial  policy,  41, 
44. 

London,  Conference  of  (1912),  250. 


Louis  XIV.  (France),  38,  47,  81. 
Liideritz,  Herr,  168. 

MAgAo,  17. 

Mackenzie.  William,  125. 

Maclean,  Sir  Harry,  258. 

Madagascar,  39,  167,  168. 

Magellan,  Ferdinand,  14. 

Mahdi,  the,  209,  210,  211,  212. 

Mahomedan  religion,  powers 
under,  not  influenced  by  Cru- 
sades, 13,  87  ;  first  impact  of 
Western  civilisation,  88  ;  Em- 
peror William  as  patron  of,  249, 
257  ;  influence  on  world  politics, 
in  North  Africa,  81  ;  in  Russian 
Empire,  87  ;  world-states,  in- 
roads on  power  of,  88. 

Malirattas,  the,  50,  73. 

Majuba,  battle,  118,  217. 

Malay  Archipelago,  196. 

Malta,  government  of,  131. 

Malthus,  T.  M.,  110. 

Manchuria,  176,  239. 

Manitoba,  108. 

Maps,  mediaeval,  13,  14. 

Marchand,  Major,  173. 

Marquesas  Islands,  83,  178. 

Marquette,  P6re,  39. 

Maryland,  36,  37. 

Mashonaland,  222. 

Matabiii,  the,  119. 

Matabililand,  222. 

Mauritius,  27,  130. 

Mehemet  Ali,  207. 

Mexico,  17,  18,  95. 

Micronesia,  178,  179. 

Militarism,  growth  of,  154;  final 
stage,  in  Germany,  262. 

Missionaries,  influence  on  coloni- 
sation, 8,  9,  32,  115  ;  German 
repudiation  of,  188. 

Mississippi,  river,  8. 

Mitte.l-Europa,  policy,  246. 

Mogul  Empire,  fall  of.  50,  73. 

Mohawk,  the,  river,  29. 

Monroe,  President,  55,  100. 

' doctrine,'     55,     93,     101, 

103, 195;  Olney's  interpretation, 
179. 

Moors,  the,  8. 

Moravians,  the,  11. 

Morocco,  geograpliical  position, 
80  ;  anarchy  in,  82  ;  settlement 
of,  173,  253-259  ;  Franco- 
British  agreement,  173,  253. 


INDEX 


297 


Mozambique,  161. 

Munro,  Sir  Thomas,  133,  136. 


Nachtigal,  De.,  168. 

Napoleon  Bonaparte,  cause  of  in- 
dependence of  Central  and 
South  America,  55  ;  in  Egypt, 
73  ;  effect  of  wars,  75  ;  Louisi- 
ana ceded  to  States,  94. 

Naples,  100. 

Natal,  as  native  reserve,  118  ; 
British,  108,  119;  race  diffi- 
culties, 215. 

National  African  Company,  167. 

Nationalism,  motive  for  im- 
perialism, 5  ;  result  of  British 
colonial  system,  232. 

Navigation  Acts,  40,  43,  47. 

New  Amsterdam,  29. 

Brunswick,  67,  128. 

Caledonia,  84,  178. 

England,  Puritans  in,  11,  35  ; 

self-government,  35,  37  ;  atti- 
tude towards  English  rule,  45  ; 
smuggling  trade,  47. 

Newfoimdland,  47,  66. 

New  Guinea,  178. 

Jersey,  42. 

Netherlands,  29,  42. 

Orleans,  39. 

York,  foundation  of,  29,  42. 

Zealand,  Dutch  in,  28  ;  dis- 
covery of,  68  ;  British  annexa- 
tion, 108  ;  organised  settle- 
ments, 113  ;  self-government, 
130. 

Niger,  the,  district  of,  166,  167, 
170. 

Nigeria,  171,  201. 

Nile,  the,  and  Soudan  campaign, 
211-212. 

North,  Lord,  colonial  policy,  57. 

North  and  South  War,  96. 

Norway,  shipping  industry,  149. 

Nova  Scotia  (Acadia),  31,  66, 
127. 

Nyasaland,  201. 

Ontahio,  67,  68,  125. 
Orange  (Albany),  29. 

Free   State,    108,    117,    195, 

216. 
Oregon,  95. 

Orellana,  Francisco  de,  17. 
Otago,  113. 


Pacific  Archipelaooks  and  larger 

islands,  annexation  in,  160,  177, 

178. 
'  Palatines,'  persecuted,  11. 
Pan-German  League,  195,  196. 
Panther,  the,  258. 
Papineau,  Louis,  125. 
Pashitch,  Nikolas,  250. 
Peace,    ideal   of,    universal,    235  ; 

Chamberlain's       policy,       199  ; 

Emperor    Wilhelm's    assertion, 

191  ;    English  aims,   236,   237  ; 

Triple    Entente,    aim    of,    261  ; 

World  ideal,  after  Great  War, 

274-275. 
Peace    Conferences,    Hague,    199, 

235. 
Peace',  League  of  (1815),  78,  99. 
Peel,  Sir  Robert,  111. 
Pegu,  108. 
Pekin,  90. 
Penn,  William,  44. 
Pennsylvania,  42,  44. 
Pequena  Angra,  117. 
Perry,  Commodore,  91. 
Persia,  Russian  relationj?  with,  84, 

87,  180  ;  in  nineteenth  century, 

174  ;  Anglo-Russian  agreement, 

260. 
Peru,  17,  18. 
Pescadores  Islands,  175. 
Peters,  Karl,  169. 
Phihp  IT.  (Spain),  17,  20,  81. 
Philippine   Islands,  the,   55,    103, 

178,  179,  191. 
Piedmont  revolt,  100. 
Piracy,  and  growth  of  empire,  21, 

28,  30. 
Pitt,  William,  Earl  of  Chatham, 

49,  58. 
Pizarro,  Francisco,  17,  187. 
Plassey,  battle,  52,  70. 
Poland,  84,  85. 
Politics,     British,     characteristics 

of,    9,    131  ;    American,    95-96  ; 

future,  philosophy  and  thought, 

in  aims  of,  146  ;    international, 

modern,  imperial,  v.  RealpolUik, 

286-290  ;  Monroe  Doctrine,  q.v. 
Polo,  Marco,  13. 
Port  Arthur,  176. 

Elizabeth,  114. 

Porto  Rico,  55,  179. 

Portugal,  colonisation  from,  5,  8, 

10 ;      monopoly     with     Spain, 

mediaeval,     13-22  ;      explorers. 


298 


THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 


14 ;  modern  colonies,  17  ; 
modern  revival,  159  ;  decline  of 
colonial  power,  16,  55,  20,  28, 
29,  46-53  ;  claims  on  Congo,  167 ; 
relations  with  Germany,  194. 

Preference,  Imperial,  43  ;  colonial, 
231. 

Prester,  John,  8. 

Prince  Edward  Island,  128. 

Protection,  fiscal,  in  inter- 
national politics,  153  ;  menace 
to  British  colonies,  159  ;  motive 
for  British  annexations,  202. 

Privy  Council,  Charles  n.'s 
committee  for  trade  and  plan- 
tations, 41. 

Prussia,  pro-war  history  of  force, 
243.  See  also  Germany  and 
Militarism. 

Puritans  as  colonists,  11,  35. 

Putumayo,  atrocities,  117. 

Quebec,  French  settlement,  31  ; 
taken  by  English,  49  ;  self- 
government,  68  ;  French  revolt 
in,  125. 

Act  of  1774,  66. 

Race,  problem  of,  in  imperial 
politics,  67,  76 ;  Austro-Hun- 
garian,  135  ;  Canadian,  125  ; 
Indian,  134 ;  South  African, 
118,  119,  216,  226. 

Rand,  the,  218. 

Red-River  Settlement,  108. 

Religion  as  political  influence,  7. 
See  also  missionaries. 

Responsible  government,  meaning 
of  term,  59,  63  ;  self-govern- 
ment, q.v. 

Revolutions,  period  of,  54-77  ; 
Japanese,  91 ;  Central  and  South 
American,  93  ;  War  of  Indepen- 
dence, modern  estimation  of,  98; 
South  Africanwars,  216, 223-225. 

Rhodes,  Cecil,  199,  220,  221. 

Rhodesia,  171,  222. 

Ricardo,  David,  110. 

Richelieu,  Cardinal,  31. 

Rolii-bach,  Paul,  266. 

Rubruquis,  William  of,  13. 

Rimiania,  247,  249. 

Rupert,  Prince,  41. 

Russell,  Lord  John,  123. 

Russia,  development  of,  84-89  ; 
238-239;     colonisation,    5,    22, 


1 57  ;  geographical  barriers  of, 
84  ;  Asiatic  railway,  176  ;  re- 
actionary periods,  84  ;  re\'olu- 
tion  after  Japanese  war,  239  ; 
Triple  Entente,  261  ;  war  pre- 
parations, 261,  264  ;  as  world 
state,  238  ;  relations  with 
Britain,  253,  257,  260  ;  annexa- 
tions in  China,  157,  176  ;  defeat 
of,  effect  on  German  policy,  176, 
257  ;  approach  to  India,  107, 
157  ;  relations  with  Japan,  89, 
176,  399  ;  relations  with  Persia  ; 
180,  260. 

Russo-British  agreement  (1907), 
253,  260. 

Japanese     War,     177,     239, 

257. 

Sahaka,  the,  80. 

St.  Helena,  131. 

St.  Lawrence,  8,  21,  125. 

Sakhalin,  89. 

Salonika,  247. 

Salzburgers,  the,  as  settlers,   11. 

Samarkand,  87. 

Samoa,  178. 

San  Domingo,  30.  See  aUo  His- 
paniola. 

Scandinavia,  5,  203. 

Schleitwein,  Herr,  188. 

Schoner's  map,  14. 

Seas,  freedom  of  the,  22. 

Seeley,  Sir  John,  229. 

Self-government,  influence  on  im- 
perialism, 4  ;  earliest  colonial, 
34,  36,  44  ;  colonial  policy  of 
Great  Britain,  109-141  ;  Ame- 
rican and  War  of  Indepen- 
dence, 56,  58-60  ;  Australian, 
129 ;  Canadian,  124-129  ;  in 
Egypt,  not  possible,  214;  in 
Hayti,  failure,  132  ;  Indian, 
difficulties,  133,  137  ;  South 
African.  119,  131,  224. 

Senegal,  83,  166. 

Serbia,  247,  251,  263. 

Seven  Years'  War,  49,  52. 

Shaftesbury,  Earl  of,  first,  41. 

Shanghai,  91. 

Siberia,  22,  23,  84. 

Sierra  Leone,  130,  201. 

Singapore,  131. 

Siraj-udduala,  Nawab,  52. 

Slave  trade,  abolition  of,  115  ; 
Berlin     and     Brussels     Confer- 


INDEX 


299 


ences  on,  171  ;  German's  ignor- 
ing of,  187 ;  labour  trouble  fol- 
lowing, 204:. 

Smith,  Adam,  110,  Ill- 
Smuts,  General,  227. 

Somaliland,  171,  172,  183,  201. 

Soto,  de,  Hernando,  17. 

Soudan,  the,  lost  to  Egypt,  172  ; 
regained  by  Kitchener,  173  ; 
French  in,  165  ;  British  rule, 
206  ;  Mahdism  in,  horrors  of, 
211. 

South  Africa,  British  in,  108,  114, 
171,  194,  200,  215-228;  dia- 
monds and  gold,  effect  on 
politics,  218,  219  ;  Dutch,  27, 
215-228  ;  Germans  in,  168,  194, 
200 ;  religious  refugees,  1 1  j 
Rhodes's  part  in  settlement  of, 
220 ;  railway  schemes,  222  : 
self-government,  119,  130,  225- 
slavery,  abolition,  115;  wars, 
Zulu,  Matabele,  Boer,  215-228. 

South  Sea  Bubble,  46. 

Spain  and  Portugal,  monopoly  of 
colonial  expansion,  13-22,  24 ; 
colonisation,  early,  5-10 ;  de- 
cline of  colonial  supremacy, 
21-23,  28,  46,  55  ;  democracy 
of  1820,  100  ;  modern  revival, 
158 ;  in  Florida,  94,  95  ;  in- 
terest in  Morocco,  255,  256 ; 
war  with  States  and  end  of 
Empire,  178. 

Spanish-American  war,  178. 

Speke,  J.  H.,  161. 

Spice  Islands,  16,  26,  53. 

Stamp  Act,  61. 

Stanley,  Sir  H.  M.,  161,  166. 

Straits  Settlements,  131. 

Suez  Canal,  207,  208. 

Swan  River  Settlement,  114. 

Sweden,  5,  203. 

Switzerland,  34,  149. 

Tahiti,  83. 
Taiping  rebellion,  90. 
Tangier,  256. 

Tea  Duties  and  American  War,  61. 
Tenasserim,  108. 
Texas,  95. 
Tibet.  260. 
Togoland,   168,   184. 
Tonquin,  Province,  175,  176. 
Tortuga,    French    buccaneers    in, 
30. 


Trade,  mediaeval,  6,  13,  15  ;  free 
trade,  first  stages  of,  110,  149  ; 
motive  for  annexation,  6,  202  ; 
colonial  preference,  231  ;  im- 
perial monopoly,  40. 

Transvaal,  108,  118,  195,  216. 

Treitschtke,  H.  von,  151,  197,  198, 
286. 

Triple  Alliance,  Italy  included  in, 
163,  166  ;  Italy's  independent 
actions,  250,  258  ;   in  1914,  266. 

Entente,  261. 

Tripoh,  173,  250. 

Trotha,  General  von,  186. 

Tunis,  80,  82,  157. 

Turgot,  Baron  de  I'Aulne,  54. 

'  Turk,  The  Young,'  movement, 
248. 

Turkestan,  84. 

Turkey,  Empire  of,  248-249 ; 
downfall,  result  of  Great  War, 
250,  251  ;  relations  with  Egypt, 
84,  86,  164,  207,  211;  growth 
of  German  influence,  196,  246, 
247,  250. 

Uganda,  201. 

'  Uitlanders,'  South  African,  219, 
222,  223. 

United  Provinces,  States-General 
of,  25  ;  early  trade,  25,  34.  See 
also  Holland. 

States  of  America,  founda- 
tion of,  42,  55  ;  civil  war.  North 
and  South,  96  ;  imperialism, 
and  colonial  expansion,  94,  95, 
158,  178-180,  241-243  ;  isolation 
policy,  traditional,  96-103,  241  ; 
non-intervention  policy,  Monroe 
Doctrine,  q.v.  ;  relations  with 
Japan,  91;  with  Germany,  195  ; 
British  free  trade,  203  ;  as  world 
state  before  the  war,  240.  See- 
also  North  America. 

Utrecht,  Peace  of,  47. 

Vandals,  the,  81. 

Venezuela,  179. 

Venizelos,  E.,  250. 

Verazzano,  20. 

Vespucci,  Amerigo,  14. 

Vienna,  Treaty  of,  75,  81. 

Virginia,    early    settlers,     10,    34, 

35. 
Vladivostock,  89. 


300 


THE  EXPANSION  OF  EUROPE 


Wakefield,  E.  G.,  113,  123,  126. 

War,  the.     See  under  Great  War. 

Washington,  95. 

Wei-hai-Wei,  177. 

Wellesley,  Marquess  of,  33. 

West  Indies,  21  ;  loss  of  slave 
labour  in,  115  ;  Dutch  in,  25, 
28  ;  English  in,  28.  37,  44,  130  ; 
French,  30,  39,  47,  49  ;  Spanish, 
17,  28. 

West  India  Co.,  Dutch,  25,  28. 

Whigs,  the  colonial  policy,  42,  46, 
47,  48,  62  ;  erroneous  views, 
57. 

William  u.  (Germany),  doctrine 
of  power,  157  ;  as  political 
leader,  190,  191  ;  Kriiger  tele- 
gram, 194,  200,  223  ;    patron  of 


Mahomedanism,  249  ;  interven- 
tion in  politics  of  Morocco,  256  ; 
peace  party,  262  ;  allocation  to 
soldiers  advising  ferocitj%  273  ; 

Winthrop,  John,  36. 

World-power,  origin  of  term,  191. 

World-States,  emergence  of,  143- 
400  ;  contrast  with  nation- 
state,  153  ;  Germany's  aim, 
after  Bismarck,  156  ;  review  of, 
181. 

YANG-TSE-KIA2Sra,   91. 

Yumian,  176. 

Zaistzibap.,  161,  169. 
Zulus,  the,  119. 
Zulu  War,  118,  216. 


Printefl  by  T.  and  A.  Constable,  Printers  to  His  Majesty 
at  the  Edinburgh  University  Press 


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